Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE99672
2008-09-17 21:46:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

63RD UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY: UNITED STATES GOALS AND

Tags:  PREL UNGA 
pdf how-to read a cable
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 STATE 099672 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL UNGA
SUBJECT: 63RD UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY: UNITED STATES GOALS AND
PRIORITIES

REF: 08 STATE 93981

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 STATE 099672

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL UNGA
SUBJECT: 63RD UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY: UNITED STATES GOALS AND
PRIORITIES

REF: 08 STATE 93981


1. (SBU) The upcoming General Debate of the 63rd UN
General Assembly (UNGA),September 23 - October 1, and
regular session, which continues through December, will
provide a platform for the advancement of key U.S.
interests. We will use the high-level ministerial
meetings Secretary-General Ban is hosting and additional
multilateral and bilateral meetings surrounding the UNGA
General Debate to advance priorities on democracy and
human rights and on regional issues including Georgia,
Kosovo, Burma, Iran, Sudan/Darfur, and the Middle East,
and to demonstrate U.S. leadership on the issues of
development and food security.


2. (SBU) During the remainder of the regular session of
UNGA we will press for other U.S. priorities, such as
human rights, UN reform including reform of the UN
Security Council (UNSC),and improved voting coincidence
within the UN General Assembly.


3. (SBU) In discussing U.S. priorities for UNGA with host
governments, posts should draw from the following points
as appropriate. In addition, background material on UNGA
will be available on the following State Department
Intranet site:
http://p.state.sbu/sites/USUN/GA63/default.as px.


4. (SBU) Priority Issues for the UNGA General Debate:

a. Georgia: The U.S. condemns Russia's actions, including
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and re-states
support for Georgia's territorial integrity and
sovereignty. Even so, support for the successful
introduction of a new resolution at UNGA to this effect
does not look promising. Consultations on the margins of
UNGA would provide a good platform to seek strong
statements on these issues, as well as a demand that
Russia cooperate with OSCE, UN, and EU as the UN Observer
Mission in Georgia's (UNOMIG) current mandate expires in
October. Our discussions of UNOMIG's future should be
directed toward the creation of an international
peacekeeping mechanism that will serve as a foundation for
a solution to the crisis in Georgia. We can expect these
discussions to be challenging, given Russia's veto in the
UNSC and its entrenched position in Georgia. Our efforts
should also seek to garner strong international support
for the findings and recommendations of the UN
humanitarian fact-finding mission.

b. Middle East: The Secretary will participate in
meetings of the Middle East Quartet and in bilateral
meetings with the Israeli and Palestinian delegations.

Our efforts are directed at sustaining diplomatic support
for the Annapolis process and the serious
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, as well as seeking
increased international financial support for the
Palestinian Authority government under President Abbas and
Prime Minister Fayyad. We urge UN Member States to oppose
resolutions containing one-sided criticisms of Israel.
Unbalanced resolutions do not contribute to peace, damage
the serious yet delicate bilateral negotiations between
Israelis and Palestinians, and undermine the credibility
of the UN.

c. Kosovo: Serbia has asked that the UNGA consider a
resolution requesting an International Court of Justice
(ICJ) advisory opinion on the question, "Is the unilateral
declaration of independence by provisional institutions of
self-government in Kosovo in accordance with international
law?" The U.S. strongly opposes this resolution but is
still considering how to prevent its passage without
isolating the U.S. If, as expected, the UNGA General
Committee places the resolution on the UNGA agenda, there
would likely be a UNGA vote on the proposal later this
fall. The ICJ's advisory opinion would not be legally
binding, but it would likely carry significant weight
internationally, and States and institutions may hesitate
to recognize Kosovo or move forward on cooperation with
Kosovo while the opinion is pending. Uncertainty also
risks undermining the effectiveness of the Kosovo
government, as well as of the UN and EU missions on the
ground. Depending on what it says, the opinion could have
an adverse impact beyond the Kosovo question, including,
for example, by creating uncertainty in other states where
secession and territorial integrity are under debate.

