Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08THEHAGUE480
2008-06-05 15:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): MEETING WITH

Tags:  CH PARM PREL RS CWC 
pdf how-to read a cable
O 051503Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1569
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 
CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000480 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR,
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP>
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (ROBERTS)
NSC FOR FLY
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2018
TAGS: CH PARM PREL RS CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): MEETING WITH
THE DIRECTOR GENERAL ON RUSSIAN AND CHINESE ISSUES

REF: A. STATE 058096 B. THE HAGUE 472

Classified By: Ambassador Eric M. Javits for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

This is CWC-27-08.

--------------------------------------
RUSSIAN AND U.S. DESTRUCTION DOCUMENTS
--------------------------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000480

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR,
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP>
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (ROBERTS)
NSC FOR FLY
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2018
TAGS: CH PARM PREL RS CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): MEETING WITH
THE DIRECTOR GENERAL ON RUSSIAN AND CHINESE ISSUES

REF: A. STATE 058096 B. THE HAGUE 472

Classified By: Ambassador Eric M. Javits for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

This is CWC-27-08.

--------------
RUSSIAN AND U.S. DESTRUCTION DOCUMENTS
--------------


1. (C) On June 5, Ambassador Javits and Delrep met with OPCW
Director General Pfirter to discuss the way forward on U.S.
and Russian destruction documents and the DG,s recent trip
to China. As per Ref A, Amb. Javits explained the conditions
that must be met for the U.S. to join consensus on the
Maradykovsky and Leonidovka documents. He received the DG,s
assurance in return that these documents do in fact set the
standard for future two-stage destruction processes, and that
he had given the Technical Secretariat team currently on the
ground in Russia strict instructions to ensure the
Shchuch,ye documents were equally as stringent. The DG did
not seem entirely confident that Russia would be flexible in
accepting references to his EC-49 statement, but also agreed
that perhaps in light of the U.S. position, Russia would be
more pragmatic. For his part, the Director General intends
to address developments at Shchuch,ye, Leonidovka and
Maradykovsky in his statement to EC-53. Finally, Delrep
noted that the timing of distribution of Maradykovsky and
Newport amendments could have a significant impact on the
likelihood of approval, and expressed hope that both sets of
documents would be available as soon as possible.

--------------
DG's VISIT TO CHINA
--------------


2. (C) On his recent visit to China, the DG stated that he
had inquired with Chinese officials as to developments with
Taiwan. He said that officials agreed that the situation
with Taiwan does bear consideration in the CWC context.
Pfirter also gave his personal assessment that, based on
recent EC and CSP statements and the use of parallel language
for Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao, China was likely to work out
a similar administrative arrangement with Taiwan. He also
noted that he had appealed to the Chinese Foreign Minister to
assist with universality efforts in North Korea and Myanmar,
and had received a categorical "no" on North Korea. Pfirter
noted that he had conveyed his disappointment with this reply
to the Chinese Ambassador to The Hague. Finally, he
mentioned that the topics of OCPF inspections and
non-proliferation had also been discussed, and that he had
informed the Chinese officials that he was requesting ten
additional OCPF inspections in the 2009 budget. He noted
that their response on the increase was non-committal, but
that their position on these inspections should not be
confused with a lack of support for non-proliferation.


3. (U) Javits sends.

Foster