INSIDE GEORGIA'S MINISTRY FOR REINTEGRATION - NO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 001595

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM RU GG
SUBJECT: INSIDE GEORGIA'S MINISTRY FOR REINTEGRATION - NO
CLEAR PATH FORWARD

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary and Comment: In a September 9 meeting with
poloffs, Deputy Minister for Reintegration David Rakviashvili
provided both the Ministry's and his own personal insights on
Georgia's strategy on South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Rakviashvili's comments suggested the government does not yet
have a clear plan or vision moving forward on conflict
resolution in Abkhazia or South Ossetia. While quite free
with his opinions, Rakviashvili is fairly new to his
position, and he himself made clear that he was offering his
personal opinions, not necessarily those of the government
inner circle. Nevertheless, the fact that he qualified so
many of his remarks as personal opinion reinforced EmbOffs'
sense that the government is searching for a strategy. He
believed his government should focus on consolidating reforms
in undisputed Georgian territory and defer resolution of the
territorial issues. Rakviashvili's emphasis on developing
democratic and economic institutions in Georgia proper as the
key to moving forward seemed to suggest that development at
home would be a priority, at least in the near term. End
Summary and Comment.

MINISTRY'S PRE-HOSTILITY ACTIVITIES
--------------


2. (C) Rakviashvili began the meeting by explaining some of
the philosophical underpinnings of the Ministry of
Reintegration. Originally called the Ministry for Conflict
Resolution, the Ministry changed its name in January 2008 to
reflect a shift in government approach to one of integrating
not only the disputed territories, but the people of the
territories as well. The Ministry's activities of confidence
and relationship building in the conflict regions
unfortunately made little progress over the last few years,
according to Rakviashvili, due mainly to the peacekeeping
forces who have supported the separatist governments.


3. (C) Before the outbreak of hostilities on August 7, the
Ministry's programs in South Ossetia addressed mainly civil
integration issues and human rights of the ethnic minorities.
This work was especially fruitful at the grassroots level
between farmers and other people with trading links.
Rakviashvili explained the Ministry was also planning a
nationwide campaign to encourage tolerance towards minority
groups.


4. (C) Rakviashvili raised a concern with some western
(non-U.S.) NGOs operating in Abkhazia. He claimed that some
groups charged with promoting inter-ethnic harmony had
actually done the opposite by separating Georgian and Abkhaz
children participants and promoting bias and separatism. He
indicated an interest in discussing what kinds of programs
might be more effective in engaging with the local
communities.

PERSONAL OPINION ON WAR AND ITS OUTCOMES
--------------


5. (C) Rakviashvili surmised that the Russians acted when
they did due to the increased speed in which the Georgian
government was internationalizing the conflicts. He stated
that the government now needed to evaluate its mistakes and
answer all questions and criticisms of its actions, even the
most sensitive. According to Rakviashvili, the government's
current vision regarding reintegration is unclear, with all
previous frameworks now invalid. He was confident that there
is no prospect of any future military solution, with the
priority now on diplomatic efforts.


6. (C) In addition, in his personal opinion, democracy in
Georgia had been largely "virtual," as most people had no
direct experience with democracy. The goal now must be to
stabilize the democratic system. He suggested that Georgia
should focus on consolidating its progress in democracy and
economic development on the territory it controls. He did
not go so far as to say that Georgia should adopt the passive
approach of luring Abkhazia and South Ossetia back into the
fold by establishing a prosperous and democratic society,
calling such a scenario naive. He did suggest, however,
that, for the time being, Georgia should focus on those areas
it can control.


7. (C) One of Rakviashvili's major concerns was the fate of
the Georgians living in Gali, across the cease-fire line in
Abkhazia. According to him, there are many instances of
human rights violations, and the ability of Gali residents to
trade with Zugdidi has become limited. If these people are
not able to trade freely, they may be forced to leave Gali,
leading to a new wave of IDPs.


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THE FUTURE OF SOUTH OSSETIA AND ABKHAZIA
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8. (C) Rakviashvili thought that South Ossetia could be
reintegrated, if the government provides for the people. He
did not regard the conflict with South Ossetia as ethnic in
origin, as there are 30-40,000 South Ossetians living in
Georgia proper, and 30% of South Ossetian families are mixed
with ethnic Georgians. His top priority was the care of IDPs,
to include (1) supporting those IDPs who have returned to the
so-called "buffer zone" behind Russian checkpoints, (2)
creating educational opportunities and providing social
benefits to them, and (3) providing benefits for the South
Ossetians living in Georgia proper. He stated that Abkhazia
presents a more difficult challenge, as the Abkhaz leadership
clans are integrated with Russian and Turkish clans, and that
all of the Abkhaz leadership hate the Georgians.
TEFFT