SCENESETTER FOR GEO MINDEF DAVIT KEZERASHVILI

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 000207

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2023
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL RU GG
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GEO MINDEF DAVIT KEZERASHVILI
COUNTERPART VISIT TO SECDEF 18-23 FEBRUARY 2008

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C//NF) Summary: Continued U.S. support for Georgia's
NATO aspirations and mil-mil cooperation will likely dominate
your meeting with Minister of Defense Kezerashvili. The
development and reform of the Georgian Armed Forces into a
NATO interoperable force is part of the foundation for a
Georgian security and foreign policy aimed at integrating
Georgia into Europe. Georgia's contributions to Iraq and
Kosovo have demonstrated Georgia's willingness to participate
in global security operations and while this participation
serves Georgia's interests it also supports long term U.S.
strategic goals in the region. Currently negotiations are
ongoing to ensure Georgia's continued participation in these
operations. While the political will exists to continue
participating in these operations, the Georgian Armed Forces
recognizes the need for continued U.S. military assistance in
order to transform their force into a viable force that can
secure the Georgian people as well as continue to contribute
as security provider on the world stage.
End Summary.

Political background and Internal Issues Impacting Georgian
Security Decisions:



2. (U) When President Saakashvili took office in 2004,
Georgia was nearly a failed state, but it is much changed
now. Georgia is a strategically significant country to the
United States because of its government's commitment to
democracy, independence from Russia, free market economic
reform and control of corruption, its aspirations for NATO
and EU membership, and support for the War on Terrorism, most
notably by the contribution of 2000 troops to Iraq coalition
forces. Georgia has the third largest contingent of troops
in Iraq. Its success or failure sends a distinct message to
other countries of the former Soviet Union, and in the Middle
East as well, about the wisdom of a Western-oriented,
democratic, free market orientation. Additionally, Georgia
sits astride the main alternative corridor for trade in oil,
gas and other goods to Europe from Central Asia and farther
East. Without Georgia's cooperation, no strategy for
bringing additional Azeri, Kazakh or Turkmen oil and gas to
the world market without passing through Russia can succeed.
These facts begin to explain as well why Russia is openly
hostile to Saakashvili's vision of an independent Georgia.


3. (U) Recent election - The January 5 presidential
election was judged by the U.S. Embassy, the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe
to be, despite some problems, in essence consistent with most
international standards for democratic elections. There were
problems, however, which the Georgian government has
committed to address before parliamentary elections in the
spring.


4. (U) Separatist regions - Georgia's long-simmering
problems with its separatist regions of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia could erupt in controversy in February when Kosovo
will likely declare independence. Russia has threatened to
recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia if
the U.S. and Europeans recognize Kosovo, recent remarks by
Russian FORMIN Lavrov notwithstanding. Such a move by
Russia, which has long supported the separatist regimes, will
be extremely destabilizing to the government of Georgia. We
believe the government is sufficiently committed to its NATO
membership drive that it would not jeopardize that goal by
taking military action. It will, however, have to resist
internal pressure to do so.


5. (U) Energy issues - Georgia hosts a major gas pipeline
from Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz field to Turkey. It also
facilitates transit of millions of barrels of Azeri and
Kazakh oil via pipelines and rail transport. Where Georgia
was subject to frequent blackouts in 2003, it has greatly
increased output of hydroelectric power and is now supplying
paying customers with reliable 24 hour electricity. It still
needs large amounts of expensive Russian gas, especially in
winter, but in 2007 it began receiving significant amounts of
gas from Azerbaijan. Over time Georgia will be less and less
dependent on Russian supplies.

Military Related Issues


6. (C//NF) Future Georgian Contribution to Operations in
Iraq: The 1st Georgian Infantry Brigade relieved the 3rd
Georgian Infantry Brigade at Forward Operating Base Delta in
Iraq on 4 February 2008, and is currently scheduled to
re-deploy on 30 JUN 2008. Following the re-deployment of 3rd
Brigade, Georgia will leave a contingent of 500 soldiers in

