HSPD-6 TEAM VISITS TO DISCUSS TERRORIST SCREENING

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 000748

SIPDIS

STATE FOR CA/P/IP BARBARA HALL, PETER THOMPSON, DIANE BEAN AND MARY
DOETSCH

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y

E.O. 12958: 1.4 (B) 1.4(D) DECLASSIFY 11/07/2018
TAGS: ASEC CVIS PGOV PREL CMGT PTER SW

SUBJECT: HSPD-6 TEAM VISITS TO DISCUSS TERRORIST SCREENING
INFORMATION EXCHANGE WITH SWEDEN

REF: (A) STOCKHOLM 704 (B) STOCKHOLM 648 (C) STOCKHOLM 510

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(U) Classified by ADCM Marc Koehler, Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: Meetings between the HSPD-6 terrorist screening
information negotiation team and the Swedish MOJ and MFA reveal that
the current Swedish political climate makes any formal terrorist
screening information agreement highly difficult. Existing informal
arrangements are working well, according to Swedish officials, who
asked whether the status quo would satisfy future requirements under
the Enhanced Visa Waiver Program. End Summary.


2. (SBU) On 23 October 2008, a joint State (CA)/Terrorist Screening
Center (TSC) team met separately with Swedish MFA and MOJ
counterparts to discuss possibilities and arrangements for exchanging
of terrorist screening information with Sweden, as required by
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6) (reftel A). The
MFA was represented by Director of the Americas Office Ambassador
Maria Lundqvist, Senior Americas Desk Officer Paula Wennerblom, and
Desk Officer for the Security Policy Office Sofie Hillbom. Swedish
MOJ participants included Dr. Anna-Karin Svensson, Director of the
Division for Police Issues, International Police Cooperation and
Crisis Management; Frida Faxborn, Division for Police Issues Desk
Officer; and Legal Advisor Annika Waller. The HSPD-6 negotiating
team included Diane Bean, Senior Coordinator, Office of International
Programs, DOS/CA; Peter Thompson, Lead Negotiator, Office of
International Programs, DOS/CA; Zandra Flemister, Deputy Director,
Terrorist Screening Center; and Wynne Teel, Attorney-Adviser,
DOS/L/CA. They were accompanied by Post's Consul and a Vice-Consul.


3. (S) After passively receiving an overview of HSPD-6 and the secure
web-based query system through which Sweden would have access to the
Foreign Partner Extract of the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB),
Ambassador Lundqvist noted this issue was strictly a matter for the
MOJ to negotiate and that the MFA's only role was to keep itself
informed of the issues at stake. She went on to say that this was a
particularly sensitive time politically in Sweden for issues
involving government surveillance and affecting personal privacy
(reftel C),indicating that negotiations were unlikely to proceed
quickly. Nevertheless, she appreciated that concluding some sort of
exchange agreement would satisfy U.S. requirements for Sweden's
continued participation in the enhanced Visa Waiver Program and
agreed to underscore this issue with her MOJ colleagues. Lundqvist
appeared to accept the U.S. interpretation that such a proposal falls
under EU third pillar, and thus was a matter within the competence of
individual member states (see reftel B).


4. (S) During their subsequent meeting with the MOJ, the HSPD-6 team
was able to drill much deeper into substantive issues, discussing the
legal basis for HSPD-6, describing specific procedures for the use
and protection of sensitive data, and brainstorming ways to approach
a workable agreement which might be politically palatable. The team
emphasized that the TSC database was primarily an investigatory tool,
particularly in dealing with asylum cases, and was to be seen as
augmenting existing channels of information exchange with the United
States. The team also emphasized that the United States is flexible
as to the form of an arrangement, and shared with the Swedes a model
aide-memoire that might, with attached procedures, be an approach to
consider.


5. (S) The MOJ team expressed their appreciation for the flexibility
of the U.S. side in regards to memorializing any agreement. They
expressed a strong degree of satisfaction with current informal
information sharing arrangements with the U.S., and wondered whether
the putative advantages of an HSPD-6 agreement for Sweden would be
offset by the risk that these existing informal channels, which cover
a wide range of law enforcement and anti-terrorism cooperation, would
be scrutinized more intensely by Parliament and perhaps jeopardized.
Dr. Svensson reiterated MFA concerns about the current political
atmosphere in Sweden. She believed that, given Swedish
constitutional requirements to present matters of national concern to
Parliament and in light of the ongoing controversy over Sweden's
recently passed surveillance law, it would be politically impossible
for the Minister of Justice to avoid presenting any formal data
sharing agreement with the United States to Parliament for review.
In her opinion, the effect of this public spotlight could also place
other existing informal information sharing arrangements at jeopardy.


6. (S) As an alternative, Dr. Svensson asked the HSPD-6 team to
inquire with Washington whether or not continued participation in the
Visa Waiver Program was fundamentally contingent on signing a formal
data sharing agreement or non-binding arrangement along the lines of
the model shared with Sweden, or could the currently strong but
informal arrangements satisfy DHS's requirements. More specifically,
Faxborn and Waller suggested that Sweden's most problematic issue
might be having access to the database, but in a brain-storming mode
asked whether an arrangement could be reached that would formalize
sharing of Swedish information on known and suspected terrorists, but

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would not/not include Sweden's access to the TSDB. The meeting
concluded with promises for further consideration on both sides.


7. (S) Comment: While MOJ was expected to raise concerns about the
need for EU coordination on this issue, they did not. Moreover, they
were clearly in no hurry in the present political climate to move
towards a formal agreement, or to risk jeopardizing existing informal
data sharing arrangements with the U.S. In that respect, the MOJ
does not appear to view the proposed non-binding arrangement as a net
gain. The MOJ's notion of a one-sided, informal data exchange
arrangement reflects Swedish constitutional restrictions on the use
of intelligence, combined with a willingness to continue feeding
information to the U.S. through existing informal channels. In the
longer term, while a changed political environment in Sweden might be
more conducive to a formal agreement with the U.S., there is a very
clear GOS belief that Sweden is not likely to be a direct target for
terrorists and therefore has little to gain from an HSPD-6 agreement.

WOOD