Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08TASHKENT1227
2008-10-24 12:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tashkent
Cable title:  

KAZAKHSTANI NGOS DISCUSS LABOR MIGRATION,

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM ECON ELAB KWMN KCRM SOCI KZ UZ 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 001227 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA, DRL, G/TIP, AND DOL
DOL/ILAB FOR SEROKA MIHAIL, DRL/ILCSR FOR ALFRED ANZALDUA,
G/TIP FOR MEGAN HALL, SCA FOR JESSICA MAZZONE AND BRIAN
RORAFF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ECON ELAB KWMN KCRM SOCI KZ UZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTANI NGOS DISCUSS LABOR MIGRATION,
TRAFFICKING, AND CHILD LABOR

REF: TASHKENT 1149

Classified By: POLOFF R. FITZMAURICE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 001227

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA, DRL, G/TIP, AND DOL
DOL/ILAB FOR SEROKA MIHAIL, DRL/ILCSR FOR ALFRED ANZALDUA,
G/TIP FOR MEGAN HALL, SCA FOR JESSICA MAZZONE AND BRIAN
RORAFF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ECON ELAB KWMN KCRM SOCI KZ UZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTANI NGOS DISCUSS LABOR MIGRATION,
TRAFFICKING, AND CHILD LABOR

REF: TASHKENT 1149

Classified By: POLOFF R. FITZMAURICE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: During a five-day trip to Uzbekistan and
southern Kazakhstan on September 29 - October 3, G/TIP
Foreign Affairs Officer Megan Hall met with Kazakhstani NGOs
to discuss labor migration, human trafficking, and child
labor issues. The president of an anti-trafficking NGO in
Shymkent, Kazakhstan observed that labor migration from
Uzbekistan was increasing and explained how migrants fall
victim to trafficking for both labor and sexual exploitation.
She reported some cooperation with local Kazakhstani
authorities and noted one recent case in which a trafficker
was imprisoned by Uzbek authorities. She also bemoaned the
lack of a shelter for trafficking victims in southern
Kazakhstan. In addition, the NGO president reported that
most incidences of child labor in southern Kazakhstan
involved Uzbek children coming across the border with their
parents to work in agriculture.


2. (C) Hall also met with the head of an NGO for Kazakh
farmers, who maintained that labor migration had decreased
due to stricter border controls and argued that conditions
were improving for Uzbek labor migrants. While he
acknowledged some Uzbek migrants were mistreated, he believed
that the vast majority of migrants were not trafficked. The
somewhat contrasting views provided useful perspectives on
the close overlap between labor migration, human trafficking,
and child labor in southern Kazakhstan. While the efforts of
NGOs are critical for raising awareness among Uzbek migrants
of their legal rights, both the Uzbek and Kazakhstani
governments clearly have a greater role to play in
coordinating their efforts to protect labor migrants,

prosecute traffickers, aid victims, and collect statistics.
End summary.

MEETING WITH KAZAKHSTANI ANTI-TRAFFICKING NGO
--------------


3. (C) On October 3, Hall met with Khadicha Abysheva, the
President of the "Sana Sezim" Legal Center for Women's
Initiatives, in Shymkent, Kazakhstan. Her NGO has been
working on human trafficking, labor migration, child labor,
domestic violence, and women's rights issues in southern
Kazakhstan since 2001 and has received funding over the years
from the U.S. Embassy in Kazakhstan, the European Commission,
the Open Society Institute, and the International Labor
Organization (ILO).


4. (C) Abysheva's organization seeks to raise awareness
regarding human trafficking and provide services to victims.
It operates separate 24-hour hotlines for trafficking
victims, domestic violence victims, and labor migrants.
Volunteers of the organization, some of whom are former Uzbek
trafficking victims, also distribute literature at border
posts and labor markets (see para 6) to Uzbek labor migrants
explaining their legal rights in Kazakhstan. Sana Sezim also
conducts trainings for local law enforcement on how to
recognize trafficking victims, which reportedly has resulted
in increased sensitivity towards victims.


5. (C) Sana Sezim also cooperates with the International
Organization for Migration's (IOM) office in Tashkent (which
is officially registered as a local NGO, Istiqbolli Avlod)
and its partner NGOs in Uzbekistan's provinces to assist the
return of trafficking victims. On October 2, Hall met with
the head of IOM's partner NGO in Uzbekistan's Jizzakh
province, who reported receiving assistance from Sana Sezim

in repatriating several sex trafficking victims.

