GEORGIA: ABKHAZIA, TORN BETWEEN TWO LOVERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L TBILISI 002174

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS RU GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: ABKHAZIA, TORN BETWEEN TWO LOVERS

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary and comment. Two recent encounters with the
Abkhaz de facto leadership produced two different
perspectives on the current Abkhaz outlook. UN Special
Representative Verbeke concluded that the Abkhaz realize they
have burned their bridges with most of the international
community and, for good or ill, are committed to a "marriage"
with Russia. EU Ambassador to Georgia Per Eklund, on the
other hand, after a visit to Sukhumi and Gali, argued that
the Abkhaz are still very interested in cooperation with
Europe and don't want to be left alone with Russia. It is
not necessarily true that one of these two accounts is wrong;
they probably represent the two poles of Abkhazia's internal
struggle to grapple with its future course. Eklund's account
of his trip to Abkhazia exposed rifts within the EU about the
appropriate level of engagement with Abkhazia at this time,
with the French Ambassador here (representing the EU
Presidency) arguing against Eklund's point of view in an EU
Monitoring Mission briefing, noting that the Abkhaz should
not be able to get EU assistance if they will not accept the
EU Monitoring Mission in Abkhazia. In the French view, if
Abkhazia still wants engagement, it should be expected to
make reasonable concessions on security and the humanitarian
situation. End summary and comment.

Verbeke: A Bride in Hand . . .


2. (C) UN Special Representative Johan Verbeke, who has an
office in Sukhumi, told the Ambassador November 13 about
recent conversations he held with the Abkhaz leadership,
including de facto "President" Bagapsh and "Foreign Minister"
Shamba. Verbeke contrasted the conversations with those from
a month earlier, when he had first arrived. In the earlier
meetings, the Abkhaz were still hoping to cultivate
relationships wih countries other than Russia, including in
particular Europe. To Verbeke they seemed at the time to be
playing a game with Russia, in which they accepted that they
would enjoy only quasi-independence (i.e., dependence on
Russia) for a while, but would later seek a more robust
version that would allow for broader relationships. Now,
however, Verbeke sensed a significant change in their
attitude: they seem to have accepted that, for good or ill,
they have made a choice to orient themselves completely
toward Russia. Although this would probably not have been
their ideal choice, they now seem to Verbeke to realize that,
by aligning themselves so closely with Russia, they have
effectively cut off the possibility of broader relationships.


3. (C) Verbeke went on to draw the analogy of a man choosing
a wife. Although he might be tempted to wait around for his
dream mate, he ultimately might also decide to go with a
reasonably acceptable, if not perfect, bride. According to
Verbeke, Abkhazia seems to have accepted that Russia is its
bride, and it's now too late to go back. By accepting this
decision, Abkhazia thinks it now has more clarity on its
future and can pursue Russian engagement and investment
without constantly second-guessing itself. It realizes it
has closed a window, but it has come to terms with that
decision.

Eklund: The EU is Welcome


4. (C) At the weekly EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) briefing on
November 20, EU Ambassador to Georgia Per Eklund told members
QNovember 20, EU Ambassador to Georgia Per Eklund told members
of the diplomatic community about his recent trip to
Abkhazia. (Note: Post believes this was the first trip to
Abkhazia by the chief of a bilateral mission since the war;
Verbeke is the only other COM who has made the trip, as far
as we are aware. End note.) He explained that the Abkhaz
with whom he met, including Shamba, expressed great interest
in continued engagement with the EU, including in particular
on assistance programs in such areas as shelter, sanitation
and schools. The only complication to continued cooperation
was that Abkhazia couldn't accept assistance designated for
Georgia. Eklund seemed to suggest that the EU should seek to
take advantage of this openness. (Note: The EU is the
largest donor currently running programs in Abkhazia, with
seven ongoing programs. Working-level officials have been
traveling to Abkhazia on the EU's behalf since the war. End
note.) In a later conversation, the DCM asked Eklund whether
he had seen any sign of the attitude Verbeke described;
Eklund said no, that all the Abkhaz he saw seemed as ready as
ever to develop relationships with various partners.

To Engage or Not to Engage: an Intra-EU Dispute

5. (C) French Ambassador Eric Fournier offered an unusually
pointed rejoinder to Eklund's remarks during the weekly EUMM
briefing session. Referring to an earlier report from the
EUMM that Abkhazia was unwilling to accept EUMM monitors,
Fournier questioned whether the EU should allow Abkhazia to
selectively accept assistance from the EU but not the EUMM.
He suggested that this pick-and-choose approach to engagement
was Abkhazia's clever way of achieving a kind of "soft
recognition," because it could receive the support it needed
to improve conditions while reinforcing a sense of reality
about its territorial boundary and legitimacy. Fournier went
on to criticize the de facto authorities in sharp language
for maintaining the Georgian population of Gali as
"hostages," questioning whether the EU should support such a
regime. After a moment of tense silence, Eklund responded
icily that EU members would clearly need to continue this
discussion in another forum.


6. (C) In his conversation with the DCM, Eklund offered a bit
of background to the exchange. Fournier, in his capacity as
representative of the current EU president, had objected to
and tried to block Eklund's trip to Abkhazia. Eklund,
however, had himself objected to Fournier's intervention,
maintaining that the EU president had no authority to
interfere with the EU's bilateral mission in Georgia. The
exchange at the EUMM briefing thus reflected a
still-unresolved dispute within the EU membership about how
best to approach the current situation in Abkhazia.

Comment: Torn Between Two Lovers


7. (C) To a greater extent than South Ossetia, Abkhazia has
over the years tried to keep open the possibility of
engagement with countries other than Russia. According to
Verbeke, the Abkhaz maintained this hope even after the war,
but then lost it as they realized the scope of international
disapproval of Russia's recognition. Considering Abkhazia's
pressing needs for development, it is understandable that at
some point they might realize that they cannot wait around
forever for their ideal arrangement and decide to throw in
their lot with Russia alone. As Eklund's experience shows,
however, they likely still harbor hopes for additional
partners and financial assistance and will continue to pursue
such opportunities whenever possible. The question for the
international community is to what extent we should maintain
the pressure on Abkhazia, and Russia, by keeping them
isolated, and to what extent we should seek to engage with
them, at the risk of lending further legitimacy. It is a
tricky balance, as the intra-EU spat demonstrates.
Fournier's trenchant objection to Abkhazia's selective
approach points toward a reasonable balance. Engagement must
be tied to cooperation in all areas, including reasonable
steps to improve security and the humanitarian situation,
such as accepting EU monitors.
TEFFT