Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08TASHKENT482
2008-04-24 04:44:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tashkent
Cable title:  

NATO ENVOY: UZBEKISTAN POSITIVE ON COOPERATION

Tags:  PREL ASEC AORC MOPS KTIA NATO AF UZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6389
PP RUEHBW
DE RUEHNT #0482/01 1150444
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 240444Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9554
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 3920
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0133
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 4535
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0402
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0357
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0413
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 4129
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2403
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 0441
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1074
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 0100
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7389
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0219
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2451
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1134
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1803
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TASHKENT 000482 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2018
TAGS: PREL ASEC AORC MOPS KTIA NATO AF UZ
SUBJECT: NATO ENVOY: UZBEKISTAN POSITIVE ON COOPERATION

REF: A. TASHKENT 212

B. 07 TASHKENT 1989

Classified By: Poloff Steven Prohaska and DATT Jeff Hartman for reasons
1.4 (b, d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TASHKENT 000482

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2018
TAGS: PREL ASEC AORC MOPS KTIA NATO AF UZ
SUBJECT: NATO ENVOY: UZBEKISTAN POSITIVE ON COOPERATION

REF: A. TASHKENT 212

B. 07 TASHKENT 1989

Classified By: Poloff Steven Prohaska and DATT Jeff Hartman for reasons
1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary. NATO envoy Robert Simmons gave a readout to
NATO Embassies on April 15 of meetings with Government of
Uzbekistan (GOU) officials. According to Simmons, senior GOU
officials may be split on pushing Uzbekistan's "6 plus 3"
proposal. Simmons reported on the NATO land transit
agreement and anticipates completion of the agreement by late
Fall 2008. He noted that Uzbekistan is very worried about
drugs and the Taliban and is highly critical of President
Karzai, advising that NATO be prepared for a possible change
in Afghan leadership next year. Simmons warned that European
Union sanctions could trouble the transit agreement
negotiations. End summary.

Uzbekistan Supportive of NATO Efforts in Afghanistan
-------------- --------------


2. (C) NATO's Deputy Assistant Secretary General and Special
Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia Robert
Simmons gave a readout to NATO Embassies on April 15 of his
recent meetings with Government of Uzbekistan (GOU)
officials. Simmons remarked that Karimov gave an especially
substantive speech at the NATO/EAPC summit in Bucharest April
2-4, and that most of his discussions with GOU officials
centered on Afghanistan. Simmons said that, in light of the
Summit and these negotiations, an eventual visit by the NATO
Secretary General to Uzbekistan is under consideration.

SIPDIS


3. (C) Simmons met with the heads of the Senate and
Legislative Chamber and addressed students at the Academy of
Sciences before more formal meetings with GOU officials.
According to Simmons, Uzbekistan supports NATO involvement in
Afghanistan and wants NATO and the USG to succeed in
Afghanistan. Simmons referred to National Security Council
(NSC) Secretary Atayev as the overall manager of GOU

negotiations on the transit agreement, and Foreign Minister
Norov as the operator, with Minister of Defense Mirzayev as
the man tasked to negotiate details.

Simmons Speculates on GOU Messages, Motives
--------------


4. (C) Interestingly, in meetings with the GOU, Simmons
reported that only Foreign Minister Norov pushed hard for the
"6 plus 3" proposal, while Atayev was more relaxed about it.
Simmons believed that Atayev was only interested in further
consultations, not a specific forum, in addition to regular
military-to-military contact. Simmons reasoned that Atayev
may have signaled the GOU's eventual acceptance of "26 plus
5." Simmons speculated that a desire to appease Russia by
giving it a seat at the table with NATO may underpin efforts
to push the "6 plus 3" proposal, but Simmons was not sure
that pulling Russia into these discussions is a good idea.
He noted that Russia feels uncomfortable about NATO having a
dialogue with the Central Asian states that is unfiltered by
Russia. Simmons even described an exchange with Russian
Ambassador to NATO Dmitriy Rogozin, who at one point
exclaimed, "How dare you talk to our colonies!" Simmons also
said that the GOU reported that it received no information on
these nego
tiations from the Russian Embassy in Tashkent. GOU officials
expressed their gratitude to Simmons for the information that

TASHKENT 00000482 002 OF 003


the GOU's mission in Brussels had received from NATO on these
transit proposals.

Doubts About "6 Plus 3" Proposal
--------------


5. (C) Simmons indicated that he had pushed back on "6 plus
3," asserting that NATO does want to consult with Uzbekistan,
but "6 plus 3" may not be the best way to do this. While
NATO and Uzbekistan share goals, he said, a format that
includes Russia and Iran could be problematic, so how to
reach these objectives is an open question. (Note:
Uzbekistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently clarified
that the "6 plus 3" proposal does not envision any role for
representatives of the Government of Afghanistan or warring
factions in the Contact Group, as this would result in "never
ending meetings." The MFA recommends that the Contact Group
come to agreement on certain issues, and then inform
Afghanistan of these decisions. End note.)