LABOR MIGRATION VERSUS TRAFFICKING
--------------


6. (C) Abysheva reported that Kazakhstan, which used to be
primarily a transit country for human trafficking, was
becoming more and more a destination country, especially for
Uzbeks trafficked for labor exploitation. Abysheva observed
that it is often difficult in many cases to distinguish labor
migration from trafficking, as the two were closely linked.

She explained that Uzbeks make up the largest contingent of
labor migrants in southern Kazakhstan and that their numbers
are growing. She noted that few Uzbek labor migrants knew
their legal rights in Kazakhstan and were therefore easily
exploited by Kazakhstani employers, who sometimes hold their
identity documents, and Kazakhstani law enforcement, who
demand bribes from them. According to Abysheva, many Uzbek
labor migrants are desperate for work and are willing to
endure difficult living conditions in Kazakhstan, even
returning to the country after they have been previously
cheated or even beaten by Kazakhstani employers. She said
that there were no solid statistics on the exact number of
Uzbek labor migrants and trafficking victims in southern
Kazakhstan.

"BUYING AND SELLING" OF UZBEK LABOR MIGRANTS
--------------


7. (C) Abysheva reported that Uzbek laborers are usually
recruited inside Uzbekistan by fellow Uzbeks, who then
shepherd them across the border in groups of 50 or more.
Even though most labor migrants legally enter Kazakhstan,
recruiters still reportedly bribe customs and immigration
officials from both countries to facilitate the process.
Once across the border, the Uzbeks are then brought to labor
markets, where they are "sold" to Kazakhstani employers
(Note: Similar labor markets, or "mardikors," are wide-spread
in Uzbekistan. While many "mardikors" in Uzbekistan are
legitimate places for individuals to find work, there
reportedly have been cases of individuals being trafficked
internally in Uzbekistan through them for both labor and
sexual exploitation. End note.) At some border posts,
Uzbeks migrants are allegedly locked inside of buildings
until the negotiations between recruiters and employers are
complete. Some Uzbeks are then loaded onto buses headed to
construction sites in Astana and Almaty, while most remain in
southern Kazakhstan to work in agriculture.


8. (C) According to Abysheva, it was impossible to determine
the number of Uzbek labor migrants who become trafficking
victims. However, she noted that at least a portion of the
Uzbeks are mistreated or not paid by their Kazakhstani
employees, which, in her view, made them trafficking victims.
She also noted that many of the Uzbeks do not understand
that they are literally being "sold" by recruiters to
employers, and sometimes employers refuse to allow migrants
to leave work sites prematurely, claiming that they had
"bought" them to work for a certain period.


9. (C) Southern Kazakhstan long has been home to a large
Uzbek diaspora. Abysheva noted that many traffickers in
Kazakhstan are ethnic Uzbeks, and that many of the recruiters
in Uzbekistan are former trafficking victims. IOM's partner
NGO in Uzbekistan's Jizzakh province provided Hall with a
similar explanation of how Uzbek labor migrants and
trafficking victims are recruited and brought across the
border.

TRAFFICKING OF UZBEK WOMEN FOR SEXUAL EXPLOITATION
-------------- --------------


10. (C) Abysheva reported that Uzbek women are also
trafficked to southern Kazakhstan to work as prostitutes in
brothels and saunas, often located close to the Uzbek border
or in larger towns like Shymkent. She reported that some of
the Uzbek women know they will end up working as prostitutes,
but never anticipate that they will be forced to work more or
less as sex slaves. She reported that when her organization
receives information on the location of exploited women, they
immediately pass the information to local authorities, which
have raided approximately four brothels in southern
Kazakhstan in the past year.


11. (C) Despite the raids, Abysheva maintained that law
enforcement officials were often reluctant to carry out such
operations and only did so under pressure from Sana Sezim and
local journalists. She also accused some police officers of
receiving protection money from traffickers and provided a
few examples of cases when law enforcement officials refused
to raid alleged brothels owned by "influential members" of
the local community.

CONVICTION OF UZBEK TRAFFICKER REPORTED
--------------


12. (C) Abysheva described in detail one recent raid against
a brothel in southern Kazakhstan that resulted in
approximately 20 women from Uzbekistan being rescued from
sexual slavery. The raid, which was carried out by local
police with Sana Sezim representatives as observers, was
reportedly initiated after Abysheva wrote a complaint letter
to the local Prosecutor. After the raid, one of the rescued
women was temporarily housed by Sana Sezim in Shymkent before
being transferred to a trafficking victims' shelter in
Tashkent, which is operated by IOM and funded by USAID.
Abysheva did not know the fate of the other Uzbek women, as
they either escaped the brothel during the raid or left
Kazakhstan shortly afterwards.


