CWC REVIEW CONFERENCE PART IV: PROCESS AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000449

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2018
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CWC REVIEW CONFERENCE PART IV: PROCESS AND
LESSONS LEARNED

REF: A. THE HAGUE 349


B. THE HAGUE 420

C. THE HAGUE 425

D. THE HAGUE 433

Classified By: Ambassador Eric M. Javits for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

This is CWC-23-08.

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (U) This cable is the last of a series on the
Second Chemical Weapons Convention Review Conference
(RevCon) April 7 -18, 2008. It follows the initial
report at the end of the Conference (ref A),the
reports on the opening plenary sessions of the
Conference and the general debate (ref B),events on
the margins of the Conference (ref C),and an
analysis of the final RevCon report (ref D).


2. (C) Following the RevCon's formal opening
sessions and the general debate (ref B),the
Conference re-convened on April 10 as the Committee
of the Whole to consider the draft report that had
been submitted by the Chairman of the Open Ended
Working Group, Amb. Lyn Parker (UK),following months
of work. From that point on in the RevCon,
delegations never knew how work would proceed, what
meetings would be called or when, or what would
happen next. The newly-elected Chairman of the
Committee of the Whole (COW),Amb. Benchaa Dani
(Algeria) demonstrated unwillingness to heed advice
and inability to effectively chair a meeting,
organize work flow, or even to understand points made
by delegations on the floor. The COW operated
dysfunctionally until the end of the Conference,
bringing the RevCon to the brink of failure.


3. (C) By the eighth day of the Conference with no
report or agreement in sight, the Chairman of the
RevCon, Amb. Waleed El Khereiji (Saudi Arabia)
mounted a rescue operation on April 16. With advice
from the OPCW Technical Secretariat (TS) and
concerned ambassadors, he called together a small
negotiating group of 18 countries, representing the
European Union (EU),Non-Aligned Movement (NAM),
states possessing chemical weapons and those with
significant chemical industry, as well as some of the
leading obstructive delegations (Iran, India, South
Africa, and to a lesser extent, Pakistan). In
response, the COW Chairman then threatened to resign
(twice),but was talked out of it by ambassadors of
the small group.


4. (C) Chaired by the Saudi Ambassador and advised by
the Director-General (DG) and his Deputy (DDG),the
negotiating group of 18 worked through two days and
nights, with only short breaks for food and sleep, to
hammer out the final text. Meanwhile, the COW under
Amb. Dani continued work separately on the
preliminary section of the report text, in effect the
summary of the text. Formal communication between
the two bodies was missing, and it was never clear to
delegations how the two processes would combine their
efforts. In the end, the small group's compromise
text was accepted by the Conference at 6:00 a.m. on
April 19, with protests voiced by several Asian
delegations about the lack of representation and
transparency in the process, a view shared but not
expressed by many other delegations.


5. (U) This cable outlines some of the chaos that
transpired during the final days of the Review
Conference and some lessons learned for the future.

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COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE
--------------


6. (SBU) During the first formal meeting of the
Committee of the Whole (COW) on Thursday morning
(April 10),Chairman Dani stated that it was
important to work from the document prepared by the
Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) under Amb. Parker.
He expressed openness to all contributions from the
floor on procedures. The Cuban Ambassador, on behalf
of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM),presented the
NAM's document with all of their agreed positions,
essentially a counter-text to the OEWG Chairman's
draft. Other delegations spoke to the need for
moving to smaller, informal drafting meetings that
could report back to the COW and to limiting the time
for interventions to keep things moving. Mexico
stated that a paragraph-by-paragraph discussion of
the text would not be practical, but proposed instead
that discussion center on different sections of the
text to identify the most contentious portions for
negotiation. Iran and India urged that the full
Committee of the Whole, particularly new delegations
that had not participated in the working group, have
the opportunity to express their views and discuss
the entire text. Iran noted that the COW was not the
place for drafting. The Chairman concluded that the
COW would discuss the entire draft text, urging the
delegations to work "well and fast."


