GEORGIAN TALKS WITH ABKHAZ IN SWEDEN:THE FAST

C O N F I D E N T I A L TBILISI 001121

STATE FOR EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIAN TALKS WITH ABKHAZ IN SWEDEN:THE FAST
TRACK TO NOWHERE

Classified By: Ambassadot John F. Tefft for reason 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary and Comment. Temuri Yakobishvili, Georgian
State Minister for Reintegration, told the Ambassador that
last week,s talks in Sweden between de facto Abkhaz
representatives yielded no progress in resolving the
conflict. The talks confirmed Georgian thinking that the
highest priority of decision makers in Sokhumi remains
preservation of the status quo. In his view, the Abkhaz are
unmotivated by promises from the West and see the Russians as
the only actors willing and able to follow through on
promises of economic assistance and security. Yakobashvili
outlined the positions of a range of Saakashvili,s inner
circle and acknowledged that Georgia will stand alone in any
military confrontation in Abkhazia. Yakobashvili sees
Georgia,s options for slowing Russian annexation of Abkhazia
as dwindling and he also sees the Abkhaz question as
inextricably linked to discord in the North Caucasus. He
speculated that any fighting -- even by guerillas or
partisans -- could spread quickly to the North Caucasus. The
Ambassador told Yakobashvili that strategies for military
action were self-destructive and urged him to find
longer-term plans to build on support garnered by President
Saakashvili during his meetings in Europe this month. End
summary and comment.

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Abkhaz Protecting the Status Quo
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2. (C) In a frank meeting with Ambassador Tefft on June
25, Georgia,s State Minister for Reintegration Temuri
Yakobashvili detailed the talks in Sweden between Georgian
and de facto Abkhaz representatives the week of June 16th.
The talks provided his first opportunity to meet face-to-face
with the Abkhaz and he described the talks as frank and open.
He noted that opportunities for informal meetings (mostly
smoke breaks and meals) created the best conditions for
discussions. The minister told the Ambassador that Abkhaz de
facto foreign minister Shamba,s message was clear, "There is
nothing we want from you. We have our independence, even if
it is quasi-independence. We know well we will never be
fully independent. We can,t rely on the Americans or the
Europeans. The Russians are our only option." However,
during a dinner, the Abkhaz said that they understood that
within ten years they would be a part of Georgia. The Abkhaz
were emboldened by their view that the Russians successfully
defeated Ukraine's and Georgia,s MAP aspirations and
therefore have proved their strength. During the formal
sessions, the Abkhaz told the Georgians that if there is a
Georgian attack in Abkhazia, they will mobilize their
political and military power to take Samegrelo and Kodori.


3. (C) According to Yakobashvili, the Georgian side raised
a range of proposals including the Free Economic Zone
proposal for Abkhazia. The Abkhaz delegation dismissed all
proposals as unacceptable because they originated from
Georgia's government. The Georgians suggested asking
academic Svante Cornell,s team to draft a concept paper for
a Free Economic Zone so that it would come from a neutral
third party. Yakobashvili believed this concept might have
had traction, but then Shamba backed away. Yakobashvili,s
opinion was that Shamba was ultimately unable to support any
change in the status quo because he answers to hardline
constituencies in Sokhumi. They fear movement of people.
They do not want de-isolation if it means allowing their
people to be exposed to life in Georgia, rejecting a Georgian
offer to permit Abkhaz to drive into Abkhazia. Given the
opportunity, the Abkhaz leaders would build a wall around
Abkhazia. Yakobashvili,s view was that this desire for
continued isolation was very Soviet. In a separate meeting,
Georgian NSC Secretary Kakha Lomaia echoed Yakobashvili's
assessment of the talks in Sweden.


4. (C) Despite this, the Abkhaz see the Sochi Olympics as
their opportunity for prosperity and security. As of July 1,
the Minister told the Ambassador, a ferry connection between
Sochi and Akbhazia will begin operation. He told us his
office has confirmed the availability of tickets for the
general public for this ferry.


5. (C) Yakobashvili acknowledged the difficulty for the
Abkhaz side in participating in the meetings. Each of the
Abkhaz representatives wanted to be seen as the "hard-liner."
He speculated that Stanislav Lakoba, chairman of the de
facto Akbhaz NSC, did not attend because he and Shamba are
now rivals and he expects Lakoba will run against Shamba in
the next "presidential" election cycle. Beyond this
political rivalry, Yakobashvili said that the Abkhaz side is
obsessed with talking about the Georgian Abkhaz war of 1992.
They believe they can repeat their success against Georgia,
with Moscow,s support.

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Follow up in Moscow
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6. (C) After the meetings in Stockholm, Yakobashvili
traveled to Moscow to continue discussions on conflict
resolution. During a dinner, he spoke to former Russian FM
Igor Ivanov and told us he was surprised to learn -- from
Ivanov himself -- that Ivanov had been a key opinion leader
within Putin,s government in building anti-Georgian and
anti-Saakashvili sentiment. Georgians had long believed him
to have been a supportive voice. In fact, he encouraged
Putin's negative tendencies toward Georgia when he headed the
security council. Yakobashvili said that it was clear to him
that the Russians believe they must support the Abkhaz,
because, if the Russian military does not, volunteers will
rally to the Abkhaz banner from around the North Caucasus.
And a surge of volunteers would lead to increased separatism
in the North Caucasus. He said Ivanov had convinced Putin
that they could not allow such a resurgence in these largely
Muslim-populated areas.

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What,s the Plan? And Who Is Behind It?
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7. (C) As the Georgians consider their options for next
steps, Yakobashvili told us that there are three camps
within Saakashvili,s circle of advisors. The "peaceniks"
(Yakobashvili, NSC Chairman Kakha Lomaia, and Deputy Chairman
of the Parliament's Defense and Security Committee Nik
Rurua),those who support military action (not spelled out)
and those who believe that there is a new opportunity
presented with a new President in the Kremlin (also not
named). Yakobashvili told us that those who support military
action have been frequently quoting U.S. President Franklin
Roosevelt about the costs of inaction. The minister told us
that there are many ways beyond direct confrontation for
Georgia to engage militarily -- including guerilla tactics
and the use of partisans. When the Ambassador asked
Yakobashvili to clarify Georgia,s strategy for next steps
specifically with Russian peacekeepers, the Minister told him
that Saakashvili has made no decision but was prepared to
allow the current intense diplomatic cycle to run through
this summer,s G-8 Summit. If there is no progress and
Saakashvili then decides to ask the Russians to leave,
western leaders will have to face the choice of supporting
Georgia or the leaders will have to face the idea that
"losing" Georgia and giving up a beacon of democracy and a
success story of transformational diplomacy. To complete his
negative assessment Yakobashvili said the Georgians have
given up on the Friends of the SYG formula. He believes the
Friends are completely incapable of making progress on
conflict resolution.

TEFFT