Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08TASHKENT1113
2008-09-29 09:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tashkent
Cable title:  

ARCENT COMMANDER MEETS NEW UZBEK DEFENSE MINISTER

Tags:  PGOV PREL KCRM PHUM MARR PINR UZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
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INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2801
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 4356
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0572
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 4973
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0831
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0589
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RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 4559
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2850
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 0870
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7602
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1509
RHMFISS/CDR ARCENT KUWAIT DOHA KU
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC
RUEABNE/DEA HQS WASHDC
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0082
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1471
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2804
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC 0405
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0259
C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 001113 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR INL ANDREW BUHLER AND ELIZABETH CARROLL
ANKARA FOR DEA MARK DESTITO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KCRM PHUM MARR PINR UZ
SUBJECT: ARCENT COMMANDER MEETS NEW UZBEK DEFENSE MINISTER

REF: A. TASHKENT 901

B. TASHKENT 917

C. TASHKENT 958

D. TASHKENT 971

E. TASHKENT 1035

Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Nicholas Berliner for reasons 1.4 (B,D)

Classified By: Pol-Econ Chief Nicholas Berliner for reasons
1.4 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 001113

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR INL ANDREW BUHLER AND ELIZABETH CARROLL
ANKARA FOR DEA MARK DESTITO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KCRM PHUM MARR PINR UZ
SUBJECT: ARCENT COMMANDER MEETS NEW UZBEK DEFENSE MINISTER

REF: A. TASHKENT 901

B. TASHKENT 917

C. TASHKENT 958

D. TASHKENT 971

E. TASHKENT 1035

Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Nicholas Berliner for reasons 1.4 (B,D)

Classified By: Pol-Econ Chief Nicholas Berliner for reasons
1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: ARCENT Commander Lieutenant General James
Lovelace met with newly-appointed Defense Minister
General-Major Kabil Berdiyev during a September 23-24 visit
to Uzbekistan. Berdiyev, who is believed to favor greater
cooperation with the U.S., thanked LTG Lovelace for support
in the wake of the Kagan munitions depot explosion and
suggested areas for further cooperation. Among the areas
Berdiyev cited were: counter terrorism, combating religious
extremism and counter narcotics. Significantly, this is the
first time the MOD included counter-narcotics as one of its
primary missions. Berdiyev promised to share specific
proposals for cooperation in the near future. LTG Lovelace
took the opportunity to recommend that the Government of
Uzbekistan accept the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA)
offer to resume its activities and told Berdiyev that a team
from TRANSCOM would like to visit Uzbekistan to look at
options for a new supply route for Afghanistan. Berdiyev said
he would make the GOU aware of both issues. President
Karimov's decision to promote U.S.-leaning defense officials
in the wake of the crisis in the Caucasus presents an
opportunity to capitalize on the goodwill generated by our
timely emergency assistance after the munitions depot
explosions and further U.S. objectives. LTG Lovelace also met
with the ICRC to signal continued U.S. support for ICRC
prison visits. End summary.


Thanks for Kagan Assistance
--------------


2. (C) ARCENT Commander Lieutenant General Lovelace visited
Uzbekistan on September 23-24 following a successful
emergency U.S. assistance program in the wake of munitions
depot explosions in Bukhara Province (refs A-D). ARCENT

provided land and underwater explosives detectors and will
deliver explosive ordnance disposal suits requested by
Uzbekistan; a team of ARCENT trainers also worked with Uzbek
counterparts in Bukhara on the proper use of the equipment.
The Government of Uzbekistan was very appreciative of the
assistance.


First Meeting for Defense Minister
--------------


3. (C) LTG Lovelace was the first foreign official to meet
with Defense Minister Berdiyev in his new capacity following
his promotion from Commander of the Southwest Military
District, where he led the response to the munitions depot
explosions. Berdiyev is known to be openly pro-American in
his views on military cooperation, and his promotion to
Defense Minister is a strong indication from President
Karimov about his desire to improve ties with the United
States. Moreover, former Defense Minister Ruslan Mirzayaev,
whom the Defense Attache Office noted is quietly
pro-American, also was promoted to the Deputy Secretary for
Military Affairs of the National Security Council. (Comment:
This may send a message in the higher reaches of the
Government of Uzbekistan and may shift the National Security
Council into a more favorable stance toward the United
States. End comment.)


Areas for Cooperation
--------------


4. (C) In the September 23 meeting with LTG Lovelace,
Berdiyev said that the Uzbek MOD was working on proposals for
cooperation in counter terrorism, combating religious
extremism and counter narcotics, areas where he said the U.S.
and Uzbekistan had shared visions. Significantly, this is the
first time the MOD included counter-narcotics as one of its
primary missions. LTG Lovelace acknowledged this and strongly
recommended that the Government of Uzbekistan approve the
full-fledged return of the DEA; he stressed that any expanded
cooperation should involve the DEA since it is the U.S.
Government's strategic lead entity on counter-narcotics.
Defense Minister (and still General-Major) Berdiyev promised
to mention the DEA issue to higher officials in the
government. (Note: In July the Government of Uzbekistan
provided a murky response to a proposed resumption of
activity by DEA, suggesting that Special Agents could be
accredited but only as "U.S. Diplomats." End note.)


NGLOC
--------------


5. (C) LTG Lovelace also informed Berdiyev of the proposed
visit by a combined team from TRANSCOM and CENTCOM to look at
the logistics of establishing a Northern Ground Line of
Communication (NGLOC) into Afghanistan, particularly in light
of the situation in Pakistan. Berdiyev noted the information
and said that he would convey it to the government, saying
that he was not in a position to speak on the issue, however,
as with the DEA issue, he promised to raise the issue higher
within the GOU.


ICRC
--------------


6. (C) On September 24 LTG Lovelace met with Rafaello Muller,
Deputy Head of the Regional ICRC Delegation to discuss the
status of ICRC prison visits now that the six-month trial
period has finished (ref E). Muller noted that the
confidential report will be submitted to the Government of
Uzbekistan in the near future "and then we will have to wait
to see how the Uzbeks react." Muller was clear that ICRC will
need to have access to all prisons if a prison visit program
is to continue, and he added that there has been no access to
detention centers operated by the National Security Service
(NSS) since 2004. Muller noted that ICRC must continuously
assess whether its work in Uzbekistan is useful and
worthwhile or whether it actually makes things worse for the
prisoners. He also reminded that ICRC is seen as a
non-Muslim, Western entity and has to work hard to convince
interlocutors that it is a neutral organization. Muller
stressed the need to be "insistent, patient, and clear" in
dialogue with Uzbekistan and emphasized that sanctions would
only make matters worse and likely prompt an overreaction in
response to perceived "dishonor."


Comment:
--------------


7. (C) Divining the intentions of Karimov and the Government
of Uzbekistan is an inexact science. However, the promotion
of Berdiyev and Mirzayev, both of whom have been (in the
context of Uzbekistan) more forward-leaning about cooperation
with the United States, could be a signal that Karimov is
ready to further improve relations. Russia's actions in the
Caucasus have no doubt served as a reminder of Uzbekistan's
strategic and economic vulnerability in the face of its
former ruler and provide the context for a discreet, but
important change in attitudes towards the U.S. Such a shift
is anything but certain and could easily be reversed by
actions that put Karimov on the defensive. Nevertheless, LTG
Lovelace,s visit and follow-up provide an opportunity to
discern both how vulnerable the GOU feels and how far it is
willing to travel on the path of cooperation with the U.S. to
find balance in its strategic position.
NORLAND