SWEDISH MFA POLITICAL DIRECTOR ON KOSOVO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 000118

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV SW YI
SUBJECT: SWEDISH MFA POLITICAL DIRECTOR ON KOSOVO

REF: A. STATE 12026


B. STATE 13716

C. STATE 14840

D. STATE 14284

E. STOCKHOLM 84

Classified By: DCM Robert Silverman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
--------------

1. (C) DCM Silverman met February 14 to review Kosovo issues
with MFA Political Director Bjorn Lyrvall and urge early
recognition. Lyrvall said:

-- Sweden intended to recognize Kosovo, but internal
procedures would delay the actual recognition until after a
"Privy Council" meeting March 4. In the meantime, Sweden
would make a "statement of intention" very shortly after the
declaration of independence. It would be as forward-leaning
as possible.

-- The EU should have the ESDP Operations Plan approved
before the anticipated February 17 Declaration of
Independence.

-- The ESDP may not be the right tool for policing northern
Kosovo.

-- Sweden shares our view that Kosovo is no precedent for
Abkhazia. End Summary.

Sweden to State Intent re Kosovo Independence
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2. (C) DCM met February 14 with MFA Political Director Bjorn
Lyrvall to discuss Kosovo policy issues (refs A and B).
Lyrvall, who had been in Serbia on February 11, said that
with Kosovo's imminent declaration of independence the
international community was not entering the end-game stage,
but only the end of the beginning stage. Sweden, he said,
would not be able to recognize Kosovo's independence
immediately after the declaration (ref A). This anticipated
recognition was considered to be of such consequence that the
King would convene March 4 the rarely convoked Foreign Policy
Board that includes all leaders of parliamentary parties plus
other dignitaries acting, in Lyrvall's words, as a kind of
"Privy Council." However, the Government would issue a
general statement of intention regarding Kosovo recognition
shortly after the declaration of independence. It would go as
far as possible without prejudging the outcome of the Foreign
Policy Board consultations. In the end, Lyrvall said, the
Government would take the necessary action, whatever the
result of the consultations. Lyrvall said Sweden, as the
largest EU donor to Kosovo, believed it deserved a place on
the Steering Group, and hoped to be invited to the first
meeting.

EU Response to Kosovo
--------------

3. (C) Lyrvall said the EU had made progress on the ESDP
mission to Kosovo, having provisionally agreed February 13 on
an Operation Plan that had been place under silence procedure
scheduled to end February 15. This would allow the ESDP
Mission to be online prior to the expected declaration of
independence (DI) on February 17. Within hours of the
anticipated DI, EU Political Directors would convene in
Brussels February 17 to prepare a statement on Kosovo for the
Ministers to approve at the February 18 GAERC. This
statement would be a platform document that Lyrvall expected
would take note of the DI and call on EU states to respond in
accordance with their domestic procedures and international
law, but would not include a EU joint recognition of Kosovo.
Lyrvall confirmed that EU states holding back on recognizing
Kosovo included Cyprus, Romania, and Spain.


4. (C) Sweden was concerned about the reaction of Serbs in
northern Kosovo to an ESDP mission. They could view the ESDP
as an alien and illegal international presence. The
atmosphere would be hostile. How would the ESDP respond if
the Serbs in northern Kosovo decided to stage their own
municipal elections, or Serb police in northern Kosovo wore
Serbian uniforms? The EU needed to address such
contingencies, and it was not clear that an ESDP presence in
northern Kosovo was the answer. Separately, MFA Global and
European Security Director Ambassador Nils Daag told Polcouns
February 13 that there were signs that the Serbs were
considering allowing an OSCE mission to continue in Kosovo,
and that this mission could have a role in addressing
sensitivities in northern Kosovo. Daag also confirmed
February 14 that Sweden and EU countries would not support
Serbia invoking the Berlin Mechanism in OSCE, and this
proposal did not appear to have sufficient support in the
OSCE to proceed (ref D).


STOCKHOLM 00000118 002 OF 002



5. (C) Lyrvall underscored Sweden's concerns about ensuring
a sound legal and administrative basis for the International
Steering Group (ISG) and the International Civilian
Representative (ICR). A UN link needed to be maintained, and
an appropriate division of responsibilities and hand-off from
Special Representative of the Secretary General Rickert and
UNMIK to the ISG and ICR. The UN Secretary General would
also need to be involved.

Abkhazia
--------------

6. (C) DCM also raised ref C concerns regarding possible
Russian recognition of Abkhazia. Lyrvall agreed with the
U.S. assessment, said it was important to underscore that
Kosovo was sui generis, and said he would review our
arguments with a view to employing them.
WOOD