CWC: WRAP-UP FOR PREPARATORY MEETINGS AND THE

S E C R E T THE HAGUE 000569

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2018
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CWC: WRAP-UP FOR PREPARATORY MEETINGS AND THE
OPCW EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SESSION, JUNE 24-27, 2008 (EC-53)

REF: STATE 66898

Classified By: Ambassador Eric M. Javits for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

This is CWC-31-08

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (SBU) Under the new leadership of Executive
Council Chairperson, Ambassador Oksana Tomova
(Slovakia),Executive Council 53 was both efficient
and productive. A notable accomplishment was the
approval all together of the U.S. and Russian
facility agreements, verification plans and
amendments for Newport, Pine Bluff, Maradykovsky, and
Leonidovka, some of which had been deferred for a
full year. The EC also decided on guidelines on
transfer discrepancies, after consultations
throughout the week that concluded late on June 26.
Routine reports that had been deferred by past
sessions of the Council and several new reports were
mostly noted, with the important exception of the
Scientific Advisory Board Report which Iran, once
again, insisted on deferring. The Director-General
(DG) introduced the Draft Program of Work and Budget
for 2009 and papers on the Other Chemical Production
Facilities (OCPFs) for further consultation and
discussion.


2. (U) This cable reports on the visit of ISN DAS
Staley on June 26-27, as well as the Ambassador's
meeting with the new EC Chairperson, and
consultations among delegations on Articles X and XI
on June 20. U.S. Del's initial views of the new
political dynamics in the Council follow details on
Council actions taken.

End Summary.


--------------
AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH THE NEW EC CHAIR
--------------


3. (SBU) On Friday, June 20, Amb. Javits and Delrep
met with Amb. Oksana Tomova and her staff to provide
background information on the U.S. and Russian mutual
deferral of destruction documents. Amb. Tomova
offered to provide whatever assistance she could in
moving the issue forward, and noted the positive
impact agreement could have on the perception of the
Council's ability to function. In general, Amb.
Tomova seemed eager to engage States Parties and to
play a constructive role in the Council's decision-
making process, and had obviously done a good deal of
outreach to facilitate a smooth start to her tenure
as Chair.


4. (S) Delrep also discussed the 2007 VIR with Amb.
Tomova, specifically the U.S. request that the Chair
engage Kazakhstan to encourage clarification of a
longstanding issue related to a former production
facility. Amb. Tomova indicated she would be willing
to do so, particularly to complement the efforts of
the Secretariat, and asked for U.S. suggestions as to
how this might best be accomplished.


5. (SBU) Amb. Tomova noted that in her initial
outreach efforts, she'd heard from several
delegations (naming only South Africa) that they had
serious concerns about destruction deadlines and the
possibility that the U.S. would be unable to meet its
2012 deadline for completion of CW destruction.
Obviously wanting to avoid having this topic dominate
discussions during her time as Chair, she proposed
beginning very informal discussions on the subject

this year with a select group of Ambassadors. Amb.
Javits offered that it was somewhat premature to
start such discussions, and reiterated the importance
of making an informed assessment and decision closer
to the actual date.

--------------
ARTICLE X CONSULTATIONS
--------------


6. (U) On June 20, Jitka Brodska (Czech Republic)
convened her last Article X meeting before stepping
down as facilitator. The agenda included an update
by the Secretariat on continued efforts in Assistance
and Protection, as well as a report of the Assistance
and Protection Workshop held in Prague in April 2008;
an overview from the UK of the training support they
provided for TS "ACAT" (Assistance, Coordination and
Assessment Team) team members; and a brief review,
led by the facilitator, of 2nd Review Conference
implications for continued work in Article X.


7. (U) Very little new information was presented, and
the meeting was marked by the outgoing facilitator's
deft handling of the Iranian delegates, who were
unable to dominate the meeting with discussions of
their CW victims' network proposal and in fact missed
several opportunities to discuss that subject. As
the readout of the Prague workshop included a mention
of assessing States Parties' reasons for not
submitting information on national protective
programs, Delrep inquired as to TS efforts in this
area, as well as any specific reasons that had been
provided during the workshop. The TS did not respond
to the second question, but noted that they continue
to use all capacity-building and training
opportunities to remind member states of their
obligation in this area. One suggestion from the
workshop was to take full advantage of the annual
National Authorities meeting to assist States Parties
in fulfilling this requirement. The Secretariat also
recommended sending declarations on national
protective programs separately from annual
declarations so that they are immediately sent to the
appropriate branch.


8. (U) The meeting was also marked by an unfortunate
tendency of TS Assistance and Protection Branch head
Gennadi Lutay to raise political issues unnecessarily
in response to delegate questions. In response to an
Iranian question on gaps in regional capabilities,
Lutay went beyond simply reminding Iran that the TS
is currently working to assess regional capabilities,
and noted that "regional centers like the Africa
Office might not be possible." As Iran continued to
press, Lutay raised the idea of an "Article X Action
Plan," noting that this sort of initiative would be
in the hands of the member states. The facilitator
also led delegates through a review of the paragraphs
of the report of the 2nd Review Conference related to
Article X, then offered the floor to the Secretariat
for its assessment of the possible implications of
the report for future work. Lutay did not provide
even an initial assessment, but noted that the
Secretariat was still considering this.


