Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08TASHKENT1225
2008-10-24 03:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tashkent
Cable title:  

UZBEKISTAN: OFFICIALS CITE AREAS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Tags:  PHUM KCRM KWMN PGOV PREL SOCI UZ 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 001225 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA, DRL, INL, AND G/TIP
DEPT FOR G/TIP MEGAN HALL; INL FOR ANDREW BUHLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2018
TAGS: PHUM KCRM KWMN PGOV PREL SOCI UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: OFFICIALS CITE AREAS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
COOPERATION

REF: A. TASHKENT 1163

B. TASHKENT 1155

Classified By: POLOFF R. FITZMAURICE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 001225

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA, DRL, INL, AND G/TIP
DEPT FOR G/TIP MEGAN HALL; INL FOR ANDREW BUHLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2018
TAGS: PHUM KCRM KWMN PGOV PREL SOCI UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: OFFICIALS CITE AREAS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
COOPERATION

REF: A. TASHKENT 1163

B. TASHKENT 1155

Classified By: POLOFF R. FITZMAURICE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: During a six-day visit to Uzbekistan, DRL
Foreign Affairs Officer Rachel Waldstein met on September 22
with the Human Rights Ombudsman, the National Human Rights
Center director, and Ministry of Interior officials. The
officials emphasized legal reforms the government had
undertaken in the past year, including the adoption of new
laws on habeas corpus and human trafficking. MOI officials
also reported that their Ministry had created a new human
rights department to investigate citizen complaints; noted
that the government planned to open new shelters for
trafficking victims in several regions of the country; and
touted two new laws that strengthen the rights of detainees
and their lawyers. Despite their occasional bluster, the
officials also identified possible areas of cooperation on
human rights, particularly in helping to implement the
government's recent legal reforms. Waldstein's visit sets
the stage for higher-level DRL contact with the government on
human rights issues, and we believe a visit by the DRL
Assistant Secretary or PDAS may help pave the way for such
human rights cooperation to be realized. End summary.

MEETING WITH HUMAN RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN
--------------


2. (C) On September 22, Waldstein met with Human Rights
Ombudsman Sayyora Rashidova and her deputy Maruf Usmanov.
Rashidova explained that her office focuses on four areas: 1)
ensuring that Uzbek legislation meets international
standards; 2) hearing citizen complaints of human rights
violations; 3) raising the public's awareness of human
rights; and 4) fostering cooperation with international
bodies. In addition to its main office in Tashkent, the
Ombudsman has branches in each of Uzbekistan's regions.

HEARING CITIZEN COMPLAINTS...
--------------


3. (C) Rashidova observed that her office hears on average

about 50 to 60 citizen complaints each working day. In
contrast to a few years ago, when 60 percent of the
complaints were related to law enforcement activities,
Rashidova reported that the majority of complaints today
revolved around economic concerns (Comment: While Rashidova
was most likely citing this information as evidence of the
effectiveness of her organization in promoting law
enforcement reform, the shift in complaints also may indicate
that citizens have lost faith in the ability of her office to
successfully intervene in such cases. In addition, the
increase in economic grievances might be reflective of the
country's worsening socio-economic conditions, which are
driving large numbers of Uzbeks to seek work in Kazakhstan
and Russia. End comment.)


4. (C) Interestingly, Rashidova admitted that her office was
"not a strong institution," as it could not directly
intervene on behalf of citizens in Uzbekistan's legal system.
Instead, she explained that her office forwards citizen
complaints, along with its recommendations, to the
appropriate government bodies for their consideration.

PRISON VISITS AND PLAN FOR "PRISON OMBUDSMEN"
--------------


5. (C) Rashidova reported that over the past year, her
office has co-sponsored a series of conferences with
Germany's Adenauer Foundation and the Organization for

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on prisoner rights
for law enforcement officials in Uzbekistan's regions, each
of which was then followed by a joint monitoring visit to a
local prison. Rashidova added that her office concluded its
own agreement with the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOI) to
conduct monthly prison visits. According to Rashidova, the
MOI also supported her plan to create "prison ombudsmen" at
three detention facilities: the Tashkent Women's Prison
Colony, the Tashkent Juvenile Detention Facility, and a
pre-trial detention facility in Bukhara. She also reported
that her office was currently cooperating with the National
Human Rights Center and the United Nations Children's Fund
(UNICEF) on creating an Ombudsman for Children's Rights.

