ACTING CENTCOM COMMANDER GENERAL DEMPSEY MEETS

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 001034

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR PHUM EAID PINR AF PK GG RS UZ
SUBJECT: ACTING CENTCOM COMMANDER GENERAL DEMPSEY MEETS
UZBEKISTAN OFFICIALS ON AUGUST 28

REF: TASHKENT 948

Classified By: Political Officer Tim Buckley for reasons 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: During a visit to Tashkent on August 28,
Acting CENTCOM Commander General Martin Dempsey met
separately with First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ilkhom Nematov and Director of the National Drug Control
Center Kamol Dusmetov. He also conducted mil-to-mil meetings
with Minister of Defense Ruslam Mirzayev, Chief of Defense
General-Major Victor Makhmudov, and Deputy Minister of
Defense Rustam Niyazov. All interlocutors praised U.S.
assistance in response to the munitions depot explosions in
Kagan and called for more cooperation in border security,
counter-terrorism, and counter-narcotics issues. However,
Dusmetov indicated that the full-fledged return of DEA Agents
would be a matter for future consideration. General Dempsey
expressed concern about two political prisoners, Sanjar
Umarov and Erkin Musaev, but Nematov said these men were
convicted of "concrete economic crimes" and added that such
inquiries were construed as meddling in Uzbekistan's internal
affairs. Nematov reiterated Uzbekistan's blunt criticism of
the Karzai regime in Afghanistan and pitched Karimov's
proposed 6 plus 3 UN Contact Group; this was the first time
an Uzbek official offered "to study the idea of incorporating
Afghanistan" into the idea. Nematov also asked many pointed
questions about the situation in Pakistan.


2. (C) Earlier in the day, Mirzayev laid out for the first
time Uzbekistan's position on the Russia-Georgia conflict.
He criticized Georgian President Saakashvili for the attack
on South Ossetia but stopped short of recognizing the
breakaway territories, instead calling for adherence to the
six-point plan. In a private comment to the Ambassador,
however, Mirzayev said that Russia provoked Saakashvili into
taking action. Uzbekistan will be under enormous pressure to
recognize the states during Russian Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin's visit on September 1-2 during Uzbekistan's
independence holiday weekend. The best strategy is to
maintain channels of engagement and avoid trying to back the
Uzbeks into a corner. General Dempsey's visit was
well-timed, and we believe additional high-level visitors
could offer the Government of Uzbekistan a refreshing
counter-balance that could further enhance bilateral ties.
End summary.

Mutual Interest
--------------


3. (C) Acting CENTCOM Commander General Dempsey met with
Nematov during his visit to Tashkent on August 28. (Note:
Foreign Minister Norov was in Dushanbe at the SCO Summit.
End note.) Nematov was frank and cordial, and he stressed "a
mutual need to develop ties," particularly in the areas of
counter-terrorism, border security, and counter-narcotics.
He also noted that Uzbekistan has "pragmatic views...not just
in its relations with the U.S. but with other neighbors."
(Comment: This seemed to be a reference to the delicate
position Uzbekistan finds itself in as a result of the
situation in the Caucasus, and a reminder to the U.S. that
Uzbekistan is under a lot of pressure. End comment.)
Nematov said the string of official U.S. visitors this year
and the Ambassador's meetings with President Karimov are
signs of increasing bilateral cooperation. He also expressed
Uzbekistan's appreciation for assistance responding to the

Kagan disaster.


4. (C) General Dempsey noted that there are far more reasons
to improve ties now than there were in 2001, and we face many
mutual threats. He also emphasized the U.S. Government
interest in pursuing a broad relationship, focusing not only
on security issues but economic development and human rights
concerns as well. He assured Nematov that the U.S.
understands the position Uzbekistan is in vis-a-vis its
neighbors but said it could count on CENTCOM as being a
consistent, predictable partner.

Afghanistan: "Afghans Need Food, Not Democracy"
-------------- --


5. (C) Nematov repeated Uzbekistan's oft-repeated blunt
criticism of the Afghan Government, particularly the Karzai
administration, as well as NATO's efforts. He said "the
situation in our region depends on the situation in
Afghanistan," and added that it "is worsening and we are not
optimistic." He drew the link with the situation in Pakistan
but attributed the problems in part to President Karzai's
"absence of authority" and claimed "he only controls half of
Kabul." Nematov emphasized Uzbekistan's position that there
needs to be a "demilitarization" of Afghanistan since too
many people have weapons. He also accused the West of being
naive about democracy and putting too much stock in
parliamentary elections. "Afghans need food, not democracy"
Nematov opined. He also called for more economic development
projects and education, and said "they do not know anything
about agriculture except growing drugs."


6. (C) Nematov then shifted gears to offer a fresh pitch for
Uzbekistan's 6 plus 3 proposal that Karimov first circulated
at the NATO Summit in Bucharest in April. He acknowledged
that the Afghanistan situation cannot be addressed without
NATO, and said the UN Contact Group would allow key actors to
better understand the situation. Nematov then offered "to
study the idea of including Afghanistan" into the proposal,
the first time an Uzbek official expressed a willingness to
do so.


