Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08THEHAGUE433
2008-05-21 15:48:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

CWC REVIEW CONFERENCE PART III: ANALYSIS OF THE

Tags:  PARM PREL CWC 
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UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000433 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR,
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP>
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (ROBERTS)
NSC FOR SMITH
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CWC REVIEW CONFERENCE PART III: ANALYSIS OF THE
FINAL REPORT

REF: A. STATE 17328


B. THE HAGUE 349

C. THE HAGUE 420

D. THE HAGUE 425

This is CWC-22-08.

-------
SUMMARY
-------

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000433

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR,
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP>
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (ROBERTS)
NSC FOR SMITH
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CWC REVIEW CONFERENCE PART III: ANALYSIS OF THE
FINAL REPORT

REF: A. STATE 17328


B. THE HAGUE 349

C. THE HAGUE 420

D. THE HAGUE 425

This is CWC-22-08.

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (U) This cable is part of a series on the Second
Chemical Weapons Convention Review Conference
(RevCon) April 7-18, 2008. It follows the initial
report at the end of the Conference (ref b),and
reports on the opening plenary sessions of the
Conference and the general debate (ref c) and events
on the margins of the Conference (ref d). One more
cable will follow focusing on the process during the
Conference and lessons learned.


2. (SBU) Negotiations at the OPCW Second Review
Conference (RevCon) were characterized by a number of
long-standing debates on issues of importance to
States Parties, but there were also several
contentious issues that received far less attention
than expected. Iran, frequently assisted by India,
South Africa and Pakistan, played its customary role,
holding various sections of the text hostage until
the eleventh hour and showing a particularly
troubling desire to walk back agreed language from
the First Review Conference. Despite Iranian
objections, the de facto solution that developed for
breaking through impasses was to fall back to either
language from the First Review Conference or the
Convention itself.


3. (SBU) Overall, the final report of the RevCon met
key U.S. objectives (ref a) in a number of areas and
the U.S. Del successfully defended our red lines.
The report reinforces commitment to all of the
Convention's provisions, lays some groundwork for
future evolution of the verification regime and
solidly underlines the importance of national
implementation of the convention. The report
acknowledges the impact of developments in science
and technology on the work of the Organization and
encourages States Parties to cooperate in mitigating
the threat of terrorist use of toxic chemicals as
chemical weapons, although both of these issues were
watered down in the report by NAM and, especially,
Iranian opposition.


4. (SBU) As was clear in the months leading up to the
RevCon, the conference proved less an opportunity to

propose new initiatives than a setting in which the
U.S. and other like-minded delegations spent much of
their time defending past achievements and fending
off problematic NAM advances. What did not/not find
its way into the report is as important as what did
in many cases. References, oblique or direct, to
"incapacitants"; non-compliance in 2012; and
portrayal of the Australia Group as inconsistent with
the CWC were either minimal or avoided altogether.
The U.S. and allies also succeeded in denying new
initiatives with respect to victims of chemical
warfare (particularly, Iranian lobbying for
compensation of their victims of Iraqi use of
chemical weapons); an Article XI Action Plan; and
unrestrained budget increases for International
Cooperation and Assistance. Although not discernable
as accomplishments in the final report, these were
hard-won successes in the negotiations.


5. (U) The sections below follow the order of the
RevCon agenda and final report.

-------------- --------------
THE ROLE OF THE CWC IN ENHANCING INTERNATIONAL PEACE
AND SECURITY AND ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVES AS SET
FORTH IN THE PREAMBLE OF THE CONVENTION
-------------- --------------


6. (SBU) In the absence of a political declaration,
the opening paragraphs of the substantive report
(Agenda Item 9) serve as an overview of progress
made, challenges confronting, and future work to be
done on the topics covered by the articles of the
CWC. The debate on this section by the Committee of
the Whole reflected the parallel debate in the
smaller negotiating group, with a few noteworthy
exceptions. Iran introduced language on riot control
agents (RCAs) and incapacitating agents up front,
clearly unacceptable to the U.S. This was eventually
replaced by compromise language that quoted verbatim
the CWC's Article I undertaking not to use RCAs as a
method of warfare. Iran also sought a declaration
that the use of chemical weapons was "illegal under
any circumstances," a characterization the U.S.
considered inappropriate as it assigns the CWC the
status of customary international law. Compromise
language was adopted based on language in the
Director General's statement to the conference that
"an overwhelming majority of states consider chemical
weapons...to be illegal and prohibited." India
substituted "prohibited" for the DG's stronger term
"immoral", creating the redundancy in the final
version of the sentence.