STATE 00099672 002 OF 005



d. Afghanistan: The International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) mandate is due to be renewed by October 13.
Italy has proposed additional language in the preamble
welcoming an ISAF role in upcoming national elections,
steps to transfer authority on security issues to Afghan
authorities, and re-establishment of the Tripartite
Commission meetings comprising ISAF's, Afghanistan's, and
Pakistan's military leadership. We support renewal of
ISAF's mandate with this added language, and we will seek
to balance any references in the text to the August 21
bombing incident in the Shindand district with
condemnation of Taliban tactics that intentionally lead to
increased civilian casualties. In addition, we will
support a dramatic increase in the 2008 - 2009 UN
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) budget as UNAMA
opens six new provincial offices. We also seek better
donor coordination to improve economic development that
can increase jobs and long-term stability.

e. Iran: UNGA provides a platform to further increase
pressure on Iran consistent with the dual track strategy.
We should seek public and private support for a fourth
UNSC resolution imposing further sanctions on Iran. We
should further stress the need for strong cross-regional
support for an Iran human rights resolution in the Third
Committee. This includes commitment from member states to
oppose any no-action motion, which would end all debate on
the human rights situation in Iran at this UNGA session.
(NOTE: In 2007, the no-action motion on Iran failed by
only a single vote. END NOTE.) Iran has not complied with
UNSC resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803, all of which
mandate its suspension of proliferation-sensitive nuclear
activities. Iran has not only failed to provide a clear,
positive response to the refreshed P5+1 offer, but has
also refused to cooperate with the International Atomic
Energy Agency's (IAEA) investigation into its
weaponization activities. Iran also continues severe
restrictions on and violations of the rights of its
people, which the international community must continue to
condemn. We should also stress that Iran could play a
constructive role in Israel, the Palestinian Territories,
Lebanon, and Iraq by ending its lethal support to Hamas,
Hizballah, and Iraqi insurgents.

f. Iraq: The President and the Iraqi delegation will
co-host an event to thank Coalition partners and
participants in the NATO training mission for their
services in Iraq and to encourage them to continue their
contributions in other missions. We expect high-level
attendance at this event. In addition, we will continue
to re-iterate our commitment to helping the Iraqi people
achieve a democratic, stable, safe, and prosperous Iraq.
We urge real and prompt steps to allow the UN Assistance
Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) to implement its expanded mandate
to engage Baghdad on issues important for political
progress and national reconciliation, including:
internally disputed boundaries; provincial elections; and
regional engagement. We want to see progress on the
building of a new UN compound, and we look forward to full
Iraqi support, financially and otherwise, to this cause.
The U.S. also offers and seeks public expressions of
support for the International Compact and the Expanded
Neighbors process and for those countries not present in
Baghdad to enhance their diplomatic relations with Iraq.
We will thank those countries who have joined us in
contributing to the reduction of Iraq's debt burden, urge
others to deliver on their previous pledges of debt
reduction and financial and technical assistance, and
press remaining creditors for positive statements on debt
forgiveness.

g. Lebanon: While some parts of UNSC resolution 1701 have
been implemented, we remain deeply concerned about weapons
smuggling from Syria and the lack of progress in disarming
Hizballah and other militias. The recent report of the
Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team (LIBAT)
indicated no progress in stemming the arms flow from Syria
over the past two years. All provisions of resolution
1701 must be implemented. We strongly support the
decision of Syria and Lebanon to establish full diplomatic
relations and call for the speedy opening of Embassies in
Beirut and Damascus. Parallel to that, the two countries
should begin talks on the delineation of their border,
including in the Sheba'a Farms area. We also urge all
states to contribute to and support the establishment of
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.

h. Burma: Despite multiple visits by Secretary-General
Ban's envoy, Ibrahim Gambari, the regime has yet to engage
in a time-bound discussion with opposition leader Aung San

STATE 00099672 003 OF 005


Suu Kyi (ASSK). Likewise, it has made no progress on the
release of ASSK or other political prisoners. The U.S.
will coordinate with like-minded partners to refocus the
UN's efforts on what we consider to be core matters (e.g.,
release of political prisoners) and away from issues not
covered in the official mandate (e.g., possible assistance
to Burmese electoral commission, possible participation in
an economic forum). The EU plans to offer a resolution on
Burma's human rights record in the Third Committee, which
the U.S. fully supports. Gambari formally briefed the UN
Security Council on September 11 on the outcome of his
latest mission to Burma, despite continued opposition by
Russia and China to addressing Burma in the UNSC and amid
widespread sentiment that the Gambari mission has not been
successful. "Next steps" are the likely subject of
discussion at a Secretary-General-sponsored "Group of
Friends of the Secretary-General on Burma" meeting, to be
held at the Foreign Minister level on September 29.

