CWC: WRAP-UP FOR THE CONFERENCE OF THE STATES

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 001015

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STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR,
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP>
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (ROBERTS AND DENYER)
NSC FOR FLY
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2018
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CWC: WRAP-UP FOR THE CONFERENCE OF THE STATES
PARTIES (CSP 13),DECEMBER 2-5, 2008

REF: A. STATE 125912

B. THE HAGUE 984 STATE 126586

C. THE HAGUE 898

Classified By: Ambassador Eric M. Javits for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

This is CWC-60-08.

--------------
SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
--------------


1. (SBU) The Thirteenth Conference of the States
Parties (CSP 13) failed to reach consensus on its
final report and broke some new ground in
establishing precedents. Long simmering tensions
with Iran -- for some delegations going back many
Executive Councils, for others rising during the
Review Conference in April -- finally came to a
boiling point. On several issues Iran failed to gain
any support for its stands, even from its traditional
allies. The Mexican Ambassador proposed a show of
hands "to gauge the temperature of the room" in lieu
of a vote at one point; the Japanese Chairman and
many delegations repeatedly urged Iran to join
consensus on more than one issue; and towards
midnight, with no support for Iran's adamant position
against compromise on draft language on destruction,
the U.S. proposed that the Chairman issue the report
on his own recognizance since there was no consensus
within the Conference to adopt it. Although the
Legal Advisor clearly stated that the consensus
decisions taken during the Conference and mentioned
in the report stand on their own, whether or not
there is a consensus report, Iran continued to
question the validity of decisions taken, failing the
Conference adopting its final report.


2. (C) Del note: In a later conversation with
Ambassador Javits and Delreps, the Director-General
stated that the report will reflect the consensus
decisions throughout and will note that one
delegation (that tried unsuccessfully to reopen an
item that had been gaveled by the Chair as a decision
taken by consensus) failed to agree to that one
paragraph of the final report, thus breaking the
consensus on the adoption of the report. End note.


3. (SBU) The Executive Council (EC) finally approved
the draft 2009 Budget and Program of Work on December
4 at a resumption of its special session of November
27 and after many months of negotiations. The
Conference then approved the budget by consensus on
its last day, December 5; however, the Director-
General, Iran, the U.S., France (on behalf of the
European Union) and others all made statements
clarifying their interpretations of the ambiguous
compromise language on Article VI inspections in the
budget decision. In the final discussion of the
Conference report, Iran refused to allow the U.S. to
add a citation for the national statements on the
budget. The Director-General helpfully volunteered
to attach a compendium of all national papers
submitted to the Conference as an appendix to the
final report, with reference to their respective
relevant agenda items, which most delegations agreed
would be a useful addition to the Conference record.


4. (SBU) The Conference was also noteworthy for the
political tone of some of the national statements in
the General Debate, including Iran, Lebanon (after
depositing its instrument of ratification in late
Qdepositing its instrument of ratification in late
November),and some other Arab states lambasting
Israel. Israel (as an observer) in return made a
strong statement in defense of its decision not to
ratify the Convention, the first time anyone could
remember Israel making a national statement in an
OPCW meeting. Cuba made an intervention during

discussion of Article XI against the "nearly 60-year
embargo" it has suffered, without mentioning the U.S.
China quietly blocked Taiwan's request for observer
status for its Chemical Industry Association in the
General Committee.


5. (SBU) The Japanese Chairman conducted the business
of the Conference efficiently and courteously
throughout. He gaveled through all of the agenda
items by consensus, with the exception of adoption of
the final report. The new Executive Council members
and members of the Confidentiality Commission were
all elected without comment, and all reports were
noted or approved. The Conference approved a
decision urging continuing implementation of Article
VII, but nothing more than report language for
Article XI after last-minute changes by Iran and
India gutted the draft decision that had been
discussed in consultations for several weeks.
Standard report language on Article X and
Universality was approved without debate.


6. (U) This cable includes detailed reporting on the
Executive Council sessions November 27 and December
4, along with final discussions of the budget; the
highlights of the Conference decisions; the role of
the Western European and Others Group (WEOG); and an
analysis of the outcomes of the Conference and what
may lie ahead. Meetings on the margins of the
Conference will be reported in septels to follow.

