SCENE SETTER FOR COMMANDER, U.S. CENTCOM,S VISIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 000115

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV
SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR COMMANDER, U.S. CENTCOM,S VISIT
TO UZBEKISTAN, 24 - 25 JANUARY 2008

Classified By: Ambassador Richard Norland for reasons 1.4(b) and 1.4(d)
.


1. (C) SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND. Embassy Tashkent welcomes
the 24-25 January 2008 visit by the Commander of U.S.
CENTCOM. This will be the first visit by a CENTCOM Commander
to Uzbekistan in nearly three years since relations dissolved
in the wake of the May 2005 Andijon events and the U.S.
departure from Karshi-Khanabad Airbase in November 2005.
Relations between the United States and Uzbekistan
deteriorated even further after that point. However, in the
past five months, there have been notable improvements in the
relationship, especially in security sectors, as several
branches of the Government of Uzbekistan (GoU) actively
re-engaged with their U.S. counterparts.


2. (C) Human rights and governance issues remain. President
Karimov and other senior officials say that they are ready to
address specific issues but, to date, there is little to
show. Meanwhile, in late December 2007, President Bush
signed legislation that allows six months for progress on
human rights before visa bans on senior GoU officials are
considered. Embassy Tashkent believes that such a ban would
stand a good chance of derailing our relationship including
the improving security partnership.


3. (C) President Karimov and the presidential apparat run
this tightly-controlled police state through the GoU's
security and intelligence service, the National Security
Service (NSS). Almost all GoU decisions are screened by the
NSS and resolved at unusually high levels, including almost
all decisions involving the United States. NSS influence
within the GoU, especially MoD and the Border Guards,
increased exponentially in the past three years, reflecting
Karimov's fear of regime change.


4. (U) Tight control extends into the economy despite
Uzbekistan's great mineral, energy and agricultural wealth,
low criminality, and an above average infrastructure in
comparison to the rest of Central Asia and the other former
Soviet republics. High-level corruption, over-regulation,
high import duties, and limits on currency convertibility
stifle the economy. Uzbekistan's GDP growth is positive, but
only because of commodities sales and remittances by labor
migrants in Russia and Kazakhstan and the United States.
Recently, Uzbekistan received one of Transparency
International's worst ratings for corruption, ranking 175th
out of 180 countries in comparative levels of transparency.
The GoU has increasingly indicated an awareness of the
necessity for reforms, but, thus far, there is little
progress to demonstrate.


5. (U) There is some U.S. investment in Uzbekistan. Proctor
and Gamble, and Texaco manufacture products for regional
consumption. General Motors recently took a minority share
of the Daewoo plant near Andijon where GM is now assembling
Chevrolets in addition to several Daewoo models.


6. (C) In respect to the U.S. - Uzbek relationship, there
are some encouraging signs that President Karimov and the GoU
are willing to progress in all areas of a more balanced
relationship. As part of this new atmosphere, the GoU is
anxious to host you and your team. Your visit comes at a
critical time in this very modest, yet noteworthy,
rapprochement.

RECENTLY IMPROVED RELATIONS
--------------


7. (C) The recent re-engagement between the GoU and the USG

was reportedly initiated by President Karimov himself at a
cabinet-level meeting, probably a GoU National Security
Council (NSC) meeting, in late July 2007. At that meeting,
Karimov instructed the security forces and power ministries
to re-engage with the United States and emphasized that there
are areas of mutual interest with the U.S. Oddly, this was
at probably the lowest point in the bilateral relationship
following the May 2007 detention and beating of an Embassy
Tashkent foreign service national (FSN).


8. (C) The exact reasons for the change in GoU foreign
policy behavior remain undetermined but probably have to do
with a desire to avoid being too dependent on a resurgent
Russia. There are signs that a recent Collective Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO) proposal concerning Afghanistan
was opposed by the GoU. Although the GoU has been an
enthusiastic supporter of Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO) trade and economic development initiatives, the GoU has
been almost a non-participant in SCO military events. This
is despite the fact that the SCO's Regional Anti-Terrorism
Structure (RATS) is located in Tashkent. GoU officials often
repeat their government's dislike of multi-lateral security
arrangements and the GoU's preference on bilateral relations.
The German airbase at Termez operates on a bilateral basis
and never allowed NATO use. ISAF and NATO partners with
rights to Termez use the facility as agreed to in separate
bilateral arrangements.