CITES U.S. COOPERATION, PRAISES AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Rashidova explained that shortly after her office was
created in 1995, she participated in a U.S.-funded trip to
study human rights institutions in the United States. She
also praised the assistance her office received from the
American Bar Association (ABA) (Comment: ABA, along with many
other international NGOs, was forced to depart Uzbekistan
following the 2005 Andijon events. ABA continues to operate
programs in Uzbekistan from its office in Almaty, Kazakhstan.
We believe that ABA may have the best chance of being
allowed to return to Uzbekistan at some point, as it often
mentioned in a positive light by government officials.
Nevertheless, the GOU recently denied a request by diplomatic
note for ABA to administer a habeas corpus-related project
with INL funds. End comment).

MEETING WITH NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER CHAIRMAN
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Waldstein met next with National Human Rights Center
Chairman Akmal Saidov, who also ran as an "independent"
candidate in the 2007 Presidential Election. Saidov
explained that since his Center was created in 1996, it has
raised awareness regarding legal reforms undertaken by the
government; drafted national reports on human rights in line
with Uzbekistan's international treaty obligations; and
evaluated Uzbekistan's legislation to ensure that it meets
international standards. Saidov observed that his Center had
written reports this year for the August 2008 UN Convention
for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW) committee meeting and the upcoming UN Human
Rights Council Third Universal Periodic Review, which will
take place in December.

RAISING AWARENESS OF, AND LOBBYING FOR, LEGAL REFORMS
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Saidov observed that his Center was involved in
raising awareness regarding the legal reforms undertaken by
the government during the past year. Saidov said that his
Center had played a key role in drafting a recently adopted
National Action Plan on implementing the ILO conventions,
adding that he personally met with the ILO's Secretary
General in Geneva last March. Saidov also reported that his
Center, in conjunction with UNICEF, was currently lobbying
for the government to adopt two facultative protocols to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, namely the Optional
Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict and
the Optional Protocol relating to the Sale of Children, Child
Prostitution, and the Utilization of Children in Pornography.



9. (c) Comment: While some observers previously have
dismissed the National Human Rights Center as ineffective, it
has received praise for its cooperation with international

organizations, including UNDP and UNICEF. Most recently
during a meeting with Waldstein on September 23, UNDP
officials identified the Center as a key partner for its
human rights-related programs, which it plans to ramp up next
year. End comment.)

GOVERNMENT OPEN TO "CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE" ON HUMAN RIGHTS
-------------- --------------


10. (C) Saidov emphasized that Uzbekistan was open to
"constructive dialogue" on human rights. He indicated that
assistance in implementing Uzbekistan's habeas corpus law was

a possible area of cooperation, admitting that Uzbekistan
"has a lot to learn from the United States" on the issue.
Saidov observed that not all judges and prosecutors were
ready to implement the habeas corpus law and suggested that
they could benefit from additional training provided by the
international community. Saidov also indicated that
implementation of the ILO child labor conventions was another
area of possible cooperation.

GOVERNMENT SUPPORT OF NGOs TOUTED
--------------


11. (C) Saidov argued that the government was making
progress in supporting the work of NGOs. He noted that in
July, a special Parliament Commission - one-third of whose
members are NGO representatives - was created to manage a new
government fund to support NGOs. Saidov reported that the
government provided NGOs with 2.1 billion soums (1.61 million
dollars) in funding in 2007 and had already provided 2.3
billion soums (1.76 million dollars) in funding this year
(Comment: It is still unclear whether only
government-controlled NGOs may apply for funding through the
commission. Many government-controlled NGOs engage in
substantive work in Uzbekistan, and several have received
funding through the Embassy's Democracy Commission over the
years. As funding sources for Uzbek NGOs are extremely
limited, any increase in funding for NGOs, whether
independent or government-controlled, would be welcome.
Nevertheless, some observers have expressed concern that the
government, by offering increased funding, is attempting to
make NGOs more dependent on the state. End comment.)

