Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08TELAVIV2252
2008-10-02 15:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tel Aviv
Cable title:  

OLMERT'S "SWAN SONG" INTERVIEW SPARKS DEBATE AND

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINR IS KPAL IR SY LE KWBG 
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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8663
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 002252 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR IS KPAL IR SY LE KWBG
SUBJECT: OLMERT'S "SWAN SONG" INTERVIEW SPARKS DEBATE AND
CRITIQUES

Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno. E.O. 12958. Reason 1.4 (B/D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 002252

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR IS KPAL IR SY LE KWBG
SUBJECT: OLMERT'S "SWAN SONG" INTERVIEW SPARKS DEBATE AND
CRITIQUES

Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno. E.O. 12958. Reason 1.4 (B/D)


1. (C) Summary: Olmert's widely read Jewish New Year
interview on the Palestinian and Syrian negotiation tracks
(see paras 2 and 3 below) struck Israeli pundits as both bold
and problematic. Commentators on the left, such as Meretz MK
Yossi Beilin, criticized Olmert for talking the talk on the
need to end Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories and
the Syrian Golan, but not walking the walk, while the right
denounced Olmert's words as further evidence of his betrayal
of the concept of Greater Israel and United Jerusalem. A
thread common to both camps was the generally shared distrust
of Olmert himself. NRP MK Aryeh Eldad, who has been a
regular critic of the prime minister's alleged corruption,
used Olmert's professed mistakes (e.g., voting against the
peace treaty with Egypt in 1978; championing undivided
Jerusalem throughout most of his political career) reportedly
commented: "Anyone who says he was mistaken for 35 years
cannot be believed." Absent from Olmert's "legacy" interview
was any acknowledgment of wrongdoing, personal or
professional, during his thirty months as prime minister. In
fact, on the personal front, Olmert professed his view that
he will emerge unscathed from ongoing investigations, and
argued that the state controller (and other investigators)
"was going after me even before I was elected prime
minister." On Lebanon, where his leadership decisions were
roundly criticized, Olmert maintained that "when the day
comes to tell the whole story about the Lebanon war, the
picture will look entirely different than it did" (to
Olmert's critics). Olmert probably intended his remarks to
initiate a national debate, but the short term political
effect is to put Livni on the spot, particularly his comments
on Jerusalem. End Summary.

--------------
The Palestinians:
Territorial Withdrawal, including Jerusalem
--------------


2. (C) PM Olmert gave a customary in-depth interview

September 29 with Israel's largest-circulation newspaper,
Yediot Ahronoth, on the occasion of the Jewish New Year
(September 30). Typically, Israeli prime ministers use such
occasions to provide a "state of the union" assessment to the
general public; however, Olmert and the editors pitched his
remarks as his swan song. Painting himself among (if not
above) the pantheon of Israeli prime ministers (Sharon,
Netanyahu, Barak and Rabin) who have negotiated peace with
the Palestinians but failed to achieve peace, Olmert declared
to Yediot Ahronoth correspondents Nahum Barnea and Shimon
Shiffer that Israel would have to withdraw from almost all
Palestinian territories. "Arik Sharon spoke about painful
prices, but refused to elaborate them. ...In the end, we
will have to withdraw from the lion's share of the
territories, and for the territories we leave in our hands,
we will have to give compensation in the form of territories
within the State of Israel at a ratio that is more or less
one-to-one." Olmert stressed that "I want to lead the State
of Israel towards this juncture, towards a decision" but did
not quantify the exact percentages of territory that he
thought must be exchanged with the Palestinians. Breaking
the taboo his coalition has placed on talking about
Jerusalem, Olmert forecast that a decision to divide the city
would be required, as the only other alternative: "bringing
270,000 Arabs inside the fences of sovereign Israel" won't
work. He said he envisioned "special solutions" for the
Temple Mount and other sacred sites, but dwelt more on his
own myopia as Jerusalem mayor than on options for the future:
"I am the first who wanted to enforce Israeli sovereignty on
the entire city. I admit it. I am not trying to justify
retroactively what I did for 35 years. For a large portion
of those years, I was unwilling to look at reality in all its
depth."

