Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08TAIPEI1705
2008-12-09 09:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:  

MA ADMINISTRATION MOVES TO INSTITUTIONALIZE

Tags:  PREL GPGOV PINR TW CH 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0522
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001705 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2018
TAGS: PREL GPGOV PINR TW CH
SUBJECT: MA ADMINISTRATION MOVES TO INSTITUTIONALIZE
KMT-CCP FORUM

REF: A. TAIPEI 1496

B. TAIPEI 1564

Classified By: The Director for reasons 1.4(b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001705

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2018
TAGS: PREL GPGOV PINR TW CH
SUBJECT: MA ADMINISTRATION MOVES TO INSTITUTIONALIZE
KMT-CCP FORUM

REF: A. TAIPEI 1496

B. TAIPEI 1564

Classified By: The Director for reasons 1.4(b/d)


1. (C) Although Honorary KMT Chair Lien Chan will take part
in the December 20-21 KMT-CCP Forum in Shanghai, KMT Chairman
Wu Poh-Hsiung will be in charge, Taiwan Deputy National
Security Advisor Ho Sze-yin told the Deputy Director December

9. Although the talks will remain informal and consultative,
the Ma administration will work with the KMT to shape the
agenda for the meeting. Taiwan's delegation to the talks
will include two Minister-level officials and three agency
heads, with the specific agencies represented to be decided
based on the outcome of negotiations over the Forum's agenda.
These moves are part of an effort to institutionalize the
inter-party dialogue, ensure that Taiwan speaks with one
voice in its contacts with the PRC, secure KMT legislators'
buy-in to the President's cross-Strait policies and,
ultimately, pursue a less confrontational relationship with
China in a transparent and effective manner. End Summary.

An Unhappy Lien Moved to the Sidelines
--------------


2. (C) Taiwan Deputy National Security Advisor Ho Sze-yin
called in the Deputy Director December 9 to brief him on the
status of Taiwan's internal preparations for the December
20-21 KMT-CCP Forum in Shanghai. Ho noted that Lien Chan had
led the first three rounds of the Forum, praising the KMT
Honorary Chairman's role in initiating the dialogue. The
time had come, though, to institutionalize the meetings
within the formal KMT structure under the leadership of
current KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung. Thus, while the two will
both travel to Shanghai, and will ostensibly co-lead the
delegation, Wu will, in fact, "call the shots." Lien was
unhappy with the decision, Ho admitted, but had been
persuaded to accept that the change was in Taiwan's best
interests. Ho also noted that, in a change from previous
practice, the government would coordinate actively with the
KMT in developing the agenda and other discussion items for
the Forum.


3. (C) The primary reason for the changes, Ho said, was to
ensure that Taiwan spoke with one voice in its dialogue with
the mainland. While the inter-party dialogue would remain an

unofficial, non-binding channel to float ideas, the new
arrangement would allow the administration to make sure that
Taiwan gained maximum benefit from the party-to-party talks
and to ensure that Taiwan was not sending mixed messages to
China on cross-Strait issues. This was particularly
important, Ho said, given the complexity and sensitivity of
the issues now on the table. Since many ideas discussed in
the Forum later would be passed on to the SEF-ARATS channel
for more formal consideration, it was important that the
government have a say in the preliminary stage of dialogue.
Ho also noted that expanding cross-Strait interaction
increased the likelihood of "accidents" occurring, citing the
example of the scuffle involving an ARATS official visiting
Tainan in late October (ref A). Upgrading the KMT-CCP
channel would give Taiwan another way to consult on such
incidents in the future.


4. (C) While Taiwan had not vetted Lien's replacement with
the PRC, Ho did not expect Beijing to object. China
understood that KMT representatives needed government backing
to remain relevant. In any event, there was no question of a
party/state divide in the Chinese system. Ho expressed
optimism that institutionalizing the relationship between KMT
cross-Strait contacts and the Ma administration's efforts
also would make it easier to get buy-in from KMT Legislative
Yuan (LY) members, many of whom would take part in the Forum.
He noted that as many as 20 LY members would attend the
talks in Shanghai. This, in turn would make it easier to
secure LY endorsement of SEF-ARATS agreements. Up to now, Ho
said, LY members felt shut out of the process because Taiwan
law explicitly prohibited them from taking any part in
cross-Strait negotiations beyond ratifying agreements reached
by the executive branch. (Note: This week the full LY is
reviewing, and is expected to approve, the four agreements
reached during the November SEF-ARATS talks in Taipei. See
Ref B for the details of those agreements.)

Ma Administration Committed to Transparency
--------------


5. (C) In deciding to strengthen the government's
coordination with the KMT, President Ma was guided by three

TAIPEI 00001705 002 OF 002


overarching principles, Ho said. First, the KMT-CCP talks
would remain unofficial. Second, while the Forum could
"float ideas," it was not authorized to make binding
agreements. Finally, and most importantly, the Ma
administration would be completely transparent in its formal
talks with the PRC. While, obviously, this did not mean that
the actual SEF-ARATS talks would be open to the public, there
would be no secret agenda items and the results of the talks
would be made known quickly.

Comment
--------------


6. (C) Establishing closer coordination between the
inter-party dialogue and the quasi-official SEF-ARATS channel
should allow Ma to better manage Taiwan's overall
cross-Strait approach. Certainly, giving some voice to KMT
LY members and other senior party officials may reduce some
of the internecine sniping that has marked so much of Ma's
tenure as President. That said, in elevating Wu Poh-hsiung
at the expense of Lien Chan, Ma may be simply trading one
potential rival for the role of Taiwan's "China desk officer"
for another. Meanwhile, news (and word is almost certain to
leak) that the administration is, in essence, making the
KMT-CCP dialogue a tool of government policy, will only
heighten the suspicion and sense of disenfranchisement of the
DPP and its supporters. Ultimately, though, Ma's decision to
make use of the KMT's unique ability to engage the PRC is
probably the correct one as he looks at the tools available
to him as he pursues a more beneficial, less confrontational
relationship with China. End comment.
SYOUNG