Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08TELAVIV2433
2008-10-31 17:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tel Aviv
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO ISRAEL

Tags:  PREL PGOV KPAL EG SY IS 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8962
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 002433 

SIPDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR CUNNINGHAM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL EG SY IS
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO ISRAEL

Classified By: Ambassador James B. Cunningham, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 002433

SIPDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR CUNNINGHAM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL EG SY IS
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO ISRAEL

Classified By: Ambassador James B. Cunningham, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Your upcoming visit to the region comes
during a time of transition in Israeli politics. FM Livni is
casting her failure to refashion a coalition as a refusal
to accept the restrictive economic and diplomatic terms
demanded by the Shas Party. The Kadima Party, under her
leadership, has pressed for elections as soon as possible,
and February 10 is the most likely date. There is debate
among Israel's preeminent oliticians over the degree to which
the caretaker government of PM Olmert can engage in
diplomatic negotiations and other weighty political matters.
The Olmert-Livni-Barak 1trio affirms that negotiations can
(and indeed must) continue. There may be differences however
over decision-making authority. Opposition figures, notably
Binyamin Netanyahu, laid down markers that the government has
no "moral right" to concede "precious assets of the Jewish
nation." Netanyahu clarified that he would not be bound by
any agreement agreed or signed by the transitional
government. While Israeli law is not explicit regarding the
limitations on the powers of a transitional government, the
High Court of Justice and precedent has affirmed a principle
that such a government should generally act with "restraint"
except in the case of a "public need for action." In the
coming three months the government will act to preserve the
integrity of the Annapolis negotiations, which at least Livni
and/or Barak would aim to pursue vigorously following
elections. Livni seems to have concluded that she will not
shrink in the campaign from identifying herself with the
negotiations , and will take on Netanyahu over the issue.
Olmert will try to re-engage his own channels with Syria, and
probably with Abbas as well. But "agreement" on any results
of efforts over the coming months is not likely to be in the
cards until after general elections, or a referendum on any
decision taken by the transitional government. END SUMMARY.

LIVNI WEARS HER ANNAPOLIS CLOAK WITH DEFIANCE


2. (C) FM Livni revealed her frustration with current

coalition partner, Eli Yishai of the Shas Party, on October
26 when she announced that negotiations over terms of a new
government had failed over disagreement on two issues:
increasing family allowances and Jerusalem. Livni stated: "I
was willing to pay a price for forming a government, but up
until the last minute, I was not willing to mortgage the
economic and political future or the hope for a different
kind of politics. There are prices that can be paid, there
are prices that others are willing to pay, but I am not
willing to pay them at the expense of the state, at the
expense of its citizens, just in order to be prime minister
in a paralyzed government." The widely-reported Kadima
characterization of Shas demands as "extortion" met with a
harsh, public response from Shas Party leader Eli Yishai, who
retorted that Livni's characterization constituted
"(anti-Sephardi) racism and condescension."


3. (C) Livni's foreign policy advisor, Tal Becker,
emphasized to us after Livni's break-up with Shas, that she
is determined to continue the Annapolis process -- and
purposefully did not hide her role in the negotiations with
the Palestinians during her efforts to form a viable
government. He is encouraging her to resume her negotiations
with Abu Alaa "no matter what Bibi throws at her" during the
upcoming election campaign. For starters, it looks like
Netanyahu is honing in on what he perceives as Livni's
willingness to negotiate on Jerusalem. Nonetheless, recent
polls indicate that Livni's stance has not harmed her
position in the polls, which show her neck-in-neck with
Netanyahu's Likud Party, a marked improvement from several
months ago.

WHILE OLMERT REMAINS AN UNCOMFORTABLE CARETAKER


4. (C) On October 27, President Peres used the opening of
the winter session of the Knesset -- which will only remain
in session through November 10 -- to clarify that early
elections are in the offing, following Livni's failure to
form a government. He also used the normally ceremonial
occasion to make a pitch for regional peace, notably by
conveying a positive response to the 2002 Arab Peace
Initiative. Peres stated in his argument for a review of
that initiative that "it is fitting that we examine how we
can include the whole Arab world in a comprehensive peace
process that will be stronger and more credible. The price
of a comprehensive agreement, in its conclusion, will not
exceed the price that Israel paid or agreed to pay in
negotiations with all the states individually." Egyptian
Embassy contacts tell us that Peres and Mubarak discussed the
Arab Initiative during Peres' October 23 visit to Cairo.


