Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08THEHAGUE825
2008-10-02 09:17:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

CWC: SCENE-SETTER FOR OPCW EXECUTIVE COUNCIL 54TH

Tags:  PARM PREL CWC 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHTC #0825/01 2760917
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O 020917Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2030
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAC PRIORITY
UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000825 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR,
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP>
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (ROBERTS AND DENYER)
NSC FOR FLY
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CWC: SCENE-SETTER FOR OPCW EXECUTIVE COUNCIL 54TH
SESSION, OCTOBER 14-17, 2008

REF: A. THE HAGUE 569

B. THE HAGUE 755

C. THE HAGUE 799

D. THE HAGUE 776

This is CWC-044-08

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000825

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR,
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP>
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (ROBERTS AND DENYER)
NSC FOR FLY
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CWC: SCENE-SETTER FOR OPCW EXECUTIVE COUNCIL 54TH
SESSION, OCTOBER 14-17, 2008

REF: A. THE HAGUE 569

B. THE HAGUE 755

C. THE HAGUE 799

D. THE HAGUE 776

This is CWC-044-08


1. (U) This is an action request -- see paragraphs 18, 21
and 27.

--------------
SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
--------------


2. (SBU) After the success of the last Executive Council
(EC) session (ref A),delegations' hopes are high that this
EC will continue the refreshingly productive trend. The
budget is the biggest item on the agenda, again with a
positive model from last year when, for the first time in
many years and only the second time in the OPCW's history,
the budget was passed by EC-50 before the Conference of
States Parties (CSP). This year's draft budget is nearly a
carbon copy of last year's budget, and consultations had
been free of fireworks until discussions on the Office of
Special Projects (OSP) on October 1. The biggest issue is
the proposed increase in the number of Other Chemical
Production Facility (OCPF) inspections, with China and some
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries opposing the increase,
while Western Group nations are in favor. Iran, as always,
and South Africa, to a lesser extent, are the wild cards in
negotiations and could hold up agreement on the budget to
bargain for something else.


3. (SBU) The report from the EC representatives' visit to
the Russian destruction facility at Shchuchye will be
distributed late, but there seems to be much less
controversy surrounding this visit, and the draft report,
than the first visit to the Anniston destruction facility
in the U.S. in October 2007. The Shchuchye verification
plan and facility agreement are on the agenda; both should
be approved unless another delegation takes issue with
them. Libya's verification plan and facility agreement for
the initial stage of loading chemical weapons for transfer
at the Rabta facility will also be on the agenda, but less
likely to provoke questions than the passing of the
deadline (July 2008) for the conversion of its production
facility.


4. (SBU) The first U.S. facility agreement for a Schedule 1
industrial site may face questioning due to being the first

of its kind. Other industrial issues that may generate
debate are the enhancement of OCPF declarations and
biomedical sampling.


5. (SBU) The long list of routine reports to the Council on
administrative and financial issues should go through
without controversy, but some may invite deferral due to
late distribution.


6. (U) More detailed review of specific agenda items
follows.

--------------
DESTRUCTION DOCUMENTS
--------------


7. (U) On CW destruction related documents, the Russian
Federation's facility agreement and verification plan for
Shchuchye will be considered, as will Libya's facility
agreement and verification plan for the reloading of their
CW stockpile into new containers prior to movement to the
future destruction facility at Rabta (the first phase of
Libya's CW destruction operations). Del has heard no
comments on either of the two sets of documents, with the
exception of an inquiry from the UK delegation, which is
Qexception of an inquiry from the UK delegation, which is
prepared to accept the Shchuchye documents but wanted to
know whether the U.S. had any concerns. Del will canvas
other delegations to learn if they have any concerns.



8. (SBU) Related to this is the fact that Libya has now
passed its deadline for the conversion of its former CW
production facility at Rabta. In previous discussions,
Legal Adviser Santiago Onate noted that the deadline had
not technically been passed, although Libya had clearly
indicated it would be unable to complete conversion by July

2008. However, the deadline now has passed, and UK
colleagues in particular have shared their concerns that
delegations wishing to cause trouble could now focus on
this. Del has also recently learned that London is
inclined to ask for a CSP decision that establishes a new
deadline for the Libyans. This is not in keeping with the
precedent set by Russian and Indian failure to meet
conversion deadlines, and Del will continue to work with
the UK and inform Washington of developments in their
position. The German delegation also noted its view
recently that the conversion deadline should not be allowed
to pass without some expression of concern.


9. (SBU) It is unclear at this time whether Libya intends
to present a new national paper before EC-54. However, the
presentation of a paper prior to EC-55 (in February 2009)
may be particularly important, given the Technical
Secretariat's reluctance to provide a clear justification
for the retention of the protective berm at Rabta when they
change the designation of the sandbag wall from specialized
to standard. Del will also continue to work with the
Technical Secretariat (TS),the UK and Italy to clarify
what appears to be lingering procedural confusion as to how
to handle the retention of the berm; however, Del does not
expect this to be raised during EC-54 unless Libya refers
to the issue during its presentation at the pre-EC
destruction informals.