--------------
THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND THE BUDGET BATTLE
--------------


7. (SBU) On November 27, a special meeting of the EC
(EC-M-28) convened with one item on the agenda: the
draft 2009 budget and program of work. Having failed
to reach consensus on the budget during the EC
session in October (ref D),and without any progress
in the intervening period (ref B),the special EC
meeting opened with little hope of quickly coming to
agreement on next year's budget. After a status
report from budget facilitator Martin Strub
(Switzerland),EC Chairperson Amb. Oksana Tomova
(Slovakia) urged EC members to reach agreement
quickly, offering to assist in any way possible,
including making her embassy available for meetings.


8. (U) Following the formal EC meeting, Strub
convened an informal meeting of "most interested
parties" to address the main point of contention: the
number of Article VI industry inspections. The first
shift in position came from Indian Ambassador Neelam
Sabharwal, who stated that she could accept up to 208
inspections, with three conditions:
- spreading the additional inspections between
scheduled chemical facilities and other chemical
production facilities (OCPFs);
- capping the number of Article VI inspections for
two years;
- tying any future changes in inspection numbers to
the outcome of Industry Cluster consultations.


9. (U) Aside from support from Chinese Ambassador
Zhang Jun, the Indian proposal initially did not gain
much traction, with other NAM delegations reiterating
their opposition to any increase in OCPFs, and WEOG
delegations insisting on at least the additional ten
OCPF inspections proposed by the DG. At one point,
QOCPF inspections proposed by the DG. At one point,
Mexican Ambassador Jorge Lomonaco suggested a
compromise between the Indian and the DG's proposals
by having eight OCPF inspections and two other
inspections for other types of facilities. Following
three successive meetings, Strub agreed to meet again
on November 28 to continue discussions.


10. (SBU) After an unproductive meeting on the

morning of November 28, at which the Indian and
Chinese ambassadors were noticeably absent, Amb.
Tomova and Strub decided to convene a small meeting
of ambassadors at the Slovakian Embassy in the
afternoon to attempt to push forward. The three-and-
a-half hour meeting included ambassadors from China,
Cuba, the Czech Republic, Germany, India, Mexico,
Netherlands, Russia, the UK and the U.S.; delegates
from France, Iran, Japan, South Africa; DG Rogelio
Pfirter and Labib Sahab (Head, Budget) for the TS;
and Amb. Tomova and Strub.


11. (SBU) Strub suggested looking only at the number
of inspections before addressing any other
outstanding issues, including the conditions India
had raised when it floated the possibility of
accepting eight additional inspections. Amb. Zhang
(China) reiterated his support for the Indian
proposal and suggested that five be allocated to
OCPFs with the other three up for discussion. After
some discussion on how -- if at all -- to spread the
additional inspections between scheduled facilities
and OCPFs, the Cuban ambassador suggested focusing
only on OCPFs and Schedule 3 facilities given that
all Schedule 1 and 2 facilities have been inspected
multiple times already. Amb. Javits stated he would
only accept spreading to Schedule 3 facilities if the
TS saw a technical need and if doing so would lead to
reaching consensus. He rejected China's proposal for
only five OCPF inspections, noting considerable
resistance to less than eight OCPF inspections, and
suggested keeping the DG's proposed ten additional
inspections split between nine OCPF inspections and
one Schedule 3 inspection.


12. (SBU) As discussions wore on, Strub and others
focused on the "magic" number eight. A number of
variations of inspections were tabled, but consensus
started to emerge around two. Amb. Burkart (Germany)
proposed 7 1 (seven OCPF inspections and 1 Schedule
3) and Amb. Sabharwal (India) proposed 6 2 (six OCPF
inspections and two Schedule 3). After having
rejected any increase in inspections, Iranian
delegate Mohsen Naziri Asl suddenly said his
instructions were to accept no more than eight
additional inspections with four OCPF inspections and
the other four spread between Schedule 2 and 3; he
then changed his proposal to five OCPF inspections,
two Schedule 3 and one Schedule 2. Strub noted that
Amb. Javits' suggestion and the Iranian proposal were
the two extremes and not feasible options, and he
kept 7 1 and 6 2 on the table as the two options.
Strub also agreed to suggestions to meet over the
weekend to discuss the draft budget decision and
incorporate India's and China's proposals.


13. (SBU) On November 30 at the Slovakian Embassy and
throughout the day on December 1 at the OPCW, Strub
held meetings -- basically drafting sessions -- to
discuss the draft budget decision. At the first
meeting on Sunday evening (November 30),India
presented text proposals developed by a group of
"like-minded delegations" -- i.e., China, Iran, South
Africa and India -- on needing to resume Industry
Cluster consultations and tying future Article VI
QCluster consultations and tying future Article VI
inspection numbers to those consultations. It became
clear that these "like-minded" and many other NAM
delegations would only accept their proposed language
in the budget decision and not in the EC's report or
anywhere else. (Del note: In 2006, the 2007 budget
was agreed contingent to holding relevant Industry
Cluster consultations on Article VI inspection
issues. Language to this effect was included in the
EC's report and not the budget decision; however,
lack of progress on outstanding Industry Cluster
issues accounted for the NAM's reluctance to accept a
similar construct this time and their insistence that
language be included in the budget decision to give

it more authority. End note.)