i. Zimbabwe: We will continue to focus UNGA attention on
the situation in Zimbabwe and implementation of the
September 15 Agreement between the parties. The U.S.
hopes the agreement provides an opportunity to put
Zimbabwe on the path to democratic reform and economic
prosperity. If implemented, the agreement offers the
people of Zimbabwe a chance to live in peace without fear
of violence and intimidation. On March 29, the Zimbabwean
people voted for a change. The election of an MDC
Parliamentarian as Speaker of the Parliament is a step in
that direction. Despite opposition by Russia and China to
a UNSC resolution, neither have blocked Assistant
Secretary General Haile Menkerios from briefing the
Security Council on the status of the South African-led
negotiations or the humanitarian situation in the
country. After repeated diplomatic and NGO requests, the
government finally lifted the ban on non-government
organizations' and private voluntary organizations' field
operations, but left itself an opening to shut down
certain NGOs or activities as they review the documents
NGOs must submit by the end of September. We are
encouraged by the lifting of the ban but will watch
cautiously to see if unfettered humanitarian access
becomes a fact. We remain deeply concerned about ongoing
human rights violations, systematic harassment of the
opposition, and the dismantling of independent news media
and the judiciary.

j. Sudan/Darfur: The U.S. continues to implement the
President's $100 million train and equip program for
African UNAMID troops. Through this program we have
trained and/or equipped an additional 4,500 troops.
However, a combination of Government of Sudan obstacles,
Troop Contributor reluctance, and UN Secretariat
logistical constraints have blocked the rapid and
effective deployment of these troops to Darfur. There is
ample evidence that weapons and military equipment sold to
Sudan by a number of countries continue to surface in
Darfur. Several countries and organizations have proposed
deferring ICC action against President Bashir under
Article 16 of the Rome Statute via a UNSC resolution. The
U.S. has not taken a position on the issue; however, we
have signaled our support for accountability in Darfur.

k. Millennium Development Goals (MDGs): USAID
Administrator Henrietta Fore will participate in
Secretary-General Ban's September 25 High-Level Event on
the MDGs. The U.S. objective will be to emphasize our
support for the core MDGs of reducing poverty and hunger,
improving health and education, and combating major
diseases, with the focus on sound strategies for both
achieving and sustaining them. We will highlight our
strong track record in supporting poverty eradication
through sustained economic growth. Our approach to
development is centered on good governance, pro-growth
economic policies, investing in people, and addressing
fragile and failing states in need of special assistance.
At the same time, we will need to resist firmly a
continuing effort within the UN to expand the scope of the
MDGs (adding new targets and indicators) and to treat them
as a proxy for effective development strategies, which
need to be developed at the country level, rather than as
global benchmarks. In particular, the U.S. continues to
object to the recent assertion by the UN Secretariat of a
new MDG target on "universal access to reproductive
health," which has not been agreed to by UN Member
States. We should redirect any misguided and unproductive
debate over the amount of Official Development Assistance
(ODA) as a percentage of GDP to a discussion of the full
range of contributions to development, i.e., trade,
investment, and other private capital flows which are far
larger than ODA. By this "total economic engagement"

STATE 00099672 004 OF 005


measure, the U.S. leads the world in its contribution to
development. (See STATE 47433 for additional background
and guidance on the MDGs.)

l. Food Security: USAID will sponsor two food security
side events on September 23 - one highlighting
partnerships to increase agricultural investment, which
will include senior officials from government,
universities, and the private sector, and the other
advancing our dialogue on African-led agricultural
development in Africa through a small roundtable with
selected African heads of state, ministers, and leadership
from the African Union. The U.S. is the world's largest
food aid provider, and is meeting its G8 commitments and
taking a leadership role on global food security through a
three-part integrated strategy: 1) a robust, flexible
humanitarian response; 2) urgent measures to increase
agricultural production, productivity, and trade in
developing countries; and 3) supporting trade
liberalization and the use of advanced agricultural
technologies, such as biotechnology, to address the
systemic causes of high food prices. Secretary of
Agriculture Schafer (or Administrator Fore) will attend a
high-level dinner hosted by the Secretary-General to
address causes and effects of food insecurity. Priorities
for UNGA include furthering commitments made at the
High-Level Conference on World Food Security in Rome in
June and the G8 in July to develop a flexible
international partnership to address food security.

m. Free Trade: The President is expected to attend a
U.S.-hosted leaders meeting with Western Hemisphere
countries with which we have free trade agreements. This
will be an opportunity to take stock of the significant
progress we have made in our Hemisphere through shared
commitments to trade and investment liberalization, social
inclusion, rule of law, and democracy. Leaders will agree
at the meeting to increase our efforts to deepen our
cooperation to ensure that the benefits of free trade and
open investment are broadly shared throughout our
societies.