--------------
90-DAY PROGRESS REPORTS
--------------


10. (SBU) Del also expects the usual Iranian posturing on
the U.S. 90-day update on destruction activities, during
which Iran likely will refer to "legal difficulties" Tehran
has with the fact that the start-up dates of the
destruction facilities at Pueblo and Blue Grass have not
been provided. Although this was previously limited to
consideration of the reports during the EC itself, it has
recently crept into the question and answer period of the
pre-EC destruction informals as well. The Iranian
delegation has gone as far as to provide a "friendly"
warning to the Del that this will be a problem at the
upcoming EC. Del recommends that the U.S. insist upon
equal procedural treatment of all 90-day reports, i.e. not
giving in to Iranian requests to "receive" the U.S. report
and "note" the others.

--------------
SHCHUCHYE VISIT REPORT
--------------


11. (U) Also under the subitem on progress made in meeting
revised destruction deadlines, Del expects the report of
the EC visit to Shchuchye to be listed. The report was
agreed on September 19 by the EC representatives who
visited Shchuchye, after only two meetings and minimal
discussion, largely thanks to balanced and thoughtful
drafting by Senior Chemical Demilitarization Officer
Gabriela Coman-Enescu. The report has been provided to
QGabriela Coman-Enescu. The report has been provided to
Russia; Del understands the Russian delegation will provide
comments if necessary before EC-54. However, given the
fact that this will result in distribution to States
Parties just before the EC, full consideration is likely to
be deferred to EC-55. Although it is possible that EC
Chair Amb. Oksana Tomova (Slovakia) may schedule an initial
meeting for interested delegations to discuss the report
during the EC, it seems more likely she may only introduce
the report and hold consultations after EC-54.

--------------

ARTICLE VII: NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION
--------------


12. (U) The 325-page annual report on Article VII
implementation was released on September 29, and Article
VII facilitator Said Moussi (Algeria) has scheduled a
consultation on October 7 to consider the report and
continue the previous consultation's discussion on whether
to pursue a decision on Article VII at the CSP (ref B).
WEOG delegations have expressed the desirability of report
language on Article VII to balance any potential action on
Articles X and XI, but did not feel a decision was
necessary.

--------------
ARTICLE X: ASSISTANCE AND PROTECTION
--------------


13. (SBU) Del expects more clarity on possible Article X
developments following the next round of consultations,
scheduled for October 7. Consultations on September 18
were informative, but far from conclusive (ref C). The
general assessment among delegations seems to be that Iran
will not push for a decision on its victims network
proposal, but both Iran and new facilitator Victor
Smirnovsky (Russia) have recalled CSP-12 report language,
which called for "intensive deliberations" and a report
(and recommendations as appropriate) to CSP-13. The Czech
delegation has confirmed that the non-paper it recently
circulated is an attempt to show that some work has been
done since CSP-12 and to give delegations something other
than the Iranian proposal to work with. The facilitator
has told Delrep he will work on report language for the EC,
and possibly more extensive language for the CSP that
demonstrates the "intensive" work that is occurring, in
fulfillment of CSP-12 and Review Conference language. The
Iranian delegation may also wait until close to or during
CSP-13 to float a last-minute proposal, as they did last
year in an attempt to circumvent procedure.

-------------- --------------
ARTICLE XI: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES
-------------- --------------


14. (SBU) The facilitation on Article XI has moved slowly
toward agreement on a workshop to develop concrete
implementation measures. Del sees this as the most
probable outcome for the EC and CSP. Iran's recent
statement on a "dual track" (without further details on the
second track) could hijack the consensus on a workshop. As
with Article X, a report is due to the CSP.

--------------
OPTIMIZATION
--------------


15. (U) On optimization, Del understands that the
Secretariat will issue its annual report on the
implementation of optimization measures at CW destruction
facilities. Policy Review Branch Head Per Runn noted that
one of the conclusions delegations should draw from this
year's report is the fact that no further reductions in
inspector team size can be made without compromising
verification.

--------------
OCPF DECLARATIONS
--------------


16. (SBU) During the Industry Cluster meeting on September
29, the DG explained that this item had been put on the
agenda to allow delegations to discuss the two June papers
on enhancing OCPF declarations (EC-53/DG.11 and EC-53/S/5).
Qon enhancing OCPF declarations (EC-53/DG.11 and EC-53/S/5).
He admitted that delegations are unlikely to reach a
decision on the papers but suggested that the EC would
provide an additional forum in which to express views on
enhancing declarations.


17. (U) In the Bureau, EC Chair Tomova, the DG and Amb.
Burkart (Germany) resisted Iranian efforts to remove this
item from the agenda. Iran will likely push to remove the
agenda item again during the EC Chair's informal
consultations on October 6 and possibly at the beginning of
the EC when the agenda is adopted.


18. (U) Del requests further guidance on the U.S. position
on the two OCPF papers in order to fully engage in
discussions on both proposals.

