CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: MEMORANDUM OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 097064

SIPDIS
THE HAGUE FOR CWC DEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2018
TAGS: KTIA PARM PREL CWC NO
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING WITH NORWAY ON CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS (SBU)

REF: A. OSLO 000769

B. STATE 163675

C. THE HAGUE 000425

Classified By: ISN/CB Office Robert Mikulak, reasons: 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (U) This is an action request; please see paragraph 9.

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OBJECTIVES
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2. (C-Rel Norway) Department requests Embassy to pursue the
following objectives:

-- Work with the Government of Norway to negotiate a Host
Country Agreement (HCA) on the conduct of Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) challenge inspections before a challenge
inspection occurs.

-- Set up a meeting between U.S. and Norwegian officials in
Oslo on December 8, 2008.

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REPORTING DEADLINE
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3. (U) Embassy should report results of discussions with
Norwegian officials by cable to ISN/CB Eugene Klimson NLT
October 10, 2008.

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POINT OF CONTACT
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4. (U) Please contact ISN/CB Eugene Klimson at (202)
647-5165 or via email for any further background needed to
meet our objectives.

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Background
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5. (C-Rel Norway) The United States and Norway have been
negotiating a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Host Country
Agreement (HCA) since 1997. In 2005, Norway provided a draft
to the United States to which the United States responded in
January 2006. In June 2006, efforts to arrange a meeting in
Norway between the two countries failed. Since then, Norway
has not provided any written comments to the United States on
its counterproposals. However, it did indicate in June 2006
that an issue of contention was the designation of the
inspected State Party (REF A).


6. (C-Rel Norway) In November 2007, Dr. Deborah Ozga of the
Joint Staff met briefly with Norwegian representative
Ambassador Knut Langeland of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
During the discussions, Langeland noted the failed attempts
to arrange a bilateral meeting in Oslo to discuss the
agreement, but expressed a willingness to discuss the matter
in The Hague. The United States suggested that both parties
plan to meet for substantive negotiations during the upcoming
CWC Review Conference (REVCON) in April 2008 (REF B).


7. (U) During the REVCON, Amb. Langeland apologized that he
was not prepared to have a discussion, because Norway,s
lawyer was unable to attend. Aside from noting the
preference for avoiding language that would indicate a bias
towards a challenge inspection of U.S. assets in Norway,
Langeland could not provide any other comments on the text.
He requested that the U.S. send a delegation to Norway so
they could meet with several Norwegian experts. U.S. Delrep
said that due to budget constraints, immediate travel was not
very likely. Amb. Langeland noted that they could try to
plan around the Executive Council (REF C).


8. (U) Washington would like to pursue a visit to Norway,
worked around the Conference of States Parties scheduled to
take place December 2-5, 2008. The preferred date of a
meeting is December 8th.

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ACTION REQUEST
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9. (C-Rel Norway) Drawing on the background and talking
points, Embassy Oslo is requested to deliver the talking
points in paragraph 10, and the draft HCA text in paragraph
11, to the appropriate Norwegian officials and report the
results of these discussions to Washington by October 10,

2008.

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TALKING POINTS
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10. (C-Rel Norway) Talking points for delivery:

- The United States appreciates Norway's continued
cooperation in working towards the conclusion of a Host
Country Agreement (HCA) in the event of a Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) challenge inspection involving both U.S. and
Norwegian assets.

- During the CWC Review Conference in The Hague in April
2008, our representative, Dr. Deborah Ozga, met with
Ambassador Knut Langeland from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to discuss the prospect of continuing our
negotiations on a CWC HCA.

- Amb. Langeland requested that the United States send a
delegation to Oslo to meet with Ministry representatives.
Amb. Langeland also indicated that Oslo would be willing to
work around the CWC meetings so as to reduce the travel
requirements for U.S. delegates.

- We would like to accommodate Norway,s request and
recommend that we schedule a visit by Dr. Deborah Ozga
following the Conference of States Parties that is scheduled
to take place December 2-5, 2008.

- We propose that the meeting be held on Monday, December 8th
in Oslo following the Conference of the States Parties.

- In addition, Ambassador Langland made a preliminary
observation on the text that it was biased towards an
inspection in Norway. We have updated the text to reflect
his comments and added some clarifications.

- We are providing this for your review in anticipation of
meeting in December.
(Hand over draft text).