TBILISI 00000207 002 OF 003


Iraq until such time as the U.S. says that Georgian
participation OIF is no longer needed. Letters recently sent
by DASD Cagan and MNF-I have requested that the Georgian
Government extend the Georgian military's deployment to Wasit
Province until the end of 2008. Negotiations to that effect
began with DASD Cagan,s visit to Tbilisi in January of 2008
and are on-going. The current Georgian position is that the
relatively newly-formed 4th Brigade is the only unit that can
reasonably follow the 1st Brigade, and that a transfer of
authority can take place no later than August 2008. The
Georgians have offered 4th Brigade for the mission. Initial
indications are that should the U.S. assist in training the
unit; the MOD will equip the unit with national funds. Many
details on the specifics remain to be discussed, including to
what standard the unit must be equipped. Kezerashvili is
certain to raise this subject but it seems unlikely that he
will be empowered to conclude a final agreement with
President Saakashvili,s forthcoming visit to the White
House, tentatively scheduled for March of 2008.


7. (S//NF) Operational Effectiveness of Georgian Units:
MND-C is so pleased with Georgian performance to date that
they have asked them to assume another off-FOB mission. The
Georgian 3rd Brigade was targeted by insurgents in Wasit
Province with mortars, direct fire and IEDs, including EFP
devices in NOV/DEC 2008. The Iranians subsequently threatened
attacks targeting Georgian forces as punishment for the GoG's
extradition of Iranian arms merchant Amir Ardebeli on 26 JAN

08.


8. (C) Special Forces: The Georgian Special Forces
Brigade recently reorganized into a battalion structure and
has completed the move to a new base in the Dighomi area of
Tbilisi. ODC-Tbilisi is currently executing the Special
Forces Capacity Building Program (SFCBP),for which SOCEUR is
the executive agent. Since this program is largely but not
exclusively funded by 1206, there cannot be a specific
linkage between the SFCBP and the deployment of Georgian
Special Forces to Afghanistan, though that is the Georgian
intent. The MOD hopes that when the first SF company
completes the program in June 2008 that they will be
certified for operations as a part of ISAF. The SFCBP has a
focus on foreign internal defense, as that is what the most
likely Georgian SOF mission in ISAF would be, though it
includes advanced infantry skills and basic direct action
missions. Due to the specific needs of the unit, the SFCBP
will be a composite of JCET training exercises and contractor
based training.


9. (U) NATO and ISAF: The Georgian military leadership
desires closer ties to NATO as well as continued close ties
with the US military. Georgia has offered to NATO company
sized SF units for deployment to Afghanistan for six-months
at a time, which we,ve folded into the SFCBP timeline.
Georgia has additionally requested that these forces be
geographically co-located with U.S. SOF within the ISAF
theater, with the understanding that Georgian SF will work
under ISAF while U.S. SOF will not. Georgian is already
participating in ISAF with a detail of medical professionals
deployed in support of a Lithuanian PRT and the Georgians are
in negotiations with the French and Dutch to assist them in
Afghanistan as well.


10. (C) Current Trends: Rumors suggest that by the time of
the delegations arrival that there will be an
across-the-board promotion for senior military members.
Current Chief of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Staff
Colonel Zaza Gogava is rumored to be promoted to Brigadier
General the week of 4-8 FEB, with all three Deputy Chiefs of
Defense being promoted from LTC to COL. This is likely a
response to NATO IS/IMS and several senior U.S. VIPs comments
that the current Georgian military rank structure is a
disadvantage for Georgia, and that the CHOD needs to be a
General Officer. It is premature to think that these
promotions herald the beginning of a serious effort to revise
and rationalize the Georgian officer rank structure, though a
program to do so has existed for at least six months.


11. (C) Minister of Defense Kezerashvili and his assistants
continue to push ahead with reform programs. The January
2008 PARP assessment visit was largely positive noting
meaningful progress in many areas, while noting the absence
of evidence that more complex programs are being implemented
(specifically, PPBS and the afore-mentioned uniformed human
resources management program).


12. (C) The November protests, crackdown and subsequent
state of emergency have done significant damage to Georgia,s
MAP case to some NATO allies. European countries that were
reticent about Georgia,s accession to NATO for unrelated

TBILISI 00000207 003 OF 003


reasons (their relationship with Russia) now have ample
ammunition to deny Georgia MAP for violations of democratic
principles. Georgia is attempting to regain the high ground
after the fall crisis be redoubling it efforts on continued
reform. We should encourage this strategy.
TEFFT