SECURITY SERVICE POWER-BROKERS LIMIT

S E C R E T TASHKENT 000113

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN BRIAN RORAFF AND INL/AAE ANDREW BUHLER
ANKARA FOR DEA MARK DESTITO
DUSHANBE FOR DEA PAUL HACKETT AND INL RANJEET SINGH
ISLAMABAD FOR DEA DOUG CORTINOVIS AND MIKE MARSAC
ASTANA FOR INL ANTHONY BEAVER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KCRM KCOR PINR SNAR UZ
SUBJECT: SECURITY SERVICE POWER-BROKERS LIMIT
COUNTER-NARCOTICS COOPERATION

REF: A. TASHKENT 82

B. 07 TASHKENT 1900

C. 07 TASHKENT 1908

D. 07 TASHKENT 2063

E. 07 TASHKENT 1988

F. 07 TASHKENT 2000

Classified By: Poloff Tim Buckley for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (C) Summary: Reftel A discussed the keen interest of the
counter-narcotics-focused Sensitive Investigative Unit in
resuming active cooperation with the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration. However, it is still uncertain whether the
Government of Uzbekistan would issue long-term visas to U.S.
Drug Enforcement Administration officials, despite recent
hints at higher levels that it wants the assistance. Such
visa difficulties have also affected the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency's contractor and visiting U.S. forensic
experts. This and other anecdotal evidence suggests that
there is competition between well-intentioned customs and law
enforcement agencies on the one hand, and some other elements
within the Government of Uzbekistan's security apparatus on
the other who may be involved in narcotics smuggling or
facilitate the activities of traffickers and do not want
border security assistance projects to be too effective. End
summary.

Baffling Visa and Accreditation Woes
--------------


2. (C) In the spring of 2007 the Government of Uzbekistan, in
effect, suspended cooperation with the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration when it would not issue visas to DEA staff,
even though the host government had declared that
counter-narcotics is a high priority. Earlier, in December
2006, the Drug Enforcement Administration suspended support
for the Sensitive Investigative Unit, for lack of results.
Also, in mid-2006, the Embassy was informed that no regional
officers could be based in the Embassy. At that time the
Tashkent Drug Enforcement Administration office also had
responsibility for Dushanbe and Bishkek. These actions
corresponded with a sharp deterioration in the bilateral
relationship.


3. (C) However, by late 2007 post observed increasing signs
that the Government of Uzbekistan wanted to improve ties.
This included hints to poloff from Kamol Dusmetov, the top
official of the National Center of Drug Control and Deputy
Chairman of the State Commission of Drug Control (part of the
Cabinet of Ministers),that the Government of Uzbekistan
would welcome renewed cooperation with the Drug Enforcement
Administration (reftel B). In November 2007, a bilateral
Joint Border Security Working Group convened to discuss
numerous pipeline projects and modalities and was itself seen
as an encouraging development (reftel C). All Uzbek law
enforcement and security agencies, including the National
Security Service (NSS) participate in the bilateral group.


4. (S/NF) Yet, surprisingly, Washington Group International
(WGI),the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's contractor in
Uzbekistan, was denied a renewal of its business
accreditation within days of the upbeat statements at this
key bilateral meeting. The contractor recently installed a
state-of-the-art network of portal radiation monitors
throughout the country that the Defense Threat Reduction
Office Chief described as "truly world-class." This system
has already paid dividends in the detection of a suspicious
freight train car containing radioactive cargo, probably
destined for Iran (reftel D).



5. (S/NF) Nonetheless, the National Security Service (which
includes the Border Guards) consistently denied Washington
Group International access to several key border checkpoints
to properly complete this worthwhile project, even though the
installation had proceeded for several years with the
Government of Uzbekistan's full understanding of the project.
In response to a request from the Chairman of the State
Customs Committee, Washington Group International's scope of
work was increased in 2007 to include the installation of a
significant number of closed-circuit television (CCTV)
cameras at border posts, which could be remotely accessed at
all times from Customs Headquarters in Tashkent. However,
the National Security Service objected to this part of the
project, suggesting there may be strong reasons why they do
not want officials from other agencies seeing what is
happening at all hours on various border crossings. As a
result of the access and accreditation problems, the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency has made the decision to terminate
the remaining portions of this project in Uzbekistan.


6. (C) The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (INL) is funding an ongoing project to
upgrade the Main Forensic Laboratory, which analyzes criminal
evidence. Visa applications for two visiting forensic
experts were submitted within a reasonable timeframe,
supported by a diplomatic note, and Americas Desk Chief Ismat
Fayzullaev assured poloff that "the necessary actions were
taken" immediately. Yet the Uzbek Embassy in Washington
subsequently reported no contact from Tashkent and presented
conflicting stories of "standard" visa procedures. The trip
was postponed, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintained
as of January 23 that there is still no record of any visa
applications even though the "inter-agency process" was
reportedly underway weeks earlier. This inter-agency process
always includes influential members of the National Security
Service and the Apparat who have the authority to supersede
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on visa issuances.