7. (SBU) Despite numerous NAM attempts to delete all
references to non-proliferation, a reference to the
non-proliferation aims of the Convention was retained
in the opening section. A paragraph noting the
impact of scientific and technological progress and
highlighting the role of the Scientific Advisory
Board was also retained, despite a slightly
surprising NAM reluctance to acknowledge any such
impact.


8. (SBU) One very contentious topic was the role of
the OPCW in the fight against terrorism. The debate
was foreshadowed by a bitter fight on the agenda of
the RevCon, months before the conference itself.
France and Algeria were particularly insistent that
terrorism be given a separate sub-item; Iran and
others were equally insistent that it not be
mentioned. In the end, the Executive Council agreed
to take terrorism off the agenda with a commitment by
delegations that absence of any one topic (and citing
terrorism as the prime example) from the agenda in no
way precluded discussion or report language at the
RevCon. In the pre-RevCon Open-ended Working Group,
the Chair's drafts consistently referred to terrorism
in the opening section. Despite bitter protests by
Iran, a paragraph on terrorism was retained in the
opening section throughout RevCon negotiations in the
Committee of the Whole along with the understanding
that it would also appear later in the report. A
number of delegations had a strong interest in not
only ensuring language on terrorism, but including a
specific reference to UNSCR 1540.


9. (SBU) The Iranians were surprisingly flexible on a
number of issues expected to generate far more debate
in the RevCon. Instead, the Iranian "must-have" (or,
in this case, must not have) that emerged was the
deletion of any reference to UNSCR 1540 specifically,
and the more general goal of minimizing references to
the OPCW's role in the fight against terrorism. In
the final hours of negotiation, Iran managed to
eliminate all references to UNSCR 1540, leaving a
paragraph on terrorism in the opening section that
instead repeated language from the first Review
Conference. This noted the increased danger of the

use of chemical weapons by terrorists, but referred
to an EC decision from 2001 rather than any more
recent action in the UN or the OPCW. The Iranians
fought for and achieved that the only other paragraph
on terrorism would appear in the final section of the
report on the functioning of the Organization, that
emphasized the OPCW's autonomy and merely "took
cognizance of the resolutions of the United Nations
on combating terrorism."


10. (SBU) From a U.S. perspective, the report's
acknowledgement of the increased threat of terrorism
coupled with the urging of cooperation to prevent
terrorist acquisition of CW can be considered to have
met our RevCon objectives on terrorism. However, the
loss of the reference to UNSCR 1540 and a general
weakening of the topic by burying it in last section
was a significant disappointment to many delegations.

--------------
ENSURING THE UNIVERSALITY OF THE CWC
--------------


11. (SBU) The Universality section was one of the
most non-controversial and extensively discussed
sections of the Chair's text. Issues included
whether to address by name the twelve states not
party to the CWC, and how to encourage those that
were already in the process of preparing to accede
(para 9.16). The now common Iranian mantra of
"States not Party whose non-adherence is a matter of
serious concern," a transparent jab at Israel that
they tried to insert in five places, was whittled
down to two references in the final report. Another
important accomplishment was ensuring that
universality alone was not considered a panacea; and
that full implementation of, and compliance with the
Convention was also necessary. The NAM proposed
dropping references to both compliance and
implementation, for which the most vocal proponents
were Iran, India and Pakistan. The U.S. delegation
argued that it doesn't matter how many join "the
club" if all members do not play by the rules. The
final text of this section stresses that universality
must be matched by full implementation.

-------------- --------------
GENERAL OBLIGATIONS AND DECLARATIONS RELATED THERETO
-------------- --------------


12. (SBU) Negotiations on this section covered
several issues of significance for the U.S., and the
final text may be more noteworthy for what it does
not/not address. Switzerland, supported by Austria,
Sweden, Norway, and to some extent Germany and the
UK, proposed that the EC address new developments in
the field of incapacitating agents. Iran
additionally proposed that such new developments were
a cause for concern which could be detrimental to the
object and purpose of the Convention. The U.S.
Delegation proposed compromise language, to which the
Swiss attempted to add language regarding follow-on
discussions. When this language, including the
follow on, was addressed in the small negotiating
group, the entire reference was dropped in response
to U.S. and Russian objections.


13. (SBU) Pursuant to instructions, the U.S.
Delegation proposed including language in this
section confirming that the CWC prohibits any
preparations by a States Party for the possible
production or use of chemical weapons, including the
development of plans for the mobilization of
industrial or research facilities for such purposes.
This proposal met with enthusiastic support from
other WEOG delegations and strong resistance from NAM
delegations and Russia. It was eventually dropped.