SAIDOV CRITICAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT
--------------


12. (C) The tone of the meeting turned slightly combative
when Saidov criticized the U.S. State Department's Human
Rights Report as a "political tool used to pressure
countries" like Uzbekistan. Saidov said he read the report's
chapter on Uzbekistan every year and claimed that "only the
names" and "perhaps 5 percept of the text" changed from year
to year. Waldstein said she was pleased to hear that Saidov
read the report so carefully each year and assured him it was
intended to be an objective and balanced report that noted
both positive and negative developments.

MEETING AT MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS
--------------


13. (C) Afterwards, Waldstein met several officials at the
Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOI),including Human Rights
and Judicial Support Department Deputy Director Abdugafur
Sattarov, Internal Affairs Director Bakhrom Aparatov, Main
Investigatory Department Senior Investigator Danelyn Frik,
and Main Investigatory Department Press Secretary Sarvar
Usmanov. The MOI's "Na Postu" newspaper later published a
short article about the meeting on September 28.

MOI CREATES NEW HUMAN RIGHTS DEPARTMENT

--------------


14. (C) Sattarov explained that he was appointed deputy
director of a newly-created human rights department within
the MOI, which is tasked with monitoring human rights issues;
supervising the implementation of laws; cooperating with NGOs
and international organizations; investigating citizen
complaints against law enforcement officials; and conducting
prison visits. In addition to its main office in Tashkent,
Sattarov said that his department planned to open regional
branches throughout Uzbekistan. The creation of the MOI's
new human rights department was widely reported in the
state-controlled media during September and October. The
OSCE office in Tashkent later confirmed that the creation of
the MOI's human rights departments was a new development and
an OSCE-supported project.


15. (C) Sattarov reported that the MOI received 100 citizen
complaints against law enforcement officials in 2007, and so
far had received 22 complaints in the first eight months of

2008. Sattarov also shared with Waldstein a pamphlet on
detainee rights that the MOI published with support from the
National Human Rights Center and the American Bar
Association, which he explained was given to all individuals
detained by the MOI.


16. (C) Sattarov admitted that the MOI faces "many problems
and challenges," including corruption within its ranks.
Aparatov explained that he worked for a special internal
affairs unit within the MOI that is responsible for
investigating allegations of corruption against MOI
officials.

NEW LAWS AFFECTING DETAINNEES AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS
-------------- --------------


17. (C) Frik reported that the protection of constitutional
rights remained a priority for the MOI and the government as
a whole. In addition to the abolishment of the death penalty
and the adoption of the habeas corpus law, Frik also referred
to two new laws ("On Strengthening the Role of Defense
Attorneys in the Judicial Process," which was signed by
President Karimov in mid-September, and "On the Bar
Association," which has been passed by the lower house of
Parliament and is similar to a decree that President Karimov
issued in May),which he said strengthened the rights of
detainees and their defense attorneys. According to Frik,
the laws included provisions that detainees and witnesses can
only be interrogated in the presence of a defense attorney;
that detainees cannot be forced to sign any documents without
first meeting with a defense attorney; and that individuals
have the right to call a defense attorney after they are
detained.


18. (C) During a meeting on September 23, members of the
Tashkent Bar Association - including Chairperson Gulnora
Ishankhanova - shared their opinions of the new laws with
Waldstein. On one hand, the members described the new laws
as "revolutionary," as they now gave defense attorneys rights
"equal to those of prosecutors." They confirmed that the
laws ensured that detainees could not be interrogated before
meeting with a defense attorney, who could then observe the
interrogation. In addition, any written confessions now must
be signed in the presence of a defense attorney. The new
laws also provide detainees with "Miranda Rights," as
authorities must now inform detainees of their rights,
including their right to remain silent. Moreover, the laws
also allow defense attorneys to challenge expert analysis
provided by prosecutors.