5. (U) PM Olmert clarified that he will remain PM until the

TEL AVIV 00002433 002 OF 003


formation of a new government after elections, stating to the
Knesset on October 27 that "I will do so with the same sense
of responsibility and prudence with which I have acted so
far, and thus, the appropriate distance will be maintained
between the turbulent politics which characterize the
election period, and the need to address the critical matters
of state." He disabused Israelis that he would act as if
there were a "pre-election stalemate." Instead, Olmert
stated that "Decisions will be made and the country will
continue to be run." He pledged to confront the global
financial crisis by taking steps to guarantee the stability
and strength of the Israeli economy, to solve Israel's
brewing education crisis and to work to release Gilad Shalit.
He made no mention of the Palestinian or Syrian track,
although Israeli journalists considered close to Olmert
reported October 31 that Olmert has sent a message to Asad
offering to resume the negotiati
ons with Syria.

BARAK AND BIBI: TALK, BUT DON'T SIGN ANYTHING


6. (C) Opposition Leader Netanyahu launched his bid to
succeed Olmert and to compete with Livni and Barak on October
27 in the Knesset, where he chastised recent governments
(Barak, Sharon, Olmert) for making "unilateral concessions"
and achieving nothing in return. He warned of the dire
impact of further withdrawals (from the West Bank) and the
division of Jerusalem, and pointedly asked Shas and Yisrael
Beiteinu why they served in Olmert's coalition: "Do you
really agree with a policy that would have Hamas rule over
neighborhoods in Jerusalem? Do you really agree with a
policy that would have them sitting on the hilltops (of the
West Bank) overlooking (Israeli towns of) Kfar Saba, Ra'anana
and Tel Aviv?" In contrast, Netanyahu outlined the
principles of his vision for the way ahead: 1) defensible
borders; 2) a united Jerusalem; 3) Israeli sovereignty over
holy sites; 4) cooperation with Egypt and Jordan over final
status questions; 5) complete dismantlement of terror
infrastructure and 6) resolving the refugee issue by
dismantling refugee camps and rehabilitating their
inhabitants -- without bringing a single refugee to Israel.
Netanyahu has stated that he would not be bound by any
political decisions or agreements regarding negotiations
undertaken by Olmert's transitional government, a view that
even some (unnamed) members of Olmert's government may also
share.


7. (C) Barak, who is not a member of the Knesset and faces
bleak polling numbers, has jumped on Peres' bandwagon with
the idea of engaging on the basis of the Arab peace
initiative as a vehicle that would allow him to reassert the
Labor Party's importance in peace negotiations. On October
29, Barak told Israel Radio that the transitional government
could continue to engage and to make progress in
negotiations, but that "no foreign policy decisions can be
made." That said, he agreed, in one respect, with Olmert, on
the need to continue efforts to free Gilad Shalit, which
would entail the release of hundreds of Palestinian
prisoners, many of them convicted of killing Israelis.
"There are no restrictions on the government, and if tough
decisions are required on his matter, they must be made, and
Gilad Shalit must be brought home even before a new
government is formed."

COMMENT: SOME STABILITY IN THE MIDST OF CHANGE


8. (C) There is a consensus that while Israeli law is not
explicit about limitations on the powers of a transitional
government, such a government still must govern. Gilead
Sher, who was then-PM Barak's chief of staff during a similar
period in late 2000, summarized what many pundits, legal
advisors and diplomats have said about such transitions:
Olmert's government is empowered to pursue its policies,
consistent with coalition guidelines (and, in Olmert's case,
Annapolis),but must stop short of obtaining or signing an
agreement with the Palestinians as that would fall beyond the
mandate of a transitional government. "It is not a matter of
law, but of legitimacy," Sher concluded. Former Ambassador
to the U.S. David Ivry told the Ambassador that he
anticipated that PM Olmert will be as active as he can during
the months ahead, but lacks the legitimacy and clout to make
an agreement with either the Palestinians or the Syrians. An
unnamed senior GOI minister quoted on Israeli radio October
31 commented that Olmert lacks the authority on his own to
restart negotiations with Syria and must bring the issue to
the security cabinet for discussion before sending any
messages to Damascus.



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