SCENESETTER FOR A/S FRIED MEETING WITH PRESIDENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 000195

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR A/S FRIED, EUR DAS BRYZA, AND EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM RU GG
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR A/S FRIED MEETING WITH PRESIDENT
SAAKASHVILI AT WEHRKUNDE

REF: TBILISI 179

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Kosovo and the upcoming parliamentary
elections will likely dominate your meeting with President
Saakashvili at the Wehrkunde conference. Kosovo is nearly
certain to be the first issue on Saakashvili's agenda, as he
seeks more information about the timing of an independence
declaration and further re-assurance that the West is sending
strong signals to Russia not to retaliate by recognizing
Abkhazia and/or South Ossetia. On elections, opposition
leaders are meeting with Speaker Burjanadze and her team to
negotiate the opposition's demands laid forth on January 28.
USAID has allocated USD 5.8 million toward election
assistance to Georgia in 2008. Areas targeted for
improvement this Spring include the election code, training
of election officials at all levels and improving ballot
counting procedures. Your meeting will be a timely
opportunity to reiterate that, given the aftermath of the
presidential election, the parliamentary elections offer
Saakashvili his best opportunity for the foreseeable future
to assure the international community of Georgia's democratic
bona fides. The closer the elections are to being truly free
and fair, the better for Georgia and its aspirations to join
NATO. Saakashvili will also ask for Washington's latest news
on the prospects for MAP at Bucharest or later. He may also
express concern about Iranian threats resulting from the
extradition of an accused Iranian arms dealer from Georgia to
the United States. We have told the GOG we will follow its
lead on responding to such threats or adverse publicity
stemming from the incident. End Summary.

Kosovo
--------------


2. (C) As we get closer to the Kosovo endgame, Saakashvili's
anxiety that Russia will respond to international recognition
of Kosovo by recognizing Abkhazia, and perhaps South Ossetia,
has only grown. Georgian officials remain divided about
whether Russia would actually do it, but Defense Minister
Kezerashvili made clear in a recent meeting with DAS Bryza
(reftel) that he believes the Russians have promoted the
prospect so much that they cannot back down. Russian
officials' recent public statements, such as Foreign Minister
Lavrov's comment that Russia would not recognize Abkhazia
"immediately," have done nothing to reassure the Georgians.
Russia may not be alone: new Foreign Minister Bakradze (whom
you met last November) told the Ambassador February 4 that
the Iranians are now privately threatening to recognize
Abkhazia after Georgia's recent (and thus far unpublicized)
extradition of an Iranian arms dealer to the U.S. If Russia
recognizes Abkhazia, Saakashvili will come under huge
domestic pressure to do something to stop the permanent loss
of Abkhazia. Pressure will be even greater if recognition is
accompanied by a new round of violence involving the ethnic
Georgians in the Gali region. Saakashvili understands the
U.S. position on Kosovo and recalls your several
conversations on the subject, but he will be eager for more
detail on the expected timing, and most of all he will want
to see that we are doing all we can to make clear to the
Russians that such a step would do serious damage to their
relationship with the West.

Opposition
--------------


3. (U) Behind-the-scenes negotiations continue regarding the
coming parliamentary elections, which will likely take place
in May. Parliamentary Speaker Nino Burjanadze and Deputy
Speaker Mikheil Machavariani are leading the talks with the
United National Council of Opposition (UNC). The UNC is also
coordinating with (non-members) the New Rightists and Labor
parties regarding the negotiations. The opposition factions
in Parliament are boycotting all proceedings except the
ongoing negotiations and any unforeseen national security
crises. At the same time, the opposition is already
beginning to fragment, with the Republicans recently deciding
to run a separate party list in the parliamentary election.



4. (U) On February 5, Conservative party MP and UNC member,
Zviad Dzidziguri, announced a new series of public protests
to begin on February 7. The protests will include posters
showing those who "stole" votes in January and also allow
people to sign a petition saying they did not vote for
Saakashvili. Burjanadze responded publicly that the
government is negotiating with the opposition and "there is
no need for protests now." Nevertheless, Saakashvili must
support Burjanadze and take a flexible approach to dealing

TBILISI 00000195 002 OF 002


with the opposition.

Parliamentary Elections
--------------


5. (C) USAID has allocated USD 5.8 million for election
assistance to Georgia in 2008. USG initiatives to improve
the election process extend the commitments undertaken for
the presidential election. Continuing efforts focus on three
areas.


6. (C) First, the election code needs to be simplified and
finalized well in advance of the election. Time to revise it
completely does not exist prior to Election Day. However, it
currently is so broadly written as to make any claims of
malfeasance or fraud impossible to prove. Similarly, the
code must be approved in final form no less than one month
prior to the election. Waiting longer will not allow time
for proper training of officials. The short lead time before
the presidential elections led to multiple problems.


7. (C) Second, election commission officials must be better
trained at all levels, from the Central Election Commission
down to the precincts. A key component of this is
introducing more transparency and oversight of the District
Election Commissions (DEC). Many irregularities and
complaints in the presidential election revolved around the
opaque DECs. A second component is to remove political
parties, especially the National Movement, from the training
process.


8. (C) Counting procedures must be improved. The higher
level of transparency in the election process that
Saakashvili introduced, such as the display of precinct
protocols on the CEC website, was a tremendous step forward.
However, this was in itself not enough. Precinct Election
Commissions must be able to count the votes and report
results directly to the CEC in a straightforward manner.
DECs should not be involved in vote tabulation.


9. (C) The closer the elections are to being truly free and
fair, the better for Georgia. The aftermath of the
presidential election revealed numerous problems with the
CEC. Most seriously, it exposed a low level of concern by
the government about ensuring the post-election process is as
secure as the ballot box itself. The upcoming parliamentary
election offers Saakashvili his best opportunity in the
foreseeable future to reassure a somewhat skeptical
international community that Georgia is truly embracing
Western values and democracy.

Ardebili Case
--------------


10. (C) Saakashvili may express concern about the Iranian
reaction to the arrest and extradition to the United States
of an Iranian arms dealer, Ardebili. The Iranians have made
veiled threats against Georgian interests in Iran, including
its Embassy there. The GOG is worried about possible attacks
against Georgian troops in Iraq and on the pipelines or other
infrastructure in Georgia. Iran is unlikely to supply
natural gas to Georgia in an emergency, as occurred in 2006.
We have told the GOG that we will not take any steps to
counter Iran's threats or any adverse publicity unless
Georgia asks us to do so. Even if Iran itself makes the
incident public, the U.S. and Georgia may find it best to
remain mute.
TEFFT