Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08TASHKENT1089
2008-09-22 11:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tashkent
Cable title:  

SCENE SETTER FOR SEPTEMBER 23-24 ARCENT COMMANDER

Tags:  PGOV PREL MARR UZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNT #1089/01 2661125
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 221125Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0315
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 4350
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0565
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 4967
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0825
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0583
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0846
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 4553
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2844
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 0864
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7596
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1503
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/CDR ARCENT KUWAIT DOHA KU
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1465
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2798
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC 0399
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0253
C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 001089 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR UZ
SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR SEPTEMBER 23-24 ARCENT COMMANDER
LTG LOVELACE VISIT TO UZBEKISTAN

Classified By: DAO Jeff Hartman for reasons 1.4 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 001089

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR UZ
SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR SEPTEMBER 23-24 ARCENT COMMANDER
LTG LOVELACE VISIT TO UZBEKISTAN

Classified By: DAO Jeff Hartman for reasons 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: Embassy Tashkent welcomes your visit to
Uzbekistan and thanks you and your command for the quick
response to the consequences of the Kagan Ammunition Depot
explosions of 10 July 2008. The delivery of equipment and
the subsequent training were very timely for relations
between the Government of Uzbekistan (GoU) and United States
Government (USG),especially in light of the Russia-Georgia
crisis that ignited just as the CENTCOM, ARCENT, NAVCENT
response operation was getting underway. The mission
supported two key GoU officials, former Minister of Defense
Ruslan Mirzayaev and former Commander of the Southwest
Military District General-Major Kobil Berdiyev. Both are
pro-US -- Minister Mirzayaev, privately; General-Major
Berdiyev is known to be pro-US even within the GoU. Both
were promoted on 17 September 2008, Ruslan Mirzayaev to the
Deputy Secretary of the National Security Council, and
General Berdiyev to Minister of Defense. Due to the ARCENT
assistance mission to Kagan, your Branch Chief for Central
and South Asia, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Derber, has met both
these senior-level officers and is known to both of them.
You will be the first foreign military dignitary to meet with
General-Major Berdiyev in his new capacity as Minister of
Defense. This is a key time in GoU - USG relations as the
United States begins to pursue possible logistic transit
options through Uzbekistan and discuss other possible GoU
assistance to USG efforts in Afghanistan. On-going concerns
about human rights mean that we will have to approach
expanded military cooperation cautiously. End summary.

Recent Modest Progress in Bilateral Relations
--------------


2. (C) USG - GoU relations have improved in the past year to
a level of civility and a promising atmosphere where we
believe there can be real effective progress in a number of
areas of mutual interest in the near future. Relations,
especially in the military and security spheres have gained
new energy due, in large part, to Russia,s recent actions in
Georgia, Russian attempts to invigorate the CIS, Collective

Security Treaty Organization,s (CSTO) role in Central Asia,
and the continued worrisome situation in Afghanistan.
Problems remain, particularly on human rights, but across the
Government of Uzbekistan, contacts with the Embassy have
increased and improved. Ambassador Norland has met privately
with President Karimov four times in the last year (once with
Central Command's Admiral Fallon). President Karimov has
stressed "positive relations" and stated that we are
gradually moving beyond merely "restoring relations." The
GoU,s Ministry of Defense was extremely welcoming to Acting
Commander of CENTCOM, Lieutenant General Dempsey. Issues of
common concern included Afghanistan and Pakistan, and in a
more general sense against what GoU officials commonly recite
as the evils of our times: terrorism, extremism,
narcotics-trafficking, and proliferation of nuclear
technology or material.

Uzbekistan-Afghanistan Relations, Northern Ground Lines of
Communication
-------------- --------------


3. (C) The Government of Uzbekistan has expressed serious
concerns about the security situation in Afghanistan,
particularly with regard to dramatic increases in drug
production, increasing Taliban activity, and the threat to
Uzbekistan. Most senior GoU security officials have
experience in Afghanistan during the Soviet War. They also
recall the dangers of having the Taliban on their southern
frontier from 1997 to 2001. While senior Government of

Uzbekistan officials have repeatedly indicated their lack of
faith in President Karzai, and are pessimistic about the
results of international efforts thus far, they are clearly
interested in seeing improved stability there. Uzbekistan
has indicated that achieving this depends on a multi-faceted
strategy encompassing socioeconomic development of the
country and agreement among major stakeholders.


