DAS BRYZA'S 19 JANUARY MEETING WITH GEORGIAN

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SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR DAS BRYZA, EUR/CARC, AND EUR/RPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS GG
SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA'S 19 JANUARY MEETING WITH GEORGIAN
DEFENSE MINISTER DAVIT KEZERASHVILI


Classified By: Ambassador John Tefft, reason 1.4(b),and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Georgian Defense Minister Davit Kezerashvili
told DAS Matthew Bryza at a 19 January meeting that Georgia
still hopes to achieve a Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the
upcoming Bucharest NATO summit. Kezerashvili argued that
failure to meet this goal before the spring 2008 Georgian
parliamentary elections could undermine domestic support for
the Georgian government's pro-NATO policy and boost those
opposition leaders who prefer Georgia adopt a policy of
neutrality. He also implied that it could hurt the
government's ability to justify the continued deployment of
troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. Kezerashvili expressed
concern that the expected recognition of Kosovo's
independence could prompt Russia to recognize Abkhazia in
response, with dangerous consequences. He also stressed the
importance of Azerbaijani gas exports to help Europe
diversify its sources of supply away from Gazprom. End
Summary.

Georgia Should Join NATO Sooner, Not Later
--------------

2. (C) At a 19 January meeting with DAS Bryza and Ambassador
Tefft, Kezerashvili contended that increasing European
dependence on Russian natural gas is driving a parallel
increase in Russian influence in Europe. As a result, he
predicted that it will only become more difficult for Georgia
to gain NATO membership over time, as European countries
become less inclined to alienate Russia, their principal
energy supplier. As a result, Kezerashvili argued that if
Georgia is not offered a MAP at Bucharest, it will be a
significant setback, although he admitted it would "not be a
disaster."

Cooperation is a Two-Way Street
--------------

3. (C) Kezerashvili speculated that without MAP, it would
become harder domestically for Georgia to cooperate with
NATO, as it would become more difficult to justify
deployments with NATO countries. The government's arguments
that such deployments help achieve NATO membership would be
vulnerable to opposition critics in the spring 2008
parliamentary elections. He added that it would also become
more difficult to explain to the families of Georgian
soldiers killed or wounded in Iraq why their sons had made
such sacrifices. Without a MAP, the Georgian government could
likewise lack sufficient domestic support for sending troops
to support NATO operations in Afghanistan, concluded
Kezerashvili.

MOD: Europeans Block Georgian MAP
--------------

4. (C) DAS Bryza reiterated strong U.S. support for Georgia's
NATO aspirations. He noted that the November 7 street
violence in Tbilisi had led many European countries to
question Georgia's progress towards democracy, making the
adoption of a MAP at Bucharest unlikely. The January 2008
presidential election partly restored Georgia's democratic
credentials, but Bryza noted that significant flaws in the
election left a negative impression, which could be corrected
with parliamentary elections in the spring that meet
international standards. Kezerashvili complained that some
European countries--he cited Germany, Bulgaria, Greece, and
the Netherlands--would use any excuse to delay NATO
membership for Georgia. These countries, Kezerashvili
contended, shy from conflict with Moscow because of their
dependence on Russian natural gas. DAS Bryza responded that
the United States would continue to lobby European members of
NATO for rapid Georgian accession as Georgia met NATO
membership criteria. The best way for Georgia to sway these
European critics, argued Bryza, is for the spring 2008
Georgian parliamentary elections to represent an improvement
in democratic procedure over the presidential elections.
Bryza explained U.S. energy security strategy, which relies
on increased exports of Azerbaijani natural gas through the
Nabucco and Turkey-Greece-Italy pipelines to help Europe
reduce its dependence on Gazprom.

MOD Predicts Russian Recognition of Abkhazia
--------------

5. (C) Kezerashvili predicted that Russia would use the
expected recognition of Kosovo as an excuse to recognize
Abkhazia in retaliation. In response to DAS Bryza's comments
that many in Moscow recognize the potential costs to Russia
of recognizing Abkhazia, especially in the North Caucasus,
Kezerashvili said that Russia would feel "trapped" into
recognizing Abkhazia. If Moscow did not recognize Abkhazia,
he concluded, Russia would "lose" Abkhazia, forcing Russia
into recognition. He also expressed certainty that Moscow
would not miss the opportunity to complicate the run-up to

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the spring 2008 Georgian parliamentary elections by such
recognition.


6. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this message.
TEFFT