Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08TASHKENT1123
2008-09-30 09:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tashkent
Cable title:  

UZBEKISTAN: NATO ENVOY ON AFGHANISTAN TRANSIT

Tags:  PREL ASEC AORC MOPS KTIA NATO AF UZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 4359
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0575
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RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2807
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL 0014
C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 001123 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2018
TAGS: PREL ASEC AORC MOPS KTIA NATO AF UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: NATO ENVOY ON AFGHANISTAN TRANSIT
AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS, COOPERATION

REF: A. TASHKENT 482

B. DAO IIR 6 939 0113 08

C. ASHGABAT 1254

Classified By: Poloff Steven Prohaska for reasons 1.4 (b, d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 001123

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2018
TAGS: PREL ASEC AORC MOPS KTIA NATO AF UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: NATO ENVOY ON AFGHANISTAN TRANSIT
AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS, COOPERATION

REF: A. TASHKENT 482

B. DAO IIR 6 939 0113 08

C. ASHGABAT 1254

Classified By: Poloff Steven Prohaska for reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: On September 26, NATO Deputy Assistant
Secretary General Robert Simmons briefed a gathering of NATO
Embassy officials on his recent meetings with Government of
Uzbekistan (GOU) officials on NATO-Uzbekistan cooperation,
including ongoing transit agreement discussions. Simmons
said that Russia is not trying to block the shipment of goods
in support of Coalition operations in Afghanistan.
Uzbekistan has also become increasingly active in its
cooperation with NATO. Despite several problems with the
GOU's recent draft transit agreement proposal, Simmons was
pleased with the progress that has been achieved so far. The
NATO agreement--which could be completed as early as the end
of this year--will cover only rail transit. Coordination
with NATO on this issue will clarify potential problems for
U.S. efforts at the bilateral level to open new lines of
communication (LOC) into Afghanistan, and could yield
valuable lessons for negotiations with the Uzbeks. End
summary.

Russia Not Blocking Cargo Transit
--------------


2. (C) On September 26, NATO's Deputy Assistant Secretary
General and Special Representative for the Caucasus and
Central Asia Robert Simmons gave a readout to NATO Embassies
in Tashkent of his recent meetings with Government of
Uzbekistan (GOU) officials. Simmons remarked that the two
main goals of his meetings were to maintain cooperation with
Uzbekistan and to reach agreement on the issue of
transporting goods through Uzbekistan in support of
operations in Afghanistan. The current draft agreement, with
NATO as a controlling authority, would apply to NATO, NATO
allies, and non-NATO contributors supporting ISAF. Despite
differences with Russia over the Russia-Georgia conflict, he
believed that Russia would not try to block the transit of

cargo in support of these operations, and noted that Russian
Ambassador to NATO Rogozin had encouraged other members of
the CIS to continue transit-related cooperation.

Uzbekistan Actively Participating in NATO Activities
--------------


3. (C) Simmons discussed NATO's role in Afghanistan and the
transit agreement with GOU officials including Foreign
Minister Norov, Deputy Foreign Minister Nematov, Defense
Minister Berdiyev, Parliamentary Chairman Safaev, and staff
of the Ministry of Emergency Situations. Uzbekistan is
satisfied with the range of activity it has with NATO, and
its participation in various projects is increasing. Simmons
noted that a NATO team will come to Uzbekistan next week to
discuss an agreement on NATO assistance with the destruction
of melange rocket fuel. (Note: The equipment will convert
toxic melange rocket fuel into a low-grade fertilizer. End
note.) He also hoped to get Uzbekistan more involved in
civil emergency planning and said that a NATO-Uzbekistan
dialogue on terrorism threat intelligence would be useful.
Furthermore, Uzbekistan has been active in the
Ambassadorial-level Central Asia-Afghanistan meetings under
NATO auspices, which are intended to keep the Central Asian
states apprised of--and involved with--the situation in

Afghanistan. The next such meeting is slated to take place
on October 13. GOU-NATO efforts to built the Internet-based
"Virtual Silk Highway" also are proceeding. Simmons said
that GOU officials recognize ongoing difficulties in
Afghanistan and want to support the West in ways that they
can. Interestingly, National Security Council (NSC)
Secretary Atayev was optimistic about the prospects for
success there relative to some of his colleagues. The GOU
still sees the Government of Afghanistan as weak, however.