9. (U) Looking ahead, the TS indicated that the next
large-scale exercise, similar to Joint Assistex 2005
in Ukraine, is being planned for late 2009 or early

2010. Russian delegate Victor Smirnovskiy will
succeed Ms. Brodska as facilitator and is likely to
schedule his first consultation in the autumn.

--------------
ARTICLE XI CONSULTATIONS
--------------


10. (U) Also on June 20, the facilitator for Article

XI, Li Hong (China),convened consultations to
complete the earlier March discussion of the annual
report and to plan ahead for the "concrete measures"
to implement Article XI more fully. Amb. Javits,
with support from South Africa, France, Netherlands,
Algeria and Germany, suggested that the TS report,
while providing a comprehensive review of annual
activities, does not indicate the corresponding
costs, which would be helpful to future planning.
WEOG members added that evaluation of the activities
would also be useful, which sparked discussion of how
and by whom such evaluation should be done. Zeljko
Jerkic, newly transferred from ERD to International
Cooperation to help coordinate ICA programs, assured
the group that the TS could provide additional
information in future reports and was working on
improving evaluation of its activities.


11. (U) The Cuban delegate presented a proposal for a
workshop to develop ideas for additional programs,
emphasizing that it be carefully designed and engage
various stakeholders, including industry (a copy of
the proposal was faxed to ISN/CB). There was broad
initial support for the idea, which will be further
discussed at the next consultation. Iran noted that
this was a new document that needed study but warned
that a workshop cannot recommend action to States
Parties. Cuba responded that the workshop is meant
to complement the facilitation and provide ideas to
the SPs. Facilitator Li Hong closed by saying that
he looked forward to additional proposals for
discussion.

--------------
VISIT OF DAS STALEY
--------------


12. (SBU) ISN DAS Kenneth Staley visited The Hague
for two days during the Executive Council. Amb.
Javits hosted a luncheon in his honor June 26, with
guests including the Deputy Director-General, the EC
Chairperson and a diverse group of active Ambassadors
(UK, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Costa Rica, Brazil, Sudan,
Germany). DAS Staley later attended ongoing sessions
of the Executive Council that afternoon and on
Friday.


13. (SBU) On June 27, DAS Staley and Amb. Javits met
with the DG, who expressed his appreciation for U.S.
support and complimented the U.S. delegation. They
discussed issues arising from the Review Conference,
and briefly touched on personnel, tenure and hiring
issues, and the impact of late payment of annual
assessments. Following the meeting with the DG,
OPCW's Protocol Head provided a guided tour of the
facilities, and DAS Staley called on Administration
Director Ron Nelson and Verification Director Horst
Reeps.


14. (SBU) DAS Staley and Director Nelson discussed a
range of management and staffing issues, focusing on
tenure policy and Nelson's successor. Nelson noted
that the Verification Division is most adversely
affected by staff losses due to the tenure policy.
With CW destruction on course to peak around 2010,
Nelson suggested a suspension of the tenure policy
for the Verification Division until at least 2010.
Despite the DG's having requested Nelson to remain in
his post as Administration Director until the end of
the DG's term, Nelson indicated his readiness to give
up his post sooner, if a qualified candidate can be
found. Nelson stressed the need for his successor to
have significant multilateral management and
political experience, ideally having worked in
another international organization or UN agency.


15. (SBU) During his meeting with Director Reeps, DAS
Staley raised the tenure issue. Reeps agreed that

without an exemption for the Verification Division,
the OPCW would not have the necessary specialized
expertise to oversee CW destruction. In a later
encounter with the DG, DAS Staley and Amb. Javits
raised the tenure issue with him. The DG warned
against any changes in the tenure policy, at least
until 2010, citing the difficulty of letting anyone
go from an exempt category and the flexibility the
policy currently provides management to keep the
best. He also stated that the TS is working on
better methods to retain institutional knowledge with
the turnover of staff.

--------------
DRAFT 2009 PROGRAM OF WORK AND BUDGET
--------------


16. (U) The DG introduced the draft program of work
and budget for 2009 (EC-53/CRP.2) with a succinct
briefing drawing on the introduction (page 6) and
giving an overview of some key points. Of note, he
has proposed 10 additional OCPF inspections, for a
total of 210 Article VI inspections. While fixed-
term staff will remain at 523 positions, a number of
positions have transferred between divisions as a
result of internal staffing reviews. The DG also
noted that two additional temporary staff posts are
proposed for 2009.