7. (SBU) Amb. Dani then quickly gaveled through all
142 paragraphs of the draft report in under 20
minutes, in what he referred to as a "first reading"
of the report. The only interventions during this
"first reading" were made by Switzerland and South
Africa, who indicated that they wanted the report to
include references to incapacitating agents
(Switzerland) and the OPCW's Programme for Africa
(South Africa). The absence of any clear explanation
by Amb. Dani on process and procedure from the
outset left most delegations in the dark and set the
tone for much of the remainder of the Conference.


8. (C) Immediately after this "first reading," the
COW broke into an informal meeting to discuss the
report, moving from the large plenary hall to a much
smaller conference room at the Convention Center
used for consultations. Since nearly everyone moved
to the smaller room, it was packed and air-less, with
many delegates standing. Amb. Dani began discussion
of the first section of the report, but tried to
force each paragraph to agreement. His lack of
success and resulting resentment was palpable. He
then assigned a small group by fiat to draft new text
for one paragraph over the lunch break; there were
widespread complaints in the room over that procedure
including from the three or four delegations named.
After more time was spent discussing whether to move
to a larger room to accommodate all interested
delegates than was spent on the substance of the
report, Amb. Dani broke for lunch and agreed to
resume the meeting in the OPCW chamber traditionally
used for Executive Council meetings, where the COW
met for the rest of the Conference.


9. (C) From Thursday afternoon (April 10),the COW
laboriously worked its way through the report,
occasionally progressing on some portions while
regressing on others, and leaving the majority of the
text bracketed with competing proposals. Throughout
these discussions, Amb. Dani arrogantly clung to
absolute control of the process, despite repeated
offers by various delegations (both formally and
behind-the-scenes) to assist. He was not familiar
with the text or issues and appeared not to
understand many of the delegations' interventions;
his attempts to suggest compromise text rarely found
support. He floundered in the chair, ineptly asking,

"How many agree with this?" instead of, "Any
objections?"

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GENERAL COMMITTEE -- SAGE ADVICE IGNORED
--------------


10. (C) The General Committee, composed of the ten
vice chairs elected by the regional groups (Kenya,
Nigeria, China, Iran, Czech Republic, Russia, Costa
Rica, Uruguay, France and the U.S.),and advised by
the Director-General and senior TS staff, was
convened only sporadically the first week of the
Conference. The normal role of the General Committee
to help manage the work of the Conference and advise
its Chairmen was not utilized by the Saudi Chair
until it became clear that the Committee of the Whole
was dysfunctional. In early meetings of the General
Committee, Amb. El Khereiji, as would be expected,
expressed complete confidence in and deferred to Amb.
Dani's chairmanship of the COW.


11. (C) Early in the second week, The U.S. proposed
in the General Committee that facilitations on
critical issues begin urgently. Everyone in the
General Committee agreed, even the Iranian Ambassador
after some skeptical questions. The Technical
Secretariat asked DelRep for a list of possible
topics and times for facilitations, and we promptly
produced a notional list for the General Committee to
consider. Amb. Dani obstinately proceeded to ignore
for two more days the counsel of his peers in the
General Committee to begin facilitations, as he
continued to personally chair the large Committee of
the Whole, with no agreement resulting on the draft
report text.

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CRISIS MANAGEMENT
--------------


12. (C) On Wednesday morning (April 16),Amb. Jorge
Lomonaco (Mexico) hosted a breakfast meeting at his
residence in an attempt to help move the Conference
forward. Attendees included Chairmen El Khereiji and
Dani, Amb. Javits, and the ambassadors of the UK,
Cuba, Germany, India and Iran. While the meeting did
not reach any decisions, the ambassadors did discuss
the need for facilitators to assist Amb. Dani, which
he stubbornly continued to reject. The Indian and
Iranian ambassadors both noted a deepening mistrust
among delegations, commented on fundamental
differences held on a number of issues, including
verification, and stressed the need for balance
between Article VII implementation and Art XI
cooperation and assistance.


