Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE98969
2008-09-16 16:48:00
SECRET
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

SOLICITING SUPPORT TO PUSH CHINA ON

Tags:  ECON EFIN KNNP PARM PTER IR UK CH SK HK PINR 
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VZCZCXYZ0017
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #8969 2601656
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 161648Z SEP 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE 0000
S E C R E T STATE 098969 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2033
TAGS: ECON EFIN KNNP PARM PTER IR UK CH SK HK PINR
SUBJECT: SOLICITING SUPPORT TO PUSH CHINA ON
PROLIFERATION-RELATED TRADE WITH IRAN

Classified By: EAP A/S CHRISTOPHER R. HILL for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T STATE 098969

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2033
TAGS: ECON EFIN KNNP PARM PTER IR UK CH SK HK PINR
SUBJECT: SOLICITING SUPPORT TO PUSH CHINA ON
PROLIFERATION-RELATED TRADE WITH IRAN

Classified By: EAP A/S CHRISTOPHER R. HILL for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is an action request. Please see para 4.

--------------
SUMMARY/BACKGROUND
--------------


2. (S) Singapore is one of the busiest transshipment points
for trade between China and Iran. As such, and as a friend
and partner of the United States, it is a key player in
combating proliferation and enforcing United Nations Security
Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) directed at thwarting Iran's
development of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
Singapore could also bring to bear limited, but potentially
effective pressure on China to aggressively implement UNSCRs
as well as more effectively enforce China's own export
controls regarding transfers of dual-use and military items
to Iran. We are therefore seeking Singapore's cooperation
in convincing Beijing to stop Chinese entities from selling
commodities used in Iran's weapons programs.


3. (S) Ships carrying cargo of proliferation concern from
China to Iran regularly call in Singapore for services or
transshipping of cargo. The United States has on occasion
requested Singapore to detain and inspect cargo based upon
information indicating an Iranian end-user designated under
applicable UN Security Council Resolution. Singapore has
been willing to take appropriate action on occasions in the
past, but then faces the problem of the disposition of seized
items. We want to inform Singapore of our efforts to
constructively address China's proliferation to Iran and
suggest Singapore raise its own concerns with China.

--------------
OBJECTIVE/ACTION REQUEST
--------------


4. (S) Post is instructed to present the non-paper at para 5
to appropriate host government officials, with the aim of
pursuing the following objectives:

-- Outline our concerns with appropriate host government

officials;

-- Inform Singapore of our efforts to constructively address
China's proliferation to Iran by pushing for action at the
source of the shipments in China; and

-- Suggest that host government approach China for corrective
measures to prevent illicit shipments from reaching
Singapore.

--------------
NONPAPER FOR SINGAPORE
--------------


5. (SECRET//REL SINGAPORE) BEGIN POINTS:

-- We are sharing information with a number of key partners
to develop a concerted diplomatic approach to China to
persuade China to enforce its export control laws more
effectively. We also seek to press Beijing to aggressively
implement relevant UNSCRs to prevent transfers and
transshipment of items that could be used to bolster Iran's
nuclear and ballistic missile programs or of conventional
arms to Iran.

-- Your port is one of the busiest transshipment points for
trade between China and Iran and we are seeking your advice
and assistance in working with China to stem transfers of
WMD-related items and technology.

-- Over the past several years, the United States has made
repeated approaches to Beijing at all levels regarding
transfers by Chinese entities of weapons-related items to
Iran, as well as transshipments of concern via Chinese sea
ports.

-- While China's nonproliferation record has improved in some
areas, certain state-owned Chinese entities and private firms
continue to export or transship key items and/or dual-use
technology needed to develop weapons of mass destruction or
their means of delivery.

-- Chinese companies continue to deal with companies that are
fronts for entities designated under UNSCRs 1737, 1747, and

1803.

-- Our information suggests that Chinese companies continue
to transfer items to Iran, regardless of end-user, that are
prohibited pursuant to UNSCRs 1737, 1747, and 1803 due to
their possible use in Iran's nuclear or delivery vehicle
programs.

-- We would be interested in beginning a dialogue with you
about these proliferation concerns and hearing your ideas on
how to approach this issue with the Chinese.

-- We have attempted to drive home to Chinese officials that
if China comes to be perceived within the United States as a
supporter or defender of Iran, a country widely viewed as a
sponsor of terrorism and one that refuses to address
international concerns over its nuclear programs, this could
ultimately damage China's reputation and its bilateral
relationship with the United States.

-- Our engagement with China highlights the importance of
Beijing setting a good example as a responsible international
stakeholder and actor on nonproliferation issues in general.

-- We look forward to working with you on this and other
related security and counter-proliferation matters, and are
prepared to provide additional information as appropriate.

END POINTS FOR SINGAPORE.

--------------
REPORTING DEADLINE
--------------


6. (U) Posts should report results within two weeks of
delivery. Please slug replies for ISN, INR, T, Treasury,
NEA, and EAP. Please include SIPDIS in all replies.

--------------
POINT OF CONTACT
--------------


7. (U) Washington points of contact for follow-up
information are M.G. Coppola, EAP/MTS, (202) 647-2769,
coppolamg@state.sgov.gov, and Michelle New, ISN/CPI, (202)
647-0186, newml@state.sgov.gov.


8. (U) Department thanks Post for its assistance.
RICE