Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08TBILISI2492
2008-12-30 14:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tbilisi
Cable title:  

IMPACT OF CLOSING THE OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM MOPS EAID ECON SNAR KBTS RU GG 
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DE RUEHSI #2492/01 3651428
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 301428Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE IMMEDIATE 2230
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0636
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0157
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4750
RUEHUNV/UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3984
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 002492 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM MOPS EAID ECON SNAR KBTS RU GG
SUBJECT: IMPACT OF CLOSING THE OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 002492

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM MOPS EAID ECON SNAR KBTS RU GG
SUBJECT: IMPACT OF CLOSING THE OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary and comment. The OSCE Mission to Georgia
offers the international community several unique tools in
monitoring and facilitating Georgia's democratic, secure and
prosperous development. As a monitoring mission, it provides
information on the situation on the ground, with a special
emphasis on security around South Ossetia; as a program
implementer, it offers direct assistance in such important
areas as human rights, economic development and law
enforcement; as a policy adviser, it represents the
collective wisdom of 56 member states. The breadth of the
organization's membership, combined with the breadth of the
mission's activities, lends the OSCE's voice special force.
Some of the OSCE's programs in Georgia are stronger than
others, and the OSCE lost a significant portion of its
value-added when it lost access to South Ossetia after the
August war. Even so, the military monitors, with their
extensive experience and contacts, are an important resource
even without that access; their loss could increase
instability around South Ossetia. The EU Monitoring Mission
should eventually take up the slack, if it remains. The OSCE
has played a key role in facilitating Georgia's European
integration, and some other mission will need to take up that
role. In general, other missions should be able to cover the
major gaps left by the OSCE closure, but the process will
take time. The OSCE's frequent role as coordinator will be
especially missed; the closure will complicate the
international community's efforts to work together to assist
Georgia and the region's peacefully and democratic
development. Perhaps most importantly, however, in the
current atmosphere of high tension between Georgia and
Russia, the loss of OSCE will remove an important mediating
voice and possibly increase the likelihood of direct

confrontation between the two. Ultimately, with its access
to South Ossetia blocked, preserving the OSCE's mission in
Georgia is not worth sacrificing any fundamental U.S.
principles -- but losing it will complicate our work in
Georgia, and that of the international community, especially
in the short term. End summary and comment.

THE MILITARY MONITORS


2. (SBU) The highest-profile element of the OSCE in Georgia
is the military monitoring mission, which has been in place
since 1992. Although the mission's mandate covers the entire
country of Georgia, in practice it focuses on the situation
around South Ossetia. The personnel are true military
monitors, with the appropriate background and focus. Despite
its small size -- 28 monitors, plus a supervisor -- the
mission's extensive experience and contacts allow it not only
to stay well informed, but also to deter destabilizing
actions and promote dialogue. The mission had an office in
Tskhinvali until the August war; although it has not enjoyed
regular access to South Ossetia since, it still maintains
regular contacts, especially on the working level, with both
Russian and Ossetian forces. A Georgian police officer
stationed just outside South Ossetia recently told an OSCE
monitor he was worried about what would happen when the OSCE
left. The December 10 direct attack on an OSCE patrol's
Qleft. The December 10 direct attack on an OSCE patrol's
vehicle could well demonstrate the threat some of the
troublemakers perceive from the OSCE (see septel).


3. (SBU) While monitoring the military situation, the OSCE
mission also gather important information on other on the
ground issues, such as the current status of internally
displaced persons (IDPs). The OSCE then shares that
information with other interested parties, as well as uses it
in the implementation of its own programs and its message to
the government. It can thereby maintain a regular focus on
the immediate, medium- and long-term impact of the conflict
and provide input into the search for solutions at all levels.


4. (C) The only entity that can cover the loss of the OSCE
military monitors is the recently established EU Monitoring
Mission (EUMM),but post expects a considerable gap in
coverage will be left. The EUMM is larger than the OSCE,
with around 100 monitors covering South Ossetia, and it has
made impressive progress since its establishment in October

2008. Nevertheless, the office has not built up the
institutional knowledge of the area that the OSCE has. More
importantly, it has not yet managed -- despite high-level
efforts in Moscow and Geneva -- to establish any reliable
contacts with either the Russians or the Ossetians. Post has
found that, despite its smaller size, OSCE consistently
obtains more information more quickly than the EUMM. It is

TBILISI 00002492 002 OF 003


unclear whether the EUMM, in which Russia has no direct
voice, will ever be able to develop the same level of
ground-level cooperation with the Russians or the Ossetians.
It is noteworthy that, although Russia at least acknowledged
the OSCE's theoretical right to enter South Ossetia after the
war (while doing nothing to facilitate actual entry),it has
never recognized the EUMM's right to access. In addition,
while the U.S. has a direct vote in OSCE decisions in Vienna,
we do not have similar authority to influence EUMM actions.