14. (SBU) Despite reaching agreement on some of the
text proposals, a few key points still remained open,
and in a final effort to resolve them in a small,
high-level group format, Amb. Tomova and Strub
invited seven delegations (U.S., Germany, UK, South
Africa, China, India and Iran),the Vice-Chair for
Budget and Administrative Issues Amb. Francisco
Aguilar (Costa Rica) and the Director General to the
Slovakian Embassy on the evening of December 1.
Despite Amb. Tomova's request that ambassadors or
heads of delegations from capitals attend, India,
South Africa and Iran were all represented by
resident delegates. Amb. Zhang's periodic
constructive interjections and the virtual silence
from the Indian and South African delegates was a
marked contrast to the four Iranians present who
tried to dominate the discussion, clearly exhibiting
a desire to keep as many things open for as long as
possible by obstructing most compromises tabled.


15. (SBU) Following the late night meeting on
December 1, and as the CSP officially began December
1, Strub decided not to hold any further formal or
informal budget meetings, opting instead for
consulting with some delegations individually in an
attempt to put together a compromise that he could
bring forward. Strub specifically chose not to have
Amb. Tomova reconvene the EC until he felt there was
consensus behind the budget. During the lunch break
on December 3, Strub held an open meeting and
presented his proposal for the budget decision; his
proposal left open the question of placement (i.e.,
whether within the budget decision or in the report)
for three paragraphs on the number of Article VI
inspections and ongoing Industry Cluster
consultations. After an hour, and with delegations
only giving initial feedback to his proposal, Strub
agreed to meet again later in the afternoon. At the
second meeting, the Iranian delegation insisted on
re-inserting a number of points that previously had
been rejected by most delegations and tried to re-
open portions for which Strub had been able to find
compromises. Strub suggested taking another break
and to re-convene in the evening in a final effort to
reach agreement.


16. (SBU) During the last meeting of the evening,
Strub once again raised the subject of inspection
numbers, which he had put to the side since narrowing
down the options to 7 1 and 6 2 on November 28. Amb.
Lomonaco (Mexico) noted that there seemed to be a
clear division: those delegations preferring 7 1
preferred putting the Industry Cluster-related
paragraphs in the report; those delegations
preferring 6 2 preferred including the Industry
Cluster paragraphs with the rest of the budget
decision. He proposed a compromise to take seven
OCPF inspections and one Schedule 3 in exchange for
including everything in the budget decision. China,
South Africa and Algeria all accepted the Mexican
compromise; Germany and U.S. Del also spoke in its
favor. Obviously cut off from the mood of consensus
around the table, Iranian delegate Naziri Asl lashed
Qaround the table, Iranian delegate Naziri Asl lashed
out saying that neither 6 2 nor 7 1 were acceptable.
He went on to insist on changes to the budget
decision, without any support from other delegations,
before storming out of the room. With consensus
minus Iran, Strub ended the meeting and announced
that the EC would reconvene the next afternoon to
approve the budget.


17. (SBU) After the meeting, Amb. Zhang, Amb.
Sabharwal and the South African delegate caucused
with the remaining Iranian delegate, urging his
delegation to join consensus and making it clear that
the Iranian delegation had isolated itself.



18. (SBU) Throughout the morning of December 4,
Strub, Amb. Tomova and Slovakian delegate Michal
Komada were locked in a room with the Iranian
delegation (numbering up to 12 at times),encouraging
them to join the consensus from the previous evening.
By noon, Strub emerged with an Iranian agreement to
join consensus on the budget contingent on altering
two of the three Industry Cluster-related paragraphs
in the budget decision. At 2:00, a flurry of
activity erupted in the OPCW foyer as ambassadors and
delegates arrived for the reconvening of the EC in
the afternoon. The DG and a number of ambassadors
(including Amb. Javits, Amb. Zhang, Amb. Burkart and
Amb. Sabharwal) caucused over the Iranian-proposed
alternative text for the budget decision and agreed
to some further modifications to make the Iranian
proposal acceptable.