19. (C) The Tashkent Bar Association members also shared

their criticism of the new laws. Their chief complaint was
that the new laws effectively destroyed the independence of
the National Bar Association and its regional branches,
including the Tashkent Bar Association. Previously, the bar
associations were able to choose their own leadership.
However, the laws created a new "National Chamber of
Lawyers," whose leadership is to be appointed by the Ministry
of Justice. The National Chamber will then select the
chairpersons of its regional branches, including the Tashkent
Bar Association (Ishankhanova was uncertain whether the
Tashkent Bar Association would continue as a voluntary
association alongside a new government-controlled Tashkent
Chamber of Lawyers, or whether it would be subsumed into the
new organization.) Membership in the Chamber of Lawyers will
now be mandatory for all licensed defense attorneys, and only
licensed defense attorneys will be allowed to represent
clients in a court of law (Note: Unlicensed individuals,
usually human rights activists, could previously represent
individuals in court as "public defenders." Human rights
activists and others will still be able to observe trials,
but will no longer be able to defend individuals without a
license. However, on October 23, poloff observed a trial in
which a local human rights activist was still able to serve
as a public defender. End note.) The Tashkent Bar
Association members were also concerned about the degree to
which the positive aspects of the laws would actually be
implemented, noting that Uzbekistan had a poor record with
implementing reforms. They also explained that defense
attorneys were not always independent and sometimes
collaborated with prosecutors to the detriment of their
clients.


20. (C) While they believed that the adoption of the habeas
corpus law was an essentially positive step, the Tashkent Bar
Association members continued to have concerns about its
implementation. For example, they were critical of the
training so far provided to judges and prosecutors on the new
law, which they described as voluntary and substandard.


21. (C) During the meeting with the MOI officials on
September 22, Waldstein observed that one concern raised by
international experts regarding the habeas corpus law is that
it allowed police to hold individuals for as long as 72 hours
without an arrest warrant and that the clock only began
ticking after a suspect was brought to a police station. The
officials agreed that the law could still be improved,
explaining that there has been discussion of eventually
lowering the time period to 48 hours, which they noted was
the "international standard."

MOI PLANS TO SUPPORT OPENING OF NEW TRAFFICKING SHELTERS
-------------- --------------


22. (C) Sattarov stated that combating human trafficking and
prostitution had become a top priority for the MOI, which was
attempting to implement the best practices of international
law enforcement agencies. In particular, Sattarov reported
that the government was planning to open new shelters for
trafficking victims in Tashkent and several different regions
of the country. Sattarov explained that the details were
still being finalized and noted that the shelters might be
run by the MOI or another ministry, such as the Ministry of
Health. He elaborated that the plan called for opening
separate shelters for juvenile, male, and female trafficking
victims.


23. (C) On September 23, International Organization for
Migration (IOM) Tashkent Deputy Director Liliya Khamzayeva
confirmed to Waldstein that the government planned to open
its own shelters for trafficking victims. She noted that
there was need for additional shelters, as the country's two

existing shelters in Tashkent and Bukhara (both run by IOM
with USAID-funding support) were usually filled to capacity.
However, she was disappointed that authorities had not yet
approached IOM for advice, noting that MOI officials had
traveled abroad recently to study the operations of
government-run shelters in other post-communist countries,
including Russia (Comment: While we applaud the government's
intentions to provide further assistance to victims, we agree
that it should first consult with IOM before trying to open
its own shelters. We also believe the government should
consider providing direct financial support to the
IOM-operated shelters, which may allow them to expand their
operations. The reluctance of the government to provide
support to genuinely independent organization is symptomatic
of its general unwillingness to provide funding or support to
any organization outside of its direct control. End
comment.)


24. (C) In general, Khamzayeva praised the government's
anti-trafficking efforts this year, including its adoption of
an anti-trafficking law - which she described as
"comprehensive" - and criminal code amendments which
increased the maximum punishment for traffickers from five to
12 years' imprisonment. She observed that an especially
positive aspect of the amendments was that they deleted
reference to the word "deceit" in the section of the criminal
code dealing with trafficking. The inclusion of the term had
previously made it very difficult to prosecute trafficking
offences, as prosecutors needed to prove that individuals had
been deliberately misled into being trafficked.