5. (C) On an informal level, the OSCE has also been more
directly helpful and cooperative with the USG. Although post
speaks daily with both the OSCE and the EUMM, the OSCE is
consistently better informed and more responsive. This
difference can be explained to some extent by the OSCE's
superior experience and contacts, but also by the EUMM's
cumbersome bureaucratic structures. Bilateral missions from
EU members states in Tbilisi are not entitled to see written
EUMM reports until they are cleared in Brussels, for example.
Some members of the EUMM have in fact suggested that the
U.S. Embassy should not expect daily phone updates. If the
OSCE mission closes, the USG will likely need to work with
the EUMM, and possibly the EU itself, to improve the flow of
information. It will also be necessary to ensure the EUMM
itself remains; many observers expect Russia eventually to
exert pressure to close it as well.

DEMOCRACY BUILDING AND HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION


6. (SBU) On human dimension issues, the OSCE fills a niche
that no other single organizations may fit. The voice of 56
member states carries an authority on democratization and
human rights protection that no single country, including the
U.S., can hope to have. Furthermore, the OSCE represents a
wider range of perspectives than the EU, but is less unwieldy
than either the EU or the UN. Its Human Dimension Office
therefore plays a key role in facilitating Georgia's European
integration efforts by helping the government meet both OSCE
and Council of Europe requirements. In both of these
processes, the OSCE office, which has greater resources than
the EU's mission to Georgia, often acts as the key organizer
and coordinator, providing staff, facilities and other
resources. As Georgia works toward European integration, the
EU will probably have to increase its engagement, and
possibly its presence on the ground, to make up for the loss
of the OSCE.


7. (SBU) The closure of the OSCE would not necessarily mean
all its current roles would go unfilled. Other organizations
do engage in similar activities. Individual EU missions, for
example, or UNDP could carry out specific roles and functions
the OSCE currently does. Local and international NGOs, such
as the International Republican Institute, National
Democratic Institute, Georgian Young Lawyers Association,
Penal Reform International, and Norwegian Rule of Law
Advisors to Georgia could continue their efforts to support
elections organization, trial monitoring, improvement of
prison conditions, and other human rights programs. Post
typically consults the OSCE on human rights issues for its
own reporting, so we would also likely have to rely more on
contacts in these and other organizations.
Qcontacts in these and other organizations.


8. (SBU) Nevertheless, because of the breadth of its
involvement, the closure of the OSCE mission will likely
leave some significant gaps that will take time to fill. On
democracy and good governance issues, for example, the OSCE
currently coordinates the Ambassadors Working Group, a forum
for exchanging perspectives on election and democratic
development among member nations in Georgia. While another
group could easily take on organization of such a group, it
will take time. Additional OSCE initiatives include:
promoting political awareness, education, and involvement
among Georgian academic and governmental circles; structural
and political development assistance to Parliament (similar
to our House Democracy Assistance Committee); technical
support and facilitation for political parties, including
opposition parties; election assistance to the government and
its Central Election Commission; international monitoring of
elections through ODIHR; and assisting Parliament with the
reform of Georgia's Electoral Code.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT


9. (SBU) The OSCE established the Economic Rehabilitation
Program not only to develop the economy in and near South
Ossetia, but also to build confidence and ultimately promote

TBILISI 00002492 003 OF 003


the peaceful resolution of the conflict. With its unique
access to both Government of Georgia and de facto officials
and areas inside South Ossetia, the OSCE was well placed to
pursue this kind of program; the EUMM and UNOMIG, as more
narrowly defined monitoring missions, do not have the mandate
to do so. Since losing access to South Ossetia, the OSCE has
proposed continuing the small business development program in
the region of Shida Kartli south of South Ossetia. The
program is still worthwhile; the region is in great eed of
economic development, and many of the beneficiaries are IDPs.
Furthermore, if the OSCE were to regain access to South
Ossetia, it would once again be in a position to combine
economic engagement with confidence building in a unique way.
If the OSCE fails to regain that access and unique role,
however, it has no comparative advantage as an implementer of
economic programs in the rest of Georgia.

LAW ENFORCEMENT AND BORDER PROTECTION


10. (SBU) The USG is by far the largest provider of
assistance in these areas, but the OSCE is second, with all
other donors sponsoring much smaller programs. The OSCE
therefore provides a useful, multilateral second perspective
on the issues. Like in the human dimension, this second
perspective is especially useful as Georgia works toward
European integration, because its law enforcement structures
resemble European models more closely than U.S. ones. Also,
the OSCE's long history of working on law enforcement and
border protection issues has allowed it to build considerable
expertise in the areas. Its staff have considerable capacity
to provide targeted training and other programs locally; it
is easier for them to find experts with the appropriate
language skills, for example, than the USG. In fact, if the
mission closes, it might even be useful to explore using the
OSCE or its staff as an implementer for USG programs, if at
all possible.
TEFFT