14. (SBU) The Chair's draft text also built in
repetition of the comprehensive nature of the CWC's
prohibitions throughout, which the U.S. and others
strongly supported. Predictably, the NAM proposed
deletion of most of these references. The final text
retained one strong reaffirmation of the contentious
definitions and their comprehensive nature and the
General Purpose Criterion.

-------------- --------------
DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND DESTRUCTION OR
CONVERSION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES
-------------- --------------


15. (SBU) The NAM sought early on to characterize
destruction as "core", "critical", "crucial",
"fundamental", or any of a number of other adjectives
to convey a sense of graduated levels of importance
between the different treaty obligations. Balanced
language was eventually found to underscore the
importance of several obligations, instead of placing
the disarmament objectives of the CWC above all
others. The NAM, with the exception of India, also
attempted to downplay the significant progress made
so far by possessor states in destruction of their
chemical weapons. Never one to settle for a single
reference when a dozen will do, Iran also managed to
work in an excessive number of references to the
"final extended deadlines," awkward from a drafting
perspective but adding no substantive difference.


16. (SBU) Having remained silent throughout the
majority of the Open Ended Working Group meetings,
Russia emerged as a surprisingly constructive ally on
destruction. This was clearly the issue of
importance for Moscow, and the Russian delegation was
vocal and effective in pushing back on NAM attempts
to inappropriately elevate the importance of Article
IV and V obligations.


17. (SBU) The expected debate over what to do when
one or more of the possessor states fail to meet the
2012 deadline was all but absent. This may be
attributable, at least in part, to the Director-
General's early and clear statements that it would be
premature to discuss possible non-compliance at this
RevCon. His suggestion that a special session of the
Conference of States Parties could be convened closer
to 2012 may also have vented some of the steam that
would otherwise have built on this issue.


18. (SBU) One paragraph that took a somewhat
disproportionate role in the negotiations on this
section was the reference to the EC visit to
Anniston. The debate took shape much as it did
during EC-52, with WEOG delegations attempting to
characterize the visit(s) as valuable, the NAM
insisting upon "expressing concern" in an attempt to
call into question the utility of a process already
set in motion by a CSP-11 decision, and the U.S.
probably taking a fairly passive role. The final
language did little more than acknowledge that the
visit had occurred.

--------------
VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES OF THE OPCW
--------------


19. (SBU) From an organizational perspective, the
placement of Verification after Destruction was
illogical and made for a less cohesive text. This
was an unfortunate carryover from the agenda debate,
and a transparent play by the NAM to give destruction
optical as well as substantive preeminence.


20. (SBU) Several of the U.S. objectives for

verification fell under the broader category of
adapting the verification regime to address changes
in technology, chemical industry, and the threat
posed by terrorist use of toxic chemicals. Debate on
this section of the report centered on a desire by
WEOG, Japan and others to point to the need for a
continuing evolution of the verification regime. In
almost direct opposition was a NAM effort to portray
the verification regime as having met the
requirements of the Convention, thus implying further
work or adaptation to an ever-changing environment
would be unnecessary. The final report language
struck a balanced tone, acknowledging the progress
made thus far and the need for further evolution.

--------------
ACTIVITIES NOT PROHIBITED UNDER THE CWC
--------------


21. (SBU) Discussion in this area was noteworthy
because of the U.S. objectives that were maintained
in the report, despite significant disagreement by
the NAM and associated States Parties. Also, several
subjects of significant NAM input were condensed to
manageable report elements. Some examples follow.


22. (SBU) The NAM's insistence on using the term
"hierarchy of risk" in relation to Scheduled
chemicals and the verification activities that result
from such declarations was successfully fought back.
The "hierarchy" term is not used in the report at
all. Although paragraph 9.54 of the report speaks to
the risk posed by the Scheduled chemicals (as laid
out in the language of the Annex on Chemicals),it
clearly points out that the risk from the various
chemicals is only one factor considered in the
selection of a plant site or facility for inspection.
Also, early NAM drafts stated that there is no risk
associated with discrete organic chemicals, an idea
which was successfully removed from the report.


23. (SBU) In addition, it was possible to
successfully maintain the inspections statistics laid
out in paragraph 9.55. The NAM's efforts to remove
the percentages that demonstrate the significant
under-inspection of OCPF plant sites were overcome,
and these statistics were maintained.


24. (SBU) Despite a significant effort by the NAM and
others to reduce the importance of discussions on
developments in science and technology, several
references were preserved throughout the report,
including in paragraph 9.58 of this section.


25. (U) In paragraph 9.60, the importance of timely
submission of declarations was captured, and the EC-
51 decision on this matter was cited.


