GEORGIA: SOUTH OSSETIA INCIDENTS: LESS FATAL, BUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 002495

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KBTS RU GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: SOUTH OSSETIA INCIDENTS: LESS FATAL, BUT
BOLD

REF: A. TBILISI 2176

B. HTTP://WWW.EUMM.EU/EN/PRESS_AND_PUBLIC_INFORM ATIO-
N/PRESS_RELEASES/668/

C. TBILISI 2492

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. Although the area around South Ossetia has
not seen any conflict-related fatalities since November 17,
several recent incidents have caused injuries and shown a
brazen attitude by the South Ossetian or Russian
perpetrators. Georgian Interior Ministry forces have been
the targets of a December 5 guided missile, a December 10
roadside bomb, a December 18 machine-gun attack, and a
December 27 shooting; the roadside bomb was placed near
Pkhvenisi, 8 kilometers outside the administrative boundary.
International monitors have also been targeted; an EUMM
patrol was threatened at gunpoint on December 6, and an OSCE
vehicle was attacked on December 10. Meanwhile both Perevi
and Akhalgori remain problematic. Reports of random shooting
are already increasing as the New Year approaches, causing
fears of further escalation; drunkenness could cause
problems; and the likely departure of the OSCE military
monitors on February 18 could cause further destabilization.
An Interior Ministry official downplayed concerns in the
immediate term, saying the cold weather will keep people
indoors and make it harder to shoot them, but he also
suggested that Russia wants to keep the situation along the
boundary tense in order to maintain pressure on the Georgian
government. End summary.

INTERIOR MINISTRY STILL UNDER FIRE


2. (C) Since the November 17 killing of two and wounding of
three Georgian Interior Ministry officials (ref A),post is
unaware of any fatalities on either side of the South
Ossetian administrative boundary. Attacks have continued,
however, with most originating inside South Ossetia and
targeting Georgian Interior Ministry officials, usually
within a short distance of the boundary. On December 5, the
OSCE reported a guided missile struck a stable next to the
police station in Mereti, causing significant damage to the
structure and injuring a cow; the EUMM reported the missile
originated in Disevi, inside South Ossetia. The OSCE
reported an anti-tank missile landed in the town of Atotsi on
December 21, doing no significant damage. On December 18 the
OSCE reported a police officer was slightly wounded in a
machine-gun attack in Khurvaleti; another police officer was
slighly wounded by gunfire near Ditsi on December 27.
Director of the Interior Ministry Analytical Department Shota
Utiashvili told EmbOff the bullet came from a "vintorez,"
which he described as a $60,000 specialized sniper rifle that
Ossetians generally would not have, but that Russian special
forces are often provided.


3. (C) On December 10, however, the EUMM and OSCE reported
the rear of an Interior Ministry vehicle was damaged by an
improvised explosive device on the road near a bridge in
Pkhvenisi, eight kilometers from the administrative boundary;
one officer was slightly wounded. The fact that the rear of
the vehicle was damaged, not the front, indicated to both
monitoring missions that the device did not detonate upon
impact, but was remotely detonated, either by wire or radio.
Although the perpetrators remain unknown, if they originated
in South Ossetia, they had to travel well beyond the boundary
Qin South Ossetia, they had to travel well beyond the boundary
in order to set the device and then detonate it. This
incident could reflect a new willingness on the part of the
attackers to reach farther outside of South Ossetia into
areas that had generally been considered secure.


4. (C) On December 20, the Interior Ministry told the EUMM
that it would begin deploying COBRA armored vehicles in the
area around South Ossetia, and both the EUMM and OSCE (and
UNOMIG outside Abkhazia) have since observed them in the
field. The EUMM publicly criticized the deployment,
suggesting that the use of such vehicles although not a
violatin of the cease-fire agreement, would not enhance
security on the ground. The EUMM statement further noted
that, although ten Georgian police officers have been killed
since the end of the war, none of those incidents would have
been prevented by armored vehicles (ref B). In private, the
EUMM expressed its concern that the Georgian use of the
COBRAs endangers its own EUMM monitors, because some -- the
Polish contingent in the Gori field office and the Italian
contingent in the Zugdidi field office -- use similar
vehicles. It also noted that following more regular standard

