GEORGIA: IMPOSSIBLE TO GOVERN WITHOUT GOD AND BIBLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TBILISI 002269

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV RU GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: IMPOSSIBLE TO GOVERN WITHOUT GOD AND BIBLE

REF: A. 04 TBILISI 3003

B. 04 TBILSI 3001

C. 05 TBILISI 1298

D. 06 TBILISI 112

E. 04 TBILISI 763

F. 07 TBILISI 2558

G. 07 TBILISI 3065

H. 04 TBILISI 3301

I. 05 TBILISI 2420

J. 05 TBILISI 2418

K. 08 TBILISI 2117

L. 08 TBILISI 1983

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary: The Georgian Orthodox Church is a
inherent part of Georgian society and for many, defines what
it is to be Georgian. For those who are not ethnic Georgian,
this close association threatens disenfranchisement. Most
Georgians, even if not fervent parishioners, would not openly
contradict the church. This holds true as well in political
circles. The church adeptly manages a juggling act between
majority and minority political parties, supporting, cajoling
and reprimanding when appropriate. In the last year, Georgia
has weathered turbulent times: large civil unrest, widely
disputed elections, and invasion by Russian troops. In each
of these instances, Ilia II, Patriarch of Georgia was active
in steering rudderless Georgians towards stiller waters.
Ilia II himself is an astute diplomat who has an active
interest in internal politics, especially in the status of
church jurisdiction over the two separatist regions of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He travels to Russia within this
context but also meets with other regional political leaders.
The internal relationship between church and state is
symbiotic; the external relationship with leaders of other
faiths sometimes is strained as the conservative elements of
the Orthodox faith attempt to maintain and broaden influence
amongst their followers. End Summary.

The Shepherd and His Flock
--------------


2. (U) Ilia II is the current Catholicos-Patriarch of All
Georgia and the spiritual leader of the Georgian Orthodox
Church. He was born Irakli Gudushauri-Shiolashvili in
Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia, Russia. Last year, he celebrated
30 years as the Catholicos-Patriarch. Ilia II is a descendant
of an influential eastern Georgian mountainous clan with
family ties to the former royal dynasty of the Bagrationi.
Ilia II trained in Russia and served in a variety of
positions before assuming his current post. In 1967, he was
consecrated Bishop of Sukhumi and Abkhazia and elevated to
the rank of metropolitan. He served in that position for 11
years. After he was elected the new Catholicos-Patriarch of
Georgia in 1977, he began a course of reforms, enabling the
Georgian Orthodox Church, once suppressed by Soviet ideology
to regain its former influence by the 1980s. During the last
years of the Soviet Union, he joined protesters in Tbilisi
against communist rule on April 8, 1989, and unsuccessfully
urged protesters to disperse before Soviet troops arrived.
During the civil wars in the 1990s, he called on rival
parties to find a peaceful solution to the crisis. From
1978-1983, Ilia II was the Co-President of the World Council
of Churches (WCC).

The Ties That Bind
--------------


3. (C) Georgian Orthodoxy has regained popularity since
Soviet times. This resurgence has raised the question of the
role of the church and has pitted "conservatives" against
"reformers." In July 2003, an open letter signed by
forty-two public figures voicing concern over ties that had
been broken between society and the Georgian Orthodox Church
was sent to the Patriarch (ref A). The letter called for
Ilia II to "resist the increased radicalism and xenophobia"
QIlia II to "resist the increased radicalism and xenophobia"
and urged him to voice concern over the violation of
religious minorities' rights. The reformist elements within
the church, then supported by civil society NGOs and the
Ombudsman, claimed the church was teaching fanaticism; had
corrupt ties to scrap-metal, alcohol and cigarette
businesses; and was infiltrated by Russian agents (Ref B).
Allegations of the Patriarch's strong ties to Russia are
manifest due to his place of birth, Russia-based theological
education, and strong contact with the Russian Patriarchy.
Conservative priests accused civil society and NGOs of
interfering in the internal affairs of the Georgian Orthodox
Church (GOC). GOC watchers ruminate that these conservative
elements surrounding Ilia II keep him from settling the
church property disputes between the GOC and the Armenian
Apostolic Church (Ref C). The Saakashvili administration's

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stance has been to remain aloof from these disputes, although
it took on a decisive role in responding to abuse of other
religious faiths (Ref, U.S. State Department's Human Rights
Report for Georgia, 2006, 2007.)

