GEORGIA: EUMM SEEKS CHANGES TO PROPOSED INFO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 002118

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL RU GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: EUMM SEEKS CHANGES TO PROPOSED INFO
EXCHANGE WITH MOD

REF: TBILISI 2050

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Begin Summary and Comment: In a November 12
meeting, European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) Head
Hansjoerg Haber told the Ambassador he is seeking additional
modifications to the proposed Exchange of Information
Agreement which is pending signature between the EUMM and the
Georgian Defense Ministry. The modifications would require
Georgians to notify EUMM 24 hours in advance of significant
troop movements or movement of heavy military equipment. The
areas affected would be the area between the main east-west
highway and South Ossetia and a 20 kilometer distance from
the administrative boundary with Abkhazia. Currently the
EUMM believes it does not have enough visibility on Georgian
east-west troop movements. While Haber said the Georgians
would resist these modifications, he sees it as necessary to
be able to give the Georgians, "a clean bill of health" and
ensure transparency. He solicited our support to this end,
but he did not respond to our previous suggestion to seek a
similar agreement with Russia (reftel). In a follow up
conversation on November 13, Haber said he had no authroity
under the Sarkozy-Medvedev ceasefire agreement to negotiate
an agreement with the Russians. He suggested the issue be
discussed at the November 18 Geneva meeting. Comment: Post
supports Haber's efforts to increase transparency but a
failure by the EUMM to seek an agreement with Russia could
create an unfair penalty on the Georgian side, especially if
the EUMM cites Georgia for any "violations." End Summary and
Comment.

Checkpoints: Military not Cops, Unauthorized Weapons


2. (C) Haber said the Russians gave the EUMM a list of 20
checkpoints where they claim the Georgians have stationed
military troops equipped with sniper pistols and RPGs, both
of which the Russians cite as violations of the cease-fire
agreement. The EUMM found that this allegation was untrue in
some circumstances, but in others it seems to have merit, as
in Zvemo Nikozi. The Ambassador pointed out that these may
have been Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOIA) paramilitary
elite troops, a group much like Italian Carabinieri forces,
who have a camp just south of Tbilisi. General Gilles
Javier, Haber's Deputy maintains the tactics and behavior of
the forces in question, not to mention the camouflage uniform
patterns, suggest they are military personnel. Haber said
that Minister of Internal Affairs Merabishvili has denied
that military troops are present, citing the superior
performance of MOIA personnel over military personnel in
fulfilling such a role.

EUMM Requests Prior Notice


3. (C) According to Haber, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov
is interpreting point four of the cease-fire agreement, which
states that "Georgians must return to their barracks," as
meaning Georgian military troops should return to post and
remain there. Haber added that he certainly didn't expect
the Georgians to give up their sovereignty, and after all, he
said, the Russians had not negotiated the cease-fire in good
faith. Even at that time it was likely that they were
negotiating Russian bases in South Ossetia and had no intent
to pull back Russians troops to pre-August 7 positions. As
it stands, there is ambiguity in the cease-fire agreement
which needs to be clarified in order for the EUMM to be able
to give the Georgians a "clean bill of health." Haber
maintains that the Georgians are moving troops and weapons
which may well be innocent, but because they are not informed
Qwhich may well be innocent, but because they are not informed
about these movements, the EUMM cannot state unequivocally
what they are doing. Thus, the proposal for prior
notification. The proposed information sharing agreement
would require the Georgians to notify the EUMM 24 hours in
advance of any movement of military troops (defined as 100 or
more) or military equipment (defined s artillery and 18mm
mortars, or larger, and all tanks and armored vehicles),
except for transit purposes and/or under special
circumstances (natural or man-made disasters.) The areas
affected by the notification would be the North direction
from the Igoeti-Gomi section of the main highway (not
including the main highway) and a 20 kilometer distance from
the administrative boundary with Abkhazia.

The Likely Scenario


4. (C) Haber cited as an example Toncha, a small village
just outside the South Ossetia administrative boundary
directly east of Akhalgori, where the Georgians are building
an encampment with artillery and infantry. From the position
of Toncha, Georgian troops can fire on Akhalgori with a

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medium range howitzer. Recently, the Russians came across
the administrative boundary just to show themselves to the
Georgians so they would know the Russians are aware of their
activity. Haber hypothesizes this could escalate into
clashes between the two groups, and thus the need for the
proposed information exchange agreement to promote
transparency. The Georgians argue that they need to protect
Tbilisi from this vantage point, so that if Russian troops
should head out on the east-west highway, Georgians would be
able to fire on them from the rear.

Georgians: Diplomatic Pressure Not Enough


5. (C) With this example in mind, Haber will ask Georgians
to notify EUMM 24 hours in advance of military movement.
Haber sees this as a compromise between what is already
written and what the Georgians perceive the agreement to
mean. Haber is aware that the Georgians will perceive this
as unfair, as no comparable pressure will be applied on the
Russians. Haber said that there would be a large diplomatic
price for Russia to pay if it attacked Georgian troops, but
for Georgians this rings hollow. The Georgians told him,
"After two months though it will be business as usual between
the Russians and the Europeans -- diplomatic pressure alone
will not be enough to deter them." Haber opined that for the
Georgians, the Russians have not finished their aggressive
stance. In Georgian eyes, the Russians were still pushing
for regime change, thwarting NATO aspirations, and blocking
alternatives to Russian pipelines.


TEFFT