Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE97395
2008-09-11 17:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

CORRECTED COPY: SUPPORTING AMENDMENT OF THE ISAF

Tags:  NATO PREL MOPS MARR AF 
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VZCZCXYZ0013
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #7395 2551712
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 111708Z SEP 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0000
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 0000
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0000
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 097395 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2018
TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS MARR AF
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY: SUPPORTING AMENDMENT OF THE ISAF
OPLAN TO EXPAND CN AUTHORITIES

Classified By: EUR Acting DAS Nerissa Cook
for Reasons 1.4 (b, d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 097395

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2018
TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS MARR AF
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY: SUPPORTING AMENDMENT OF THE ISAF
OPLAN TO EXPAND CN AUTHORITIES

Classified By: EUR Acting DAS Nerissa Cook
for Reasons 1.4 (b, d)


1. (U) This is a CORRECTED action request. Please see
paragraph 4. CORRECTIONS: demarche shuold be delivered only
to NATO Allies and points in paragraph 4 are classified as
Confidential/Releasable to NATO.


2. (C) BACKGROUND: On June 11, Supreme Allied
Commander-Europe (SACEUR),U.S. General Craddock, proposed to
NATO Defense Ministers an amendment to the Counternarcotics
Annex of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
Operations Plan (OPLAN) to authorize ISAF forces to interdict
narcotics production and trafficking facilities where such
action would offer a direct military advantage. Secretary
Gates and then-Ambassador Nuland spoke out strongly in
support of the amendment, and in response the North Atlantic
Council (NAC) requested advice from NATO Military
Authorities. In August, the NAC received recommendations
that supported expanding ISAF's current authorities, citing
the link between the narcotics industry and the insurgency.
These recommendations are now stalled in NATO's Military
Committee, where objections from key Allies are blocking an
agreement that would allow the amendments to go before the
NAC for final decision. Progress can only be achieved at a
higher level, namely at a meeting of NATO Chiefs of Defense
on September 12, 2008, in Brussels.


3. (C) The UK is planning a demarche to key Allies
(Washington, Paris, Berlin, Madrid, Ankara, Ottawa, Tallinn,
The Hague, Budapest) in support of amending the OPLAN to
grant ISAF interdiction authorities, but in a manner that
would significantly limit ISAF's flexibility (the U.S. favors
a broader approach). The UK seeks to set conditions on
interdiction operations based on the availability of
intelligence demonstrating a clear nexus between a specific
counternarcotics target and the counterinsurgency campaign.
Such a requirement could effectively paralyze ISAF
interdiction operations due to the need for legally "iron
clad" evidence.


4. (C/REL NATO) ACTION REQUEST: Action Addressees are
requested to approach senior-level government officials,

civilian and military, to urge support for SACEUR's
recommendation to amend the Counternarcotics Annex of the
ISAF OPLAN to authorize ISAF forces to interdict narcotics
production and trafficking facilities. Post should send a
front-channel response slugged for EUR/RPM and SCA/A by
September 12, 2008. Posts should draw from the following
points:

-- Proceeds from the narcotics trade are an important source
of funds for insurgents in Afghanistan who conduct attacks on
NATO and Afghan troops as well as Afghan civilians.

-- In short, there is a direct link between the drug trade
and the insurgency.

-- Consequently, SACEUR has requested an expansion of ISAF
authorities to allow counternarcotics interdiction missions.

-- For clarity, there is no proposal that ISAF troops should
be employed in eradication operations.

-- The recent UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report on
Crop Production in Afghanistan reinforces the correlation
between insecurity and poppy cultivation, reporting that 98
percent of Afghanistan's poppy production now occurs in the
most insecure areas of south and southwestern Afghanistan.

-- UNODC Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa recently
addressed the NAC and offered his strong support for greater
NATO engagement on counternarcotics, mentioning a number of
areas where NATO could play an expanded role in, inter alia,
destroying high-value targets (labs, markets, convoys),
seizing precursor chemicals, and working to enhance
provincial and border security in high poppy and
opiate-transit provinces.

-- Integration of counter-narcotics interdiction activities
into ISAF's campaign would be a force multiplier in this
challenging fight against the drug trade, which funds
violence and instability, fuels the insurgency, and
undermines legitimate economic development and governance.

-- If the Military Committee (MC) cannot agree on its advice
to the NAC in response to SACEUR's request, then the NAC
should deal with the request without that advice. We cannot
allow obstructionism in the MC to indefinitely delay a
response.

-- We urge your government to support expanding ISAF's
authorities to conduct counternarcotics interdiction through
an amendment to the CN Annex of the OPLAN, in line with
SACEUR's request.

-- While eliminating the trade in illicit narcotics is an
Afghan responsibility, Afghan authorities currently lack, and
will continue to lack in the near future, the capacity
themselves to combat trafficking in narcotics.

-- ISAF interdiction operations would fill a critical gap
until such time as the Afghan security forces have a more
developed capacity to discharge these responsibilities
effectively.

-- In amending the OPLAN, we should avoid qualifiers that
might restrict commanders' ability to act in response to a
threat to their forces or to enhance force protection.
Authority should rest within the theater. To address the
issue of national caveats, the broader counternarcotics
authorities should be structured in such a way as to allow
nations to opt into them (rather than opt out).

-- Currently there is no deterrent to engaging in the trade.
This amendment will help provide a deterrent and thereby
hamper funding of insurgent activities.


5. POINT OF CONTACT: Department appreciates Post's
assistance in assuring the success of this critical
requirement. The point of contact for this cable is Chris
Dorle, EUR/RPM, 202-646-7293.
RICE