17. (U) The balance between Chapter I and Chapter II
programs will remain about the same as in previous
years (50.23% and 49.77%, respectively). However,
the DG has proposed a 6% increase in funding for the
International Cooperation and Assistance (ICA),the
largest increase in any division. Other divisions
granted increases include the Inspectorate (3.8%
increase),Administration (2.3% increase),and
Executive Management (1.1% increase). These
increases are offset by decreases in Support for
Policy-Making Organs (13.2% decrease),Verification
(13% decrease),and External Relations (7% decrease).


18. (U) As the TS had promised, the draft budget
document is more user-friendly than previous
versions, including colored graphs and tables and
consolidated information. The DG noted that the
improved format, as well as the introduction of
measurable key performance indicators, are part of
the ongoing evolutionary process of implementing
results-based budgeting (RBB).

--------------
DESTRUCTION INFORMALS
--------------


19. (SBU) The Secretariat provided its standard
updates on Verification, Declarations, and Chemical
Demilitarization, presented by the respective heads
of each division/branch. (Hard copies of
presentations have been forwarded to Washington.)


20. (C) Of the State Party updates, the most
noteworthy was Libya's, which was more detailed and
more focused on actual progress of conversion than
any of its more vague or commercially-focused
presentations from the past year. Although Libya did
not provide an updated national paper, this improved
focus and level of detail seemed to be directly in
response to U.S. and UK efforts to improve the
transparency of Libyan reporting. The updated
presentation covered the conversion timeline for the
two Rabta Production Facilities and related
infrastructure: 30% was completed by April 2008, 70%
is projected to be completed by October 2008, 90% by
March 2009, 93% by May 2009, and 100% by September

2009. By December 2009, the facility will be
validated for operation as a pharmaceutical plant per
Libyan pharmaceutical regulations GMP. In response

to an inquiry by Germany as to whether the CSP had to
take a decision to extend Libya's conversion deadline
from July 2008 to December 2009, the DG noted a
different precedent had been set by the Russian
Novocheboksarsk conversion process. Libya stated
that its national paper from EC 50 should suffice as
providing the reasons it cannot meet the July 2008
deadline and proposing a new date for completion.


21. (SBU) The Verification Plan and Facility
Agreement for the Rabta Destruction Facility are
being drafted and should be completed following the
initial TS visit to the site at the end of August

2008. Libya plans to begin reloading the stored
mustard from canisters to transportable tanks on
January 15, 2009.


22. (C) Russia reported on progress in its
operational facilities, as well as those expected to
come on line in the next several years: Leonidovka
in September 2008, Shchuch'ye in December 2008,
Pochep in 2009 and Kizner in 2010. Russia reported
destruction of 28.2% of its Category 1 stockpiles,
with destruction ongoing at Kambarka and
Maradykovksy. Destruction at Kambarka is expected to
be completed by the first quarter of 2009. The
Russian delegation also provided a more detailed
report than normal on the conversion of the former
production facility at Novocheboksarsk. Lingering VX
contamination has complicated conversion efforts, but
internal partitions and equipment within the VX-
contaminated areas should be destroyed by the end of

2008. Following this step, Russia must determine how
to destroy the buildings themselves. Russia also
noted that destruction of the former production
facility at Dzerzhinsk is close to completion, and
that the TS expects to issue a destruction
certificate shortly.


23. (S) India has destroyed 97% of category 1 and all
of Category 2 and 3 stockpiles. Half of the remaining
3% of Category 1 consists of unspecified munitions
and the other half is heel in bulk containers. The
Indian delegate indicated that any heel that could
not be flushed out with chloroethanol would be
destroyed by thermal treatment. India expects to
complete destruction by the April 2009 deadline.


24. (S) The Republic of Korea reported that 99.3% of
its stockpile has been destroyed. It expects
destruction to be complete by 10 July 2008.


25. (U) China reported discovering more "Japanese
Abandoned Chemical Weapons" in early 2008 and
expressed its concern about Japan's delay in
beginning destruction. It urged Japan to exert
greater effort and asked the TS to play a more
constructive role. Japan followed, reporting that
Nanxing would be the first site for the Mobile
Destruction Facility (MDF). Japan has invited bids
for the construction of the MDFs, with expected
operation to begin in 2010. Japan has been
overpacking recovered munitions. In fall 2008, Japan
will excavate 1000 munitions in Haerberling to
determine the physical condition of the varied
munitions in that area. Japan noted that the meeting
in May 2008 with China and the TS was constructive.


26. (U) The United States made a short presentation,
indicating that as of 31 May, it had destroyed 14,916
MT. U.S. rep also indicated that there are currently
five operational facilities, with no issues to report
since the last EC, and that the operations at
Newport, Indiana, should be completed by August 2008.
Setting the stage for interventions during the
Council session itself, Iran requested information
about when the two projected U.S. facilities (i.e.
Pueblo and Bluegrass) would become operational, and

inquired as to why it wasn't part of the U.S.
presentation. U.S. Rep replied that it was still too
early to project operational dates. South Africa
also requested clarification as to the number of
destruction facilities currently operational in the
U.S., having heard five, seven and nine in the U.S.,
Chem Demil Branch, and Verification presentations
respectively. U.S. Rep clarified the different
definitions of "facilities" that led to this apparent
discrepancy.