My Peace I Give You
--------------


4. (C) The Patriarch is a positive force who has admirably
defused, on more than several occasions, potentially
dangerous situations before they became uncontrollable. In
2004, the Patriarch played a positive role in the Ajaran
stand-off between President Saakashvili and Aslan Abashidze
(Ref E). In November 2007, he urged calm after large scale
public unrest resulted in the injury of protesters and
policemen alike; on the first anniversary of the event, he
repeated this call. In March 2008, he urged opposition
candidates to cease their hungerstrike when they cried foul
on Presidential election results and to resume dialogue with
the government. (Comment: After dialogue failed to break
the impasse, both opposition and authorities blamed each
other for what they called "a failure to heed the Patriarch's
appeal.") In August 2008, Ilia II traveled to Gori through
Russian occupation lines to retrieve dead soldiers' remains,
after appealing to Aleksey II, the Patriarch of the Russian
Orthodox Church, to mediate his access. Gori was then uner
the control of Russian and South Ossetian forces. Ilia II
often uses the pulpit to call for Georgian unity, such as the
September Human Chain "Stop Russia" exhortation, which turned
out thousands of Georgians in a scene of solidarity across
the country.

Cast in Thy Lot Amongst Us
--------------


5. (C) A constitutional agreement (Concordat) signed by
the president and the Orthodox Patriarch in 2005 gives the
church legal status. It also gives the church a unique
consultative role in the government. Association with the
church is known to be a politically successful pairing,
regardless of party affiliation, and attacks on the church
can be damaging. Sozar Subari, Ombudsman, who dared to be
openly critical of the church's Concordat, was dressed down
by Orthodox officials for suggesting it made other religions
less equal. Papal Nuncio Claudio Gugerotti told post shortly
after this incident, that revoking the Concordat would cause
a public outcry that could jeopardize the stability of the
government (Ref D). "If the people are forced to choose," he
said, "they will choose the church over the government. The
U.S. could easily be seen as the force behind the proposed
revocation." Since Georgia's independence in 1991, the
Patriarch's role in domestic politics has become increasingly
more salient. It was the Patriarch who baptized Eduard
Shevardnadze, then President, in a highly symbolic gesture of
christening the long time communist leader. The gesture
demonstrated the Patriarch's support for the new authorities
of the country, and with the advent of the Rose Revolution,
even stronger support for the new leader, Mikheil
Saakashvili. The Patriarch blessed Saakasvhili when he was
first elected in 2004 and then re-elected in 2008. On both
occasions the Patriarch symbolically led the ceremony at the
tombs of Georgia's highly esteemed monarchs, David the
Builder and Bagrat III, both known for their successful
efforts to unify the country. The Patriarch's presence is
noted at many of President Saakashvili's public addresses and
recognized by name in Saakashvili's opening remarks. The
Patriarch regularly attends the May 26 National Day military
parade standing next to the President. Conversely,
Qparade standing next to the President. Conversely,
Saakashvili can be seen with other members of his cabinet
attending Sunday sermons.


6. (C) Opposition candidates court the church's
endorsement, even the more radical elements such as Kakha
Kukava of the Conservative Party. In May, Kukava said, "The
new chairman of the Central Election Commission should be
respected and a trusted person--and here we can also listen
to the Patriarch and his recommendation for who this person
can be." The Christian Democrat Movement (CDM),set up by
Giorgi Targamadze in February 2008, saw the potential of
basing a political party around the church's values as a
unifying factor. As one of only two opposition parties to
pass the threshold in May 21 Parliamentary elections, his
platform--based on "protecting Georgian Orthodox
Christianity"--has been successful. The CDM has vowed to
initiate an amendment in Parliament that would declare the
Orthodox Christianity an "official religion" in Georgia. The
CDM website lists amongst its major principles belief in God
and moral values, and that distancing politics from moral
values is unacceptable. In October 2007, the Patriarch
called for the abolition of the republic in favor of a
constitutional monarchy. Two of the opposition candidates

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adopted this as part of their platform, most notably the New
Rightist Party, which dedicated a press conference to the
issue. Insiders who know New Rightists leader David
Gamkrelidze maintain that it was not the political parties
seizing the idea from the Patriarch, but the other way around
(Ref F,G).

