Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08TEGUCIGALPA541
2008-06-10 23:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Cable title:  

AT A HIGH COST OF LIVES AND MONEY, ZELAYA

Tags:  EAIR EFIN ECON MARR MASS MCAP MOPS PBPTS PGOV 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHTG #0541/01 1622337 
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O 102337Z JUN 08 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8271 
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE 
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0148 
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 0608 
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RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE 
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RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//CINC/POLAD// IMMEDIATE 
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 
RUEAHND/CDRJTFB SOTO CANO HO IMMEDIATE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEGUCIGALPA 000541 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2018
TAGS: EAIR EFIN ECON MARR MASS MCAP MOPS PBPTS PGOV
PINR, PINS, PNAT, PREL, ES, HO
SUBJECT: AT A HIGH COST OF LIVES AND MONEY, ZELAYA
MAINTAINS SINGLE-MINDED FOCUS ON SOTO CANO

REF: A. TEGUCIGALPA 527 B. 07TEGUCIGALPA1678

Classified By: Ambassador Charles A. Ford, reason 1.4(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEGUCIGALPA 000541

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2018
TAGS: EAIR EFIN ECON MARR MASS MCAP MOPS PBPTS PGOV
PINR, PINS, PNAT, PREL, ES, HO
SUBJECT: AT A HIGH COST OF LIVES AND MONEY, ZELAYA
MAINTAINS SINGLE-MINDED FOCUS ON SOTO CANO

REF: A. TEGUCIGALPA 527 B. 07TEGUCIGALPA1678

Classified By: Ambassador Charles A. Ford, reason 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY and ACTION REQUEST: Twelve days after the
TACA 390 crash at Tegucigalpa's Toncontin International
airport (Reftel A),the initial investigation points mostly
to pilot error, and the fuselage should be completely removed
from the highway by Wednesday. President Zelaya has found
himself backed into a corner. At his discretion, flights to
and from Tegucigalpa of other than small aircraft (less than
42 passenger capacity) remain cancelled. A chorus of public
and private opposition is mounting, as are economic losses.
The military, including the Defense Minister, Honduran Air
Force and Joint Chiefs, is dutifully attempting to put into
action President Zelaya's impulsive announcement that a
civilian/commercial dual use facility would be opened at Soto
Cano (Palmerola) airbase within 60 days. Their option-less
strategy to is urge the United States to allow use of almost
all key services and equipment at the base for a temporary,
yet unspecified period. Post has strong concerns about legal
liability and technical capacity tied to assisting GOH with
civilian operations at the base, even for a temporary period
and requests guidance in the shortest time period possible,
in coordination with SOUTHCOM, on a response to this request.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) In recent days, President Zelaya is finding himself
with fewer and fewer supporters in his bid to keep Toncontin

Airport effectively closed to international flights. Some
private airlines reportedly have indicated they would rather
keep their flights at San Pedro Sula, the current alternative
destination for international traffic, than move to Soto
Cano. Taca has maintained its position that it would not use
Toncontin again if it opens, probably in an attempt to reduce
its own liabilty for the crash. In the face of public
opposition, always fickle President of Congress Roberto
Micheletti has reversed his previous support for moving the
international airport and is calling to reopen Toncontin.
Zelaya has responded by declaring that he has already
completed 290 of the 300 required steps to open an
international airport, but local press deftly pointed out
that he failed to specify the 10 steps he had not completed,
which surely include construction of a terminal, viable
runway, sewage and water systems, and buildings for customs
and migration.


3. (U) Local press is also reporting that there have been
300 deaths in the last three years on the highway connecting
Tegucigalpa to Soto Cano, underscoring the real safety
factors involved in this rash decision. Post has also heard
informally of at least two deaths, and another now comatose
victim, of traffic accidents which occurred on the same road
while in transit from Tegucigalpa to the airport at San Pedro
Sula. Press also reports economic losses of at least USD 21
million over the last week due to the airport closure, and
laments rising job losses, cancellations of international
conferences and visits by investors, and empty hotels in
Tegucigalpa.

-------------- --
Crash Investigation Points to Pilot Error
-------------- -


4. (C) The leader of the NTSB/FAA team assisting Salvadoran
investigators looking into the May 30 crash gave Embassy
staff a close-hold, preliminary readout of his findings on
June 6, stressing that final conclusions might not be
available for more than a year. Preliminary indications
point to some level of pilot error coupled with a wet runway,
and landing long with a significant tailwind. The NTSB
expert, who hopes to return periodically to continue to
assist the Salvadoran investigation, said crowning and
grooving the runway would enhance its safety. But he said
the runway was still usable and "I would land on it with my
family tomorrow" and pointed out that the Taca 390 crash was
the first serious accident at Toncontin Airport in more than
17 years.

-------------- --------------
Military Charged with Creating a Civilian Operation
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Despite strong evidence that the crash was caused in
large part by pilot error, President Zelaya has maintained
his public position that he is concerned about the potential
political costs of another accident at Toncontin, and has
declared the airport indefinitely closed to Class C and D
flights until further notice. (Note: The Honduran Civil
Aviation authorities are defining Class C and D flights as 42
passengers or more. Class A and B, defined by the
authorities as 42 passengers or less, have been operating out
of the airport as normal since the evening of May 30.
Federal Aviation Authority, ICAO, and aviation experts on the
ground have told post that the international standard for
classifying aircraft is actually based on landing speed, and
suspect that the GOH definition is arbitrary. End Note.)
Under the guise of a transport "emergency," Zelaya charged
the Honduran military, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the Air Force, and the Ministry of Defense with drafting and
executing a plan to open the Soto Cano joint air base as a
dual-use military-civilian airport within 60 days of the
accident. His order stipulates that the civilian use may not
interrupt existing military operations at the base.