13. (C) Following the fruitless morning session of
the COW on Wednesday (April 16),the Director General
hosted a lunch for the General Committee and senior
TS staff. This meeting was the turning point for the
conduct of the Conference. Several ambassadors and
TS senior representatives urged Amb. Dani to allow
facilitators to hold consultations on the most
disputed topics. Amb. Dani continued to insist that
the process remain transparent and that the only way
to achieve this was through continuing discussion
among all delegations in the COW. The DG and others
argued that after two readings of the report in the
COW, most delegations would prefer to sacrifice some
transparency in order to reach agreement on a final
document rather than finish the RevCon with nothing
at all. Amb. El Khereiji diplomatically raised his
proposal for a small consultative group to begin
negotiating the remaining issues apart from the COW.
Following the lunch, plans proceeded quickly for this
"rescue operation" of some 18 countries to begin work
in a secret location the next morning.



14. (C) (Del note: Well after the Conference, Amb.
El Khereiji told Amb. Javits that he had had the idea
of a small group in mind even before the Conference
started but was reluctant to raise it because of
strong opinions among the Europeans and others he
consulted that the Iranians should not be permitted
to have closed meetings with the Americans as they
had done at the conclusions of the First RevCon and
at several CSPs since then. Amb. El Khereiji said he
had asked the Iranian ambassador that Wednesday for
his suggestions for the composition of the group, but
expanded the list well beyond those few Iran had
proposed. He also said the list was never closed and
noted that many other countries ended up sitting in
on the small group meetings.)

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FACILITATIONS -- TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE
--------------


15. (C) On Wednesday afternoon, April 16, without
warning, Amb. Dani suddenly announced the launch of
five facilitations, naming the new facilitators on
the floor of the RevCon without prior consultation
with them. The Mexican Ambassador was not present at
the time; his surprised deputy said he would have to
contact his ambassador to see if he were available
and willing to chair a meeting that afternoon. Amb.
Lomonaco later told Delreps that he was furious; he
only agreed to serve as a facilitator to help salvage
the RevCon.


16. (C) These facilitations were allowed only about
two hours each in a confused schedule of rooms and
topics. Led by the Ambassadors of Mexico, Germany,
Sudan, Brazil, and a senior delegate from
Switzerland, the consultations were nevertheless a
useful exercise, and some of the discussions made
progress on agreed language. If they had been
allowed more time, they might have been even more
useful. However, Amb. Dani reconvened the COW even
as many delegates were in the facilitation meetings,
so that some issues were discussed concurrently --
with different results. All-in-all, it was too
little, too late.


17. (C) Late Wednesday evening, the General Committee
met to plan for the next day. The Saudi Ambassador
purposely absented himself. It was agreed that the
small negotiating group would commence its
negotiations the following morning in a relatively
private room at the Convention Center. When asked
what the rest of the Conference delegations would do,
the Russian representative cynically suggested that
they be given the opening section to work on. The
Iranian ambassador complained about the simultaneous
meetings, but the Director General advised him
pointedly to send his "best delegate" to the COW, as
all delegations needed to participate in the work of
the Conference.

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I TRIED TO RESIGN BUT THEY WOULDN'T LET ME
--------------


18. (C) Thursday morning, April 17, started with a
meeting of the small negotiating group of 18
countries in one of the OPCW Conference rooms, during
which Amb. Dani attempted to tender his resignation
as Chairman of the COW. He announced that he had
been unable to sleep the night before due to the
extreme amount of pressure he was under, and that he
"could not stand pressure." Despite being an
experienced diplomat and believing that facilitations
were the way to proceed, he insisted that he had been
forced into accepting facilitation, which had failed.
The other ambassadors present, in an effort to

dissuade him, expressed confidence in him and
encouraged him to continue deliberations in the COW,
noting the important work that remained to be done.
(Del note: Amb. El Khereiji weeks later told Amb.
Javits that Dani had phoned him earlier that Thursday
morning at home to say he was resigning, that he
could not take the pressure. Amb. El Khereiji said
he had tried to "stroke his ego" so the conference
could continue, but Dani still repeated his
resignation later that morning at the meeting.)