The Prodigal Territories
--------------


7. (C) Public opinion polls underline that territorial
integrity is among the top three concerns of most citizens.
President Saakashvili made return of the de facto territories
a key part of his election platform in 2004. Georgian
Orthodox Church representatives are active on the diplomatic
front with regards to the practical jurisdiction of the GOC
in the de facto territories, even more so now that Russia has
recognized their independence. A Georgian delegation from
the church met with the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia
Aleksey II in Moscow November 6-10, 2008. Zurab Abashidze,
former Georgian Ambassador to Russia and member of the
delegation which went to Moscow, told Emboffs that the
Russian Patriarchy had offered to hold religious services in
both territories until Georgian priests would be allowed
there. The Georgians declined this offer. The Georgian
Church maintains that the Russian Church will let in other
religions to the de facto territories, but not the Georgian
Patriarchy, and see this as encroaching upon their domain.
Georgian media coverage was positive of the Moscow visit, but
did not offer many details.


8. (C) Excommunicated priest Basil Kobakhidze conducted a
seminar on the subject at the Caucasus House to analyze the
results of the visit. Kobakhidze was excommunicated from the
church in 2004 for his reformist leanings (Ref H). Kobakhidze
outlined several factors which indicated to him that the
Russian Orthodox Church is well on its way to ingratiating
itself within the perceived Georgian flock in the
territories. First, the subordination of de facto church
officials indicate their loyalty is to Russia: the de facto
Alania Eparchy of South Ossetia is headed by Father Giorgi
Pukhate who has close personal ties to Kokoity. Allegedly,
Abkhazia is under the supervision of Father Kupov, Bishop of
Maikop ad Adigea Eparchy of the Russian Federation. The
Sukhumi Eparchy itself is under the leadership of Father
Besarion Aplia, who is under the direct control of Moscow.
In 2002 and 2008, the Russian church openly decorated Father
Aplia with special awards. Aplia has a representative office
in Moscow. Secondly, there is an ongoing flurry of Russian
Orthodox Church activity: millions spent on charity
activities; mobilizing funds for the construction of an
Orthodox Cathedral in Tskhinvali; and conducting memorial
services for Russian soldiers who fell on the battlefield in
August. Kobakhidze opined that while the Russian Church will
try to maintain control over Orthodox Churches in breakaway
regions of Georgia, it will not recognize its jurisdiction.
This could be due to fears that the Orthodox Churches in
Latvia, Lithuania, and Ukraine may also demand independence
which eventually could be recognized by Constantinople.

Faith of Our Fathers
--------------


9. (C) The relationship between the GOC and other religious
denominations is at times rocky. The concordat is a thorny
issue, especially for the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC).
AAC officials claim that the concordat gives special
treatment to the GOC that other religions do not receive.
Churches other than the GOC must register as a local
QChurches other than the GOC must register as a local
association or as a foundation. The AAC has refused to do
so, arguing that it opens itself up to the Government of
Georgia's determination as to what and what is not a
religious body. (Embassy note: On the other hand, the Roman
Catholic Church in Georgia has chosen to register as an NGO,
the association of St. Joseph, and therefore must pay taxes
as other organizations do. Both the AAC and the Roman
Catholics have complained to the Embassy about this "unfair
practice" and urged the USG to take action. End note.)
Indeed, AAC has been lobbying for years for the resolution of
Armenian properties, so far without result. AAC Priest Narek
Kushyan blames the government for the "lack of will" in
resolving the problem. GOG officials such as Minister of
Reintegration Temuri Yakobshvili are sympathetic, but see the
issue as one into which the government should not intrude.
As he told Kushyan, "I just can't call up Interior Minister
Vano (Merabishvili) and tell him to fix it."