--------------
The Syrians:
Start from the Endgame on the Golan Heights
--------------


3. (C) Recalling how former PM Menachem Begin dispatched
Moshe Dayan to tell the Egyptians that Israel was prepared to
withdraw from all of Sinai before Sadat decided to visit
Jerusalem, Olmert underscored that Israel would have to give
up the entire Golan Heights in negotiations with Syria.
Olmert recapitulated this episode to make the point that
Begin "started from the end" before negotiating the terms of
Israeli withdrawal; Olmert stressed that "if we are not
willing to say this (re: the Golan Heights),(then) all the
talk about talks with Syria is worthless." Olmert stressed
the value of negotiations over the cost of a fruitless war
with Syria, and warned of the dangers of viewing future
regional threats through the lens of the past. "Because the

TEL AVIV 00002252 002 OF 002


only fears that we listen to are the fears we have already
experienced, not the fears we have not yet experienced. Once
the thought that a division of Syrian tanks was standing on
the Golan Heights and could move into the State of Israel,
justifiably frightened us. Today we live in a different
reality. We have the tools to stop a ground offensive
without taking control of a single meter in Syria." In
return, Olmert insisted that Syria would have to "give up
their relationship with Iran as it now exists; they will have
to give up their relationship with Hizballah; they will have
to give up the continued backing they are giving to Hamas
terrorism, the Al-Qaida terrorism and the jihad in Iraq."

--------------
Blasting others for failed thinking
on the PA, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, Iran
--------------


4. (C) Olmert used the interview to chastise his critics for
failed strategic thinking (vis a vis the Palestinian issue
and the Syrian track): "I read the words spoken by our
retired generals, and I say, how is it possible that they
have not learned anything and have not forgotten anything.
... they are still living in the War of Independence or the
Sinai campaign. With them it is all about tanks and land and
controlling territories and controlled territories and this
hilltop or that hilltop. All these things are worthless."
Olmert gave no indication of using the same yardstick to his
own policy decisions, particularly those involving the Second
Lebanon War. On Lebanon, where his leadership decisions in
going to war were roundly criticized as lacking strategic
vision, Olmert maintained that "when the day comes to tell
the whole story about the Lebanon war, the picture will look
entirely different than it did (to Olmert's critics)." On
Gaza, conversely, Olmert argued that Sharon's decision to
withdraw was sound. Moreover, he rejected "the view posed by
those who say we should make a renewed assault on Gaza and
take control of it. The price we will pay for this matter
are not worth any benefit that we will derive." Olmert
differentiated between the need for Israel to engage with its
immediate neighbors, and the Iranian issue, which is a threat
to the entire international community. "Part of our
megalomania and our loss of proportions is the things that
are said about Iran."

--------------
Comment
--------------


5. (C) Olmert's candid remarks on the likely endgames of
Palestinian and Syrian negotiations represent the culmination
of a five-year period of gradual evolution in his thinking
about land and peace. But they also constitute an effort to
create a rhetorical legacy that will bind his successor to
specific positions (e.g., one-to-one land swaps with the
Palestinians; a return to the Rabin "deposit" on the Golan)
on which there is little room to maneuver. This is also the
first time Olmert has personally gone on record in
specificity about final status issues that he (and Livni)
have been secretly discussing with Palestinian counterparts
for nearly a year. The Israeli public has not been briefed
on these negotiations to date nor seen any action on the
ground that corresponds to the PM's rhetoric. And Olmert
himself acknowledged that the Israeli government that he
heads is "impossible" -- relying as it does on a coalition
regime and "an almost endless system of maneuvering in order
to maintain a majority." Olmert clearly feels he is an
honest victim of this system, and makes no admission of
wrongdoing for the actions for which the Israeli public and
media hold him responsible. Olmert's current image as
Israel's most corrupt prime minister, whether or not borne
out by fact, undercuts his attempt to engage the public on
the critical importance of negotiations with Israel's
neighbors. Critics from both ends of the spectrum question
whether in being so specific on several key points, he will
tie the hands of Livni -- both in forming a coalition and in
continuing negotiations with the Palestinians and the
Syrians. Moreover, his faint-praise labeling of Livni as "a
capable leader" may only serve to undercut what waning
influence he has left. End Comment.


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