GEORGIA: YOUR MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SAAKASHVILI

C O N F I D E N T I A L TBILISI 001620

SIPDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL GG RU
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: YOUR MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SAAKASHVILI
AT UNGA

REF: TBILISI 1602

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) AND (d).


1. (C) In your meeting with President Saakashvili on the
margins of the UN General Assembly you will find a leader who
is newly focused on the concept of strategic patience. He is
circling his wagons around several key objectives:
reconstruction of damaged infrastructure and Georgia's
economy; maintenance of public support and confidence in him
and his government; avoidance of any actions that would lead
to long-term negative consequences for conflict resolution in
a way that would threaten Georgia's territorial integrity;
and accession to NATO. He and his key ministers have told me
and Matt Bryza that they will wait out the current crisis in
order to find constructive ways to insure Georgia's
territorial integrity.


2. (C) Saakashvili told us on September 14 that he
preferred to be patient in view of Russia's current dominant
negotiating position. He wanted to make sure that Georgia,
in its haste to end the conflict, did not make commitments
that would endanger territorial integrity in the future (as
he believes Shevardnadze did by signing the infamous Moscow
agreement on Abkhazia in 1994). Saakashvili predicted that
the political situation in Russia would change and that
Georgia was prepared if necessary to wait for a more
favorable climate. In your meeting, you can encourage this
new-found patience for resolving the conflicts with a strong
commitment of continued U.S. and European support for Georgia
and its territorial integrity.


3. (C) One of the areas on which we need to continue to
press President Saakashvili is making progress on deepening
and institutionalizing democratic reform. This will help
with NATO, while warding off potential Russian efforts to
undermine his regime. In his September 14 State of the
Country address to Parliament, he committed to launch a new
wave of reforms (reftel): strengthening Parliament,
establishing free and impartial media, promoting free and
unbiased courts, limiting executive powers, and protecting
private property. Saakashvili made a good point in his
speech that in the face of crisis, he wanted to broaden and
deepen Georgian democracy, not tighten up in the name of
security. It is important that he follow through on these
permanent real adjustments to enhance Georgia's democracy.
If he does, he can both impress the Europeans as well as
reassure his American supporters that he remains a true
democrat.


4. (C) Saakashvili's political opponents here have become
increasingly vocal in calling for an accounting of his
actions during the war. Some are already calling for his
resignation and new elections. Although they are
well-covered in the press, the opposition continues to be
divided and without much of a common program beyond disliking
Saakashvili. Recent polling by a reputable U.S. company
supports the view that Saakashvili and his Government
continue to be popular in Georgian society as a whole --
although key Saakashvili advisors have confided that they
know this popularity could be short-lived this winter if he
does not focus on domestic political and economic issues now.
While Russian troops remain in the country, Saakashvili will
continue to be strong politically. Georgian popular hatred
of Russians continues to dominate the political scene here.


5. (C) The biggest challenge that you may face in your
meeting with President Saakashvili will be to keep him on
track for the October 15 meeting in Geneva. Matt and I told
Saakashvili that the assistance Georgia needs - both economic
and in moving closer to NATO - will depend on reassuring key
policymakers in Europe that Georgia is working in good faith
on the issues relevant to the conflicts. The Foreign
Minister told us that Georgia had no expectation that the
Geneva talks would lead anywhere, but Georgia needs to ensure
the processes developed in the talks will lead ultimately to
Georgia's long-term survival. After coming close to losing
all of the gains made since the Rose Revolution, the Georgian
leadership understands the existential threat it faces from
Russia.


6. (C) During the meeting, Saakashvili will seek from you
assurances that the United States will take the lead on
developing penalties for those conducting business in either
South Ossetia or Abkhazia - something that we are working on
with the Georgian authorities. You will want to encourage
Georgia not to jeopardize its NATO aspirations by appearing
to be obstructionist in Geneva -- he needs to understand that
the international community will support Georgia as long as

it plays a constructive role. The United States will not
urge Georgia to sign an agreement prematurely. We need to
work together closely to keep the separatists isolated and to
shine a spotlight on Russian efforts to undermine Georgia's
territorial integrity permanently.


7. (C) Georgia is arguing now that Russia is unwilling either
to protect human rights or to allow the investigation of
possible serious crimes in the conflict zones as well as in
the occupied territories in Georgia proper behind Russian
checkpoints. During his visit to Tbilisi, Matt and I
discussed with senior Georgian officials a strategy of
pushing for the protection of human rights in the
territories, including those of IDPs - and the introduction
of new international (non-Russian) peacekeepers to do it.
Although Russia will balk, the Europeans will not question
the importance of protecting human rights. If Saakashvili is
completely forthcoming in cooperating with human rights
investigators - even if they uncover some problems on the
Georgian side - that openness could further isolate Russia
and keep Europe squarely behind Georgia's future and
territorial integrity.
TEFFT