19. (C) Amb. Dani's wounded pride and frustration at
being marginalized again came to the fore when he
announced to the entire Committee of the Whole later
that morning that he had offered his resignation and
wished that it had been accepted.

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THE RESCUE OPERATION BEGINS
--------------


20. (C) The invited members of the small group
included 16 countries (Brazil, Canada, China, the
Czech Republic, France, Germany, India, Iran, Japan,
Mexico, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Russia, South
Africa, the UK, and the U.S.) and two observers (Cuba
for the NAM and Slovenia for the EU). The Saudi
Ambassador chaired the meetings, with the Director
General or his Deputy or Ralf Trapp sitting by his
side, and the group began working through the entire
report late Thursday morning (April 17). Progress at
first was slow, with the discussion mirroring the
polarized debate from the COW and the earlier working
group discussions of the same text. Much of the text
was bracketed in order to move on. The group worked
through meals, with sandwiches ordered in by the TS,
and took no breaks until early Friday morning.


21. (C) At one point on Thursday evening, the Iranian
ambassador disappeared and his delegation could not
speak to any of the issues on the table. Realizing
that any agreements would all be re-opened by the
Iranians the next day, a British delegate consulted
with key western delegations, and Amb. Javits
subsequently took the floor to insist that the
Iranian Ambassador be called back into the
negotiations. Iranian Amb. Ziaran could not have
been far away, because he re-appeared soon afterwards
and the discussion continued. At the request of the
Indian Ambassador that she needed to sleep, Amb. El
Khereiji agreed to recess for a break at 4:00 a.m.
Friday morning to reconvene at 9:00, although he said
he himself was prepared to continue straight through.

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THE COW PLODS ON
--------------


22. (C) Following the aborted facilitations, and the
sequestering of the small negotiating group, Amb.
Dani reconvened the Committee of the Whole on
Thursday, April 17, to begin one more discussion of
the introductory paragraphs of the draft report.
Delegations were confused as to their role and asked
about the small group, which Amb. Dani described as
"normal consultations" with no details as to which
delegations were participating or what report
sections they were discussing. The Swiss delegate
announced a meeting that morning to continue his
facilitation on the functioning of the Organization,
only to find that it was not needed any longer and
few delegations showed up. As with his appointment
by Amb. Dani as a facilitator, neither was he told
that the negotiations had moved elsewhere. Most of
the delegations that were participating in the small
group also sent delegates to represent their
countries in the COW, although Pakistan's chair was
empty. The discussion settled into the well worn path

of known positions, following earlier COW discussions
during the RevCon of the same material just as with
even earlier sessions in the Open Ended Working
Group.


23. (C) By Friday, the final day of the Conference, a
number of delegations (Indonesia, Philippines,
Thailand, Malaysia, Italy, Slovakia, Malta, Sweden,
Austria, Ireland, Nigeria) requested briefings on the
activities of the small negotiating group, including
which delegations were represented, and how the COW's
deliberations would mesh with the work being done in
the other group. Amb. Dani provided very little
information, raising the level of dissatisfaction
with the transparency and legitimacy of the process.
U.S. Del joined others in formally requesting a
briefing by the Chair of the RevCon or the DG on the
small group's negotiations, in an effort to increase
transparency and lower frustrations. The DG did
brief the COW just before the Friday lunch break, but
did not reveal the countries involved in the smaller
group nor provide any real insight into the progress
being made.


24. (C) Throughout the deliberations in the COW, the
Iranian delegate consistently blocked any compromise
language, either citing NAM positions or insisting
that he "had no instructions" on the matter at hand.
Amb. Dani lectured many delegates on the need to
compromise during the debate, but became incensed
with the Iranian obstruction. At one point, he told
him that it was the day before the end of the
Conference and that he "had better get instructions."
On another issue, Amb. Dani asked whether other NAM
members present agreed with the characterization of
the NAM position by the Iranian delegation. Several
NAM members spoke against what Iran was portraying as
the NAM position. The Cuban delegate intervened to
state that the NAM position was guidance and not
immutable; delegations, of course, were free to
express their national views. By Friday, the Iranian
delegates were constantly referring to the need to
wait for the results from the "other room" and that
"nothing was decided until everything was decided."
When Amb. Dani reacted to Iran's total disregard and
disrespect for the proceedings of the COW, the
Iranian delegate dramatically stormed out of the
room.