13. (C) Abysheva added that the Uzbek recruiter who
allegedly lured the women to Kazakhstan, Ilhom Yusupov, was
being prosecuted by Uzbek authorities for his role in the
crime. On the other hand, she noted that Kazakhstani
authorities have so far refused to bring charges against
Yusupov's Kazakhstani accomplice - Elmira, the madam of the
brothel - claiming that they could only charge her if they
had direct evidence that she received money from Yusupov.
Abysheva observed that Uzbek authorities in general were more
aggressive in prosecuting alleged traffickers than
Kazakhstani authorities.


14. (C) On October 8, the Russian Regnum news agency
reported that the Chilonzor district criminal court in
Tashkent convicted Ilhom Yusupov and three female accomplices
of trafficking 20 women from Uzbekistan to Kazakhstan and
sentenced them to between 10 to 14 years' imprisonment under
criminal code article 135 (human trafficking). According to
the article, the criminal group received 300,000 soums (230
dollars) from their Kazakhstani accomplices for each woman
that was trafficked.

SOUTHERN KAZAKHSTAN LACKS SHELTER FOR TRAFFICKING VICTIMS
-------------- --------------


15. (C) Abysheva noted with regret that there was still no
shelter in southern Kazakhstan for trafficking victims. Sana
Sezim representatives have occasionally housed trafficking

victims in their private residences or temporarily rented
apartments for them in Shymkent. Abysheva recognized that
such measures were inadequate, as trafficking victims needed
special psychological counseling and medical care that only a
professional shelter could provide.

TREATMENT OF ILLEGAL MIGRANTS BY AUTHORITIES
--------------


16. (C) Abysheva explained that Uzbeks do not need a visa to
enter Kazakhstan and may remain in the country for up to 90
days, although they are required to register with Kazakhstani
authorities within 5 days of arrival. Few migrants
reportedly bother to register with Kazakhstani authorities,
and all migrants become illegal as soon as they begin
working. According to Abysheva, Kazakhstani authorities
routinely detain Uzbek migrants, particularly those without
documentation, though Uzbek migrants have reportedly paid
bribes to escape detention. Detained migrants are held at a
special detention facility in southern Kazakhstan for up to
30 days before they are deported to Uzbekistan. According to
Abysheva, Kazakhstani authorities keep records on deportees,
and those who have been deported three times are permanently
banned from re-entering Kazakhstan.


17. (C) Abysheva could not describe conditions at the
detention facility, as authorities have not allowed
independent organizations to monitor it. However, she
reported hearing incidences of Kazakhstani employers,
including alleged traffickers, visiting the detention
facility and negotiating with Kazakhstani authorities to "buy
back" their Uzbek "employees."

AMNESTY FOR ILLEGALS?
--------------


18. (C) Abysheva explained that the Kazakhstani government
passed a law in December 2006, which enabled roughly 3,000
Uzbek migrants to legalize their status in Kazakhstan and
granted them the right to work for three years. However, the
law applied only to those who had entered Kazakhstan within
two months of the law being passed, and thus, did not apply
to the vast majority of Uzbek migrants in Kazakhstan. She
knew of no plans for the Kazakhstani government to offer
another amnesty for illegal migrants in 2009, but favored
such an approach. Abysheva observed that Kazakhstan had
immigration quotas for skilled workers, but not for unskilled
laborers.

CHILD LABOR IN SOUTHERN KAZAKHSTAN
--------------


19. (C) Abysheva reported that most examples of child labor
in southern Kazakhstan were Uzbek children coming across the
border with their parents to work in agriculture,
particularly in the fall and the spring. Incidences of child
labor were reportedly highest in the Saryagash and Maktakal
regions of Southern Kazakhstan province. Children - some as
young as seven, but mostly older than 12 - picked primarily
cotton, tobacco, and fruit. Abysheva noted that tobacco
picking was especially bad for the health of children. The
Kazakhstani government has promulgated a list of banned forms
of child labor, which includes tobacco picking but not cotton
picking (Note: A similar list, which includes cotton picking,
was issued in Uzbekistan in 2001, but it is not enforced.
End note) She also reported incidences of child labor in
southern Kazakhstan involving Kazakhstani children, but
explained it was far less prevalent than incidences involving
Uzbek children (Comment: While driving through southern

Kazakhstan during the 2007 cotton harvest, poloff was told by
a pair of students that "Kazakhstani children never pick
cotton, that is what Uzbek children are for." End comment.)


