GEORGIA: MILITARY MOVES FROM ABKHAZIA ON THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 002458

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/218
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS RU GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: MILITARY MOVES FROM ABKHAZIA ON THE
HORIZON?

REF: A. TBILISI 2271

B. HTTP://WWW.ABKHAZIAGOV.ORG/RU/PRESIDENT/PRESS /NEW-
S/DETAIL.PHP?ID=14295

C. TBILISI 2053

D. TBILISI 2413

E. HTTP://CONSILIUM.EUROPA.EU/UEDOCS/CMSUPLOAD/1 6110-
8%20RUSSIANS%20RETURN%20TO%20PEREVI.PDF

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary and comment. The chilly winter air in
Georgia is rife with rumors that the Abkhaz and Russians are
planning military action in the near future, possibly to
annex undisputed Georgian territory north of the Enguri River
and establish the river as the "border." Facts on the ground
seem to lend these rumors credibility: de facto Abkhaz
authorities have passed a law unilaterally redrawing the line
along the river; UNOMIG and others have observed a
substantial military buildup along the administrative
boundary; and anecdotal evidence suggests something is afoot.
Post assesses that, if a decision were made by the Abkhaz
and Russians to move on the areas around Ganmukhuri and
Khurcha, they could establish control within about an hour,
with the Georgians able to offer little resistance. It would
take only slightly longer to grab the triangle of land west
of the Enguri Dam. Although seizing the strategically
important triangle is diplomatically riskier and therefore
possibly less likely than a move on Ganmukhuri and Khurcha,
the seizure of any territory would represent a real test for
the U.S. and the international community. Now is the time,
before anything happens, to consider not only how we might
react in the event, but also what we should do now to raise
the cost to Abkhazia and Russia and reduce the likelihood of
any moves. End summary and comment.

Preparations are underway


2. (C) Georgian officials have been warning that the Abkhaz
and Russians have their eyes on the pieces of undisputed
Georgian territory north of the Enguri (ref A). A quick look
at the map shows the attraction. Making the river the line
of demarcation would offer clear strategic advantages in
terms of maintaining control of the boundary. Controlling
the area west of the dam would furthermore give the Abkhaz
and Russians the ability to control the dam, and therefore
both elements of the Enguri hydroelectric production system.
In recent weeks, the chatter in the press and elsewhere about
such an intention on the part of the Abkhaz and Russians has
increased, especially with regard to Ganmukhuri and Khurcha.


3. (C) Changing facts on the ground indicate such chatter is
not unfounded. On October 26 the Abkhaz "Parliament"
announced it had adopted a measure to define the southern
"border" of Abkhazia as the Enguri River itself, beginning as
far east as the Nenskra River (ref B). This would include
the areas around Ganmukhuri, Khurcha, and the triangle west
of the Enguri Dam. This legislative act seems to lay the
groundwork for a more forceful assertion of that boundary at
some point in the future.


4. (C) Steps to prepare for such a move seem to be proceeding
apace. Along with an ongoing expansion of Abkhaz and Russian
fortifications along the existing boundary (ref C),there has
been a significant uptick in the movement of military
hardware in recent weeks. The EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM)
has heard from locals there are now 100 Abkhaz or Russian
tanks in the Gali region, and has itself seen evidence of
Qtanks in the Gali region, and has itself seen evidence of
tanks across the boundary. The Georgian press reported 55
tanks moving into Gali District on December 11 and a military
unit in Gagida, just north of Ganmukhuri. Russian units have
reportedly been deployed in Pichori (north of Ganmukhuri),
Sida (north of Khurcha),and Chuburkhinji (just east of Sida)
-- all villages close to the boundary. The press also
reported that Russian forces have been deployed in the
heights of Gali District that allow observation and
potentially shelling into Zugdidi District.


5. (C) Over the last month or so, UNOMIG has seen its freedom
of movement greatly limited. It can now count on access only
to a narrow corridor along the M-27; any movements beyond
that corridor depend on the mood of local Abkhaz forces.
UNOMIG can rarely gain access to the area close to the
boundary. On December 12, for example, locals told UNOMIG
that 12-14 tanks had moved toward Nabakevi (inside Abkhazia,
just across the administrative boundary from Khurcha),and
that the road they took was then closed for civilian use. A

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patrol tried to verify the information by approaching the
location from another direction, but was prevented from
proceeding by a Russian road block. Despite these
limitations on its patrols, UNOMIG has been able to confirm
significant military movements and equipment in recent weeks.
On December 11, for example, a patrol directly observed a
convoy on the M-27 heading south, consisting of 10 T-72 tanks
equipped with reactive armor, 6 self-propelled howitzers, 2
armored personnel carriers with turret and machine guns
mounted, and other vehicles; the convoy was eventually
observed turning off the highway toward Salkhino village
(inside Abkhazia between Gali and Zugdidi). UNOMIG also
confirmed the presence of unidentified vessels off the coast
of Ganmukhuri on December 7 and 20, one of which seemed to
resemble a Grisha-class frigate.