25. (C) Without Iran present, the COW suddenly began
meaningful negotiations and reached consensus on much
of the introductory text. A small group of
interested parties agreed to draft compromise
language over the lunch break on the most
controversial paragraphs on terrorism. Colombia,
Indonesia, France, Russia, the U.S. and others
crafted a paragraph on terrorism, citing the UN
Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions
(including UNSCR 1540). It included a caveat to
allay NAM concerns that the OPCW is independent from
the United Nations but contributes to broader global
efforts to combat terrorism. This draft language was
later approved by the COW, minus Iran.
Unfortunately, much later that evening in the small
group, Iran turned that text on its head by
emphasizing the autonomy of the OPCW and gutting the
UN references and international cooperation.

--------------
WAITING FOR GODOT
--------------


26. (SBU) The COW wrapped up its work on the
introductory paragraphs of the report late Friday
afternoon. At Amb. Dani's instruction that the COW
would formally re-convene in plenary at 7:30 p.m.,
delegations dutifully moved to the auditorium in the
Convention Center, awaiting a text of the rest of the

report from the small group and discussion of the
final draft text. They were to wait a very long time
indeed.

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SMALL GROUP SHIFTS INTO HIGH GEAR
--------------


27. (C) When the small group of 18 met again after a
few hours of sleep on Friday morning, they began work
on the text where they had left off (Article X).
However, a growing sense of unease spread as many
people began to realize how much of the text was left
-- both bracketed from the day before and sections
yet to be discussed. The Saudi ambassador proved
himself to be a very capable chair, shifting into a
much faster mode and pushing decisions through. The
Director General weighed in actively advising the
Chairman on the text, as did UK Amb. Parker, who knew
the sections intimately from the working group draft
and could identify all the fault lines. Both Amb.
Parker and the Director General were helpful in
moving through difficult issues. Deals were also
brokered at the margins of the table, usually by one
or two delegations with Iran, and occasionally India
and Pakistan. All of these marginal deals were
brought back to the larger group to approve.
Unfortunately, the TS assistants trying to record the
agreed changes to the text could not always keep up
with the rapid pace. The final text shows some of
the awkwardness and inaccuracies of speed editing,
and some omissions may have been made inadvertently.


28. (C) (Del Note: The UK delegation told DelRep
after the RevCon that Amb. Parker had purposely
chosen to sit near the head of the table so that he
and the Director General could quietly guide the
chair through the text and the negotiations. At
least one delegation, which was near the other end of
the table, said they had considered moving closer to
the head of the table to hear more of what was going
on and to be more active.)


29. (C) By about 9:00 Friday evening, the small group
came to the end of the report with agreement on
almost all paragraphs, except for the introduction
(which had been left for the COW) and the paragraphs
on terrorism and UNSCR 1540. At Iran's urging, Amb.
El Khereiji agreed to leave aside the terrorism
reference and tackle the introduction. The U.S.
Delegation and others noted that the COW had been
able to reach agreement on most of the introduction
and encouraged those present to be mindful of the
work of all those delegations not represented in the
small group. The Indian ambassador pointedly
responded that she did not recognize the work of the
COW and insisted that she would abandon the
negotiations wholesale if the small group could not
edit the introduction as it wished. Her comments
were echoed by Iran and Pakistan, who had, like
India, essentially abandoned the COW in favor of the
small negotiating group.


30. (C) Despite the palpably tense atmosphere in the
room following the Indian ambassador's protestations,
the group agreed to go through the introduction to
make sure it tracked with the changes made in the
rest of the text. Using the COW's revised draft,
delegations proceeded to walk back or slash a number
of paragraphs that had achieved consensus in the COW.