25. (C) Khamzayeva also reported that another positive
development was the formation of provincial-level
anti-trafficking committees composed of local officials and
NGO representatives, a rare example of government officials
partnering with genuinely independent NGOs (Note: On October
2, poloff met with the chairperson of IOM's partner NGO in
Jizzakh province, Nazifa Komilova, who is also now
Chairperson of the Jizzakh province anti-trafficking
committee. End note.) Khamzayeva also reported that
Gulnora Karimova, President Karimov's daughter, who is now
the Uzbek Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva,
reportedly met recently with IOM officials. She believed
this was potentially a sign that the government might soon
move to officially register IOM in Tashkent (Comment: Due to
its lack of official registration, IOM has operated in
Tashkent as a local NGO, Istiqbolli Avlod. End comment).

OFFICIALS ACCUSE ACTIVISTS AND NGOS OF BIASED REPORTING
-------------- --------------


26. (C) On September 21, the MOI officials accused activists
and international organizations of bias in their reporting on
human rights cases in Uzbekistan, referring specifically to
the case of journalist Salidjahon Abdurakhmanov, who was
arrested in June on drug charges in Uzbekistan's Autonomous
Republic of Karakalpakstan. Contrary to reports from
activists and relatives, the officials claimed that
Abdurakhmanov was not singled out and punished for his
journalism, which was often critical of local Karakalpak
authorities, but was one of roughly 30 individuals who were
arrested on June 7 as part of an anti-narcotics sweep in
Nukus. The officials also claimed that tests had found drug
residue on Abdurakhmanov's lips and underneath his
fingernails. Abdurakhmanov was sentenced on October 10 to
ten years' imprisonment for possessing narcotics with the
intent to distribute (ref A). Frik added that Uzbekistan
"has no political prisoners."

COMMENT
--------------



27. (C) A certain amount of bluster on human rights is to be
expected from Uzbek officials, who know their words are
surely to be reported up the chain of command and are
therefore naturally reluctant to openly criticize official
government policy in front of foreign diplomats.
Nevertheless, the officials appeared sincere in their
willingness to seek human rights cooperation with the United
States in certain areas, especially in implementing recent
legal reforms, including the habeas corpus and anti-human
trafficking laws. As most knowledgeable international
observers in Tashkent have already concluded, the government
tends to respond better to offers of engagement than blunt
criticisms of its human rights record (ref B). By offering
human-rights related assistance, we may be able to help
bridge the gap between paper reforms and their implementation
on the ground, as well as build trust with reform-minded
officials that may eventually translate to greater progress
on human rights down the road. Frankly, there is no real
alternative. Renewed talks of sanctions will most likely not
result in further human rights concessions from the Uzbeks,
but rather a breakdown in dialogue.


28. (C) Government officials previously have expressed
interest in receiving assistance from the United States on
implementing the habeas corpus law, but they also recently
denied a concrete offer for ABA to administer a habeas
corpus-related project with INL funds. It is difficult for
us to square the various mixed signals we receive, but it is
possible that offers of such assistance are not reaching the
highest levels of the GOU, either because mid-level officials
are afraid to pass along such offers up the chain of command
or because a particular part of the government (most likely
the National Security Service) is actively blocking attempts
at cooperation. Nevertheless, the German government is
already providing such assistance to the GOU, and the EU
plans to include Uzbekistan in a regional judicial reform
project that begins in January 2009 (ref B). While we do not
seek to duplicate the efforts of EU governments, their
existing cooperation with the government suggests that it is
genuinely interested in receiving some international human
rights assistance. We believe a visit by the DRL Assistant
Secretary or PDAS would enable the message -- that the United
States is interested in providing assistance -- to reach
higher levels of the government, and this in turn could pave
the way for such cooperation to finally be realized.
NORLAND