Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE99685
2008-09-17 22:15:00
SECRET
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

EGYPT: POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF RETRANSFER, END-USE

Tags:  EG MAS PARM PREL 
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P 172215Z SEP 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
INFO SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T STATE 099685 


SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2018
TAGS: EG MAS PARM PREL
SUBJECT: EGYPT: POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF RETRANSFER, END-USE
AND SECURITY OBLIGATIONS

REF: NONE

Classified By: PM A/S MTKIMMITT Per E.O. 12958 Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

S E C R E T STATE 099685


SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2018
TAGS: EG MAS PARM PREL
SUBJECT: EGYPT: POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF RETRANSFER, END-USE
AND SECURITY OBLIGATIONS

REF: NONE

Classified By: PM A/S MTKIMMITT Per E.O. 12958 Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (U) This is an action request for Embassy Cairo. Please
see paragraph 2.

--------------
OBJECTIVE
--------------


2. (SBU) Department requests that Post engage appropriate
host country officials to determine the status of the Chinese
proposal, discussed below, and confirm whether any subsequent
action has been taken by the Egyptian military.



3. (S/REL EGYPT) Points to Deliver:

-- We have information that a Chinese defense company in late
2007 drafted a proposal for submission to the Egyptian
military for a test kit designed for use with the US produced
AN/ALQ-131 jamming pod and radar warning receiver.

-- In February 2007, MOD Tantawi committed Egypt to fully
comply with its end-use, retransfer and security obligations
to the United States. This was a welcomed, positive step in
addressing this challenge and it moved our relationship in
the right direction.

-- It is imperative that the Egyptian government clearly
understand the importance of its compliance with end-use,
retransfer and security obligations and protecting against
unauthorized access to U.S. technology and information.

-- We must be very clear that any unauthorized sharing of
sensitive data associated with U.S. military equipment, even
inadvertently, may violate Egypt's end-use, retransfer and
security obligations, which may require a report to Congress
pursuant to section 3 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA),
as amended.

-- We ask you to investigate whether technical data or access
to defense articles had been provided
without USG authorization and share with us the results.

--------------
REPORTING DEADLINE
--------------


4. (U) Post should report findings by cable to PM/RSAT Chris
Danielewski and PM/DTCC Tim Watkins, preferably no later than
September 30.

--------------
BACKGROUND
--------------


5. (S//NF) According to intelligence reporting, a Chinese
defense company in late 2007 drafted a proposal for
submission to the Egyptian military for a test kit designed
for use with the U.S.-origin AN/ALQ-131 jamming pod and radar
warning receiver. The AN/ALQ-131 is an airborne, electronic
countermeasures (ECM) modular-jamming pod, which is
canister-contained, that targets anti-aircraft radars. This
system can be installed on F-16C Fighting Falcons, among
other aircraft, which are currently in use by the Egyptian
air force. There has been no additional reporting to confirm
whether the Egyptian government has accepted or responded to
this proposal.


6. (S//NF) The Chinese company's ability to draft a test kit
proposal to the Egyptian military suggests that it may have
access to, or be in receipt of, technical data on the U.S.
produced AN/ALQ-131 system. If the Government of Egypt (GOE)
transferred such sensitive technical data to the Chinese
company, the GOE may have violated its retransfer, end use or
security obligations to the United States.


7. (S//NF) If the GOE did indeed transfer technical data, or
provide access to U.S. technology, to a third party without
USG authorization, this would represent a continuation of a
pattern of infractions by Egypt regarding its retransfer and
end-use obligations to the United States. Between 2006 and
2007, we notified Congress of 4 possible violations, to
include the notification in January 2007 that Egypt allowed
testing of a Chinese-manufactured electro-optical
countermeasure system ("Bodyguard") against the GOE's
U.S.-provided precision guided munitions (PGMs).
Most recently in June 2008, the Department notified Congress
of an incident involving the possible transfer of a
U.S.-origin radar warning receiver technical data to Chinese
or French nationals.

End Points.
RICE


NNNN




End Cable Text