Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08TBILISI2053
2008-11-04 14:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tbilisi
Cable title:  

GEORGIA: ABKHAZIA: VIOLENCE CONTINUES, TROOPS DIG

Tags:  PGOV PREL MOPS GG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2707
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSI #2053/01 3091429
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 041429Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0346
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 4716
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE IMMEDIATE 2204
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 002053 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: ABKHAZIA: VIOLENCE CONTINUES, TROOPS DIG
IN

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Kent Logsdon for Reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 002053

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: ABKHAZIA: VIOLENCE CONTINUES, TROOPS DIG
IN

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Kent Logsdon for Reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (C) Summary and comment. Two disturbing trends have
emerged in Abkhazia in recent weeks. Abkhaz and Russian
forces have taken steps to establish firmer control over the
administrative boundary, such as reducing crossing points,
extending trenches and limiting cooperation with UNOMIG. De
facto officials have accused Georgia of intentionally
planning provocative acts of violence and have reportedly
taken steps to defend the boundary and respond. At the same
time, unconfirmed press reports of violence and even
fatalities suggest some tension within Abkhazia between the
Abkhaz and the Russian occupying forces, raising questions
about the harmony between the new allies. The competing
versions of individual events increase the danger that rumors
could provoke a disproportionate response to any of these
incidents. An October 25 explosion outside Abkhazia in
Eritskali that killed two Georgians, including the local head
of the district administration, offers a sober reminder of
the continuing danger on the boundary. End summary and
comment.

DIGGING IN


2. (SBU) Both the EUMM and UNOMIG have observed numerous
examples of steps Abkhaz and Russian forces have taken in
recent weeks to assert greater control over their side of the
administrative boundary. Three bridges were blown up within
a few minutes of each other November 1, bringing the total of
disabled bridges to six since October 19. At other
locations, such as Pakhulani, Russian forces block movement
across existing bridges. An Abkhaz commander told UNOMIG
that one bridge is closed to civilian traffic, although it
remains open for the UN, Red Cross, Enguri power station
workers, and "emergency cases." In some cases pedestrians
are allowed to cross, but not vehicles. The current rate for
departing Abkhazia, at least in the area of Rike, Rukhi and
Pakhulani, is around 600 (approximately 22 USD) rubles per
person and 50 rubles (approximately 2 USD) per bag, levied by
Abkhaz and sometimes Russian forces. One man with two bags
told UNOMIG he had to pay 2,000 rubles (approximately 75
USD). UNOMIG has also heard that those fees are sometimes

charged to those entering Abkhazia as well, meaning that some
travelers end up paying in both directions.


3. (SBU) UNOMIG has noted numerous examples of Abkhaz and
Russian forces reinforcing and extending trenches in
positions along the administrative boundary. One patrol
observed "a series of interlinked and independent trenches on
both sides of the road within a radius of 100 meters from the
checkpoint, seemingly to ensure all round defense." Another
patrol observed "an area of about 200 sq. meters leveled
around post with a series of interlinked trenches being
fortified on both sides of the road. . . It is assessed that
all round company-sized defense is being prepared." UNOMIG
has also seen some evidence of additional Abkhaz forces at
boundary checkpoints. More and more locals are reporting
mined areas along the boundary, which discourage locals from
using unofficial crossings. One Abkhaz commander said the
Georgian government had mined the Abkhaz side of the
boundary, using released prisoners to do so.


4. (SBU) UNOMIG has heard several stories recently of
individuals being harassed, although the identity of the
attackers is sometimes difficult to determine. On November 3
Qattackers is sometimes difficult to determine. On November 3
an individual on a cart was stopped by three armed, masked
men in uniform, who shot five times in the air, beat the man,
then carried him off to Nabakevi. Locals told UNOMIG that on
October 31 three men in Kvemo Bargebi were detained by Abkhaz
militia from Gali, who accused the men of mugging and illegal
gun possession. Likewise in Gagida, locals reported that
four individuals were detained for drug possession and
demanded 5,000 lari for their release. Locals have also
complained that the decreased ability to cross the boundary
has made it more difficult to buy daily commodities,
including medicine. Georgian Interior Ministry officials in
a few locations told UNOMIG about nightly automatic gunfire
from the Abkhaz side of the boundary, which locals confirmed.