19. (SBU) Taking the floor, Strub presented the draft
decision as had been agreed the previous evening by
all delegations except Iran. He then went on to
describe his morning consultations with the Iranian
delegation and announced that they had agreed to the
budget in exchange for some revised text. The TS
distributed the revised text, as further modified a
few minutes earlier in the OPCW foyer; however, due
to an editorial mistake, a key Iranian insertion
accidentally was excluded, prompting the Iranian
delegation to reject the circulated text amid claims
that it had been changed behind their back. Other
delegations complained about the Iranian deviations
from the agreed text the night before and the private
consultations that morning.


20. (SBU) The Chinese Ambassador proposed a
compromise text that most delegations agreed to;
however, the base text behind that proposal was not
clear -- the Iranians insisted that it be on their
version of the text, while others had agreed to the
revised text as circulated with the Chinese change.
Amid the confusion, everyone wanted to pass the
budget and agreed to the ambiguous decision language
including Iran's changes. Following approval of the
budget, Amb. Javits made a statement clarifying the
U.S. position on two separate points in the budget
decision related to Industry Cluster consultations
and Article VI inspection numbers. With a sigh of
relief from the Chairperson, and a round of thanks to
Martin Strub, the EC forwarded the budget to the
Conference and closed.

--------------
GENERAL COMMITTEE
--------------



21. (SBU) The CSP 12 General Committee met the
morning before the opening of CSP 13 to discuss
accreditation for observers. China, as expected,
blocked the request by the Taiwan Chemical Industry
Association, so the list of Non-governmental
organizations went forward to the Conference without
TCIA on it.


22. (SBU) Unlike during the Review Conference, where
the General Committee's advice went largely unheeded
by the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, the
Japanese Chairman held regular, crisp General
Committee meetings and made decisions based on the
views of his Vice Chairs, including the decision to
set a deadline (Friday at 1300 hours) for draft texts
Qset a deadline (Friday at 1300 hours) for draft texts
of decisions. On the final afternoon, when the
Iranian delegate stated that they had circulated
draft report language on destruction to interested
States Parties, most members of the General Committee
objected that they had not yet seen it and admonished
Iran to circulate the text to everyone as an item of

interest to all States Parties.

--------------
WEOG, WEOG PLUS AND THE AUSTRALIA GROUP
--------------


23. (SBU) In addition to regular morning meetings
during the Conference, WEOG Coordinator Ruth Surkau
(Germany) diligently kept WEOG delegations apprised
of the status of budget negotiations and other
developments through mobile telephone text messages.


24. (SBU) On December 2 following WEOG, Mike Byers
(Australia) held a brief, ad-hoc meeting of WEOG
Australia Group (AG) delegations. Byers distributed
"defensive" talking points provided by the AG Chair
and reported that the AG Chair did not support
holding a discussion within the OPCW on the AG.
Referring to the proposed Article XI workshop, Byers
suggested that it would be good to hold it after the
2009 AG Plenary in September.


25. (SBU) On December 4, WEOG Plus (WEOG, non-WEOG EU
delegations, Japan and South Korea) met to discuss
the budget and other Conference business in an
expanded format. In contrast to past WEOG Plus
meetings where non-WEOG delegations tended to be
silent observers, non-WEOG delegations actively
participated in the discussion and shared their
views. The timing of the meeting was useful to
ensure broad support for the budget and to formulate
tactics on dealing with articles VII and XI.

--------------
OPENING SESSION AND GENERAL DEBATE
--------------


26. (U) The Thirteenth Conference of the States
Parties commenced on December 2 with easy election of
the Chairman, Ambassador Minoru Shibuya of Japan;
Vice-Chairpersons; the Credentials Committee; the
Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, Ambassador
Benchaa Dani of Algeria; followed by prompt adoption
of the Agenda, the Organization of Work and
Establishment of Subsidiary Bodies, and Attendance by
International Organizations, NGOs and Industry.
Chairman Shibuya's style of reading each item slowly,
giving a short amount of time for possible comment,
and swiftly gaveling through to the next item served
him, and the Conference, well throughout the four-day
session.


27. (U) The Director General's statement, nearly a
full hour long but shorter than some past speeches,
detailed the activities of the year, presenting the
achievements of the Organization, and thanking
specific contributions made by numerous countries.
He emphasized the African program repeatedly in all
the pertinent sections of the speech.