5. (SBU) Themes for the Regular Session of the UNGA:

a. Human Rights and Human Dignity: Reftel STATE 93981
provides detail on the U.S.' priorities for Third
Committee human rights priorities at this year's UNGA,
which include resolutions on the human rights situations
in Iran, Burma, and DPRK, as well as possible initiatives
on Zimbabwe and certain thematic human rights issues such
as freedom of expression, prisoners of conscience, and
close monitoring of discussions on "defamation of
religions." We face a number of tough votes on human
rights resolutions for which we will need the support of
capitals to win adoption. Our highest priority among the
country-specific measures is the Canadian-sponsored
resolution on human rights in Iran; last year, this
resolution survived a no-action motion by only one vote.
The above-mentioned cable requests posts to demarche at
the highest appropriate level to solicit support for U.S.
priority resolutions that will be offered, and to seek
host government views on other important resolutions that
may be offered in the upcoming fall session of the UNGA
Third Committee.

b. Climate Change: The 14th Conference of the Parties to
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
will take place in Poznan, Poland in December. With
accelerated meetings and ongoing discussions on a future
climate change agreement within the UNFCCC, climate change
will likely feature in a variety of discussions at the
UNGA. Further, a group of Small Island Developing States
is pushing a request that the UNGA and the UNSC address
the peace and security implications of climate change.
Our goal is to gain support for our priorities in a
climate change agreement, which include: Mitigation of
global emissions through commitments from all major
economies; Development and deployment of existing and new
low carbon technologies; Encouraging incorporation of
adaptation into national development strategies. UNGA
deliberations and decisions should not pre-judge nor
pre-empt negotiations under the Framework Convention.

c. Voting Blocs in the UN General Assembly: As key issues
of importance to U.S. policy interests, including Israel,
human rights, development assistance, and the UN budget
are increasingly brought to votes, one of our priorities
is more effective influence on other countries to improve
voting coincidence inside the UN with friendly nations.
This will entail assertive approaches to G-77 and
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries that have reasonably

STATE 00099672 005 OF 005


good relations with the U.S. but have a tendency to vote
on resolutions based on bloc positions, often irrespective
of resolution merits or individual countries' policy.
Therefore, at this session the Department will launch the
pilot phase of a long-term strategy in the UNGA to build
coalitions and establish new voting patterns where U.S.
and NAM or G-77 interests coincide. This pilot will
involve a list of 17 countries. Posts in those countries
will receive a separate cable requesting a demarche on the
subject.

d. UN Reform: Our focus continues to be on reforms that
improve oversight, accountability, and integrity. The
Secretary-General's public statements emphasize these
principles for the UN Secretariat, but he has not focused
on specific proposals to improve performance among the
UN's rank-and-file staff. In 2007, we launched our UN
Transparency and Accountability Initiative at 22 other UN
agencies to strengthen oversight and accountability,
increase public access to information, establish a
credible approach to ethical conduct and integrity, and
increase financial transparency. While most of these
agencies recognize the importance of our goals, much
remains to be done.

e. UN 2008 - 2009 Budget Add-ons: We support a biennial
budget that achieves maximum efficiency and the meaningful
ordering of priorities in the UN's program of work. We
intend to work to limit the level of real budget growth
that would result from approval of the proposed add-ons
and to impose discipline over the budget process,
continuing to object to the piecemeal approach to
budgeting.

f. UN Security Council Reform: In the 63rd session, the
main topic of discussion will be launching
inter-governmental negotiations outside the framework of
the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG). A number of Member
States, led by the G-4 (Brazil, India, Germany, Japan)
have grown frustrated with the inertia within the OEWG,
which was tasked with establishing the frameworks and
modalities prior to commencing negotiations. Our position
is that any inter-government negotiations should proceed
with pre-established rules and procedures, with consensus
being the final objective. We will closely monitor
progress on this issue to ensure that discussions occur
within the broader context of UN reform. We support
Japan's bid to become a permanent member of the UNSC.

Minimize considered.
RICE