-------------- --
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL 53 OPENING, DIRECTOR-GENERAL'S
STATEMENT AND GENERAL DEBATE
-------------- --


27. (U) The Executive Council opened on June 24 with
the traditional reports by the new EC Chairperson and
Vice Chairmen providing updates on consultations and
meetings in their clusters of issues since the Review
Conference. Of note was the Iranian delegate's
presentation (the Ambassador was absent the entire
week of the Council) that he had "nothing" to report
on Article VII and Universality except that both
would have new facilitators. The Coordinator for the
Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism, Annie Mari
(France),reported that the next meeting on July 10
would include presentations by the EU's counter-
terrorism coordinator's office and by Spanish and
French officials. She noted that the Review
Conference had highlighted the OEWG as a useful
platform for further discussion.


28. (U) During discussion of the present EC's agenda,
Amb. Javits expressed concern with the number of
documents received late from the TS in accordance
with reftel guidance. The DG responded that all
"statutory" papers had been produced on time, but
that some documents depended on the actions of member
states or other bodies (ABAF) that the TS could not
control.


29. (U) The DG's statement noted that the Review
Conference had set new standards for disarmament and
non-proliferation, and he highlighted efforts to
ensure greater inclusiveness and transparency. He
distinguished different categories of action, some
that the TS can take on its own, some that require
additional work with States Parties, and some that
are already underway. He cited letters he is sending
to the eleven remaining Non-States Parties urging
accession to the treaty. He also emphasized that the
OPCW is "going 'e' in everything" with improved
electronic systems.


30. (U) Much of the General Debate reviewed the
results of the Review Conference in a positive light.
Cuba's statement on behalf of the NAM and China,
however, seemed a bit retrograde in its citing
concern about destruction, calling for removal of
trade restrictions, and emphasizing the "hierarchy of
risk." China's national statement took a different
tone, with support for working to advance non-
proliferation and improving OCPF declarations. The
EU statement called for a coordinated work program
following the RevCon to be drawn up by the EC
Chairperson with the DG. The EU pointed to the need
for timely conclusion of OCPF site selection
methodology, and touted the OPCW as a platform for
discussion among NGOs, industry and other
stakeholders. The Russian statement explicitly
connected implementation of Article XI to that of
Article VII, a point much noted afterwards.


31. (U) Mexico's statement received the most
attention and discussion during the EC for its
provocative points on consensus. While noting the
"undeniable" value of consensus, Mexican Ambassador

Lomanoco warned that it should not be used as a veto
to the will of the vast majority. The statement went
on to suggest voting as a potential decision-making
tool. In private conversations with Delreps, the
Mexican Ambassador and delegate said that they had
intended to provoke thought, and were pleased that
they had succeeded.

-------------- --------------
DETAILED PLANS FOR CWDF VERIFICATION AND FACILITY
AGREEMENTS
-------------- --------------


32. (U) EC-53 was unusually productive in terms of
approval of facility agreements and related
verification plans. Having been deferred by Iran for
several sessions, the Swedish and Canadian agreements
for Schedule 1 facilities were finally approved.
More significant were the approvals of a number of
U.S. and Russian destruction documents, as detailed
below. After seeking technical clarifications on the
updated Indian facility agreement and verification
plan, these too were agreed.

--------------
U.S. AND RUSSIAN DOCUMENT APPROVAL
--------------


33. (U) After, in some cases, over a year of deferral
from one EC agenda to the next, the Council approved
the facility agreements and verification plans for
the destruction facilities at Newport, Pine Bluff
(Binary),Mardykovsky and Leonidovka. Despite the
Pine Bluff Binary facility having completed
operations in late 2007, there was clear relief on
the part of many delegations that the continued
U.S./Russian mutual deferral of documents had been
overcome. All along, few delegations have understood
the technical and political issues at stake, and were
simply happy to close the book on these agenda items.


34. (C) Prospects for approval looked poor even into
the week of the EC itself. However, it became clear
when the delegation from Moscow arrived that the
reason for continued delays in issuing the
appropriate updates to the Maradykovsky documents was
more a drafting issue than one of substance.
Following a brief meeting with OPCW Legal Adviser
Onate, Russia agreed to the changes and the
amendments were distributed. The basic nature of the
changes was to add a second possibility (thermal
processing and deformation) for the treatment of
munitions to the already existing procedure of
welding.