4. (C) Currently, some sixty percent of aviation fuel
necessary for Coalition operations in Afghanistan passes by
rail through Uzbekistan. Ninety-nine percent of all of the
fuel that Afghanistan's aviation forces use, and tons of
bottled water for our troops in Afghanistan each month, also
transit Uzbekistan's territory. Uzbekistan is a vital and
relatively secure logistical pipeline in support of
operations in Afghanistan now and offers the potential of
becoming even more important in the near term given its
favorable geographic position and transportation
infrastructure and given continued instability in Pakistan.
The Government of Uzbekistan continues to invest considerable
resources into improving and expanding its railroad
infrastructure, and the state joint stock company Uzbekistan
Railroad has upgraded many of its Soviet-inherited rail
facilities and built new lines between Nukus and Navoi and
between Karshi and Termez. Uzbekistan Railroad's lines
terminate in Hayraton, Afghanistan in the northern Balkh
Province, which provides easy and safe access to Bagram
Airbase and other U.S./NATO operating points in eastern
Afghanistan.


5. (SBU) On 29 January 2008, the Government of Uzbekistan
approved the use of the Uzbek-German Termez Airbase as a
transit point into Afghanistan for U.S. personnel assigned to
NATO and/or International Security Assistance Force missions.
Uzbekistan previously indicated that it is willing to expand
the currently limited "case by case" permission granted in
this initial agreement to a blanket one, like the one the
Germans exercise now, and are considering a diplomatic note,
already sent by the German government, to formalize the
agreement. This effort is pending. This expansion of the
current "Termez Bridge" agreement promises a much-needed
alternate route for moving U.S. personnel supporting
operations in Afghanistan.


6. (C) We are exploring ways to follow the German
Government's and NATO's model and improve upon their transit
agreements in order to transport critical non-lethal goods
across Uzbekistan in support of operations in Afghanistan.
The transit agreement, if one is concluded, which would
provide an important alternate logistical route into
Afghanistan. Recent transit problems with numerous
contractor-controlled DOD shipments becoming stuck due to
declaration issues with the State Customs Committee
underscore the need for some form of codified bilateral
understanding.


7. (C) Representatives from TRANSCOM and CENTCOM are
proposing a senior-level fact-finding trip to Uzbekistan for
three days around 20 October 2008. The proposed delegation
would be led by Vice-Admiral Harnitchek, the Deputy Commander
of TRANSCOM. The goal of the proposed visit would be to see
selected transportation infrastructure and meet with key GoU
officials in order to investigate the logistical, political
and diplomatic challenges and make recommendations to the USG
for potential transit of DoD cargo to Afghanistan as part of
new Northern Lines of Communication (NGLOC). At this time,
TRANSCOM and CENTCOM are emphasizing the possible transit of
containerized building materials and food. We want to stress
this initiative as a commercial and civilian operation. Any
requirement for U.S. military personnel on the ground would

require approval from senior policy levels in Washington D.C.



8. (C) In order to stimulate GoU interest in a new potential
NGLOC, we recommend that this proposed delegation research
local purchase from US companies manufacturing in Uzbekistan
as well as production or services by other Uzbek-owned
enterprises. This would help energize the stagnant Uzbek
economy, create jobs and reinforce US influence. We also
encourage proposals for USG counter-narcotics assistance to
Uzbekistan as a means to compensate the GoU, help them
expedite US DoD cargo movement through counter-narcotics
inspections, and help the GoU combat overall narcotics
smuggling emanating from Afghanistan (or transiting
Tajikistan into Uzbekistan, if not coming directly across the
Amudaryo).


9. (C) If the senior-level fact-finding trip to Uzbekistan
led by Vice-Admiral Harnitchek is successful, we anticipate
that General McNabb, the new TRANSCOM Commander will visit in
mid-November 2008.

Foreign Policy
--------------


10. (C) While Uzbekistan belongs to a variety of regional
security organizations including the Russian-led Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO),and the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO),Uzbekistan's often
half-hearted military participation in these organizations
has actually decreased in the last month most likely due to
the GoU,s displeasure with Russia,s military and diplomatic
heavy-handedness toward Georgia, especially their unilateral
partition of Georgia. In changes to plans in mid-August
2008, the former Minister of Defense Ruslan Mirzayaev skipped
the late August 2008 summit in Dushanbe attended by SCO
presidents, including President Karimov and Prime Minister
Putin. Instead, Defense Minister Mirzayaev remained in
Tashkent and, under robust coverage by the state-run media,
hosted General Dempsey. Earlier that same week, the MoD sent
the Chief of the MoD,s Department of International
Cooperation, Colonel Rustamov, to a CSTO minister of defense
summit in Yerevan. This was a step down even from Deputy
Defense Minister Niyazov who was originally programmed to
represent Uzbekistan. More interesting, Colonel Rustamov
attended meetings at the CSTO summit in civilian clothes.
Such signals about who represents the nation at various
meetings and how are only decided at the highest level.