28. (U) Notably, the DG made strong points on non-
proliferation, chemical safety and counter-terrorism,
and addressed the need for more inspections of Other
Chemical Production Facilities (the central
unresolved issue in the budget negotiations). On the
last point, he outlined in detail that each Schedule
1 facility has been inspected six times, each
Schedule 2 facility 2.5 times, while 55% of Schedule
3 facilities have been inspected, only 13.6% of the
OCPFs have been inspected. He described ongoing
efforts to improve the inspection selection process.
The DG also noted the importance of both consensus
QThe DG also noted the importance of both consensus
and transparent deliberations after the experience of
the Review Conference, and urged the Executive
Council not to keep the rest of the Conference
waiting on the budget decision.


29. (U) The General Debate began Tuesday morning

(December 2) and continued through that afternoon and
most of the next day. The group speeches (European
Union, Non-Aligned Movement and China, and the
African group of States Parties) sounded familiar
themes that were echoed by many later national
statements:

Meeting the final destruction deadlines in 2012 (NAM
noting serious concern at the pace of destruction;
Iran -- newly noting the need for timely commencement
of CW destruction facilities; China, and others)

Implementation of Article VII (strong statements by
the EU, Russia, Japan, but also some of the NAM
states in their national speeches such as Sri Lanka)

International cooperation in the exchange of
chemicals, with criticism of trade restrictions (NAM,
Iran, Pakistan)

Article XI assistance (NAM, the African group
statement emphasizing capacity building; Saudi
Arabia)

Importance of Article X assistance (most countries
mentioned this but very few national statements added
the victims' network cited in the NAM and Iranian
speeches; many cited the link to terrorism)

Universality and welcoming Lebanon into the CWC
(nearly all)

Nonproliferation (EU, China noted its export control
regime, despite having signed up to the NAM statement
against trade restrictions; Russia, Japan and others)

Other Chemical Production Facilities Inspections --
any increase in the number of inspections to wait for
consultation process and political decisions (NAM,
Pakistan, India citing the hierarchy of risk and the
fact that over half of current inspections are for
OCPFs)

OCPF -- support for the DG's determination of
inspection numbers (EU, New Zealand, Canada, Turkey)

Incapacitating agents and Riot Control Agents
(Pakistan, Switzerland, Norway)


30. (SBU) The Russian address by Grigory Rapota, the
Representative of the Russian President to the Volga
Federal District, appeared to mark a change from past
statements in its emphasis on safety as the priority
concern in the destruction of chemical weapons, of
its "aim" for 2012 as the deadline, and subordinating
a statement of its commitment to the deadline through
quoting the EC report on the September visit to
Schuchye. (Del note: This shift in emphasis may be
due to the change in speaker or speech writer, but we
will watch to see if Russia is moving away from
previous strong assertions that they will meet the
2012 deadline. End note)


31. (U) The Lebanese Ambassador announced that
Lebanon had deposited its instrument of ratification
in New York in late November and would become a full
member of the Convention within 30 days. He praised
the TS for its assistance in this regard, and thanked
States Parties for welcoming Lebanon's accession.
Because Lebanon never considered having a CW program,
the Ambassador claimed that Lebanon had essentially
always been a member of the OPCW. He spoke strongly
against Israel for the "60 years of turmoil" in the
region. He called on all states to work together to
rid the world of all WMD, especially within the
Middle East, and he highlighted the importance of
UNSC Resolution 1540 toward this objective.
QUNSC Resolution 1540 toward this objective.


32. (SBU) Lebanon was only one of several Middle
Eastern states, including Iran, Saudi Arabia and
Libya, that specifically blasted Israel in their
national statements. This was a greater political
emphasis than in OPCW meetings in the recent past,
although the rhetoric was familiar from other
international organizations. Israel spoke as an
observer, for the first time that anyone could
remember, late in the General Debate, perhaps in
response to earlier remarks. The Israeli Foreign
Ministry official began by reminding the Conference
that Israel was actively involved in the negotiation
of the CWC and an early signatory; unfortunately, the
security situation in the region and linkage to other
treaties did not allow them to accede. The threat
against Israel is "far from theoretical" and Israel
has taken steps to secure the safety of all residents
against possible attacks, she said. Concluding that
the vision of a Middle East free of WMD is one Israel
subscribes to and "not unattainable," she stated that
vision would require concrete, substantive changes in
the region starting with mutual recognition and good
neighborliness.


33. (U) The Secretary announced that the TS will
compile and copy all of the national statements in a
binder and on the web-site for future reference. The
TS requested electronic copies from all states in
order to do so.

