REVISED: VISIT OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD

S E C R E T STATE 097389

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2033
TAGS: EFIN FR GM IR IS KNNP MNUC PARM PREL SZ UK
SUBJECT: REVISED: VISIT OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD
CORPS OFFICIALS TO GERMAN AND SWISS UNDERGROUND
CONSTRUCTION FIRMS

Classified By: ISN PDAS PATRICIA A. MCNERNEY
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 3.

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SUMMARY
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2. (S) Representatives of an Iranian underground construction
company affiliated with the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC) planned to visit underground equipment
manufacturers in Germany and Switzerland from 14 to 26 April

2008. The U.S. would like to inform Germany and Switzerland
of this visit, urge appropriate authorities in those
countries to investigate such contacts, and to take steps to
freeze any accounts held or transactions conducted in support
of proliferation-related activities.


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OBJECTIVES/ACTION REQUEST
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3. (S//NF) Posts are requested to pursue the following
objectives:

-- Alert host government officials to information we have
about planned commercial contacts between companies in their
jurisdictions and an IRGC-affiliated company.

-- Remind host governments that the IRGC was designated
under U.S. Executive Order (E.O.) 13382 on October 25, 2007
for its involvement in proliferation-related activities.
Many IRGC-related individuals have also been designated by
the UN Security Council in Resolutions 1737 and 1747 for
their involvement in Iran's nuclear and missile programs.

-- Urge appropriate authorities to investigate whether these
meetings took place and end any commercial or financial
relationships that host country's firms may have with
IRGC-affiliated entities and individuals to ensure that the
IRGC does not facilitate proliferation-related activities in
the jurisdiction of host countries, in circumvention of UNSC
sanctions.

This cable was originally issued as STATE 095843 and is being
reissued to correct classification markings. Post may leave
the points in paragraph 4 with host government interlocutor
as a SECRET//REL non-paper.

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BACKGROUND AND NONPAPER
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4. (S//REL GERMANY, SWITZERLAND) FOR GERMANY AND SWITZERLAND
ONLY:

-- We would like to inform you of possible Iranian financial
activities that could aid Iran's proliferation efforts.

(S//REL FRANCE, UK, AND ISRAEL) FOR FRANCE, UK, AND ISRAEL
ONLY:

-- In the spirit of our cooperation on countering Iran's
proliferation-related activities, we are sharing this
information in order to keep you as informed as possible
whenever new information comes to light on different methods,
routes, or tactics Iran is employing to advance its
proliferation activities and potentially evade sanctions
placed upon it by the UN Security Council. We believe
sharing this information will help build support for our
shared goal of disrupting and impeding Iran's efforts to
facilitate proliferation-related activities.

(S//REL GERMANY, SWITZERLAND, FRANCE, UK, AND ISRAEL) FOR
GERMANY, SWITZERLAND, FRANCE, UK, AND ISRAEL:

-- Representatives of an Iranian underground construction
company affiliated with the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC) planned to visit underground equipment
manufacturers in Germany and Switzerland from 14 to 26 April

2008.

-- The itinerary for this trip included visits to German
companies Wirth, Herrenknecht, Muhlhauser, and Swiss company
Rowa.

-- As you know, the IRGC was designated under U.S. Executive
Order (E.O.) 13382 on October 25, 2007 for its involvement in
proliferation-related activities. Many IRGC-related
individuals have also been designated by the UN Security
Council in Resolutions 1737 and 1747 for their involvement in
Iran's nuclear and missile programs.

-- Considered the military vanguard of Iran, the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is charged by the Iranian
Constitution to protect the theocracy, defend the clerical
regime against internal and external threats, and aid
oppressed Muslims throughout the world. It is the chief
defender of the ideals of the Iranian Revolution and is part
of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's powerbase.
The IRGC is composed of five branches (air, ground, naval,
Basij militia, and Qods Force special operations) overseen by
a counterintelligence directorate and representatives of the
Supreme Leader. It runs prisons, and has numerous economic
interests involving defense production and construction.

-- The IRGC has not been shy in its public statements about
its willingness to engage in the proliferation of the
WMD-capable missiles it controls. The IRGC's missile
inventory includes the Shahab-1, 2 and 3 missiles, all of
which could be used to deliver WMD. The IRGC has broad links
to Iran's ballistic missile programs and is one of the
primary regime organizations tied to developing and testing
the Shahab-3 program. The IRGC attempted as recently as 2006
to procure sophisticated and costly equipment that could be
used to support Iran's missile and nuclear programs.

-- UNSCRs 1737 and 1747 require States to freeze the assets
of entities and individuals that are designated in the
annexes of those resolutions, as well as to freeze the assets
of entities and individuals that are acting on behalf of or
at the direction of, or entities that are owned or controlled
by, those designated entities.

-- We urge you to investigate whether these meetings took
place, to encourage an end to any commercial or financial
relationships that your country's firms have with
IRGC-affiliated entities and individuals, and to ensure that
the IRGC does not facilitate proliferation-related activities
in your jurisdiction in circumvention of UNSC sanctions.

-- We look forward to working with you on this and other
related security and counter-proliferation matters, and are
prepared to provide additional assistance as appropriate.

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REPORTING DEADLINE
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5. (U) Please report delivery of the U.S. non-paper and
any response within seven days of receipt of this cable.
Please slug replies for EUR, ISN, T, TREASURY, and NEA/IR.
Please use SIPDIS caption on all responses.

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POINT OF CONTACT
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6. (U) Washington point of contact for follow-up information
is Kevin McGeehan, ISN/CPI, (202) 647-5408,
McGeehanKJ@state.sgov.gov.


7. (U) Department thanks Post for its assistance.
RICE