7. (C) General Dempsey acknowledged that the complex
situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated but emphasized that
the U.S. would likely be increasing resources by spring 2009.
He added that the Afghan people are adamantly opposed to a
return of the Taliban and assured Nematov that the situation
will never be as bad as it was during the Taliban's
repressive regime. Nematov said he was pleased to hear the
U.S. remains committed to Afghanistan and agreed "the people
do not want the Taliban to return and neither do we."

On Pakistan
--------------


8. (C) Nematov asked many pointed questions about Pakistan,
which he said is a major concern for Uzbekistan because of
its impact on the security of neighboring Afghanistan. He
was particularly interested in whether the Pakistan army will
continue to support Musharraf and the status of possible U.S.
plans to attack terrorist training camps on Pakistani soil.


Human Rights Cases
--------------



9. (C) General Dempsey acknowledged some of the steps forward
on human rights issues Uzbekistan has made in the past year,
which Nematov appreciated. General Dempsey did also express
the U.S. Government interest in the plight of two political
prisoners with serious medical problems -- Sunshine Coalition
leader Sanjar Umarov and former Ministry of Defense official
and Embassy contact Erkin Musaev. General Dempsey
respectfully requested reconsideration of their incarceration
on medical grounds; however, Nematov responded negatively,
noting that both of these men were "convicted of concrete
economic crimes" and that such inquiries could be construed
as "meddling into the internal affairs of Uzbekistan."


10. (C) Nematov did note that occasionally the Parliament
approves amnesties for certain individuals on the occasion of
holidays, and the MFA released a press statement on August 29
confirming that there will be an amnesty in conjunction with
the Independence Day holiday on September 1. (Comment: We
have not received any indication that either of these two
individuals or any other political prisoners whose cases we
monitor will be among those released, but we will monitor
this closely. There is increasing concern about Umarov in
recent days because the government has apparently transferred
him to another location and is refusing to provide
information about his whereabouts to family members. End
comment.)

Termez Air Base
--------------


11. (C) General Dempsey thanked the Uzbeks for their January
decision to allow U.S. civilian officials assigned to NATO to
transit the German Air Base in Termez en route to Afghanistan
on a case-by-case basis. He noted that there are also U.S.
military personnel assigned to NATO who cannot accompany
their units if they transit the Termez Air Base en route to
Afghanistan, and he requested that the Uzbeks consider
granting a blanket clearance for such U.S. personnel assigned
to NATO. Nematov responded that a NATO delegation met
recently with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss such
issues but no decision has yet been reached.

Counter-narcotics Issues
--------------


12. (C) In a separate meeting Kamol Dusmetov, who is the top
counter-narcotics official in Uzbekistan, thanked the U.S.
for its major assistance in training, equipment, and
infrastructure over the years. He noted that there "is an
intensification" of drugs being smuggled into Uzbekistan via
the Amu Darya River, which forms the border between
Afghanistan and Uzbekistan. Traffickers, he explained, are
getting bolder and are devising creative new methods of
hiding and transporting larger quantities of drug shipments
(for instance, using the gas tanks of vehicles to conceal
drugs). Previously, Uzbek authorities reported that
smugglers tended to avoid the direct, heavily-guarded border
in favor of remote terrain in Tajikistan and then to
Uzbekistan. He cited two recent heroin seizures in excess of
500 kilograms in Uzbekistan and also cited a 1.6 ton seizure
of heroin precursor chemicals as part of the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime's (UNODC) Operation Tarcet (ref).


13. (C) General Dempsey stated that it is now clear that

money from the illicit narcotics trade gets back to
terrorists and the Taliban, which amounted to at least USD
one billion last year alone. Therefore, counter-narcotics is
a security issue for all parties and the U.S. encourages more
regional efforts in Central Asia to reduce the flow of drugs
and precursors in both directions, General Dempsey noted. He
followed up on the U.S. proposal -- proffered after
consulting with receptive Uzbek officials -- to reestablish
an office of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in
Tashkent. (Comment: Despite the stated desires by law
enforcement officers to resume cooperation, the Embassy
received a disappointingly negative diplomatic note on July
22 rejecting the re-establishment of a DEA office, which we
believe is due to high-level reluctance in the National
Security Service. End comment.) Dusmetov praised the
previous work of DEA and privately has told emboffs that he
wants to see the return of accredited DEA Agents, but he
carefully toed the current official line. He told General
Dempsey that "we have enough productive cooperation ongoing
in this sphere at present" but that "this issue will remain
open for consideration in the near future." He added as an
afterthought that there were "political reasons for closing
this office."

Russia-Georgia
--------------


14. (C) At a luncheon earlier in the day, Minister of Defense
Mirzayev told General Dempsey that, in anticipation of a
question on Uzbekistan,s position regarding Russian
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, he had prepared a
briefing memo. He proceeded to read from the memo, which
laid out Uzbekistan,s stance as follows:

--The issues in Georgia are part of the legacy of the
ethnic-territorial disputes left over from the Soviet era.