35. (C) For its part, Russia had a number of last
minute questions on the Newport documents, an advance
copy of which had been provided to the Russian
delegation to avoid exactly that possibility. It
quickly became apparent, however, that Russia's real
concern was that the U.S. procedure for destroying
leaking ton containers at the Blue Grass Storage
Facility not be considered a precedent. Russia's own
handling of "munitions in hazardous condition" has
been a source of disagreement with the Secretariat
for years, as destruction of these munitions is
handled as "routine maintenance." The U.S. policy of
declaring all such cases as part of an existing
destruction facility is somewhat different, and not a
procedure Russia would care to adopt. The addition
of "no precedent" language in the decision covering
the facility agreement, similar to that in decisions
for other two-stage destruction processes, was
sufficient to allay Russian concerns.


36. (C) The U.S. delegation requested that the
unclassified U.S. documents be considered during the
classified session. After having been briefed on the

reciprocal nature of the U.S.-Russian document
approval, Chairperson Tomova grouped all of the U.S.
and Russian documents together and gaveled them
through rapidly as a package on June 25 during the
classified session, an unprecedented but successful
move. Many in the Council, including the Iranians,
did not follow exactly what was happening and failed
to react before the "package" (never named as such)
was approved.


37. (C) No sooner had the session ended than the
heads of the Chemical Demilitarization and Policy
Review branches informed Delrep that the Secretariat
had just realized the version of the Newport facility
agreement approved by the Council was not only
incorrect, but actually misrepresented the U.S.
position on the end point of destruction. Initial
Secretariat and U.S. instinct was to wait until after
the close of the session to re-issue the correct
version, as the errors had occurred in attachments to
the agreement, changes to which do not require EC
approval.


38. (C) At the urging of the DG, however, the Del
informed the Russian delegation of the error, which
resulted in the drafting and clearance of a corrected
version of the document in time for the last day of
the session. Interestingly, from the meeting early
on Friday during which Delrep walked the Russian
delegation through the changes, it seemed obvious
that the Russians were not as familiar with the
documents they had approved as the Del had expected.
Delreps emphasized the fact that re-opening one
document would mean re-opening the entire package in
the Council, and after the expected posturing, Russia
agreed to allow the Secretariat to reissue the
document "for technical reasons," provided the matter
was handled during EC-53.


39. (C) Having worked late into the night with the
U.S. to prepare an updated version for distribution,
the Secretariat published the document Friday
afternoon and Legal Advisor Onate gracefully noted to
the Council, in conjunction with adoption of the
relevant paragraph of the report, that the document
had been circulated with several errors and had been
reissued and distributed for technical reasons. Had
the previous Iranian delegate still been present,
this could have led to a long and painful series of
questions and delayed adoption of the report until
late Friday evening. Fortunately for the Council,
this was not the case, and the report was adopted
without comment.

--------------
INDIA BILATERAL MEETING
--------------


40. (S) Delreps met with Indian Rep Mr. Kapoor from
Delhi to seek answers to U.S. questions about India's
updated facility agreement and verification plan
before the classified Council session that approved
the documents. Mr. Kapoor provided a detailed
explanation of the destruction of sulfur mustard at
India's Borkhedi destruction facility. The agent is
stored in bulk (4,000 to 5,000 liter tanks) and in
155 mm artillery shells. For the bulk storage, the
liquid agent is removed and stored in a vessel. It
is subsequently diluted with chloroethanol and
incinerated at 500 degrees C. In about fifty percent
of the tanks, a "heel" of polymerized agent remains.
The heel is treated by adding chloroethanol and
agitating with compressed air for anywhere from
several minutes to several hours. This is apparently
effective in about fifty percent of the tanks; the
dissolved heel is then transferred for incineration.
Tanks that have been successfully emptied are
returned to the CW storage facility until they can be

thermally treated. In cases where the heel cannot be
dissolved, the entire tank is treated directly in the
furnace by slowly ramping the temperature up to 800
degrees C.


41. (S) The munitions are opened by drilling through
the burster well connection to the shell casing and
thermally treated in the furnace at 500 degrees C
without decanting the mustard. Mr. Kapoor indicated
that India had experienced problems in opening and
draining the munitions, and asked how the U.S.
accomplished this. Delrep explained the general
procedure used at U.S. facilities for opening and
treating similar caliber munitions.

-------------- --------------
CONVERSION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES
-------------- --------------


42. (U) As referenced above, both Russia and Libya
gave a detailed explanation of the status of their
conversion efforts during the destruction informals,
and the corresponding Secretariat Notes were noted
without debate. The Council also considered the UK's
Portreath facility, its first case of a converted
facility having passed the ten year mark, after which
the Council is to decide upon continued verification
measures. Concerned at possible implications in
terms of precedent for converted Russian facilities,
Russia deferred consideration of the matter to EC-54.

--------------
PROGRESS REPORTS IN MEETING REVISED DEADLINES
--------------


43. (U) As has become its tradition, the Iranian
delegation intervened on the U.S. 90-day destruction
update, this time to voice its concern that the U.S.
has repeatedly failed to provide information on the
projected dates of operation for its facilities at
Pueblo and Blue Grass. U.S. Delrep noted that the
progress report covered events of the preceding 90
days, as opposed to speculating about future
progress, a point that received support from a number
of other delegations who spoke from the floor.
Eventually, after demanding better information in
future sessions and referring to the now common
"chapeau language" on destruction obligations in the
report, Iran agreed to note the U.S. report.