Kagan Disaster, CENTCOM/ARCENT Assistance Efforts
-------------- --------------


11. (C) The series of explosions that rocked the Kagan
Ammunition Depot--which stored nearly 190,000,000 rounds of
ammunition--occurred near Bukhara on July 10, 2008.
President Karimov and other GoU senior officials have
repeatedly conveyed appreciation to the Ambassador for the
offer of USG assistance. MOD leaders have asserted that they
need help dealing with the remaining 70-80 percent of the
depot's unexploded munitions including projectiles tossed
into surrounding canals. MoD has established a joint 300-man
"Independent Sapper Battalion" from MoD and the Ministry of
Internal Affairs. MoD projects that the site will require a
clean-up effort lasting at least one year. CENTCOM, your
headquarters and NAVCENT facilitated the delivery of over 150
land-based metal detectors and 26 underwater-capable
detectors. A 5-man Military Training Team went to Kagan and
helped train Uzbek sappers in detection techniques in late
August 2008. The balance of 24 detectors and 20 EOD suits

are expected to arrive in late October 2008. Your ARCENT
staff engineers have recommended that the two EOD-related
training events in FY09 concentrate solely on MoD,s
Independent Sapper Battalion. Interestingly, the Kagan Depot
disaster highlights the importance of such
military-to-military events. A key reason for the success of
this mission was the already strong relationship between your
deputy ARCENT engineer, LTC Bolos, and MoD,s lead engineer,
Lt.Col. Komilov based on the experiences in FY08 at Samarkand
and Fort Irwin.

Counter-narcotics and other Security Cooperation
-------------- --


12. (C) In Fall 2007, Uzbek officials began to hint that they
would welcome the resumption of cooperation with the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA),which suspended its
activities early in 2007 due to limited effectiveness in
working with the host government. DEA officials traveled to
Tashkent in April 2008 and had productive meetings with
officials from several partner agencies. Following up on the
positive signals, the Embassy submitted a diplomatic note
formally proposing the reestablishment of a DEA office.
Disappointingly, the response from the Government of
Uzbekistan rejected the proposal; MFA officials, however,
explained that up to three DEA special agents would be
authorized to augment the Embassy staff, but only as "U.S.
Diplomats" assigned to the Embassy Political Section. DEA is
negotiating a more acceptable proposal, but the episode
reflects ongoing concern within the GoU that U.S. "agents"
might be trying to undermine the leadership of President
Karimov. We ask that you follow up on the possibility of DEA
returning during your meetings with the Government of
Uzbekistan.

Human Rights: Keeping Uzbekistan on Track
--------------


13. (SBU) Human rights issues continue to be the real thorn
in our relations. Uzbekistan has taken several positive
steps in the past year, including allowing the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to restart prison visits;
adopting new anti-human trafficking legislation which
increases protections for victims; adopting two International
Labor Organization (ILO) conventions on child labor;
abolishing the death penalty; increasing the independence of
the judiciary by implementing a new "habeas corpus" law; and
releasing several political prisoners. In addition, though
repressive measures against suspected Muslim extremists
continue, they seem to have abated somewhat. The Government
of Uzbekistan appears to have recognized a need to encourage
the growth of moderate Islam, and the result has been a
predictable drop in the appeal of radical alternatives.


14. (SBU) The restart of ICRC prison visits was an especially
important step forward, as a majority of the country's human
rights abuses occur behind prison walls. Several human
rights activists have since reported improving conditions at
several prisons across the country. We believe that Admiral
Fallon, who visited the ICRC while visiting Tashkent in
February, was instrumental in convincing Uzbekistan to come
to terms with the ICRC on restarting prison visits in March
for an initial six-month trial period.


15. (SBU) Lately, however, Uzbekistan is threatening to
backslide on human rights again, potentially complicating
other aspects of the relationship as well. For example, in
the past few months, Uzbekistan has run documentaries on
state-television attacking Radio Free Europe reporters and
religious minorities; imprisoned three Jehovah's Witnesses;

and detained a prominent journalist and activist in
Karakalpakstan. We also have seen a recent increase in
harassment of activists and religious minorities in several
regions of the country.


16. (SBU) Uzbekistan still seems to believe that it can
isolate discussion of human rights from other areas of the
relationship. Progress on security and other types of
cooperation must go hand-in-hand with progress on human
rights. Lieutenant General Dempsey did meet with the ICRC
and did discuss human rights issues with the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. At this time, on this visit, with a new
minister of defense, we do not propose that you discuss human
rights unless GoU officials broach the topic, especially
since General Dempsey,s visit was less than a month ago.