--The USSR -- and in particular the Communist Party
leadership -- were in denial about the effects of ethnic
disputes; they simply acted as if there were no such thing.

--When the USSR broke up, these disputes rapidly surfaced;
everyone remembered past abuses, nationalistic and chauvinism
sentiments burst forth and were manipulated by some
unscrupulous political leaders.

--The "Communist Party of the Soviet Union" supported some
groups against others in an effort to prevent and then manage
the break-up of the USSR, but Moscow was unable to succeed in
holding the Soviet Union together.

--Following the dissolution of the USSR, Russia sought to
maintain tensions with and between the newly sovereign
countries of the former Soviet Union.

--In Abkhazia and South Ossetia, conflict erupted in
1991-1993, resulting in much civilian suffering. The CIS
sought to negotiate a solution, and peacekeepers were
deployed from Russia and Georgia with UN support.

--The status quo lasted for more than 15 years but began to
erode in the past few years.

--Georgia did not pursue a peaceful approach to the situation
in South Ossetia, despite appeals from Tskhinvali.

Saakashvili claimed he wanted peace but he did not act
accordingly. Subsequently, Georgia launched a "blitzkrieg"
on Tskhinvali, using heavy artillery and aviation, destroying
much of the city and 10 neighboring villages with thousands
of civilian casualties, all of them citizens of Georgia.
Saakashvili acted in the belief that there would be no
repercussions.

--The Georgian government,s decision should be reviewed by
an independent commission.

--All sides need to observe the six-point ceasefire plan
negotiated by France on behalf of the EU.

--Russia was left with a stark choice as a result of
Georgia,s actions: (1) Do nothing, despite the deaths of
Russian soldiers and civilians, and risk losing influence in
the region, or (2) use military force and its peacekeeping
mandate to intervene. It chose the latter, unsurprisingly.

--This conflict, like all the other frozen conflicts in the
former USSR, can only be resolved peacefully.

--Uzbekistan "is not taking sides" with Russia or Georgia.
"We are far off" from these events, though we are interested.


15. (C) Mirzayev privately told the Ambassador, on the
margins of an official lunch in General Dempsey,s honor,
that the Russians had continued to play a dirty game behind
the scenes in the Caucasus, leaving Saakashvili with little
choice but to respond. (Comment: The Uzbeks are clearly
trying to stay right down the middle on this issue, while
conscious of Russian pressure to get them to recognize South
Ossetia. That pressure will only intensify with the
anticipated September 1-2 visit to Tashkent of Russian Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin at the head of an economic
delegation. End comment.)

Menacing Behavior from Putin's Advance Team
--------------


16. (C) Russian Prime Minister Putin's advance team has
arrived at Tashkent's Intercontinental Hotel, and early in
the morning on August 29 several drunken Russians harrassed
U.S. Embassy staff involved with General Dempsey's visit.
This occurred multiple times over a period of several hours.
In one instance, a big Russian man approached our Air
Attache, and upon learning that he was a member of the U.S.
military, repeatedly demanded, "Why are American troops on
Russian territory?!" until other members of the advance team
pulled him away. It appeared the Russians wanted to provoke
a verbal argument that could have escalated.

Georgian Embassy Comments on Uzbekistan, Russia
-------------- --


17. (C) The Georgian Charge d'Affaires told our Acting Deputy
Chief of Mission on August 27 that the Uzbeks will not
respond to his requests for Tashkent's commentary on South
Ossetia and Abkhazia with anything other than variations of
"we're studying the situation." He believed nothing will be
forthcoming until after Putin's visit here. He knows the
Russians have far more leverage with the Uzbeks than the
Georgians do, and said he wished he could find a reason to be
hopeful that Uzbekistan could at least remain neutral.


Comment:
--------------


18. (C) By coincidence, the timing of General Dempsey's visit
just prior to Putin's arrival in Tashkent provides a useful
counterweight that highlights improving U.S.-Uzbek relations.
The Uzbeks are keeping careful track of high-level official
American visitors, as they recited during the official
meetings, and General Dempsey's visit will add to the
momentum. This may gradually help us advance strategic goals
with regard to Afghanistan, counter-narcotics,
counter-terrorism, and human rights.


19. (C) From the Uzbek perspective the visit was likely
particularly welcome in advance of what will certainly be a
forceful Russian effort -- led by Putin himself -- to elicit
support for its independence declarations for South Ossetia
and Abkhazia. The Russians have a lot of leverage over the
Uzbeks, particularly due to the importance of remittances,
from migrant workers in Russia, that keep the Uzbek economy
afloat. The Uzbeks are most comfortable playing the
superpowers against each other and they are clearly uneasy
about having to choose sides. The best strategy is to keep
our channels of engagement open and continue scheduling
visits by high-level officials, which will assure the Uzbeks
that we are not trying to back them into a corner and can
accept a pragmatic balancing act as long as it meets our
interests.


20. (U) This telegram was cleared by Acting CENTCOM Commander
General Martin Dempsey.

NORLAND