44. (SBU) Del comment: Although Iran had no support
at this EC for its demands that the U.S. present
additional information, it is quite possible that
others in the NAM will join the chorus in the near
future, and question the U.S. inability to provide
even projected years of operation for these two
facilities. Iran in particular has yet to miss an
opportunity to point to impending U.S. non-
compliance, and del expects the Council will return
to this issue at each session for the foreseeable
future. End comment.

--------------
TRANSFER DISCREPANCIES
--------------


45. (U) The facilitator for transfer discrepancies,
Kiwako Tanaka (Japan) held four meetings during the
EC, in addition to the session of the week before.
Her goal was to tackle the remaining Iranian concerns
and proposals in order to get the draft decision to
the EC during its session.


46. (U) The Iranian proposals centered on: clear
indication that the guidelines are voluntary and not
legally binding; reference to the Verification Annex
language on the transfer ban on Schedule 2 chemicals
to States not Party, as well as a reference to the EC

decision on Schedule transfers to States not Party;
and the absence of any clear reference to Article
VII. In the end, one reference to "voluntary" was
included in the preamble to the decision; all
reference to restrictions or decisions on transfers
of Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals was removed; and a
general reference to the implementation of this
decision in accordance with the Convention was
included.


47. (SBU) The end-game negotiations against the
Iranian proposals pivoted on India's insistence that
implementation of an EC decision cannot be voluntary,
even if the guidelines themselves are; South Africa's
insistence that implementation in accordance with the
Convention was vital in order to allow National
Authorities to make the necessary adjustments to
their practices; and Brazil's careful explanation of
why a single well-placed reference to the voluntary
nature of the guidelines was sufficient. The removal
of the reference to transfer bans and decisions was
part of a trade to remove another preambular
paragraph that Western delegations felt was not at
all important to the outcome of the decision.


48. (SBU) One other event in the negotiations
Thursday night (June 26) may be of interest in light
of ongoing dealings with the Iranian delegation, as
reconfigured this summer. At the end of the
consultation, the Iranian delegate (Ali Reza
Hajizadeh) took the microphone to publicly apologize
to the facilitator for a remark he made during a
consultation several weeks earlier. He felt he had
offended her and wanted to set the record straight in
a public forum. It is unclear what motivated this
unusual move by the Iranian delegation, but this
public softening of their image may be important in
the future.


49. (U) The agreed-to decision (EC-53/DEC/CRP.4,
Rev.1, dated 27 June 2008) was gaveled through on the
final day of the EC meeting. Several delegations
voiced their thanks to Ms. Tanaka, including Iran.

--------------
OTHER ITEMS UNDER STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION
--------------


50. (U) Article X. The Council noted the DG's report
on the status of implementation of Article X without
discussion, which was somewhat surprising in light of
Iran's desire to use every possible stage to forward
its agenda on establishing a CW victims' network.


51. (U) Article XI. Li Hong of China, the
facilitator for Article XI, reported on the
consultations held since the last EC. The Council
noted the status report with no discussion.


52. (U) 2007 VIR. The 2007 Verification
Implementation Report, the comments on the 2007 VIR,
and the Chair's summary of consultations were all
unexpectedly noted without objection, with Iran
asking only a clarifying question about how comments
on the VIR yet to be received would be treated. The
TS explained that comments received would be
circulated to the delegations and that if the Council
so chose, it could include the comments as an item in
the provisional agenda for the next session.


53. (U) Timely submission of declarations. This
status report (EC-53/DG.8, dated 5 June 2008) by the
DG noted progress made since the EC-51 decision (EC-
51/DEC.1, dated 27 November 2007). Although several
WEOG delegations had privately expressed
disappointment in the progress made since the
decision, the Council noted the report without
discussion.



54. (U) Enhancement of OCPF declarations. Knowing
that many delegations were disappointed about the
late availability of these documents (EC-53/S/5,
dated 17 June 2008 and EC-53/DG.11, dated 17 June
2008),the DG made a lengthy introduction to the
issue. He stated that it was not his expectation
that the EC would take up discussion at this meeting;
but that the matter would be considered for future
discussion, and the EC followed by deferring the
matter. Of note, the Netherlands delegation has
announced informally that Diana Gossens had
volunteered to facilitate consultations on the paper
that the DG believes must receive EC approval before
it can be implemented (EC-53/S/5).

