Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08TASHKENT139
2008-02-01 11:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tashkent
Cable title:  

RADIATION DETECTION UPDATE: GOVERNMENT OF

Tags:  MNUC KNNP PARM KCRM PTER ASEC KCOR KZ KG UZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNT #0139 0321129
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011129Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9156
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 3691
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 9901
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 4305
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0167
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0181
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0183
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 3896
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2163
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 0255
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0841
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7292
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2290
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0074
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0109
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 000139 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN BRIAN RORAFF, ISN/CTR ARYN LESTER, AND
SCA/RA ANNE CUMMINGS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2018
TAGS: MNUC KNNP PARM KCRM PTER ASEC KCOR KZ KG UZ
SUBJECT: RADIATION DETECTION UPDATE: GOVERNMENT OF
UZBEKISTAN PASSES ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

REF: A. 07 TASHKENT 2063

B. 07 TASHKENT 2081

C. 07 TASHKENT 2090

D. BISHKEK 44

E. TASHKENT 43

F. STATE 4751

Classified By: Poloff Steven Prohaska for reasons 1.4 (b, d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 000139

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN BRIAN RORAFF, ISN/CTR ARYN LESTER, AND
SCA/RA ANNE CUMMINGS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2018
TAGS: MNUC KNNP PARM KCRM PTER ASEC KCOR KZ KG UZ
SUBJECT: RADIATION DETECTION UPDATE: GOVERNMENT OF
UZBEKISTAN PASSES ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

REF: A. 07 TASHKENT 2063

B. 07 TASHKENT 2081

C. 07 TASHKENT 2090

D. BISHKEK 44

E. TASHKENT 43

F. STATE 4751

Classified By: Poloff Steven Prohaska for reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) On January 30 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
delivered a diplomatic note to Post with additional
information related to the November seizure of a railcar
carrying radioactive material. Post has e-mailed copies of
the enclosures to the Uzbekistan Desk Officer, Brian Roraff
(202-647-6765). The first document is a truncated version of
the original Institute of Nuclear Physics Committee's
findings (Ref E) with an update on the status of the train at
the end. This document omits the original report's
discussion of spectrums detected and neutron radiation.
(Note: The text "This confirms that the levels of neutron
radiation were several times higher than the background" from
Ref E should actually read "This is confirmed by somewhat
increased neutron radiation background." End note.) Post's
unofficial translation of the additional information and
enclosure captions follows:

"Institute of Nuclear Physics specialists measured the
background radiation at 600 microsieverts per hour. Taking
into account the harmfulness of the cargo, the decision was
made to return the railway car #64032139 back to the
sender--'Temir' company in Kyrgyzstan."

Page 1:
Seized railway car with high background radiation at the
railway station "Uzbekistan"

Page 2:
Seized railway car with high background radiation

Page 3:
Seized railway car - view from the top

Page 4:
Detached car at a siding track

Page 5:
Detached car at a siding track

Page 6:
Seized railway car - view from the top


2. (C) Comment: Although the Government of Uzbekistan has yet
to respond to the follow-up questions Post delivered on
January 16, this additional reply appears to be another sign
of Uzbekistan's increasing (if still selective) willingness
to cooperate with the United States on counter-proliferation
issues. The Government of Uzbekistan did not provide any
information to Embassy staff through official channels after
two similar incidents in 2006, but has already delivered two
diplomatic notes to Post with information related to the
latest November 2007 seizure.
NORLAND