5. (SBU) UNOMIG itself has also encountered an increasing
amount of resistance north of the administrative boundary, in
particular from Abkhaz individuals. Reactions have included
polite refusals to let patrols pass, sometimes based on
specific orders; refusals to speak with patrols; requests
that patrols not return to particular checkpoints;
denunciations of the UN as working contrary to Abkhaz
interests. Some of the latter sentiments have been expressed
by private Abkhaz citizens who happen to encounter UNOMIG

TBILISI 00002053 002 OF 003


patrols. One Russian soldier noticed the Pakistani flag on a
UNOMIG monitor and launched into an extended diatribe against
Pakistan for "sponsoring" terrorism.


6. (SBU) Steps to increase control of the boundary are not
necessarily well coordinated, and the Abkhaz and Russians
have not yet established a hermetic seal. The EUMM reports
that the various Russian units and de facto authorities
involved in enforcing border control are not very well
organized. Locals have told UNOMIG about various makeshift
crossings they can still use, despite reports of mines. In
the case of the bridge discussed by the Abkhaz commander in
paragraph 2, UNOMIG itself observed about 20 civilians with
bags crossing later the same day. Shortly after the October
19 destruction of the bridge near Shamgona, neither Abkhaz
nor Georgian Interior Ministry officials were obstructing
30-40 locals from making the crossing (apparently by fording
the river) daily.

ONGOING VIOLENCE


7. (SBU) The Georgian press has reported a series of violent
incidents in Abkhazia in recent weeks. The lack of reliable
sources has made it difficult to confirm most of them, but
the persistence of the stories suggest a state of heightened
tension north of the boundary. A number of incidents involve
violence between Abkhaz and Russians. In response to recent
incidents, on October 27 Abkhaz "President" Bagapsh blamed
them on the Georgian side, accusing the Georgian government
of seeking to disrupt the ceasefire agreement and announcing
he had ordered his "army" and "border guards" to respond to
provocations promptly. "Foreign Minister" Shamba accused the
EUMM of being ineffective by failing to prevent such acts.
UNOMIG reported that the de facto Security Council
established a special unit to fight Georgian "terrorist
groups" in the Gali district; as a result, UNOMIG expects
increased activity by Abkhaz units, including in areas not
previously covered.

-- On October 29, Russian forces confirmed to UNOMIG that an
armored vehicle skidded off the road, killing one Russian
soldier and wounding another. The Georgian press reported
that two vehicles were destroyed by mine laid by the Russians
themselves and that two soldiers died.

-- On October 28, an Abkhaz commander told UNOMIG a fellow
soldier was injured in an ambush near Repo and Primorsk, when
armed men shot at him with automatic weapons from a short
distance. Although he could not identify the armed men, the
commander said they looked like Georgian special forces, and
they were carrying American weapons. UNOMIG noted that the
latter fact means little, because many American weapons were
captured by the Abkhaz in the Kodori Valley.

-- Around October 28 in Okumi, Russian forces reportedly
fired at the car of and killed the Abkhaz deputy head of
administration of the village Repi-Shesheliti, Zurab Gvaramia.

-- Around October 28, drunken Russian forces reportedly
clashed with Abkhaz forces in Ghumurishi, and four civilians
were injured as a result.

-- On October 27, villagers pulled the corpse of 19-year-old
Alexandre Khuntsaria out of a well in Gali district. Press
reports suggested that Russian forces first checked his
documents, then killed him.