Land Transit Agreement
--------------


6. (C) Simmons noted that NATO signed a land transit
agreement with Russia, on which he had briefed the Central
Asian Embassies in Brussels after his discussions with the
Russians. Russia wanted the land transit agreement to
operate under the auspices of the Russian-led Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO),Simmons said. While
Russia had provided only minimal information on its proposal,
it expected everyone to sign up. Among the Central Asian
states, only Kazakhstan pushed for a land transit agreement
under the CSTO, with the other Central Asian leaders
explicitly stating that they did not wish this to occur under
CSTO, he said. Simmons opined that Uzbekistan is better at
balancing its relations between NATO and CSTO than Kazakhstan
is.


7. (C) Simmons said that the Russians signed a permissive
letter for the agreement to avoid running it through the Duma
for formal approval. (Comment: Nationalist sentiments could
flare up in the Russian Duma. End comment.) The GOU, on the
other hand, intended to complete an exchange of letters to be
voted on by the two Houses of Parliament. (Comment:
Uzbekistan's Parliament is firmly under President Karimov's
control. End comment.)


8. (C) Simmons stated that the model for the NATO rail
transit agreement is the German agreement signed by both the
Governments of Uzbekistan and Germany in March 2008. Simmons
identified three categories for for goods shipped per the
terms of the land transit agreement: non-military, military
but non-lethal, and lethal military equipment. During
Simmons' meeting with Uzbekistan's Minister of Defense
Mirzayev and NSC Secretary Atayev, the GOU representatives
reported that they had approved the transit of non-lethal
military equipment through Uzbekistan's territory, Simmons
said. Simmons hoped that any goods that were not explicitly
prohibited would be permitted, but was not sure this was
likely. (Note: This NATO transit agreement agreement is for
rail shipment only. NATO does not envision discussions for
road transit. This agreement is also expressly for
contractor-delivered shipments, not for NATO member
government-vehicle delivery. End note.)


9. (C) Simmons explained that NATO aimed to complete an
agreement with the GOU by the summer break in August 2008.

TASHKENT 00000482 003 OF 003


Sounding very optimistic, he said that NATO had promised a
working copy of the transit agreement to the GOU within a
week. The GOU would then have a month to study and react to
the draft before follow-on discussions in late May 2008.
Simmons warned that NATO expected negotiations with
Kazakhstan to proceed very slowly, but that NATO anticipated
completion of the agreements in Fall 2008 followed by
operations as early as late Fall 2008.

Uzbekistan's Threat Perceptions, Views on NATO Cooperation
-------------- --------------


10. (C) Uzbekistan is very worried about drugs and the
Taliban in Afghanistan, Simmons noted. Foreign Minister
Norov was also critical of President Karzai, suggesting that
NATO be prepared for a possible change in leadership after
the election in Afghanistan next year. (Comment: Norov's
comments track with the skepticism that GOU officials have
conveyed during meetings with the Ambassador and Embassy
staff over the past six months. End comment.)


11. (C) Simmons sensed strong support for non-military
engagement with NATO, particularly from Atayev and the
Parliament. Simmons said that the GOU is happy that NATO's
Science Committee will pay for a project involving the
destruction of melange rocket fuel residue.


12. (C) Simmons also spoke with Minister of Defense Mirzayev
about the Planning and Review Process (PARP),but did not
indicate what the results of this discussion were. (Note:
Uzbekistan's Deputy Defense Minister Niyazov in May 2007
pledged to re-join the PARP at an unspecified date, reftel B.
End note.) Mirzayev invited NATO to visit Uzbekistan's
training center for forces interoperable with NATO.

Sanctions Could Adversely Affect Transit Agreement
-------------- --------------


13. (C) A European Union decision to re-impose sanctions
could lead to a negative response from Uzbekistan, Simmons
warned. Uzbekistan can live with "statements of concern," he
said, but would regard steps like sanctions as "punitive
measures." "We might have trouble with the transit agreement
if sanctions are adopted," Simmons opined, without additional
explanation.

Comment:
--------------


14. (C) Simmons' comment on Uzbekistan's probable reaction to
EU sanctions is speculative, but we will perhaps have a
chance to see for ourselves after the EU's April 28 decision.
The overland transit of fuel across Uzbekistan's territory
already plays an important role in NATO operations in
Afghanistan, and a land transit agreement could bring further
benefits in terms of transporting other goods and providing a
secondary route besides the current primary one through
Pakistan.
NORLAND