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operating procedures would have done more to protect the
Georgians, and furthermore suggested that the use of armored
vehicles might actually encourage attackers to shoot. (Post
comment: The EUMM public arguments are not convincing to the
Georgians and many diplomats, because the EUMM monitors
themselves always use armored vehicles. The real concern is
what they expressed to us privately: that their own monitors
not be confused with Georgian forces and attacked. One could
argue that the use of the COBRAs, which have a more military
appearance than traditional police vehicles, increases the
perception of militarization along the boundary (although
some EUMM vehicles have a similar appearance),but it is hard
to find fault with the Georgian side taking a step to protect
its personnel -- the same step taken by all three
international monitoring missions. End comment.)

MONITORS ALSO IN THE CROSSHAIRS


5. (SBU) On December 6, the EUMM reported drunk Ossetian
militia threatened an EUMM patrol with a pistol in Didi
Gromi. An OSCE monitor told EmbOff that an EUMM patrol was
forced out of its vehicle and held for over an hour at
gunpoint; this may have been the same December 6 incident.
On December 10, outside the South Ossetian boundary near Zemo
Khviti, an unidentified individual in partial uniform
suddenly appeared before an OSCE patrol from behind some
bushes, drew a weapon, and fired into the air. As the
vehicle began withdrawing, a second individual, also in
partial uniform, appeared from behind some bushes and fired
directly at the vehicle, hitting it several times. The
vehicle was armored, and no one was injured. This was the
first such direct attack on any monitors since the war.


6. (C) The December 10 attackers appeared to the OSCE to be
laying in wait for them. Although the immediate
circumstances are somewhat inconclusive -- the attackers may
have been surprised by the patrol -- an OSCE monitor
suggested to EmbOff it was most likely premeditated, offering
the following explanation. On December 1, an OSCE patrol
witnessed an individual stop a white Lada across the
administrative boundary from Zemo Khviti (the same location
as the December 10 attack),remove an automatic weapon from
the trunk, and fire a single shot toward the village (no one
was injured). The OSCE patrol then revealed itself, and the
individual quickly drove off. One week later, in the same
location, an Ossetian soldier warned another OSCE monitor to
stay away from the area. Two days later, on December 10, an
OSCE patrol returned to the spot to show it had not been
intimidated -- and was attacked. The OSCE monitor
interpreted the attack as retaliation for what was perceived
to be interference in the Ossetian militia's military
activities.

HAPPY NEW YEAR!


7. (C) The OSCE has already received increasing reports of
random shooting along the boundary, probably in connection
with upcoming New Year's celebrations. As the administrative
boundary is so poorly defined and so interlocking, and
because so many villages on either side of the boundary abut
each other, any shooting -- even of a celebratory nature --
in an already tense atmosphere could easily escalate into
something more malicious. Holiday drunkenness -- frequently
cited by the Georgian government, the EUMM and the OSCE as a
problem among the Russians and Ossetians anyway -- could make
Qproblem among the Russians and Ossetians anyway -- could make
the situation even more unstable. Analytical Department
Director Utiashvili did not expect any major difficulties in
the coming weeks, suggesting that the cold weather will keep
people indoors, making them more difficult targets. He
acknowledged, however, that alcohol could lead to
misunderstandings and therefore escalations.

COMMENT: BEWARE WASHINGTON'S BIRTHDAY TOO


8. (C) On February 18, the OSCE's military monitoring mission
is scheduled to close, and post expects it will take some
time for the EUMM to pick up the slack (ref C). Utiashvili
also downplayed this concern, suggesting that the OSCE's lack
of access to South Ossetia makes the mission unable to have
much impact now anyway. He did add, however, that Russia
probably wants to keep the situation along both the South
Ossetian and Abkhaz boundaries tense, in order to maintain
pressure on the Georgian government. The apparently
premeditated retaliation against the OSCE for interference in
potentially attacks suggests to post that the unidentified
troublemakers roaming the administrative boundary see the

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OSCE as a hindrance to their activities. End comment.
TEFFT