-- Around October 26, a Russian patrol engaged in a gunfight
with Abkhaz militia near the village of Pichora, wounding two
Abkhaz.

-- On October 24, two Abkhaz officials were reportedly
murdered in the village of Konstitutsia. One, Raul Ashuba,
Qmurdered in the village of Konstitutsia. One, Raul Ashuba,
was the mayor of the village and a "hero" of the Abkhaz war.
De facto authorities blamed "the Georgian group of saboteurs"
for the murders, but representatives of the Tbilisi-loyal
Abkhaz government-in-exile blamed an internal struggle among
criminal groups, possibly linked to a staff change at the
Enguri Power Plant, where Russian officials appointed a new
supervisor. Some locals suggested a link with the citrus
business, of which Ashuba had been forced to give up control.

-- On October 22, Eduard Emin-Zade, chief of intelligence of
Abkhazia's "defense ministry," was murdered in the Gali
district. Abkhaz officials said Emin-Zade had been on a
mission "to unmask the masterminds of the recent frequent
terrorist acts," while Georgian officials attributed the
murder to business interests. Emin-Zade was known as a close
ally of Aslan Abashidze, and in August he reportedly

TBILISI 00002053 003 OF 003


supervised the stationing of Russian forces in the areas
adjacent to Abkhazia. "President" Bagapsh ordered law
enforcement officials to solve the murder as quickly as
possible and to tighten the boundary-crossing regime. A few
days later, Emin-Zade's associate, Mr. Kvevkeskiri, possibly
his attorney, was shot and wounded, reportedly after handing
sums of money to Russian forces. Some Russians were wounded
in the attack as well.

-- Around October 16, an Abkhaz police officer was reportedly
killed in a confrontation with Russian forces in Gali
district.

-- Around October 11, a Russian vehicle reportedly exploded
in Sida, killing 5-10 soldiers. UNOMIG was not able to
confirm this event, other than to collect reports of locals
hearing an explosion in approximately the right area.

-- On October 6, Russian forces told UNOMIG unknown
assailants ambushed an Abkhaz patrol near Nabakevi and shot
dead Abkhaz "Border Guard" Mukhran Ashuba.

-- On October 5, a thirteen-year-old boy was found dead near
Sida; UNOMIG determined he most likely died of blunt injuries
to the head. Georgian press reported that Russian forces
tried to loot his home, abused his family members, and he was
killed trying to protect his mother.

ATTACK AT ERITSKALI


8. (SBU) On October 25, the EUMM and UNOMIG both received
reports of explosions in Eritskali, a village just outside
Abkhazia, west of Jvari and the Enguri Dam. Patrols from
both organizations arrived to witness another explosion in a
house that killed both the local head of administration, Giva
Meboniya, and the owner of the house and wounded a police
officer. Both organizations saw RPG-22 rocket launchers,
which they believe caused the original explosions, but both
organizations believe the fatal explosion was caused by a
remotely detonated explosive inside the house. On October
30, the EUMM reported hearing stories that the cause of the
attack was a "settling of accounts," suggesting that the
attack may not have had any political significance.

COMMENT:


9. (C) As the above list makes clear, Abkhazia remains a
dangerous place for all parties. Numerous potential
motivations for violence exist, from private disputes to
Russian-Abkhaz rivalry to the larger Georgian dispute with
Russia and the de facto authorities. The difficulty in
investigating incidents and obtaining reliable, objective
information means any side can use almost any incident to
justify any response. One response from the Abkhaz and
Russians seems to have been to assert greater control over
the administrative boundary. It is not clear, however, that
they are working together entirely harmoniously, and it is
also not clear that clamping down on the boundary will
resolve the violence. Ideally, the EUMM and UNOMIG will gain
increased access and improve their ability to investigate
incidents. In the meantime, as the international community
continues to work to encourage restraint, it will be
important not to allow intra-Abkhazia clashes, or private
matters, to be called provocations and exploited politically.
LOGSDON