10. (C) The GOC withdrew from the WCC in 1997 due to
disagreements over the proposal that the organization take on
a more ecclesiastical nature. According to Giorgi Andiradze,
former director of Patriarchy Television Iveria, there was

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pressure from priests who claimed that GOC should be
independent from all other churches, as the GOC is the only
true church. Ilia II apparently succumbed to this pressure.
The GOC can rally its congregation to mass when it feels
threatened by other religions. Such was the case in 2003
when President Shevardnadze yielded to the pressure of the
church and refused to sign an agreement with the Vatican.
The document, which was to set up an interstate agreement
with the Vatican, was expected to be signed on September 20,

2003. Several thousand protesters gathered in front of the
Parliament to protest the agreement. Ilia II himself at the
time said in press statements, "This agreement will cause
serious problems for the Georgian government." Press
articles indicated that the GOC felt that the agreement with
the Vatican would threaten the GOC's exclusive status in
Georgia. Andiradze maintains that the proposed agreement had
not been discussed with the GOC ahead of time. When the
Union of Orthodox Parents perceived the Catholic Relief
Services USAID-funded youth program, Building for the Future,
as proselytizing activity, they protested in front of the
U.S. and Vatican Embassies in Tbilisi holding signs reading
"Stop Catholic Expansion" and "The Vatican is a Spiritual
Aggressor." (Ref I, J).

Go Forth and Spread the News
--------------


11. (C) Anecdotal evidence indicates the GOC may be gearing
up efforts to widen its spiritual presence in Georgia.
Emboffs visited a monastery which is being built near the
Russian-Georgian border at Kazbegi. Border guards who work
at the post told Emboffs that the facility is being built by
volunteers and funded by private donations. Due to the harsh
climate and short construction season in Kazbegi it is
estimated that it will take 20 years to complete the main
church and all the out-buildings. It is already in its
fourth year of construction. According to the Border Police,
the Patriarch feels it important to have a monastery near the
border because it shows that not only will the GoG protect
Georgian citizens and villagers, but that the church is there
to protect them as well. (Comment: Although the Patriarch
was born in Vladikavkaz, he grew up and spent his childhood
in the Kazbegi region. End Comment.) Kazbegi Border Police
had heard that the Patriarch would like other churches and
monasteries built at other borders as well. (Emboffs heard
this as well in the Lagodeki district near the Azerbaijan
border.) According to a source close to the Patriarch, in
the near future the Patriarchy intends to open its own TV
Channel, designed to air conversations with spiritual
leaders, sermons, and programs about the history and
activities of the church. The channel, which will be a
further means of outreach to the Georgian population, could
be a powerful tool to leverage public opinion, including on
political issues. According to the same source, Iveria which
currently airs some religious programming is not owned by the
church and will stop broadcasts.

12.(C) The Turkish Consul in Batumi, Thugrul Ozten, told
Emboffs that he had heard of mass bptisms in Ajara amongst
the Turkish-speaking population and that church officials had
been accompanied by government Deputy Ministers. Ozten sees
a parallel between the growth in Georgian nationalism and
support for the Georgian Church. He drew on his own country's
parallel with the struggle between religion and state, and
opined that the Turkish-speaking population perceives that
Qopined that the Turkish-speaking population perceives that
they would be marginalized if they did not have strong ties
between them and the GOC (Ref K).

Comment
--------------


13. (C) Comment: The Georgian Orthodox Church is an
influential and invaluable ally of the Saakashvili
administration. Given the church's strong emphasis on
traditional values, this traditional conservatism could
conceivably clash with future government priorities if the
church would find them unacceptable. Some such as former PM
Gurgenidze see the Georgian church as an unstoppable force
and anti-western (Ref L). For the moment the church is very
supportive of NATO and EU integration, but if this should
change, particularly when Ilia II's replacement takes office,
it could present a formidable opponent to those in power and
have a major influence on Georgia's foreign policy.
TEFFT