ESTONIAN AGENDA FOR 2008 NATO BUCHAREST SUMMIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TALLINN 000111

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/NB-KATHERINE GARRY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS NATO EN
SUBJECT: ESTONIAN AGENDA FOR 2008 NATO BUCHAREST SUMMIT

Classified By: DCM Karen Decker for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d).

REF: A) 08 TALLINN 66
B) 07 IIR 6954003408
C) STATE 19516


1. (C) Summary. Afghanistan is Priority One for Estonia at the
upcoming NATO Summit in Bucharest. Estonia has announced it will send
a mortar platoon to Afghanistan this spring as an additional
commitment to ISAF, but is unlikely Estonia will be ready to
contribute to a new PRT in Nimroz. Other Government of Estonia (GOE)
priorities at Bucharest include NATO enlargement and cyber security.
While the GOE is not satisfied completely that the "Adriatic 3" are
fully prepared for NATO membership, it is largely satisfied with the
pace of reforms and wants NATO to extend invitations to all three
nations at the Summit. Estonia has consistently supported Membership
Action Plans for Ukraine and Georgia (especially the latter),but GOE
officials accept that other Allies may prefer to see further reform
before MAP invitations are issued. The GOE strongly supports
reference in the Summit's final declaration to the commitment of NATO
allies to cyber defense. End Summary.

AFGHANISTAN


2. (C) The GOE believes that Afghanistan is the most important agenda
item for Bucharest. In addition, Estonia has pressed for improved
NATO-EU cooperation in Brussels (Note: Estonia has also pressed for
inclusion of Afghanistan on the GAERC agenda. End Note.) GOE
interlocutors expect the Parliament to approve another extension of
Estonia's own military mandate in Afghanistan (which will expire in
December 2008),but acknowledge they understand that other countries
who have sustained significant losses want to see the burden better
shared between European allies (Ref B).


3. (C) MOD and MFA contacts, up to and including the Undersecretary
of Political Affairs (Harri Tiido),who is also Estonia's
non-resident Ambassador to Afghanistan, are actively engaged in
looking for more ways Estonia can contribute in Afghanistan. (Note:
The GOE plans to more than double development assistance to
Afghanistan - from USD 146,000 in 2007 to almost USD 390,000 in 2008.
GOE also sent a Health Advisor to Helmand March 10. End Note.) It
is unlikely, however, that the GOE will announce plans at this time
to contribute to a new PRT in Nimroz (suggested Ref C) or to provide
an OMLT. There continue to be unofficial discussions on these
possibilities, but at this point, no decisions have been made.
"Sustaining Estonia's current contributions in Afghanistan and other
operations will be difficult enough," our MOD contacts note.


4. (C) That said, the GOE will be sending a mortar platoon in May to
reinforce its current contingent in Helmand Province. This mortar
platoon will provide general support to all coalition forces in the
Task Force Helmand Area of Operations, not just to the Estonian
contingent. (NOTE: Final approval by the MOD for the deployment of
the mortar platoon is pending. As the deployment was not anticipated
during budget preparations, the UK will be funding ammunition this
year. Other issues of interoperability have been resolved.
Deployment of the mortar platoon (approximately 20 soldiers) does not
require additional parliamentary approval. The mandate approved by
Parliament in December 2007 allows Estonia to deploy up to 150 troops
in Afghanistan. Right now, there are 121 troops on the ground. End
Note.)


VIEWS ON ENLARGEMENT


5. (C) Estonia has been a consistent, vocal supporter of both NATO
and EU enlargement. Among the Adriatic 3 (Croatia, Macedonia and
Albania),the GOE views Croatia as the best prepared. However, GOE
officials have voiced concerns to us about the Croatian public's lack
of popular support for NATO. GOE interlocutors have also stressed
their interest in encouraging Greece and Macedonia to settle the name
issue, but feel that it is unfair to deny Macedonia membership if all
other stipulations have been met. GOE interlocutors are least
optimistic about Albania's chances at Bucharest. However, FM Paet
commented on the eve of his March 5 trip to the NATO foreign
ministers meeting in Brussels that if the Adriatic 3 continue making
the necessary reforms at their current pace, Estonia supports issuing
an invitation for accession to each of them during the Bucharest
summit.


6. (C) The GOE considers Georgia and Ukraine as two of its top
priorities with respect to development assistance and has been very
active in fostering democratic, security and economic reforms in the
two countries. The GOE has also been a strong advocate of MAP for
both Georgia and Ukraine at Bucharest as an acknowledgement of the
achievements of both countries. Our contacts in the MOD and MFA have
told us they are concerned that if MAP is not offered to these two
countries at Bucharest, it could cause a regression in their progress

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and provide Russia with an opportunity to destabilize the region (Ref
A). GOE officials have publicly acknowledged that the events in
Georgia in November damaged Georgia's reputation and potentially its
MAP aspirations. The GOE is also concerned that Ukraine has not
implemented all the necessary reforms and still needs to convince an
openly hostile public as to the benefits of NATO membership. As
Bucharest approaches, GOE officials have begun stressing the
importance of encouraging further reforms by giving clear and
positive signals regarding eventual MAP offers to Ukraine and Georgia
at Bucharest. This was reflected in a recent statement by FM Paet
that Estonia supports further Euro-Atlantic integration in Georgia
and Ukraine, and that both partners could receive a MAP "during this
year."

CYBER SECURITY


7. (C) The GOE views a public reference to cyber security as a
priority deliverable at Bucharest. From the Estonian perspective,
this declaration would not only confirm NATO's willingness to build
up the cyber defense network of the Alliance, but also would serve as
a public example of NATO's willingness to tackle emerging threats to
society. The GOE is also hopeful that any statement will highlight
progress already achieved and prioritize implementation of the cyber
defense policy agreed upon at the Defense Ministerial in Vilnius in
February. At the same time, the GOE is not seeking a statement that
specifically defines current NATO thought regarding the relationship
between Article 5 and cyber security.

Phillips