--------------
DRAFT REPORT OF THE OPCW FOR 2007
--------------


55. (SBU) Iran voiced concern over references to
UNSCR 1540 in the OPCW report for 2007 (EC-53/CRP.1
and Corr.1). After a long intervention citing the
Review Conference report and objecting to references
to UNSCR 1540, the Iranian delegation concluded by
insisting that the final sentence of paragraph 4.9 be
changed. While the DG and several other delegations
responded that the report was only factual and should
not be open for changes, the DG eventually agreed to
issue a corrigendum to assuage Iran's concerns while
preserving the report's factual accuracy.


56. (C) However, a number of delegations felt that
the corrigendum (Corr.2) went too far, and they spoke
out against any attempts to censor the DG and the TS.
The UK insisted privately to the TS that the DG issue
a new corrigendum. (Note: Del learned that the DG
showed more flexibility on amending the report as it
is a report of the entire organization and not in his
name). The DG's final corrigendum (Corr.3) was able
to reach consensus, and the Council forwarded the
report to the CSP.

--------------
OPCW CENTRAL ANALYTICAL DATABASE
--------------


57. (U) Even though problems were expected from India
and Iran on this issue, both lists of new validated
data (EC-52/DEC/CRP.3, dated 30 January 2008; EC-
53/DEC/CRP.2, dated 16 May 2008) were approved
without comment.

--------------
ADMINISTRATIVE, FINANCIAL AND RELATED MATTERS
--------------


58. (U) OIO and External Auditor reports. The
facilitator, Takayuki Kitagawa (Japan),held a three-
hour consultation during the EC session to discuss
outstanding issues on a number of OIO and External
Auditor reports. Delegations agreed to note the
reports on implementation in 2007 of the External
Auditor's recommendations (EC-52/S/2, which had been
deferred from the previous EC) and the OIO's
recommendations (EC-53/DG.2). However, South Africa,
Iran, and India all raised a number of questions and
concerns about the 2007 OIO Report (EC-53/DG.3),
requesting that the report be deferred to the next EC
for consideration so that consultations can continue.
All three indicated their intent to link findings in
the 2007 OIO Report to onsideration of the 2009
Program of Work and Budgt. Due to late release of
the 2007 External Audtor's Report (EC-53/DG.10),
Kitagawa requested tat it be deferred to the next EC
to give time fo him to consultations on it.


59. () Implementation of the tenure policy. Echoing

statements made previously, South Africa requested
the DG to provide detailed TS staffing information
(including geographical distribution data) in future
reports. The DG agreed to this request, and South
Africa proposed report language to this effect, which
the Council approved.


60. (U) ABAF. There was little discussion about the
ABAF report (ABAF-24/1) and the accompanying DG's
response (EC-53/DG.13),aside from South Africa
requesting deferral of both documents to the next EC
due to their late distribution.

--------------
SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD
--------------


61. (U) Iran requested deferral of the SAB report and
the Director-General's response to EC-54. Amb.
Javits objected and said there should efforts to note
these documents at this EC. Iran objected. This
prompted the United States and Mexico to ask for
specific reasons for the deferral. Iran indicated
that the "substantive" report required study by
experts in Tehran in relation to decisions taken at
the Review Conference and a review by a panel of
experts as specified by the Review Conference report
(paragraph 9.133). Strong reactions from the United
States, the Netherlands, Germany, France and Austria
stated that this SAB report was published in February
and had been presented to the EC before the Review
Conference, and that the Review Conference had
explicitly noted that the consideration by a panel of
experts would be only for the report forwarded to the
RevCon, not a mandate to convene a panel of experts
for all SAB reports. The Director-General confirmed
that this was his understanding as well. Despite a
Chairperson proposal to defer the issue until Friday,
Iran still insisted on deferring the report to the
next Council session.

--------------
CSP AGENDA
--------------


62. (SBU) At the EC Preparation meeting two weeks
before, Iran had emphasized its desire for a separate
agenda item for Article X in the Conference of States
Parties. However, the Iranian delegation was silent
at the EC session and the traditional agenda passed
without discussion or change. The Costa Rican
Ambassador, a member of the EC Bureau, told Delrep
that the Bureau had had a lengthy (45 minutes)
discussion of the Article X matter and had talked the
Iranian representative out of pursuing it in the
Council.

--------------
2009 EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SESSION DATES
--------------


63. (SBU) Following reftel guidance, Del requested
that the final EC session for 2009 be moved from
early to late October. The Netherlands suggested
changing the proposed dates to allow for two spring
and two fall sessions; South Africa proposed holding
three sessions, two in the spring and one in the
fall. Director for Policy-Making Organs Alexander
Khodakov provided a lengthy justification for the
proposed dates, indicating that the last EC should
not be later than mid-October to allow for document
preparation and distribution in advance of the CSP in
early December. Chairperson Tomova pointedly
reminded all delegations that the proposed dates
already had been discussed in the Bureau and
circulated well in advance to all regional groups for
comment.


64. (SBU) Discussion in WEOG indicated general
support for the U.S. position. However, there was a
divergence of views on the number of sessions to
hold, with Australia speaking in favor of holding
only three sessions, and Switzerland and Austria
noting that the number of sessions should correspond
to the amount of substantive work before the Council.