31. (C) Despite not having finished the introduction,
by 11:00 p.m. the DG suggested breaking in order to
hold a plenary session of the COW and to update the
increasingly restless delegations that were milling
around the corridors of the Convention Center. It
was agreed to do so only on the understanding that
the small group would reconvene to finalize the

report.

--------------
AND THEN TIME STOOD STILL
--------------


32. (SBU) When it became apparent that the small
group would not finish before midnight, Amb. Javits
sent a Delrep to consult with the TS on the legality
of continuing the proceedings beyond the scheduled
date of April 18, when the RevCon's mandate
officially expired, or, in the alternative, arranging
to "stop the clock." With midnight fast approaching,
the Secretariat's solution was to place a large clock
near the podium and to stop it at 11:55 p.m., thereby
allowing the Conference to continue as long as
necessary. The Conference formally reconvened to
stop the clock and take care of a few other
procedural matters. Delegations were informed that a
draft text of the report would be available shortly.
After this brief interlude, the Conference again
recessed, with most delegations consigned to waiting
while the small group reconvened to finish
deliberating the report. Delegations began to thin
noticeably with departures for flights, other
engagements, or sleep.


33. (C) After having been cooped up for two days and
with only a few final paragraphs left to consider,
the mood in the small negotiating group was
increasingly strained. Delegations appeared to have
reached a point where they were unwilling to make any
more concessions. Things came to a head when the
South African delegate objected to a one-sentence
reference to challenge inspections in the
introduction, claiming that developed countries were
using the threat of challenge inspections as a sword
pointed toward smaller, developing countries. At
this point, Amb. Javits seized the opportunity to
intervene, lambasting the South African delegate for
impugning the trust and integrity of the States
Parties to the Convention and for resorting to scare
tactics to sway small delegations. He described the
challenge inspection as a sword of Damocles hanging
over everyone, best if never used. Stunned silence
ensued.


34. (C) Like a thunderstorm breaking open the
oppressive atmosphere to allow the rain to fall,
delegations began to heed Amb. Javits' call and
reached agreement on the remaining portions of the
text. All was agreed -- except for the paragraphs on
terrorism. Iran had repeatedly insisted that its
willingness to concede on other issues was dependent
on having acceptable language on terrorism. While
other delegations were willing to agree to the
compromise language from the COW, the Iranian
delegation continued to object. Amb. El Khereiji,
noting that all of the options and arguments had
already been discussed, instructed Iran to draft
language and to work with other delegations to reach
agreement. He then adjourned the small group around
2:30 a.m. to give the TS time to consolidate the text
before distributing it for plenary consideration.

--------------
DEALING WITH THE DEVIL
--------------


35. (C) As the small group adjourned, the Iranian
Ambassador approached Amb. Javits and asked for input
on the terrorism language. Amb. Javits commented
that the draft sentences they showed him did not meet
the needs of other delegations. He said the text
should include reference to UNSCR 1540 and
cooperation between the OPCW and the UN and other
international organizations working to counter
terrorism. He also said the paragraph should be

highlighted in the introduction and that he looked
forward to seeing their final proposal.


36. (C) It later emerged that the Iranian delegation
went to the French delegation privately and presented
their proposed terrorism language, indicating that
Amb. Javits had agreed to it. The French delegation
then agreed to accept the Iranian proposal (without
checking back with the U.S.) as the best deal they
could get. The Iranian "deal" repeated the language
of the First Review Conference in the introduction,
noting the increased threat of terrorism, and
relegated the other paragraph to the final section of
the report on the Functioning of the Organization.
That paragraph emphasized the autonomy of the OPCW
and merely "took cognizance of the resolutions of the
United Nations on combating terrorism." Iran then
presented their draft to the TS as agreed language to
be inserted in the report with no further meeting or
consultation by the small group.


37. (C) The EU called a meeting to discuss the text
and agreed to accept the weakened terrorism language.
Many delegations did so reluctantly as UNSCR 1540 had
been a key EU objective. When the U.S. Delegation
advised the French and several other delegations, as
well as the TS, that the U.S. had not seen the final
Iranian terrorism language nor agreed to it, the
Iranian ambassador made a blunt threat that if
delegations wanted to "re-open" the text, they could
take responsibility for not reaching a final report.
European delegations told U.S. DelReps that they had
accepted the terrorism language to avoid scuttling
the entire report.