26. (SBU) Discussions in the late run-up to the
Review Conference saw Iran starting to express some
interest in adding language to the report on the
topic of low concentration thresholds for Schedule
2A/2A* chemicals. This may have just been done in an
effort to try to muddy the waters for the WEOG
delegations and Japan, those most interested in the
matter and still in disagreement on a solution. In
the end, Iran made no more mischief on the matter.
Canada's call for report language that would put in
place an interim declaration requirement (based on
the last facilitator's draft from the fall of 2006),
although supported from the floor by a large number
of WEOG delegations, was quickly cut down by the
German delegation. In the end, an expression of
concern and an urging to resume work promptly were
all that ended up in the report.


27. (SBU) On the various topics under consideration

regarding OCPF declarations, nothing in the report
caused any damage to U.S. objectives. The report
calls for early resumption of consultations on the
selection methodology, citing the relevant paragraphs
of Part IX of the Verification Annex. However,
language specifically focusing on proposals by States
Parties (element c of paragraph 11) was not achieved.
There was significant concern by India about any
mention of efforts to improve OCPF declarations to
enable focusing verification activities on the most
relevant plant sites, but eventual language making it
clear that this would be done without imposition of
any additional declaration obligations allowed this
concept to be captured in the final report.


28. (SBU) Despite the usual blustering from Iran,
report language on transfers of Schedule 3 chemicals
to States not Party made no movement toward the ban
Iran wants. In the end, the report does nothing more
than reaffirm and reference the EC-47 decision. In
early sidebar conversations, an Iranian delegate
confided to Delrep that some of the biggest concerns
in this area (meaning transfers to Israel) come from
some of their NAM colleagues -- China and India.

--------------
NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES
--------------


29. (SBU) The discussions in the area of national
implementation (Article VII) fell along historical
lines, with WEOG delegations and many others calling
for continued work toward all States Parties meeting
their obligations and the NAM calling simply for
further encouragement. Many of the comments by Iran
and India in the final run-up to the Review
Conference gave the impression that they would try to
truncate the Article VII Action Plan by focusing
future work solely on the TS reporting elements
(i.e., States Parties notifying the TS of their
efforts, however minimal). There was also an
expectation that, as had been attempted previously,
the NAM would try to barter continued work on Article
VII for an Action Plan for Article XI. None of these
concerns became reality.


30. (SBU) In the end, the report captured U.S.
objectives by highlighting the need for a
comprehensive approach to the enactment of
implementing legislation, filling gaps in
legislation, and ensuring that legislation fully
reflects CWC prohibitions. The report also retained
statistics regarding progress to date, something the
NAM had fought to remove in hopes of minimizing the
importance of these issues. In national statements
and within the meeting of the Committee of the Whole,
a number of normally quiet delegations (particularly
within the GRULAC) spoke about the importance of
Article VII efforts.


31. (U) This section of the report, interestingly,
also captures language on a number of other important
elements as they relate to Article VII, i.e., changes
in the security environment, changes in science and
technology, and terrorism.

--------------
CONSULTATIONS, COOPERATION AND FACT FINDING
--------------


32. (SBU) The debate on Article IX followed
traditional lines. The NAM, China and Russia implied
that a challenge inspection could not be launched
without either exhausting all other Article IX
options first or resolving the "unresolved issues"
from the Preparatory Commission. The U.S., WEOG and
others insisted that States Parties had the right,

without prejudice, to request a challenge inspection.
The inevitable result was a fairly neutral text that
met U.S. objectives by reaffirming the right of
States Parties to request a challenge inspection and
continuing the TS mandate to maintain a high standard
of readiness to conduct a challenge inspection. Of
note, however, was a slight shift in the
characterization of the "unresolved issues." The
report of the First RevCon simply requested the
Council to resolve these issues expeditiously; the
new report repeated this but additionally noted that
their resolution "is important for challenge
inspections."

-------------- --------------
ASSISTANCE AND PROTECTION AGAINST CHEMICAL WEAPONS
-------------- --------------


33. (SBU) Like destruction, Article X was another
area more noteworthy for the debate that did not
occur. Having assured delegations for weeks before
the RevCon that they would "have some additional
language" on assistance for victims of chemical
warfare, the Iranians came forward fairly late with
language that was clearly unacceptable to any
delegation but their own. However, in discussion of
this section of the report, most of these proposals
dropped out with little or no protest. This was
particularly surprising given the presence of Iranian
victims of chemical warfare at the World Forum
Convention Center manning an exhibit and setting the
stage to somehow transform the tragedy of the Iraqi
attack on Iran into an OPCW responsibility. In the
final report, the reference to victims was
essentially a restatement of the CSP-12 decision,
although this was complemented by Iranian language on
"ensuring the availability of adequate resources" for
the Director General to take measures of assistance
for victims. Even this was caveated as emergency
assistance, thus not a real victory for Iran.