What would Georgia do?


6. (C) Based on the apparent strength and location of Abkhaz
and Russian forces in the area, post assesses that, once a
dcision is made to take the areas around Ganmukhuri and
Khurcha, the Abkhaz and Russians could do so in about an
hour. The triangle of land west of the Enguri Dam would not
take much longer to seize. The Georgian Interior Ministry
has reinforced its positions along the boundary; UNOMIG
reported on December 18, for example, an increase in the
number and staffing of Georgian posts in the Ganmukhuri area.
The EUMM reported December 22 that the Georgian 24th tank
battalion, consisting of 26 T-72s, recently moved to Senaki
Base; the EUMM speculated that this move was in response to
recent moves in Abkhazia. Nevertheless, considering the
tactical difficulty of defending territory on the far side of
the river and the larger military risks of renewing
engagement with the Abkhaz and Russians, it is unlikely that
the Georgians would be able to put up much resistance to a
determined movement to take the areas near Ganmukhuri,
Khurcha, and the triangle west of the dam.

What will the Abkhaz and Russians do?


7. (C) Post has heard many predictions that the Abkhaz and
Russians will move at some point. A half-Abkhaz,
half-Georgian employee of a western NGO based in Gali, for
example, recently told EmbOff that a Russian military
commander told her additional military action was coming this
spring. Some observers expect action against Ganmukhuri and
Khurcha within three months. Although the value of these
predictions vary, it is possible to consider issues the
Abkhaz and Russians will analyze when making their decision.
The strategic interest for the Abkhaz and Russians in both
occupying additional territory and establishing a more
naturally defensible "border" is clear. The military risk
also seems to be fairly low.


8. (C) The primary question for them is therefore whether the
benefits are worth the potential diplomatic costs. In making
this determination, the Abkhaz and Russians will no doubt
look to the example of Perevi (ref D). In this case, Russian
forces established control over a village clearly outside the
administrative boundary of South Ossetia; in fact, they
implicitly recognized its location when they withdrew their
forces on December 11. When they decided they needed to
maintain control, however, they reintroduced their forces on
December 13, and the Georgian side withdrew. Although some
international observers, such as the EUMM, promptly condemned
Qinternational observers, such as the EUMM, promptly condemned
the Russians' reentry (ref E),the Russian side apparently
made the determination that controlling the area -- which has
far less strategic significance than the areas north of the
Enguri -- was well worth the censure. That censure was not
unanimous or overwhelming, however. On December 22, EmbOffs
in fact heard from the EUMM that even its statement was
itself internally criticized by EU Special Envoy Pierre
Morel, who apparently feared it would upset the Russians on
the eve of the third round of Geneva talks.


9. (C) Because the Enguri Power Station generates 40 percent
of Georgia's electricity in the winter, the international
community would likely react quite strongly to any move on
the triangle west of the Enguri Dam. Some observers
therefore suggest that the Abkhaz and Russians will move on
Ganmukhuri and Khurcha, not the triangle, and observe the
reaction.

What will we do?


10. (C) Considering the changed situation on the ground and

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the various incentives and disincentives, post considers it
quite possible that Abkhazia and Russia will move at some
point in the future to annex the territories north of the
Enguri. This is therefore the time to consider a response if
such a scenario plays out -- and what steps we might take to
ward off such a move. The international community was able
to work together to stop the fighting on August 12, but it
has not yet successfully enforced the terms of that
cease-fire. The situation in Perevi suggests that Russia has
calculated that the international community will tolerate
even further violations, at least around the edges of the
current situation. Unless we clearly articulate the damage
further incursions will do to Russia's international
standing, it may well decide an improved boundary for
Abkhazia is worth a bit of scolding. It may eventually
decide that controlling 40 percent of Georgia's winter
electricity -- and all of Abkhazia's -- is worth some
diplomatic pain as well. A stronger response to the
situation in Perevi might send a different signal on the
costs of ignoring existing boundaries. A rejuvenated UNOMIG
might be better able to monitor and deter military action.
An EUMM with access into Abkhazia might do the same. All of
these steps will be difficult, requiring concerted efforts by
a coordinated international community -- but they would be
easier than determining an appropriate response to annexation
after the fact.
TEFFT