20. (C) Abysheva reported that she has had some cooperation
on addressing child labor issues with authorities, including
roundtables with local law enforcement and education
officials. She noted that one of the main obstacles
encountered by her organization was that the use of child
labor is largely tolerated by society, as many adults in
Kazakhstan worked as children (Note: Many adults in
Uzbekistan share similar attitudes. End note.)

MEETING WITH KAZAKHSTANI AND UZBEK FARMERS
--------------


21. (C) After the meeting in Shymkent, Hall Qwith
Myrzadadyr Abdykhalykov, a farmer from the Zhetysai district
of Southern Kazakhstan province and head of the Center for
the Support of Agriculture and Entrepreneurs. The meeting
took place at the home of Abdykhalykov's relatives, who live
in a village in Uzbekistan's Tashkent province near the
Kazakhstani border. Abdykhalykov's relative, an Uzbek
farmer, also joined the discussion. Abdykhalykov explained
that his NGO assists farmers in using modern agricultural
techniques, including more efficient irrigation techniques
and organic farming. His organization, which is currently
partnering with Sana Sezim on a labor migration monitoring
project, has previously received funding from USAID.
Abdykhalykov also has participated in two professional
exchanges with the United States.

STRICTER BORDER CONTROLS LEADING TO DECREASED MIGRATION?
-------------- --------------


22. (C) Abdykhalykov noted that Uzbek labor migrants
traveled to Kazakhstan primarily to sow fields in the spring
and to participate in the fall harvest. In the spring, the
majority of Uzbek labor migrants reportedly come from
Uzbekistan's Jizzakh, Syrdarya, and Tashkent provinces, which
border Southern Kazakhstan province, but greater numbers of
labor migrants come from all over Uzbekistan during the fall
harvest. However, Abdykhalykov observed that labor migration
from Uzbekistan to Kazakhstan had decreased in the last few
years due to increased border controls instituted by both
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. A few years ago, it was
reportedly easier for Uzbek migrants to illegally cross the
border, which some did in order to avoid paying bribes to
border officials. Abdykhalykov believed that the increased
controls on both sides of the border, including the erecting
of new fences and increased patrols, was primarily aimed at
combating smuggling and narcotics trafficking. These days, he
reported that the vast majority of Uzbek labor migrants
crossed the border legally.


23. (C) Abdykhalykov reported that labor migrants were
recruited in Uzbekistan and shepherded across the border in
groups of 15 to 20 by Uzbek middlemen, who reportedly paid
bribes to Uzbek customs officials of approximately 10,000
soums (7.70 dollars) per person, with Kazakhstani border
authorities receiving slightly less. Afterwards, the
migrants are "matched" with Kazakhstani employers.
Abdykhalykov denied that most of the Uzbek labor migrants
were "trafficked," arguing instead that they were ultimately
able to choose for whom they worked and under what conditions
(Comment: Abdykhalykov, a Kazakhstani farmer who hired Uzbek
labor migrants and knew many other Kazakhstani farmers who
did the same, clearly had a different perspective on the
issue than Abysheva. End comment.)


FARMER REPORTS IMPROVING CONDITIONS FOR MIGRANTS
-------------- ---


24. (C) Abdykhalykov argued that Kazakhstani employers have
been forced in the last few years to improve living
conditions for Uzbek migrants due to a greater competition
for their labor. He noted that Uzbek labor migrants in
southern Kazakhstan used to live in tents or other make-shift
shelters, but now were often being provided temporary housing
by their employers. He reported that conditions were
generally better for migrants in the Maktakal region, where
his farm was located, but were worse in Saryagash region,
where he said migrants were sometimes not paid or were
provided inadequate food or water. He also reported
incidences of Uzbek labor migrants being beaten, though he
believed such incidences were rare and decreasing.