7. (C) Poloff also followed up with Fayzullaev on January 23
regarding the pending application for a U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration officer to temporarily visit Tashkent for
discussions about the long-term prospect of supporting the
Sensitive Investigative Unit. In contradiction to the
lower-level enthusiasm for renewed cooperation and more
senior-level hints, the visa was not promptly issued despite
repeated follow-ups. Fayzullaev also informed poloff that
this was held up in "the inter-agency process" and "under
consideration." (Note: After additional follow up efforts
by post a three-month visa was ultimately issued on January

25. End note).


8. (C) Government of Uzbekistan officials have recently
appealed for more counter-narcotics assistance from donor
countries in the wake of alarming new Afghanistan drug
production figures (reftel E),yet we believe that some
elements within the government are not eager to facilitate
foreign aid that would significantly impact the drug trade.
There is also institutional memory at post recalling that,
when the Drug Enforcement Administration was active here, it
was difficult to convince law enforcement authorities,
including the SIU, to target kingpins rather than just
low-level mules.

"Roof"
--------------


9. (C) Post LES Political Specialist reported that it is
widely assumed among local residents that Afghan drug traders

are building big houses in the Tashkent area under the
watchful and protective eyes of the National Security
Service. This is consistent with widespread and longstanding
beliefs that the National Security Service runs a protection
racket in which legitimate and illegitimate businesses alike
must pay what Uzbeks refer to as the "krisha" (or "roof" in
Russian, i.e., protection money) in order to operate. It is
reasonable to assume that, as everyday Uzbek entrepreneurs
are targeted, so too the drug smugglers must pay. Thus, even
if the National Security Service is not directly involved in
the drug trade it may have every reason to look the other
way.

No Support From Above
--------------


10. (C) Without exception, we have been favorably impressed
by the professionalism of rank-and-file law enforcement and
customs officers on our field observations in this annual
round of end-use monitoring throughout the country. Local
officers are proud of the equipment that has been provided to
them and seem to genuinely strive to do their jobs as best as
they can. Yet, it is impossible to overlook the failure of
the top levels of the Government of Uzbekistan to provide
even modest sums for obtaining spare parts or issue timely
visas for visiting experts to conduct training programs. In
recent weeks poloff has visited numerous Customs offices as
well as the main Forensic Laboratory at the Ministry of
Health, the Ministry of Internal Affairs Explosives
Laboratory, and the Sensitive Investigative Unit. While
local staff clearly do their best to keep things in good
condition, invariably some breakdowns have occurred. Each
location appealed for modest additional assistance to provide
the replacement parts which the Government of Uzbekistan is
unwilling to procure itself. Even if it is arduous to obtain
foreign parts from abroad, higher-level officials could
certainly have prioritized such repairs if they wished.
Instead, a few years ago the National Security Service
confiscated one of the Jeep Cherokees intended for the
exclusive use of Customs.

Comment:
--------------


11. (C) While the Government of Uzbekistan has hinted at a
higher level that it would indeed welcome the return of the
Drug Enforcement Administration's assistance, it is uncertain
whether it would commit to issuing long-term visas for
American Drug Enforcement Administration staff to properly
support any resumption of assistance to the Sensitive
Investigative Unit. On the positive side, our field visit
suggests that, if the Drug Enforcement Administration decides
to resume activities in Uzbekistan, at least it will not have
to start over from scratch and it will encounter a
cooperative attitude among many law enforcement and customs
personnel. Yet the difficulty of obtaining even short-term
visas for visitors and of accessing border operations is
troublesome. The mixed messages may be due to involvement of
the elements of the National Security Service, including the
Border Guards, in narcotics smuggling or in facilitating the
activities of narcotics traffickers. This may also explain
why Washington Group International was sidelined by visa and
accreditation problems while upgrading border security at key
access points (reftel F). It may be telling that, during
CENTCOM Commander Admiral Fallon's January 24 meeting with
Uzbek National Security Council members, National Security
Council Secretary (and senior National Security Service
officer) Ataev bristled at the suggestion that narcotics were
transiting Uzbekistan.



12. (C) Certain vested and well-placed interests probably
have a strong incentive to keep the U.S. counter-narcotics
activities on a short leash if they operate again in
Uzbekistan and, as before, may balk at pursuing leads that
incriminate parties higher than drug mules. Post welcomes an
upcoming visit by Drug Enforcement Administration officers,
as well as possible counter-narcotics-related follow-up to
Admiral Fallon's visit, to test the waters with the Ministry
of Internal Affairs and other officials. We need to
determine whether the Government of Uzbekistan as a whole is
serious about counter-narcotics cooperation or not and
whether it can work effectively with U.S. agencies to tackle
even high-level official involvement in narco-trafficking.


NORLAND