NETHERLANDS/GAERC: FLEXIBILITY ON SERBIA SAA/ICTY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000372

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2018
TAGS: PREL EU XF ZL NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/GAERC: FLEXIBILITY ON SERBIA SAA/ICTY
CONDITIONALITY

REF: A. STATE 43742


B. GIAUQUE GAERC EMAIL 4/21/08

C. THE HAGUE 355

D. FALLS-GIAUQUE EMAIL 4/22/08

THE HAGUE 00000372 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael F. Gallagher for reasons 1.5(b
) and (d)


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On April 22, Charge d'Affaires reviewed ref
B points on the Middle East with Baroness van Lynden-Leijten,
Dutch MFA Director for Middle East and North Africa Affairs,
and her deputy, Gert Heijkoop. Also on April 22, 2008
POLOFF delivered ref B points to Dutch MFA EU Correspondent
Desiree Kopmels and other key contacts. The Dutch reaction
on Iran was discussed in reftel C. FM Verhagen's pre-GAERC
overview letter to the Dutch parliament was reported in ref

D.


2. (C) On the Balkans, the Dutch are willing to look at
"creative" solutions to reach out to Serbia (para 3-5).
Regarding the Middle East, the Dutch would encourage and
support a trip by Solana to Baghdad (para 6-7). Paragraph 8
reviews Dutch concerns on Afghanistan, Burma, Pakistan,
Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe. END SUMMARY.

Balkans
--------------


3. (C) In an April 23 briefing for allied nations, Deputy EU
Correspondent Rochus Pronk repeated that FM Verhagen is open
to "creative solutions" but remains firmly opposed to signing
a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with Serbia
until it cooperates with the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). However, on March 24, the
parliament gave Verhagen leeway to negotiate. The opposition
put forward a motion to require him to oppose an SAA
signature, but the proposal was defeated by the ruling
coalition. (Comment: Prospects for Dutch flexibility are
offset by the ICTY prosecutor Brammertz's recent statement
that Serbia is not cooperating, and by past Verhagen
statements requiring Serbian cooperation before approving an
SAA.)


4. (C) On Kosovo, the Dutch remain concerned about
developments in northern Kosovo and want the GOK and EULEX to
show authority in the area. The Dutch want EULEX to deploy
as quickly as possible. The Serb proposal for local
elections creates the prospect of a de facto partition.


5. (C) Bosnia may not be discussed at the GAERC. The Dutch
see signing of the police reform measure important, but
further integration is needed. The Dutch are undecided on
signing an SAA with Bosnia given Brammertz's description of
ICTY cooperation as only "satisfactory."

Middle East
--------------


6. (C) In her April 22 discussion with the Charge, MFA
Director for the Middle East Van Lynden-Leijten said the
Dutch are looking for "ways and means" to support Iraq, which
they currently offer with military and diplomatic training.
The Dutch would encourage and support a trip by Solana to
Baghdad. The Dutch want the Iraqis themselves to be
stronger. On the Middle East peace process, Van
Lynden-Leijten inquired about U.S. visits to the region in
support of a peace agreement. She would like to believe the
"closed door sessions mean there's progress." FM Verhagen
will visit Israel in May for the 60th anniversary of
bilateral relations. The Dutch continue actively engaging
with funding and development support to Palestine. On
Syria and Lebanon, Van Lynden-Leijten indicated the FM
encouraged the Syrians to be constructive during his visit to

THE HAGUE 00000372 002.2 OF 002


Damascus. There are not positive signs coming out of Syria,
but it's good to keep the door open to dialogue. Van
Lynden-Leijten's Deputy, Gert Heijkoop, noted that there is
speculation that Lebanon will operate without a president
until parliamentary elections in 2009. "The government
doesn't do much but pay debt anyway." The Dutch continue to
support good governance programs for Lebanon, and
participated in UNIFIL.


7. (C) On April 23, Pronk said that the EU should continue
supporting the Annapolis process for a Middle East peace
agreement, but there are no recent positive developments. On
Iraq, the Dutch see positive signs in the push to end
criminal and sectarian violence. The Dutch support EU
funding to assist refugees and Internally Displaced Persons.
The Dutch will continue to raise the human rights situation
in Iraq, especially the plight of women and minorities.
Pronk said it was his personal opinion, but he saw no reason
that Solana should not visit Baghdad.


Other regions
--------------


8. (C) Pronk also made the following points in his April 23
briefing:

-- Afghanistan: Afghanistan is not on the agenda but the
Dutch will express concern about the GOA Supreme Court's
approval of 100 death sentences.

-- Burma: the EU should continue pressure on the regime with
demarches and sanctions -- the GOB's proposed elections and
constitution do not lessen Dutch concern. The Dutch remain
concerned also about restrictions on Aung San Suu Kyi. The
Dutch want to go further than the EU's October 2007 sanctions
and include oil and gas on the sanctions list, but there is
"not a lot of support for that." The Dutch expect the EU to
expand the number of companies and individuals subject to the
asset freeze.

-- Pakistan: the Dutch believe the EU policy from 2007 is
"still valid" as it emphasizes human rights, counter
terrorism efforts, and regional cooperation. The Dutch look
forward to working with the GOP.

-- Uzbekistan: the Dutch support ending the suspension of
sanctions. The Dutch human rights ambassador is critical of
the current situation in Uzbekistan. The Dutch do not see
sufficient improvements to support ending sanctions or
continuing the suspension.

-- Zimbabwe: the Dutch support condemning Zimbabwe and bring
in election observers for the next election. The election
process was not credible. The results of the mediation by
the South Africa Development Community are disappointing, but
a solution to the crisis "should have an African mark on it."
Gallagher