25. (C) Abdykhalykov observed that demand for labor in
southern Kazakhstan was increasing as the amount of cotton
grown in the region was increasing each year. At the same
time, he believed Uzbek authorities were making greater
efforts to keep adult laborers in Uzbekistan during the
cotton harvest. He also believed that Kazakhstani
authorities understood that their region was dependent upon
Uzbek migrant labor and therefore did not seek to discourage
it too actively. He reported that police occasionally
checked documents, carried out raids, and detained
individuals without appropriate documentation, but he noted
that such actions largely did not affect the majority of
illegal Uzbek migrants in southern Kazakhstan. He also
reported that Uzbek labor migrants paid bribes to Kazakhstani
police.

LABORERS STILL PAID MORE IN KAZAKHSTAN, BUT GAP NARROWING
-------------- --------------


26. (C) Abdykhalykov and his relative said that Uzbek
laborers were still being paid more during the cotton harvest
in Kazakhstan than Uzbekistan, but they observed that the gap
was beginning to narrow. They said that laborers in
Kazakhstan were paid between 110 to 120 soums (between .08
and .09 dollars) per kilo of cotton versus an average of only
80 soums (.06 dollars) per kilo in Uzbekistan (Note: The 80
soums per kilo figure matched what poloff was told by human
rights activist on October 2 in Uzbekistan's Syrdarya
province, reftel. End note.) However, they reported that
wealthier farmers in Uzbekistan were beginning to pay adult
laborers higher wages, with some of them now receiving as
much as 100 soums (.07 dollars) per kilo, an amount they
believed was adequate to keep laborers in Uzbekistan
(Comment: The local ILO representative in Tashkent also had
told poloff that there were farmers in Uzbekistan who paid
high enough salaries to attract adult laborers for the cotton
harvest and therefore did not rely on conscripted student
labor. Before her departure from Uzbekistan in August, the
representative was hoping to organize a project to share the
best practices of those farmers with others. End comment.)
However, Abdykhalykov and his relative noted that the
majority of Uzbek farmers still could not afford to pay
laborers so much, and those farmers were still dependent upon
local authorities to provide conscripted student labor to
pick their cotton.

CHILD LABOR IN UZBEKISTAN
--------------


27. (C) Abdykhalykov's relative reported that Uzbek
authorities conscripted mostly older students (from the ninth

grade and up) to pick cotton. For example, his son was in
the eighth grade and was still in school. In his region,
Abdykhalykov's relative said rice was grown more than cotton,
and local farmers generally relied on adult laborers, rather
than students, to collect their cotton. However, he noted
that other regions where cotton was grown in greater
abundance depended more heavily on conscripted student labor.
He explained that the extent of such student labor varied
considerably from region to region and was also partly
dependent upon the whims of local authorities.

LEVELS OF MECHANIZATION REPORTEDLY HIGHER IN UZBEKISTAN
-------------- --------------


28. (C) Interestingly, Abdykhalykov reported that rates of
agricultural mechanization were higher on the Uzbek than the
Kazakhstani side of the border - even though the Kazakhstani
side was wealthier - because Uzbek farms inherited more
combines and tractors from the Soviet Union. He also
reported that farmers in Kazakhstan still found it cheaper to
use manual labor than to invest in greater mechanization.

COMMENT
--------------


29. (C) Abysheva and Abdykhalykov provided somewhat
contrasting - but ultimately both useful - perspectives on
the overlap between labor migration, human trafficking, and
child labor in southern Kazakhstan. Whether rates of labor
migration from Uzbekistan to Kazakhstan have increased or
decreased in the past year, it is clear that significant
numbers of Uzbeks are still seeking work in southern
Kazakhstan - especially as economic conditions in Uzbekistan
continue to deteriorate - and some of these migrants are
becoming victims of trafficking for both labor and sexual
exploitation. The illegal status of most Uzbek labor
migrants in Kazakhstan has made them prey for unscrupulous
employers and corrupt law enforcement officials. While
efforts by NGOs like Sana Sezim are critical for increasing
awareness among Uzbek labor migrants of their legal rights,
both the Uzbek and Kazakhstani governments clearly have a
greater role to play in coordinating their efforts to protect
labor migrants, prosecute traffickers, aid victims, and
collect statistics.


30. (C) The issue of labor migration is also tightly
intertwined with the phenomenon of child labor in both
southern Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. As long as salaries for
agricultural laborers remains significantly higher in
Kazakhstan than in Uzbekistan, Uzbek adult laborers will
continue to travel to southern Kazakhstan (some with their
children) during the cotton harvest, leaving students behind
to pick cotton in Uzbekistan.


31. (U) This message has been cleared by Embassy Astana.
NORLAND