Economy Strong, but Little Trickle-Down
--------------


17. (SBU) Uzbekistan's macroeconomic performance continues to
be strong. According to official GOU figures, in 2007 the
economy grew 9.5 percent, and the country had a large current
account surplus corresponding to 19 percent of GDP. The
balance of payments continued to be strong with a surplus of
USD 7.5 billion. The official debt ratio is now 17-18
percent of GDP and is likely to fall below 15 percent in the
next few years. Uzbekistan practices a policy of "import
substitution" that helps to insulate it from international
financial markets.


18. (SBU) In 2008, the Government of Uzbekistan hopes to
maintain an eight percent growth rate, largely from exports
and industrial production. Although assessing the
Uzbekistani economy as strong, the International Monetary
Fund believes Uzbekistan's predictions for economic growth in
2008 to be overly optimistic.


19. (SBU) The benefits of Uzbekistan's strong macroeconomic
performance are slow to be seen in the lives of Uzbekistani
citizens. Although gross national income per capita is
growing, the official consumer price index of 6.5 percent
contrasts with World Bank estimates that show the cost of
living rising by 20 percent and more annually. Ranking among
the five most corrupt countries in the world, Uzbekistan has
a shadow economy that accounts for 20 percent of GDP by
official estimates and by up to 45-50 percent of GDP in
independent assessments. According to the World Bank, over a
quarter of the population lives below the poverty line and is
able to spend less than USD 1.1 per day.
Nevertheless--largely due to underemployment--unemployment is
a low 0.75 percent according to government figures and eight
percent according to the International Labor Organization.
As much as 9-18 percent of Uzbekistan's GDP comes in the form
of remittances from workers who have migrated abroad, largely
to Kazakhstan and Russia.


20. (SBU) Enhancing financial intermediation and confidence
in the banking system, as well as improving the business
climate--including through the liberalization of trade and
payments--are crucial if Uzbekistan is to achieve the
government's ambitious growth objectives and create
much-needed jobs for this young population. Greater legal
predictability is needed. Foreign investors have complained
that Uzbekistani courts do not always honor contractual
arbitration agreements. At the same time, the General
Motors-UzAvtoprom joint venture is off to a good start, and
GM is now considering a substantial expansion of its
operations in Uzbekistan. As mentioned above, one of the
main incentives that the mbassy promotes for NGLOC is the
possibility of local purchase of goods produced and services

rendered in Uzbekistan. Coca-Cola (bottled water, sodas and
juices),Texaco (lubricants),Proctor & Gamble and GM are
among the US companies manufacturing in Uzbekistan.

ARCENT-hosted Land Forces Symposium
--------------


21. (C) MoD has the received the invitation and is
considering it. This was discussed with the DAO on Thursday,
18 September 2008. In accordance with the GoU,s system, the
invitation will need to be elevated above MoD for approval
and then permission for the MoD- selected officer. Our
expectation is that the GoU will send the highest-ranking
available officer available depending on the competing
demands of the GoU and MoD at that time.

Action Summary
--------------


22. (C) We recommend that you raise the following issues
during your meetings with GOU officials:

(1) A proposed senior-level fact-finding trip to Uzbekistan
by representatives from TRANSCOM and CENTCOM, led by
Vice-Admiral Harnitchek, the Deputy Commander of TRANSCOM.
The proposed three-day visit is requested between 20 and 24
October 2008.

(2) At the MoD - CENTCOM Consultative Staff Talks (CSTs) in
August 2008, MoD was told that CENTCOM needs letters of
request (LoRs) from MoD regarding hospital supplies, patrol
boat spare parts and training, and upgrades for the MoD
Special Center for Modeling and Simulation. These LoRs are
needed by 30 September 2008 in order for Uzbekistan to
forfeit unspent FMF.

(3) Additional EOD-related training events to complement the
2008 CENTCOM Uzbekistan Security Assistance Plan.

(4) Establishment of a vigorous bilateral military
intelligence exchange program focusing on Afghanistan.

(5) The possibility of DEA returning to Uzbekistan officially
as the DEA, and other joint counter-narcotics cooperation.

(6) Possible counter-narcotics riverine patrol boat training
in November 2008. This training can only take place with
submission of the required LoRs mentioned above.

(7) Verbal invitation for a senior MoD officer to attend the
Land Forces Symposium. MoD has the original invitation and
is considering it.

NORLAND