Reticent on Russia-Georgia, Supportive of Cooperation with
NATO, Russia
--------------


4. (C) Parliamentary Foreign Relations Chairman Safayev had
voiced his strong support for cooperation with NATO on
transit. When Atayev told Simmons that Uzbekistan has no
position on the Russia-Georgia situation and is still
studying the issue, Simmons gave arguments against
recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Simmons believed
that the NSC still considers the issue of recognition of
these provinces to be "an open issue." Atayev also had
warned Simmons that if NATO-Russia relations deteriorate,
this could affect Uzbekistan's relations with NATO. Simmons
said that he had pushed back in response this statement.
(Comment: Atayev's statement suggests that Uzbekistan is
still trying to strike a balance between Russia and the West
that avoids alienating either side. End comment.)

MFA Still Pushing "6 Plus 3," NSC Doesn't Care
-------------- -


5. (C) Deputy Foreign Minister Nematov had again raised
President Karimov's "6 Plus 3" proposal for Afghanistan.
(Note: During the April 2-4 NATO/EAPC Summit in Bucharest,
Karimov proposed establishing a United Nations-administered
and coordinated "6 Plus 3" Contact Group--consisting of
Afghanistan's neighbors, Russia, the U.S., and NATO, but not
Afghanistan itself--to address the situation in Afghanistan.
End note.) Simmons noted that the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs always raises this issue with him, while the National
Security Council never does. Not including Afghanistan in
this mechanism remains a problem, Simmons said.

Problems with GOU Transit Draft not Insurmountable
--------------


6. (C) The GOU responded to NATO with a draft transit
agreement two weeks ago, Simmons continued. Unfortunately,
this resembles the current Uzbekistan-Germany transit
agreement. Because this format differs from what NATO is
pursuing with Russia and Kazakhstan, the GOU's draft could
result in some shipments of goods being blocked. There are
four problems with the GOU's draft. First, and most
importantly, Uzbekistan wants the agreement to make NATO
liable for all shipments. NATO disagrees with this proposal
on the grounds that it should not be held responsible for the
actions of contractors. Second, Uzbekistan wants to reserve
the right to stop any shipment of goods at the border if a
dispute arises. Third, Uzbekistan had proposed coming to an
agreement on a list of the goods that can be shipped, while
NATO wants a list that identifies the goods that cannot be
shipped. Uzbekistan appears to be warming to NATO's view on
this issue, however. On a related note, the GOU wants combat
troops to be listed as a banned item, while NATO believes
precluding troop movements can be prevented within the

agreement without identifying them as a commodity. Fourth,
Uzbekistan wants a "notification requirement" which would
give it the right to take up to 30 days to approve any
shipment of goods, but has pledged that it will try to decide
on shipments in less time than this.


7. (C) Simmons said that overall, he was satisfied with the
progress of negotiations with Uzbekistan on the transit
agreement, and that the agreement can move forward if the
aforementioned problems are resolved. The agreement with
Uzbekistan must be a seamless web with the agreements with
Russia and Kazakhstan, he said. Simmons was optimistic that
the agreements could be in place by the end of the year.

NATO Hoping for Routes Through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan
--------------


8. (C) Simmons noted that he has visited Turkmenistan three
times and met President Berdimukhamedov. In discussions with
him, the Government of Turkmenistan has been cautious on the
transit agreement because of its policy of neutrality, but
Simmons had countered that other neutral countries such as
Sweden and Finland still have cooperated with NATO on certain
projects. Simmons said that he was hoping to establish
transit routes through both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, but
the option through Turkmenistan appeared less likely now (ref
C).

Impressions of Berdiyev
--------------


9. (C) Simmons said that he had not met Defense Minister
Berdiyev directly, though Berdiyev had been present during
one of his meetings with GOU officials. Simmons observed
that Berdiyev said nothing during the meeting, and opined
that his reluctance to engage was due to his newness.
Simmons found it reassuring that Deputy Defense Minister
Niyazov had retained his position and had been seated at
Berdiyev's right.

Comment:
--------------


10. (C) The NATO agreement--which could be completed as early
as the end of this year--will cover only rail transit. It
therefore appears the U.S. will still need a bilateral
transit agreement to address road and air shipments, and
possibly other issues as well (septel). Coordination with
NATO on this issue is essential to clarify potential problems
for U.S. efforts to establish a new LOC for Afghanistan, and
could yield other lessons for negotiating with the GOU on
this issue. Particularly in light of some of the possible
difficulties with NATO transit through Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan may be poised to play a pivotal role in our
efforts to support Coalition operations in Afghanistan.
NORLAND