Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08TBILISI1608
2008-09-19 07:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Tbilisi
Cable title:  

GEORGIA: GOVERNMENT CONFIDENT OF PUBLIC SUPPORT

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM RU GG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6439
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSI #1608/01 2630703
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 190703Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0111
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 001608 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CARC AND GCG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM RU GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: GOVERNMENT CONFIDENT OF PUBLIC SUPPORT
AND OPPOSITION NOT UNITED ON MUCH

REF: A) TBILISI 1525 B) TBILISI 1602

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 001608

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CARC AND GCG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM RU GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: GOVERNMENT CONFIDENT OF PUBLIC SUPPORT
AND OPPOSITION NOT UNITED ON MUCH

REF: A) TBILISI 1525 B) TBILISI 1602

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Introduction and Comment: Tbilisi Mayor and
Saakashvili insider Gigi Ugulava told the Ambassador that
polling data indicates that Saakashvili and his Government
enjoy broad public support, but noted that the Government
needed to use the next 12-18 months to focus on
rehabilitation and reconstruction in the country in order to
ensure stability. In Ugulava's view, Saakashvili needed to
stay focused on domestic issues and reassure the public by
giving them realistic expectations of what would be ahead.
On the opposition's side of the fence, smaller opposition
parties signed on to the government-sponsored Charter of
Georgian Politicians, but four key groups refused to sign
touting the agreement as no more than government propoganda
to shirk responsibility for its actions during the crisis.
The Charter envisages a joint anti-crisis commission, whose
role remains unclear although President Saakashvili in his
September 16 state of the union address called for the group
to have an implementing role in supporting IDPs. The New
Rightists, Republicans, Labor, and the United Opposition
(UNC) parties all refused to sign, leaving them free to
publicly criticize government actions during the conflict.
Upon her return from the United States, Nino Burjanadze did
not sign the Charter because, according to her, "it was not a
serious document." She instead called for a transparent
analysis of the government's actions during the crisis.


2. (C) Ugulava -- buoyed by recent polling results --
believed that the government enjoys broad public support and
made a compelling case for the stability of Saakashvili's
government, at least for now. The opposition seems intent on
gaining political advantage from the current crisis, and is
seeking ways to reestablish its credibility with voters after
being soundly defeated in the presidential and parliamentary
elections. Whether it is seeking to shore up its public
support or is worried about the chorus of critical opposition

voices, the government has taken a step towards involving the
opposition in governance by inviting opposition members to
sit down with key MPs and international observers. In his
9/16 address to the Parliament (reftel B),the President
called for important reforms to Georgia's democracy. On the
opposition's side, the four larger parties, by not signing
the Charter, have turned down the opportunity to engage with
the government and are sticking with their thus far,
unsuccessful strategy -- gaining popular support, and
eventually political power, based on a purely
anti-Saakashvili platform. Some, including the Republicans,
may feel they have been burned during negotiations with the
government in past, and likely believe the government will
not grant the Commission any real authority. Others, such as
Labor, see no benefit to dealing with the government at all.
And some, like former Speaker Nino Burjanadze, are still
flirting with the idea of opposing Saakashvili. While the
government faces the very real challenges of managing its
response to the current crisis, we fully expect these
opposition figures to continue to be the Government's
fiercest critics and seek political advantages wherever they
can find them. Whether they can translate these advantages
into popular support remains to be seen. End Introduction
and Comment.

Saakashvili Confidante Tells the Ambassador That the
Government Enjoys Popular Support


3. (C) During an August 10 meeting with the Ambassador and
DCM, Government insider and Saakashvili confidante Tbilisi
Mayor Giorgi Ugulava provided some interesting insights on
the domestic scene. Ugulava started out by noting that the
polling commissioned by the Government from Greenberg,
Quinlan, Rosner research had concluded that President
Saakashvili needed to focus on domestic issues, specifically
reconstruction and rehabilitation. He said that Rossner,s
polls and focus groups showed that Georgians are now
concerned about social and economic issues, and the upcoming
winter, not the international scene. In general, Saakashvili
and the Government enjoyed high approval ratings and
Rossner,s polling found that there was a strong sense of
unity among Georgians that was translating into support for
the Government. Fifty-seven percent of respondents believed
that the Russians or Russian PM Vladimir Putin were
responsible for the war compared to 18 percent who held
President Saakashvili responsible. Interior Minister
Merabishvili had the highest rating of any minister in the
Government. (Note: Rosner's polling sent via email to
EUR/CARC.)


TBILISI 00001608 002 OF 003



4. (C) With regard to the opposition, Rosner,s polls found
that support and sympathy for the opposition had plummeted.
The demands of several opposition politicians that
Saakashvili and the Government step down had been met with
anger by the population. In the popular view, the opposition
demands would lead to instability and a catastrophe for the
country. According to Ugulava, the opposition had no basis
in popular opinion upon which to argue for a change in
government.


5. (C) The focus groups uncovered important differences
between regions. Tbilisi voters noted that although the war
had been lost, Georgia had won in the battle for
international support. On the other hand, Gori residents
were more angry and expressed great hate for the Ossetians.
However, regardless of region, Rosner,s data showed a strong
sense of unity in support of Georgia and the Government.
Ugulava acknowledged that this sense of unity was temporary
and that the Government would have to continue to work hard
to maintain support. In Ugulava,s view, people were worried
that the end of the conflict could bring a return to the
conditions of 1993 following the Abkhaz War when the economy
collapsed and the Government was unable to respond. This
time, the Government had succeeded in restoring "normalcy'
very quickly. This was taking place even in Gori as the
Government pushed ahead with making repairs and
rehabilitating damaged buildings and infrastructure. With
regard to the IDPs, Ugulava said that "they blame Russia for
everything." As soon as the IDPs left the Tskhinvali area,
they understood that Russia was openly pushing for regime
change.