--------------
BIOMEDICAL SAMPLING
--------------


19. (U) The TS note on the OPCW's capability to analyze
biomedical samples is also on the EC agenda. The paper
outlines plans for a "capability building" exercise in
which laboratories that have some expertise in this field
will be asked to provide samples to laboratories wishing to
gain experience. As the OPCW would need to provide some
oversight and guidance, there are costs associated with
acquiring additional equipment and capabilities. Del
expects other delegations may be inclined to defer
consideration. As this relates directly to the OPCW's
capability to conduct an investigation of alleged use, Iran
may take a particular interest in developing capacity in
this area.


20. (U) Verification Director Horst Reeps discussed
biomedical sampling briefly during budget consultations
(ref D). He said that faced with either developing its
internal capability at great expense or building up a
network of qualified laboratories (similar to the
designated laboratories),the TS had opted for the latter,
more cost-effective option. The draft 2009 budget includes
EUR 98,000 for an external expert to advise on building up
this network.


21. (U) Del requests guidance as to whether Washington
agrees with the general concept and projected costs.

--------------
OPCW CENTRAL ANALYTICAL DATABASE
--------------


22. (SBU) Del has also received and forwarded to Washington
a draft paper from the TS on the addition of analytical
data for non-scheduled chemicals in the OPCW Central
Analytical Database (OCAD). The TS hopes to circulate this
note prior to EC-54, and OPCW Laboratory Head Gary Mallard
has specifically requested U.S. feedback prior to
circulation, if possible. From conversations with the UK
delegation and Mallard, Del understands London is very
concerned that the approach outlined in the note closes the
door on future additions to the OCAD and is still
considering its position. Based on initial reactions from
Washington, Del has informed Mallard that the U.S. has
serious reservations about the proposed approach and
recommends the TS delay circulation.

--------------
DRAFT PROGRAM AND BUDGET
--------------


23. (U) The budget is the most critical item on the agenda,
with three main areas to be addressed after a month of
consultations: the increase in OCPF inspections, the Office
of Special Projects (OSP) and a number of key performance
indicators (KPIs) that are not measurable and do not meet
results-based budgeting standards.


24. (SUB) This year's draft budget is nearly a carbon copy
Q24. (SUB) This year's draft budget is nearly a carbon copy
of last year's budget, and the consultations were free of
fireworks until October 1 when several NAM states led by
India (South Africa, Iran and Cuba) took aim at the OSP,
particularly its counter-terrorism and non-proliferation
activities. An additional meeting on this issue has been

scheduled for October 6. Aside from the unknown NAM
intentions on OSP, the thorniest issue will be the proposed
increase in the number of Other Chemical Production
Facility (OCPF) inspections, with China and some Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM) countries opposing the increase,
while Western Group nations are in favor.


25. (U) Iran, as always, and South Africa, to a lesser
extent, are the wild cards in negotiations. Iran could, as
it has in the past, hold up agreement on the budget to
bargain for something else; South Africa already has hinted
that it might follow this example. Neither the Iranian nor
South African delegations have previewed what they want;
Del's best guess for Iran is that it might be their
longstanding proposal for an Article X victims' network.
NAM countries have been disorgnized of late and hiding
behind South Africa's ative engagement but have scheduled
meetings every day in the week before the EC. The NAM
could block the budget to eliminate the additional OCPF
inspections or to press for another favored item, such as
Article XI. Del believes NAM holdouts to be less likely
than Iranian mischief, but both are possible, pushing
passage of the budget to a special EC before or during the
CSP.

--------------
OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL MATTERS
--------------


26. (U) Transfer agreement with the UN Pension Fund: This
draft agreement would allow contributors to the UN Pension
Fund to transfer their contributions from the OPCW's
Provident Fund back into the UN Pension Fund when re-
joining the UN System after working at the TS. Originally
considered at EC-45 and deferred pending advice from the
Advisory Body on Administrative and Financial matters
(ABAF),the most-recent ABAF meeting in September concluded
that the agreement was ready for EC consideration.


27. (U) Del requests guidance on whether it may join
consensus in recommending approval of the agreement by the
CSP.

-------------- --------------
OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT AND EXTERNAL AUDITOR
-------------- --------------


28. (U) After drawn-out consultations on the 2007 OIO
report following its deferral at EC-53 (ref A),delegations
are expected to note the report without any objections.


29. (U) After two consultations in September on the
External Auditor's Report and the TS's responses to it,
delegations are expected to note both reports without any
objections.

--------------
HOST COUNTRY COMMITTEE
--------------


30. (SBU) The Host Country Committee will meet on October 8
to discuss further developments in finalizing an agreement
to govern access to the OPCW's commissary. The Dutch
delegation and the TS have informed the Del that the
proposed agreement is pending approval from the Dutch
Finance Ministry and that the agreement might be ready to
be concluded by EC-54. The U.S. Delegation has held up the
report on the Host Country Committee's activities pending
the meeting of the Committee. Del recommends that the U.S.
not/not request deferral of the late report.
Qnot/not request deferral of the late report.


31. (U) Javits sends.
Culbertson