--------------
ROUTINE BUSINESS PASSED -- NO DEBATE
--------------


34. (U) The Conference completed most of its agenda
items quickly, with few interventions and no
objections until the final evening's discussion of
the report (see below). The first session following
the General Debate on Wednesday afternoon saw sparse
attendance, with Iran among others absent from its
seat in the plenary hall. The Conference noted the
progress report for meeting revised deadlines for the
destruction of chemical weapons with no debate. It
approved the guidelines regarding declaration of
import and export data for Schedule 2 and 3
chemicals, also without debate.


35. (U) On December 4, the Conference noted routine
financial and administrative reports and elected the
new member states to the Executive Council, as well
as the new members of the Confidentiality Commission
-- all without discussion or fanfare.

--------------
THE PLENARY PASSES THE BUDGET
--------------


36. (SBU) After the special Executive Council
forwarded the budget, the Conference promptly
approved the budget. The DG then took the floor and
presented his interpretation of the budget decision
as finally agreed. The Iranian delegation followed
with a worrying intervention presenting their view
that future Article VI inspection numbers needed to
be decided within the Industry Cluster before being
discussed for future budgets. Refuting the Iranian
intervention, Amb. Javits delivered a statement
similar to the one he had made during the EC the day
before. France -- on behalf of the EU -- followed
with a similar statement. South Africa then spoke to
Qwith a similar statement. South Africa then spoke to
the complementary nature of the budget and Industry
Cluster consultations. Germany and Cuba both
stressed that future discussion should be on
substance and not on interpretations of the budget
decision. Argentina, Algeria, Peru and Mexico made
similar interventions and reaffirmed the prerogatives
of the DG and TS in formulating and proposing future
budgets.



37. (U) The U.S. and French interventions were later
submitted as national papers and distributed to the
Conference. During consideration of the report, Iran
refused to accept a U.S. request to note the two
national papers under the budget agenda item.
Despite the U.S. citing a precedent from the previous
Conference and the TS reassuring the Conference that
there were no technical or legal obstacles to
including a reference to national papers in the
Conference report, Iran stubbornly refused to move
on. As a compromise innovation, the DG decided to
attach a compendium of all national papers submitted
to the Conference as an appendix to the final report.

--------------
ARTICLE VII
--------------


38. (SBU) Breaking from past years' practice, the
Conference agreed to a decision on Article VII
without a similar one for Article XI. Part of this
might be due to the tenacious perseverance of Article
VII facilitator Said Moussi (Algeria),but Iran's
last-minute torpedoing of a draft Article XI decision
undoubtedly played a part.


39. (SBU) As reported previously, Moussi had held
multiple consultations since September, and aside
from halting meetings for a week during budget
negotiations, he continued the constant pace during
the last half of the Conference. On December 3, with
budget negotiations wrapping up, Moussi turned to
resolving key differences in his draft proposal and
tasked the UK and South African delegates to work on
a compromise that could gain consensus. Although it
did not gather any traction, the Iranian delegation
attempted briefly to include references to Article
XXII's prohibition of reservations to the Convention,
trying to equate national legislation and regulations
to formal reservations. Backed by Legal Adviser
Onate, Moussi blocked these attempts and suggested
that the Iranians address their ideas in a different
facilitation.


40. (SBU) By December 4, the UK and South African
delegates had worked out a compromise on Article VII,
that was agreeable to most delegations; but Iran --
although increasingly isolated -- insisted on holding
up agreement on the text. And, while the format of
Moussi's proposal still had not been decided, he
successfully lobbied delegations -- bar Iran -- to
agree to submitting a decision to the Conference. By
noon on December 5, the Iranian delegation was alone
in objecting to the consensus text that emerged from
the numerous consultations. On his own initiative,
Moussi submitted the draft decision to the TS for
circulation by the deadline established by the
Conference Chairman. This insured that Iran had to
face discussion of the text on the floor of the
Conference that finally pressured it into accepting a
decision that built on previous years' decisions.

--------------
ARTICLE XI
--------------


41. (SBU) In consultations on Article XI before the
CSP, it became clear to most delegations that Iran
did not want a Conference decision and that NAM
delegations were divided. The U.S. and WEOG had
agreed to take the high road, continuing to discuss
the proposed Article XI workshop and to participate
Qthe proposed Article XI workshop and to participate
positively in the facilitations, letting Iranian
obstruction play itself out. The strategy worked.