9. (C) The GoU is also very concerned about the situation in
Afghanistan and what the GoU calls "narco-aggression" coming
both from Afghanistan and through Tajikistan. The GoU has
expressed a very pessimistic view of developments in
Afghanistan. Some of the pessimistic reporting comes from
General Dostum's supporters and may be intended to influence
the GoU concerning Afghanistan and President Karzai's
government. Counter-narcotics and intelligence sharing on
Afghanistan are two main areas of mutual interest where the
GoU very much wants to work bilaterally with the USG and U.S.
CENTCOM.


10. (C) The Uzbek MoD has thus far dutifully executed its
part of the current military-to-military plan, including
three Uzbek-hosted events and one event in the United States.
Uzbek MoD also hosted two previously unscheduled CENTCOM
delegations, the first led by the Chief of CJ5-SCC, and the
second led by the Deputy J5. On short notice, the GoU MoD
changed its mind in September 2007 and sent a general officer
to the U.S. Air Commanders' Conference in Washington D.C.
The GoU is now sending some military officials to the
Marshall Center under the bilateral U.S. - German
arrangement.


11. (C) In mid-November 2007, the GoU approved a requested
one-year extension to the existing commercial cargo
over-flight protocol without re-negotiation. At the same
time, the GoU also gave hints that it was interested in
expanding the existing over-flight protocol. In December
2007, during a visit by the CENTCOM Deputy J5, the Minister
of Defense himself seemingly offered the use of Termez
Airbase for cargo and humanitarian flights transiting
Uzbekistan with loads destined for Afghanistan. A week
later, MoD favorably inquired what types of cargo U.S.
TRANSCOM was interested in shipping across Uzbekistan by road
and rail. MoD officials expressed an interest in negotiating
a rail and road transit agreement for supplies to OEF. At
present, over 60% of fuel headed to OEF transits Uzbekistan.

HUMAN RIGHTS CONTEXT
--------------


12. (C) Currently, the GoU is unusually interested in
improving security relations with the United States. In
time, the GoU may accept measures toward mutual progress in
human rights and civil society in order to accommodate
continued improvements to the GoU - USG security partnership.
Your visit is an opportunity to test this dynamic. As
reflected in recent U.S. legislation which threatens a visa
ban in five months unless there is progress in human rights,
the USG resists the GoU view that human rights can be
compartmentalized from security and other issues.


13. (C) The USG is looking for tangible progress on the
following issues:
(U) Amnesty of high-profile political prisoners.
(U) Prison access for the International Committee of the Red
Cross and fuller engagement with the GOU on ICRC's 2004
report.
(U) Registration of civil society NGOs and more media
freedom.


14. (C) In response to your request to meet with members of
civil society, Embassy Tashkent has arranged a meeting
between you and the local representative of the International
Committee of the Red Cross. This meeting will occur at the
U.S. Embassy. Meanwhile, Mrs. Fallon will meet with the GoU
Ombudsman for Human Rights in the company of the Country
Director for Open Dialogue Project, an NGO linked to Eastern
Kentucky University and funded by USAID.

MILITARY COOPERATION OPPORTUNITIES
--------------


15. (U) Embassy understands that there are several areas of
possible military-to-military cooperation with the GoU,
subject to U.S. interagency agreement.

(1) (U) Negotiating an agreement with TRANSCOM for road,
rail and air transit across Uzbekistan to Afghanistan and
other CENTCOM partner countries.

(2) (U) Developing a counter-narcotics program between the
GoU and CENTCOM.

(3) (C) Renewing the bilateral military intelligence
exchange concerning Afghanistan. (This is a subject recently
broached by GoU MFA.)

(4) (U) Reestablishing a GoU defense attache position at the
Uzbek Embassy in Washington D.C.


16. (U) POC: Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Hartman, USA, Defense
and Army Attache, USDAO Tashkent, Office:
(998)-(71)-120-5450, Cell: (998)-(90)-370-1529, Classified
e-mail: diharxw@dia.smil.mil. Unclass e-mail:
hartmanjw@state.gov.
NORLAND