34. (SBU) Despite its length and repetition, this
section covered little else of substance. However,
two other themes did emerge. One was an effort to
broaden the mandate of Article X assistance,
ostensibly only to cover incidents of terrorist use
of toxic chemicals, but several proposals veered
uncomfortably close to establishing a mandate for the
OPCW in the case of industrial accidents. The
connection between assistance and protection under
Article X and the OPCW's role in the fight against
terrorism was also evident. Despite resistance to
acknowledgement of terrorism in the report as a
whole, and certainly to any mention of UNSCR 1540,
Iran allowed a specific reference to terrorists in
the Assistance and Protection section.

--------------
ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
--------------


35. (SBU) Despite concerns that virtually every other
section of the report would be held hostage to
demands for an Article XI Action Plan, and a
particularly problematic NAM alternative text for
this section, the final text on Economic and
Technological Development was far more reasonable
than expected. The debate ran along familiar lines,
with the NAM calling for an almost unlimited and
ever-increasing pool of financial and human resources
to be devoted to international cooperation, in
contrast to developed countries seeking to ensure
relevant programs were carried out within reasonable
guidelines and with objective assessments of
effectiveness and efficiency. The usual sub rosa
Iranian/Cuban attack on the Australia Group as
inconsistent with the provisions of the Convention

was also present, but did not play a particularly
significant role in the negotiations.


36. (SBU) NAM alternative text sought rather
blatantly to create new obligations where none
existed in the Convention, and also to claim that
international assistance needs, defined vaguely if at
all, were not being met. The final text, however,
reflected their reluctant acceptance that assistance
to States Parties in fulfilling their CWC obligations
was in fact valuable assistance under Article XI.

--------------
ARTICLES XII TO XV AND FINAL CLAUSES
--------------


37. (SBU) This paragraph was never contested. There
was some concern initially that Iran would try to use
the provisions of Article XII to set the stage for
accusing the U.S. of being in non-compliance with the
Convention after April 2012 because of ongoing
destruction efforts. Those concerns never
materialized.

--------------
THE PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
--------------


38. (SBU) This was another relatively non-
controversial section of the report. There was some
unexpected resistance to language welcoming the
progress made on the Verification Information System,
which may have been based on actual concerns
regarding the protection of electronically submitted
data, but also seemed to be in keeping with a general
refusal on the part of the NAM to acknowledge
positive steps or progress in any area since the
First RevCon. One practical step forward in this new
text was to request a recommendation from the
Secretariat on the long-term handling of confidential
information, an issue that languished in
consultations for years, thanks to Iran.

--------------
THE GENERAL FUNCTIONING OF THE OPCW
--------------


39. (U) In addition to covering some of the more
administrative aspects of the Organization, this
section of the report also became the de facto
recipient of other issues that were either too
contentious or not significant enough to receive
their own heading. Terrorism, falling into the first
category, was relegated to a mention here. Language
on the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB),focusing
primarily on procedure as opposed to substance, also
landed here and seemed to serve as a substitute for a
more in-depth assessment of the impact of advances
since the First RevCon in science and technology on
the work of the Organization.


40. (SBU) Compromise language on the SAB gave India
and Iran the "meeting of government experts" that
they both sought to discuss the SAB's report to the
RevCon. While many viewed a similar meeting that had
been held in conjunction with the First RevCon to
have been a colossal waste of time and energy, the
compromise limited the exercise to one meeting as
opposed to setting up a standing body as envisaged by
India. The compromise further prevented the SAB's
future work from falling victim to this practice,
instead requesting the Director-General to provide
advice on the best way to enhance interaction between
the SAB and States Parties in the future. In keeping
with a U.S. proposal, SAB language also called for
increased funding of the SAB through the regular
budget to include two regular meetings annually, as

well as two meetings annually of SAB temporary
working groups.


41. (SBU) The sole reference to terrorism stressed
the OPCW's independence before simply taking
cognizance of UN resolutions on combating terrorism.
Previous French insistence for stronger language on
terrorism was placated with a reference to the Open-
ended Working Group on Terrorism, which is chaired by
France.


42. (SBU) In discussions of TS staffing, a familiar
developed/developing world debate also played out in
characterization of the attention that should be
given to equitable geographical representation. The
report also recognized, in light of the tenure
policy, the need to maintain a high level of
expertise, specifically CW-related.


43. (U) Javits sends.
Gallagher