42. (SBU) For the November 25 consultations,
facilitator Li Hong (China) circulated a new draft

decision text that included a list of ideas for
concrete measures to be explored further. The U.S.
proposed that the list be clearly labeled as
"potential" or "proposed" measures since no agreement
had been reached. Discussion ranged from rejection
of some items on the list to whether the list should
form the basis of the proposed workshop. The Mexican
delegate expressed what many others were concluding,
that the list of concrete measures could be "explored
further" during the workshop, without excluding other
ideas or proposals. The Iranian delegate then came
out strongly against the workshop as "premature." Li
abruptly stopped the discussion, noting there was no
consensus, and suggesting that he would make a full
oral report instead of continuing discussion of draft
decision language. Several WEOG delegations
encouraged him to continue to work on a written
report, whether a decision or report language for the
CSP. With ongoing budget meetings throughout the
week, as well as the EC and the National Authorities
meetings, no further consultations were held until
the CSP had begun.


43. (U) During the CSP, Li Hong consulted delegations
bilaterally before holding a short meeting on
December 4 to discuss the draft text, at which no
agreement was reached. On December 5, the last day
of the Conference, India and Iran presented Li with
their changes to the text, removing the list of
potential measures entirely and adding strong
language on resolving to review restrictions and
impediments that hamper the economic development of
States Parties toward the full implementation of
Article XI. WEOG countries led by France objected to
the latter addition and several delegations
questioned the deletion of the list of proposed
measures. Once again, Li Hong concluded that with no
further agreement on the final text, he would report
orally on his consultations to the Conference and
would share report language with delegations that
afternoon.


44. (SBU) In the evening session of the Conference
December 5, Li Hong made his oral report on the
consultations over the past year, including intense
discussions of the Cuban proposal for a workshop "in
due time" which had received widespread support. The
Conference approved his report language by consensus.
Cuba then made a statement noting that the discussion
had been "complicated" and that the NAM attach great
importance to Article XI. The Cuban Ambassador
stated that progress to date in implementing Article
XI has been "insufficient" and cited the challenge of
the blockade on his nation for almost fifty years.

--------------
ARTICLE X AND UNIVERSALITY
--------------


45. (U) On both Article X and Universality, the
Conference agreed fairly standard report language
reflecting previous mandates given and work that had
occurred since the last session. That Article X did
not fall prey to last-minute Iranian demands for a
"victims network" was somewhat surprising, and
inconsistent with Iranian behavior in Article X
consultations.

--------------
Q --------------
DESTRUCTION AND THE IRANIAN END GAME
--------------


46. (U) In keeping with their traditional last-minute
tactics, the Iranian delegation was unusually silent
on the subject of chemical weapons destruction until
the last day of the Conference. Also true to form,
Iran ensured that the last and most memorable debate
of the session was on the U.S. destruction program.

Having been out of the room when the DG's report on
destruction was adopted, the Iranian delegation
waited until Friday to propose report language that
was clearly unacceptable. When the Iranian
delegation mentioned this in General Committee, there
was general dissatisfaction with the fact that Iran
had failed to share this language with anyone other
than Russia and the U.S., despite claiming to have
discussed it with "interested States Parties."


47. (U) In the hopes of avoiding an unnecessarily
protracted debate in the plenary, the U.S. proposed
alternative report language. This was, of course,
unacceptable to Iran, and the Iranian delegation
circulated its language to the CSP late Friday
afternoon. Thanks to growing exasperation with
Iranian tactics, there was no real support for their
last-minute proposal, and several GRULAC delegations
- led by Mexico - spoke up to note that there was a
procedural problem with report language that in no
way reflected the Conference proceedings. (DEL
COMMENT: The broad support for the U.S. was entirely
procedural-based. Had Iran intervened on the agenda
item itself, there would almost certainly have been
substantive support for stronger language on
destruction obligations and "timely commencement of
construction" of the remaining destruction
facilities. END COMMENT.) Several attempts were
made to return to the TS-drafted, factual report
language. Russia intervened to suggest that, in the
absence of agreement, consideration could be deferred
to the next regular session of the Conference.


