Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08TASHKENT1022
2008-09-02 12:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tashkent
Cable title:  

UZBEKISTAN: CSTO DEMARCHE AND PUTIN VISIT

Tags:  GG PBTS PREL RS UZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHNT #1022 2461258
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 021258Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0239
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 4316
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 0530
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 4933
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY 0812
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7570
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS PRIORITY 0392
RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN PRIORITY 0294
C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 001022 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA DON CAMP AND BRIAN RORAFF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2018
TAGS: GG PBTS PREL RS UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: CSTO DEMARCHE AND PUTIN VISIT

REF: STATE 93357

Classified By: Econoff Robert McCutcheon for reasons 1.4 (b, d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 001022

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA DON CAMP AND BRIAN RORAFF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2018
TAGS: GG PBTS PREL RS UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: CSTO DEMARCHE AND PUTIN VISIT

REF: STATE 93357

Classified By: Econoff Robert McCutcheon for reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) On Sunday, August 31, we delivered reftel demarche to
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Americas Desk Chief Ismat
Fayzullaev, who promised to relay it immediately to
appropriate officials. Contacted at home on the September 1
Uzbek Independence Day holiday, Fayzullaev said a response
had to be formulated "at the highest levels" and that the
response would, therefore, not be immediate. We have been
unable to reach Fayzullaev today, and we have likewise been
unable to reach MFA Americas Department Chief Takhir
Mamadjanov. Ambassador Norland raised the demarche with FM
Norov at the September 1 Independence Day festivities but
received no substantive response. It is becoming clear that
we will receive a formal response to our demarche only after
the completion of Russian Prime Minister Putin's September
1-2 visit to Tashkent.


2. (SBU) At present we know little about the results of
Putin's visit beyond what has been reported in press
accounts. According to these, PM Putin held talks with both
Uzbek President Karimov and Uzbek PM Mirziyayev. These talks
centered on economic questions. A Russian-Uzbek Plan of
Economic Cooperation through 2012 was signed, and the Russian
and Uzbek leaders agreed on the price of Uzbek gas that will
be sold to Gazprom in 2009. Putin was quoted as saying "this
will be a European pricing formula," which presumably implies
market pricing. Russia and Uzbekistan reached agreement to
begin construction of a new gas pipeline for the export of
Turkmen gas to Russia across Uzbekistan, and Lukoil announced
plans to increase its investment up to USD 5 billion in hopes
of extracting up to 12 billion cubic meters of natural gas in
Uzbekistan. The two sides discussed following through on
integrating the Chkalov Aircraft Factory (TAPOiCh) into the
Russian United Aircraft Corporation (UAC). (COMMENT: An
agreement to integrate TAPOiCh into UAC was reached last
winter, but it has not yet been ratified by the GOU. END
COMMENT) Finally, Uzbekistan and Russia signed an agreement
on space cooperation.


3. (SBU) Although Russian press reports prior to Putin's
visit indicated the situation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia
would be discussed, today's press releases give no hint of
the results.


4. (C) According to other news items, Putin has left for
Karimov's private residence in Durmon for continuing
discussions this evening. Reading tea leaves, we notice that
the Independence Day notices listed the greetings from Putin
first followed by those of the Chinese President and then
President Bush. In addition, a web site has printed that FM
Norov may visit the United States this fall. We have been
aware of this for some time and find it interesting that the
information appears in the press the day of Putin's visit.
NORLAND