6. (C) Mil Group Commander, DATT and Econ Off attended a
meeting June 9 with the Honduran military, headed by CHOD
Vasquez Velazquez, to discuss the GOH plan for creation of
this dual-use facility on such short notice. CHOD
underscored at every opportunity the need to achieve this
transition without affecting current military operations at
the base. Honduran military presented the plan under the
assumption that developing an international airport at the
base which follows International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) regulations would require at least two years and USD
50 to 100 million. The presentation recognized the need for
involvement of over 13 Honduran government agencies in
long-term conversion of the base to a dual-use facility.


7. (C) But the real focus of the conversation was the need
for "strong JTF-Bravo cooperation" in the short term, meaning
provision by Joint Task Force-Bravo of all critical base
operations utilities, personnel, and equipment. These
include: electricity, water, sewage, trash collection and
incineration, fuel storage, runway maintanence, control tower
operations and equipement, navigation equipment, radio
communications equipment, fire and rescue personnel and
equipment, and medical infirmary. Additional consultations
on temporary parking, security entrance and exit from the
base, and the security perimeter, would also be necessary.
Finally, despite previous discussions about division of the
military and civilian sides of the base (Reftel B),the
military indicated it plans to use the same runway and ramp
for both, and had not developed concrete plans to divide the
two sides. The presentation did not mention other details
such as animal/bird control, ramp lighting and HAZMAT
response and disposal.


8. (C) Vasquez told Embassy offs that GOH has no
alternatives if the U.S. denies this assistance and meekly
admitted he would have to consult airport concessions manager
Carlos Ramos to find other solutions. Near the conclusion of
the presentation, Minister of Defense Mejia joined the
meeting, and started by declaring that Zelaya had hastily
made the decision without the advice of experts, and that it
was up to Mejia and his military advisors to lay out the
options "in black and white" for the President, including
what the United States can and cannot do. Mejia strongly
implied that the military does not back Zelaya's plan and is
looking for a pretext to scrap it.


9. (C) Embassy PolCouns, DATT and Econ off were summoned to
a meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on June 10.
Though the diplomatic note informing us of the meeting
implied we would be observers, the meeting was an abbreviated
version of the day before. The only difference were that
interlocutors from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were now
present, including lawyers form the MFA's treaty office.
Twice during the meeting, they expressed their willingness to
quickly negotiate changes or addendums to the existing
Bilateral Military Assistance Agreement of 1954 if it were
required to commercialize the airstrip. Embassy offs
reiterated that we would need a few days to seek guidance
from SOUTHCOM and U.S. policy makers and would provide a
formal response when we have been able to study the legal
implications of providing this type of assistance.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) There is mounting evidence that the GOH has no
physical excuse to keep Toncontin closed and the political
game is becoming more clear. Post has concerns about the GOH
assignment of a team from El Salvador to head the ongoing
investigation and report about the causes of the crash. Taca
is based in El Salvador, and we believe there are serious
possible conflicts of interest. We would urge Embassy San
Salvador to underscore the political implications of
threatening operations at Soto Cano for the entire region.


11. (C) Minister of Defense Mejia's search for an excuse to
cease planning of a Soto Cano dual-use facility on a
compressed schedule is understandable, but post is proceeding
with caution. We want Mejia to deliver the news in a way
that does not give Zelaya, who is rumored to be flirting with
airport financing offers from Hugo Chavez and a construction
offer from the PRC, fuel to vilify the United States. We
also see a continued lack of strategic thinking on the part
of advisors, who have twice summoned U.S. diplomatic and
military officials to meetings, hoping for immediate answers
to their request for our temporary assistance. Strikingly
absent in these discussions with GOH officials is the
possibility of making temporary improvements to Toncontin,
which would entail crowning and grooving the runway at a much
lower price, and/or moving the international airport to a
more practical location closer to Tegucigalpa. Feasibility
studies at three sites were done years ago. In the last
week, according to one World Bank representive, World Bank's
International Finance Corporation (IFC),has expressed
interest to GOH officials in financing construction or
reconditioning of Honduran international airport, wherever it
ends up.


12. (C) Post believes our response to the GOH should be
clear that we cannot provide utilities, logistical support or
equipment for commercial use at the base, and that the
response must focus on legal liability issues and the fact
that we cannot accept payment for these services. We request
guidance from SOUTHCOM, with interagency input, as soon as
possible. Post has already informally reminded Honduran
officials that we have been working with them on the possible
joint commercial/military use of the Soto Cano airbase for
several years, most recently in October 2007 (see Reftel B),
and that we have not objected to the idea. In October, the
meetings concluded with an agreement that the GOH would
develop and present a plan focused on commerical cargo - not
passenger flights - which to date we have not seen. When the
plan to convert Palmerola on short notice fails within the
next week to two weeks, we should be prepared to respond to
the GOH by publicly presenting these facts. End Comment.

FORD