48. (U) Despite numerous constructive suggestions,
Iran refused to yield, and became more disruptive as
the session dragged on into late evening, claiming
the Chair had gaveled through acceptance of item 9(c)
prematurely since they had "pushed the button" to
register objection even before the gavel fell. They
repeatedly intervened claiming the Chairman had
refused to recognize them and prompting a firm
statement from the Director General that the
Secretariat's credibility should not be called into
question. The Chairman asked if there was any
support for opening up item 9(c) as requested by Iran
and there was not any support for that proposition -
a total isolation Iran for the first time in the
OPCW. With the Conference at a clear impasse, Amb.
Javits intervened to remind delegations that, in the
absence of consensus on the report, the Chair could
also issue his own factual account of the
proceedings. With strong support from the Director
General and Legal Adviser, the Chair agreed to do
just that, and said that he would take it upon
himself to issue a Chairman's Report. Amb. Javits
also referred to the Rules of Procedure to highlight
the Chair's authority to close the session. The
Finnish Chair of the Credentials Committee intervened
shortly before midnight to warn that delegations'
credentials were about to expire. After a round of
interventions from India, Pakistan, and others making
clear statements about the Conference moving ahead
without consensus, the Chair declared the session
Qwithout consensus, the Chair declared the session
closed. In an unusually abrupt ending, delegations
simply left the plenary room, without the traditional
round of congratulatory statements on behalf of the
regional groups.

--------------
COMMENT -- WHAT IT MEANS, WHAT LIES AHEAD
--------------


49. (C) Following the crash of consensus at the CSP,
OPCW delegations have been abuzz sorting out what it
all means. Most delegations, particularly the Latin
Americans, have thanked the U.S. for standing up to
Iran, letting the Iranians know that they cannot hold
the entire Conference hostage endlessly in pursuit of

a vague national agenda. Our European colleagues are
less effusive, but generally agree that the show-down
was inevitable, and that, while the next Executive
Council meeting will be tough, the Iranians may
eventually learn that they need to replace combative
"Mr. No" (Mohsen Naziri Asl) with a diplomat
possessing greater negotiating skills. There is
general approval among delegations in The Hague for
the broader participation witnessed in this
Conference by more delegations and the greater
transparency of the process.


50. (C) This delegation's assessment is that Iran
lost big in this Conference. Led by Mexico, many
countries were quite ready to vote (or at least
display a show of hands) to end Iran's control over
the pace of the agenda. The TS, and particularly the
Director General, strongly defended their mandate in
the budget battle, and offered new and innovative
solutions to Iranian obstruction of business --
including publishing all national statements and
papers in appendices to the Conference report, and
supporting a Chairman's report that will make clear
that only one delegation objected to only one
paragraph of the text. Iran's total isolation at the
end of the Conference will probably not last long,
but the delegation has visibly lost its once
traditional allies in the NAM and will have to do
some work to regain their trust and support. The
Iranians should have learned that they cannot rely on
consensus as an automatic veto for each and every
issue they choose to obstruct.


51. (C) On substance, only three OCPF inspections
were cut after months of negotiations and only
because of India's and China's strong stance on this
issue. When the Iranian delegation attempted to spin
the ambiguous decision language on the budget during
the plenary to say that all political decisions on
OCPF inspections must be made prior to increasing the
numbers of inspections, they hit a firestorm of
response from a variety of members of the Conference,
not to mention the DG's direct refutation of that
claim. That fight will likely re-surface in budget
negotiations next year, and may render the industry
consultations more challenging.


52. (C) The budget, EC elections, and all the other
business of the Conference passed by consensus. The
Conference approved a balanced decision on Article
VII reaffirming that more work needs to be done in
implementing the Convention, as well as noting the
importance of assistance to some States Parties in
their efforts. This was more than the WEOG expected
out of the consultations, and a credit to the
Algerian facilitator for early drafting, persistent
negotiation, and obtaining the support of African and
other NAM states. The failure to agree on a parallel
decision on Article XI is a failure for both Iran and
the NAM. The report language on Article XI highlights
the workshop Iran objected to -- a far cry from the
action plan Iran and others have long advocated for
Article XI. And at the end of a long Friday, Iran
stood alone in the plenary refusing to join consensus
on the final report.
Qon the final report.


53. (C) Delreps have heard that the Iranian
delegation requested a meeting with the Japanese
Chairman to protest his chairman's report. We expect
an angry Iranian delegation to come to the next
Executive Council with more adept procedural
maneuvers and expertise than they showed at this CSP.
They will probably seek to prevent decisions being
taken by the EC, in their new awareness that the
final report has no legal bearing on those decisions.
We also expect continued and more virulent Iranian
verbal attacks on the United States, most
particularly our destruction program and the

facilities that will not complete destruction by 2012
(this has already appeared in the Iranian press).
For the latter, we will need to polish our own
talking points and procedural adroitness, since many
in the Council, as in the CSP, and including some of
our allies, have sympathy for the Iranian complaint
against missing treaty deadlines, thought perhaps not
for the Iranian tactic to attack for something that
has not yet occurred.


54. (U) Javits sends.
CULBERTSON