6. (C) With regard to the issue of who started the
conflict, Ugulava said that this was not an important
domestic issue -- he believed people were not interested.
However, he acknowledged that people here were asking why the
Government didn,t know what the Russian reaction to Georgian
actions in South Ossetia would be and that was a concern for
the Government. Ugulava said that the Government was making
the argument to the population that they had no choice but to
engage to protect the Georgian population in the villages of
South Ossetia. He also admitted that there had been an
assumption in the Government that Tskhinvali could have been
held, but only if the international community had defended
Georgia,s actions immediately. (The conversation with
Ugulava took place before the New York Times' publication of
its 9/16 article on Georgian intercepts showing Russian armor
moving through the Roki Tunnel before Georgia commenced its
attack on Tskhinvali.)


7. (C) When asked about the possibility of political
changes, Ugulava said that there was no push for a change or
for a Government reshuffle -- and the Rossner polling
supported this. The opposition,s call for new elections was
unpopular, because it was associated with rallies,
demonstrations and instability. The opposition statements
calling for the Government,s resignation were "scaring
people" and interpreted as a challenge to Georgia,s unified
anti-Russian stance. He suggested that the opposition had
only its small group of supporters in the Vake region of
Tbilisi as a sounding board and they were out of touch with
the rest of the country. In his view, Nino Burjanadze was
not serious and did not have enough support. "She needs to
show the public that she is serious competition, but she has
no discipline." Ugulava noted that her decision to get the
Government to approve the sale of a large home to her for one
lari (as she was leaving Government) made her vulnerable
politically.


8. (C) Ugulava suggested that it was important for the
political elite to stay united behind the Government in order
to reassure Ministers who were insecure about their futures.
With regard to the business elite, Ugulava said that they
were concerned about mortgage and banking problems. They saw
Saakashvili as the guarantor of stability and reform and they
would continue to support him.

The Charter of Georgian Politicians


9. (SBU) Given the strong popular support enjoyed by
President Saakashvili and the Government, the decision to
reach out to the opposition appears to have been made partly
in response to international concerns about the health of
civil society and partly in an effort to bring some of the
Government's harshest critics back into a dialogue. All of
the opposition politicians who participated in reftel
discussions to form an anti-crisis coalition readily agreed
to the first three tenets of the Charter, namely:
territorial integrity, NATO membership and EU integration,

TBILISI 00001608 003 OF 003


and that all protests should take place by constitutional
means. However, there was disagreement among the parties on
the fourth clause, which states that the government will
undertake democratic reforms and form an anti-crisis
commission. Due to this fourth clause, the United National
Council, Republican Party, the Labor Party, and New Rightists
all refused to sign the charter. Kakha Kukava, co-leader of
the Conservative Party said it was yet another propaganda
move by the authorities, adding that "the real opposition"
would not accept it. One member of Parliament from the
ruling United National Movement (UNM) suggested in an
informal discussion with Poloff that the charter was mostly
for show. This MP suggested that it would help prevent any
drastic moves by the Opposition -- at least until Russian
forces depart undisputed Georgian territory. (Comment: This
conversation was separate from the consultations, and the MP
was not a key member of the UNM. End comment.) Some
oppositionists believed the government could tout this
Commission as an example of engaging the opposition without
actually doing so, could prove to be a distraction from
legitimate criticism of the government.


10. (SBU) On September 5, the Charter was signed by:

David Bakradze - Speaker of the Parliament, United National
Movement (UNM)
Mikheil Machavariani - First Vice Speaker of the Parliament,
UNM
Giorgi Targamadze - Leader of the Parliament Minority,
Chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement (CDM)
Levan Vepkhadze - Vice Speaker of the Parliament, General
Secretary of CDM
Bachuki Kardava - Chairman of the National Democratic Party
Zurab Tkemaladze - Chairman of the Industrialists
Paata Davitaia - Chairman of On Our Own (Abkhaz refugees
political party)
Jondi Bagaturia - Chairman of Georgia Troupe
Gia Tortladze - Independent MP, Chairman of Parliament
opposition faction
Gia Tsagareishvili - Independent MP, member of the Parliament
Minority


11. (SBU) Speaker Bakradze declared the document "open for
joining" until September 8, 2008, and called on other parties
to join. As of September 12, 2008, no other parties had
joined, and the non-signatory parties were drafting their own
parallel charter. Koba Davitashvili, the Chairman of the
Party of People and member of the United Opposition, and
Marina Muskhelishvili from Georgia's Way (both members of the
United Opposition) attended the consultations, but have not
yet signed. It is also unclear whether Konstantine
Gamsakhurdia, leader of the Freedom Party, will sign.


12. (C) Although she would not bring a huge electoral
following with her, well-respected former Speaker of
Parliament Nino Burjanadze is publicly flirting with the
opposition and is considering her next move (additional info
septel). Upon her return from a visit to the United States,
she told the press that she "would not sign the Charter, as
it is a declaration of obvious principles and not a serious
document." Rather she said, only after the commission
releases its findings will she announce her position on
government responsibility for the crisis and whether she
would support Gamkrelidze's and Natelashvili's recent calls
for Saakashvili's resignation. She defended her actions by
saying the country needs transparent analysis of the crisis
now and that difficult questions should not be prohibited.
TEFFT