--------------
THE FINAL SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE
--------------


38. (SBU) Meanwhile, weary delegates continued to
mill around and wait. By 4:00 a.m. Saturday, April
19, the TS started to distribute the draft of the
final report. Amb. Dani reconvened the COW and asked
for delegations to approve the circulated report.
Echoing comments previously made by several
delegations, the Philippines delegate insisted that
time be given for all delegations to review the final
report before adopting it; she also stated that she
did not recognize the introductory paragraphs as they
did not reflect what had been agreed earlier by the
COW. Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand supported the
Philippines. Amb. Dani replied that, unfortunately,
there was no time to recess and the report had to be
approved immediately. The Philippines delegate
intervened a second time, supported by other
Southeast Asian and several European delegations, and
Amb. Dani finally agreed to recess for a token 30
minutes for delegations to review the draft report.


39. (SBU) Following the 30-minute review period, and
as dawn began to break outside, the Committee of the
Whole approved the final report, despite many
delegations (including the Philippines, Malaysia, and
Thailand) lamenting strongly the lack of transparency
or full representation of all delegations in the
process. The plenary session of the Review
Conference then adopted the report of the Committee
of the Whole. As many delegates nodded off in sleep,
the final formalities and votes of thanks concluded
the Conference.

--------------
LESSONS TO BE LEARNED
--------------


40. (C) The results of the Review Conference, the
final report, and evaluations of the procedures for
producing that report will all provide fodder for

analysts for a long time to come. The Del's initial
list of lessons for the future and recommendations
for the next Review Conference follows:

-- Representation and transparency do matter greatly.
The NAM has preempted the role of several regional
groups that do not work well, and a few delegations
(Iran, India, South Africa, fronted by Cuba) have
taken over the NAM. The regional groups need to be
held to higher levels of accountability by and toward
their constituents, with a spotlight on their
representatives' actions.

-- Personalities also matter a great deal. While a
lot of lobbying and discussion took place before
choosing and recruiting the Saudi Chairman, less
thought was given to the even more critical role of
the Committee of the Whole. The main concern, at
that time, was to get anyone other than the Iranian
Ambassador as Chairman. Amb. Dani, while well
respected, proved disastrously incompetent in
chairing the major work of the Conference.

-- Conference structures and meetings at different
levels should have clearly stated agendas and
purpose. The General Committee in this RevCon was not
used by the leadership to share responsibility and
information about the workflow. Regional groups were
not required during the RevCon to hold regular
meetings nor tasked with disseminating information.
The Committee of the Whole never had a published or
pre-agreed agenda for any of its meetings and often
lacked specificity on the time and place for the next
meeting.

-- Facilitations should start early and provide
continuity between the working group preparations and
the Conference itself. In this RevCon, facilitations
commenced in the Open Ended Working Group only after
the draft text had been completed two weeks before
the Conference, and then re-started under different
facilitators far too late during the RevCon. Early
appointment of capable facilitators, even before the
RevCon begins, could provide additional expertise and
experience in resolving specific issues, and ideally
would allow earlier agreement on the bulk of the
text.

-- No delegation should be allowed to hijack the
process. Iran followed past practice by holding the
entire text hostage until the bitter end, and by
insisting on secret negotiations. This RevCon
broadened the number of delegations participating in
the small negotiating group, far more than some of
the back room meetings of past Executive Councils and
Conferences of States Parties. But, Iran could have
been more effectively isolated by putting the small
group on record -- formally recording the proceedings
on video tape, and requiring the group's
representatives to be endorsed by and to report back
to the regional groups.

-- Professional facilitation and chairing techniques
could be taught more widely to multilateral
delegates. Dealing with conflict or obstruction in a
meeting is a skill that few people have
instinctively, but it can be learned. Facilitators
for large multilateral meetings should be known to
have the necessary skills before being asked to chair
critical issues.


41. (U) Javits sends.
Gallagher