Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08TBILISI2400
2008-12-15 14:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tbilisi
Cable title:  

GEORGIA: NOT ALL OPPONENTS SUPPORT EARLY ELECTIONS

Tags:  PGOV PREL GG 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHSI #2400/01 3501443
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 151443Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0580
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 002400 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: NOT ALL OPPONENTS SUPPORT EARLY ELECTIONS

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 002400

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: NOT ALL OPPONENTS SUPPORT EARLY ELECTIONS

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Comment: Although parliamentary and presidential
elections are not scheduled to take place until 2012 and 2013
respetively, calls for early elections have become de
rigueur in Georgia for some opposition leaders. Thus far,
President Saakashvili does not appear inclined to call either
parliamentary or presidential elections in the near term.
According to the Constitution, the President has the
authority to call for new elections at any time, but it
appears at this point, elections bring him no political
advantage. They are not widely desired by the public at
large, and elections are expensive - something Saakashvili is
quick to note. Christian Democratic (CDM) leader, Gigi
Targamadze told us he opposes early elections, as his party
has a four-year strategy for winning the highest office.
Targamadze is focusing on building a party throughout the
country and thinking politically in terms of years rather
than days, a strategy which separates him from virtually all
of the non-Parliamentary opposition. End Comment.

THE MECHANISM EXISTS, BUT DOES THE MOTIVATION?


2. (C) To clarify Georgia's process, President Saakashvili
could initiate early presidential or parliamentary elections
by one of potentially four ways. The first would be to
resign his presidency, which would trigger a new election
after at least a 60 day interim period. (Embassy Note:
Saakashvili used this mechanism to trigger last January's
Presidential Election. If Saakashvili resigned again, the
Georgian Constitution could bar him from competing in the
next Presidential Election by virtue of having won two
concurrent elections. End Note.) The second would be to
dissolve Parliament and call for new elections after three
successive votes fail for Prime Minister, the Government, or
the budget. In principle, this power allows the President to
dissolve a recalcitrant Parliament. However, Saakashvili
could easily meet this legalistic hurdle if he wanted new
elections as the overwhelming majority of Parliamentarians
are members of the President's party (the National Movement
-- UNM) and a vote of "no confidence" could easily be
arranged. Again, the election would be subject to a minimum

60 day waiting period. Another possibility would be for
Parliament to vote to change the constitution and allow for
new elections which was the basis for last May's
Parliamentary elections. (Embassy Comment: Because UNM
still holds a constitutional majority in Parliament, this
would probably be the most straightforward way to hold new
pre-term elections. End Comment.) Lastly, in theory,
President Saakashvili could declare a crisis situation then
use his emergency powers to "resolve the crisis" by holding
new elections. In this case, the President's legal authority
may be dubious or unclear, but opposition leaders would be
highly unlikely to forgo new elections by challenging the
decision on legalistic grounds.


3. (SBU) Saakashvili recently addressed the question (and
indirectly Nino Burjanadze's recent comments that Georgia
under Saakashvili is viewed as a banana republic) by saying
frequent elections would not be a sign of "statehood". He
further criticized the opposition saying that "(i)f we want
to make fun of our country and hold two or three elections
per year anytime someone is unhappy with the election
results, then it would mean we are no longer a state."
According to the CEC chairman, the government spent
approximately $45 million for elections in 2008, and
QSaakashvili said those calling for early elections in the
midst of the current financial crisis are doing so "not for
our people; not for the economy; not for development and not
for rescuing Georgia; but for politicians and their
campaigns".


4. (C) In the Embassy's view, Saakashvili has practically
nothing to gain by calling for new elections. Calls for new
elections enjoy little public support, and the President's
argument that elections are expensive has put opposition
candidates on the defensive. Saakashvili's other argument is
also sound; essentially stating that the opposition wants him
to fix their failures - either their failure to win enough
votes to enter Parliament last May or their failure to accept
their seats. Conversely, acquiescing to demands for new
elections would be seen as legitimizing his critics and their
agenda. Moreover, the non-Parliamentary opposition has not
yet decided what kind of elections to demand (Parliamentary
or Presidential) or how to initiate these elections. Absent
a major public crisis in confidence, Saakashvili is almost
certain to keep elections on their normal timelines.
Saakashvili seems content to have the opposition paint
themselves into a corner by single-mindedly pursuing new
elections.

DOES ANYBODY HAVE AN ALTERNATIVE PLAN?


TBILISI 00002400 002 OF 002



5. (C) CDM leader and member of Parliament Gigi Targamadze
told us on December 13 that he largely agrees with
Saakashvili's view on elections ad does not support an early
contest. Targamadze has seen his public profile rise since
accepting his Parliamentary mandate and he leads a credible,
albeit small, opposition group within the Parliament.
Targamadze is committed to building a long-term strategy to
bring the CDM to power in four years. Targamadze is slowly
establishing himself and his party as a "third" way, neither
in government nor as a member of the United Opposition.
Rather than a singular focus on new elections, hoping he
catches an anti-Saakashvili wave to bring him to power, he is
focused on party building and governance. Targamadze
believes that expanding into the regions and creating a
national organization with a "bench" of local politicians is
how the Christian Democrats can make, and have made,
substantial gains. Targamadze understands that building a
party and engaging in policy debates on issues like national
defense (septel) and the budget is a more effective way to
work in opposition. Ironically, because they have followed a
less confrontational approach, if the more radical opposition
gets their new elections, Targamadze and the Christian
Democrats could stand to gain at their expense.
TEFFT