65. (U) When the item was brought up for
reconsideration, the EC agreed to keep the proposed
dates for February, April, and June 2009. It also
decided to hold the final EC one week later than
proposed, postponing it to October 13-16. Amb.
Maarten Lak of the Netherlands made an intervention
from the floor stating that, whatever the dates, the
work flow for the Council should be appropriately
planned with preparation of documents in a timely
fashion.

--------------
LIBYA CONVERSION AND CW DESTRUCTION
--------------


66. (SBU) Following their detailed presentation in
the destruction informals, the Libyan delegation
proved rather difficult to pin down. Despite
repeated assurances that he would provide a hard or
electronic copy of the presentations, as well as a
copy of the most recent final inspection report from
Rabta, Dr. Hesnawy did not deliver this material.
Del did, however, discuss the developing plans for a
U.S. delegation to visit Rabta and gave two possible
time frames for U.S. expert availability. Delrep
also expressed hope that a written invitation would
also be forthcoming.


67. (C) Delreps also met informally with the UK
delegation to ascertain London's intent for the
upcoming visit of a UK delegation to Libya's former
production facility at Rabta. MOD Rep Clive Rowland
initially indicated the UK might attempt to discuss
the issue of the dual use equipment, but later came
back to say that London had decided not to do this,
and would instead keep to the CWC agenda (conversion
of the former production facility at Rabta and the
destruction of Libya's CW stockpile).

--------------
TS MONITORING VISITS
--------------


68. (U) Delreps met with Policy Review Branch Head
Per Runn and Inspectorate Management Branch Head
Renato Carvalho to discuss the Secretariat plan to
begin conducting "monitoring" (quality review) visits
in conjunction with scheduled inspections. The
presence of an evaluator, who is likely to be a
Verification or Inspectorate branch head, will be
noted on inspection mandates and notifications. The
purpose of the evaluation will be to assess the
inspection team's use of time, staff, procedures and
equipment from the preparatory phase through the
completion of the final report. As this is a
mechanism for internal analysis, the TS does not plan
to make their evaluation reports available to States
Parties (in part to avoid inadvertently granting
access to inspection files),although the Secretariat
may produce an overall report to inform States
Parties of lessons learned that might lead to an
improvement in procedures.

--------------
TS PRESENTATION ON THE PROGRAM FOR AFRICA
--------------


69. (U) On June 26, ICA Director Kalimi Mworia hosted
a briefing on the Program for Africa for African
PermReps and interested donor countries. A number of

African delegations not present in The Hague attended
the briefing. Mworia made a presentation on the
program's key aspects and provided a list of planned
ICA activities for 2008 that are part of the program.
She noted that four additional slots in the Associate
Program have been reserved for African participants.
Mworia also noted that India will be offering
industrial placements as part of this summer's
Associate Program, and she encouraged other
developing countries with chemical industry to
consider following suit. Amb. Lak (Netherlands) also
made a few remarks on Dutch support for the Program
for Africa and announced a donor coordination meeting
on July 15 to further discuss the Program.

--------------
ATMOSPHERICS / POLITICAL TRENDS
--------------


70. (C) Del Comment. This session was both efficient
and much more productive than the EC sessions over
the past year, a fact much commented on by
delegations. The mood was upbeat and discussion much
more balanced than that of the recent Review
Conference. Delegations seemed ready to get down to
work. The two months since the Review Conference
allowed delegations time for reflection, but the
bonding experience of intense days and sleepless
nights at the RevCon has also contributed to a fresh
spirit of collaboration.


71. (C) Ambassador Tomova took charge of the EC with
grace, gaining in confidence and pounding the gavel
faster and more forcefully as the week progressed.
She had clearly done her homework, meeting with key
delegations and Ambassadors for weeks beforehand, and
she knew the issues and potential landmines. She
continued to meet at the edges of the formal sessions
with critical players and hosted a well-timed
reception mid-week with a strategic guest list to
move the EC's business forward.


72. (C) The NAM, apart from the joint statement in
the General Debate, was largely silent as was its
Cuban leadership. They seem to have taken a more
pragmatic approach with the introduction of the
workshop proposal for Article XI in consultations,
rather than strident interventions in the Council.


73. (C) Iran, lacking both its Ambassador (recalled
to Tehran and reportedly about to move to Geneva to
the CTBTO) and its long-time leading delegate
Shahrokh Shakerian (who appeared only briefly on
Tuesday to say goodbye),was nervous and remained
quiet on most issues. They were often in discussion
amongst themselves and missed key actions, gaveled
through before they realized what was happening. We
do not believe this confusion will last long,
however. Shahrokh's replacement is a U.S.-educated
former instructor at Tehran's diplomatic training
school who told Amb. Javits he had taught all of the
current delegation, including Amb. Ziaran. End
Comment.


74. (U) Javits sends.
Gallagher