UZBEKISTAN SHARES ITS VIEWS OF SCO SUMMIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 001061

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2018
TAGS: PREL ASEC ECIN ECON PGOV PINS PTER UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN SHARES ITS VIEWS OF SCO SUMMIT

REF: TASHKENT 639

Classified By: Poloff Steven Prohaska for reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: A representative from Uzbekistan's Ministry
of Foreign Affairs Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
Section told us on September 11 that Uzbekistan is pleased
with the results of the August SCO summit in Dushanbe.
Uzbekistan's main goals for future summits include further
security and economic cooperation, particularly with regard
to improving conditions in Afghanistan. The official claimed
that there had been no official discussions of South Ossetian
or Abkhazian independence during the summit, signalled
Uzbekistan's continuing distrust of Iran and Tajikistan, and
described SCO initiatives to create a joint analysis center
and a role for SCO "dialogue partners" somewhere between that
of observers and fully-fledged members. By maintaining a
dialogue with Uzbekistan on the SCO, we gain another window
into the activities of such regional fora and perhaps the
opportunity to influence the outcomes of SCO meetings,
although Tashkent's calculus of its own interests is not so
easily discernible. End summary.

Positive View of Summit Results, No Discussion of South
Ossetian or Abkhazian Independence?
--------------


2. (C) On September 11, Poloff met with Second Secretary
Muhammad Rashidov of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs'
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Section to discuss
Uzbekistan's reaction to the SCO summit in Dushanbe on August

28. Rashidov noted that he had participated in the
coordination meetings in the run-up to the summit as well as
the summit itself. He said that Uzbekistan views the results
of the summit favorably, and that the summit serves
Uzbekistan's interests in promoting regional stability.
Turning to the Russia-Georgia situation, Rashidov said that
SCO members had expressed concern about the situation there
and believed it was necessary to solve the issue through
diplomatic means based on the six-point plan, as reflected in
the SCO's declaration. He claimed that there had been no
official discussion of South Ossetian or Abkhazian
independence, however.

Increased SCO Role in Afghanistan
--------------


3. (C) The SCO plans to create a "joint analysis center"
intended to prevent and respond to external threats, due to
SCO concerns about increasing drug trafficking and
transborder crime. He quoted President Karimov's expressions
of concern about increasing threats to security and stability
in Afhganistan, growing radicalism, and the increased
frequency of terrorist attacks there. Rashidov said that
Karimov wants the international community to devote more
attention to Afghanistan, particularly in the economic and
social spheres. The SCO also supports increasing the role of
the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group, and plans to hold a
conference on counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and crime.
The SCO also has decided to have a meeting of Deputy Foreign
Ministers to discuss the situation in Afghanistan. Rashidov
did not know, however, when the conference or meeting will
take place.

Suspicious of Tajikistan, Shia
--------------


4. (C) Rashidov denounced Tajikistan for actively calling for
a discussion of Iranian membership in the organization. He
complained that Tajikistani President Rahmon has repeatedly
proposed that the SCO consider Iran's application, but said
he was not sure of whether Rahmon brought it up during the
summit. Rashidov said that this, as well as the opening of a
Shia Cultural Center in Dushanbe in 2003, illustrates Iranian
influence in Tajikistan. He then condemned Shia Islam as
"radical" and "aggressive." (Comment: The Government of
Uzbekistan has repeatedly indicated to us both its strong
opposition to Iranian SCO membership and its distrust of
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan's perception that Tajikistan
supports Iran's application appears to be yet another source
of friction between Tashkent and Dushanbe. End comment.)

Priorities for Future Summits Include Security and Economic
Cooperation
--------------


5. (C) Uzbekistan's primary goals for future SCO summits
include making progress on a broad range of security issues
including Afghanistan as well as further economic
cooperation, Rashidov continued. He noted that Uzbekistan is
particularly interested in realizing projects related to
transportation, communications, tourism, creating new
enterprises, and the development of infrastructure.


6. (C) Rashidov described a series of documents the heads of
state had signed, including agreements related to joint
military exercises and combating the trafficking of weapons,
explosives, and ammunition. (Note: He did not, however,
comment on whether Uzbekistan would participate in any SCO
joint military exercises. End note.) The SCO is planning to
conduct a special meeting focused on counternarcotics in the
first half of 2009, and the organization is working to
develop a strategic program to combat narcotics and precursor
materials in Afghanistan. The organization had also
discussed further economic cooperation and intensifying
cooperation between Ministries of Emergency Situations to
respond to natural disasters.

New Group Related to SCO Expansion and "Dialogue Partners"
--------------


7. (C) Rashidov corroborated press reporting indicating that
the SCO is forming a group of experts that will work out
rules and procedures for regulating further expansion of the
organization. The SCO also approved a memorandum on the
status of "dialogue partners"--with responsibilities and
privileges greater than those of observer states but less
than those of full members--which could apply to current
observer states or to international organizations. Each
partner would have the right to participate in selected SCO
activities relevant to the partner's mandate, which could
include meetings of working groups and technical meetings, he
continued. Furthermore, each SCO partner would be able to
receive selected SCO documents that have not been deemed
"restricted" and would be able to circulate its own materials
to the SCO. These SCO partners would not, however, be able
to participate in preparation meetings or signing ceremonies
for official SCO documents.

Comment:
--------------

8. (C) In recent months, several Uzbek officials have shown
themselves to be open and enthusiastic in discussions with us
on their views of a number of international organizations,
including the SCO. Signalling our interest in a dialogue
with the Government of Uzbekistan on the SCO not only
provides us with an additional window into the activities of
this organization, but also might give us the opportunity to
shape the outcomes of SCO meetings. Uzbekistan gave us
indications earlier that it would work to counter any
"anti-Western" initiatives within the framework of the SCO,
and so Tashkent may keep our expressed interests in mind
during these meetings as long as it wishes to maintain
positive relations with the West. Nevertheless, given
Uzbekistan's interest in receiving security and economic
benefits from this organization, and the GOU's proclivity for
opacity, it is difficult to divine where Tashkent sees its
own equities or imperatives to strike a balance between
competing interests. Any decision to oppose a potential
anti-Western policy from a fellow SCO member is unlikely to
be disconnected from Uzbekistan's own interests.


9. (C) Despite differences with certain members of the
organization, GOU officials have consistently praised the SCO
in meetings with us over the past several months. President
Karimov's and Rashidov's comments also suggest that
Uzbekistan has become increasingly interested in engaging
with observer states--India, Iran, Mongolia, and
Pakistan--for projects under the auspices of the SCO that
have the potential to stimulate economic growth in
Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan's desire for assistance in addressing
its security concerns, and perhaps the hope for international
prestige associated with an SCO endorsement of Karimov's "6
plus 3" initiative, also appear to be motivating GOU
engagement with the SCO.
NORLAND