- We look forward to further discussions.

End talking points.

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DRAFT TEXT
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11. (C-Rel Norway) Text for Delivery to Norwegian Officials:

Memorandum of Understanding

Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of
America (hereinafter the "United States") and the Kingdom of
Norway (hereinafter "Norway") concerning procedures for
inspections pursuant to Article IX and the Annex On
Implementation and Verification (hereinafter the
"Verification Annex" or "VA") of the Convention On the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and On Their Destruction, opened for
signature on January 13, 1993 (hereinafter the "Convention8
or the "CWC"),conducted on the territory of one of the
Participants but involving vessels, aircraft, or assets
operated and/or owned by the other Participant.

This Memorandum should be interpreted in a manner that is
consistent with the Convention and any agreements between
Norway or the United States and the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (hereinafter the
"Organisation8 or "OPCW8). In the event of a conflict
between the provisions of the Convention or such other
agreements and this Memorandum, the provisions of the
Convention or said agreements are to take precedence.
Notwithstanding any language used herein, this Memorandum
does not create any rights or obligations for the
Participants under international law.


I. Definitions.


A. "Participant(s)8 refers to the Government of the Kingdom
of Norway (hereinafter referred to as &Norway8),the
Government of the United States of America (hereinafter
referred to as the &United States8) or, collectively, to
both.


B. "Host State Participant8 refers to the Participant on
whose territory a challenge inspection takes place.


C. "Other Participant8 refers to the Participant whose
assets may be affected by a challenge inspection on the
territory of a host State Participant.


D. "Other State Party8 refers to the Participant that is
not designated as the CWC State Party that is being inspected.


E. &Government sovereign vessels or aircraft8 refers to
public vessels (including warships, under customary
international law as reflected in Article 29 of the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, or other
ships owned or operated by a state and used only for
government noncommercial service),or state aircraft.

II. PROCEDURES CONCERNING INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED ON THE
TERRITORY OF THE HOST STATE PARTICIPANT, OR ANY OTHER PLACE
UNDER THE HOST STATE PARTICIPANT,S JURISDICTION AND CONTROL,
THAT AFFECT THE OTHER PARTICIPANT

The following procedures are to apply in the case where the
Host State Participant receives a notification from the
Director-General of the Organisation about the Organisation's
intent to conduct an inspection, pursuant to Article IX of
the CWC and Part X of the Verification Annex, on the
territory of the Host State Participant.


A. NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES


1. When, in the case of a Challenge Inspection (CI),the
Inspected State Party (ISP) is notified of the location of an
inspection site, and if on the basis of available
information, the possibility cannot be ruled out by the ISP
that an asset of the other State Party may be affected, the
ISP is to inform the other State Party within two hours of
receipt of the notification. Norway should contact the
United States Nuclear Risk Reduction Center at
01-202-647-0025, Fax 01-202-647-4892, and the United States
European Command Joint Operations Center,
0049-711-680-5065/7, Fax 0049-711-680-5066. The United
States should contact Norway through the duty officer at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs at tel. 47 22 24 35 62/63
(direct) or 47 22 24 35 64/ 47 22 24 36 00, fax: 47 22 24 95
80/81, e-mail: saksbehandlervakten@mfa.no.


2. After the ISP notifies the other State Party, the other
State Party notified should acknowledge receipt of the
notification promptly. At a minimum, notification between
Participants is to include the information enumerated in
section D (32(B)-(F)),Part II and section B (4 and 7),Part
X of the Verification Annex. The Participants are to
continue to update each other regarding any additional
information received from the OPCW prior to the arrival of
the inspection team at the point of entry.


3. The other State Party is to confirm with the ISP whether
equipment or installations belonging to it are present within
the inspection site or in the immediate vicinity of the
requested perimeter. The Participants are to update each
other on the existence of any agreements they might have with
the OPCW relevant to this Memorandum without delay following
the other State Party,s acknowledgement of the CI
notification from the ISP.


4. If assets of the other State Party are affected by the
inspection, the ISP is to advise the inspection team that the
inspection affects assets of both Participants. The
inspection team may be briefed by facility representatives
from both Participants.


5. The ISP is to be responsible for inspection activities of
all assets, except assets belonging to the other State Party
located within the area to be inspected. The ISP is to brief
the inspection team on the availability of all facility
personnel and records, except those of the other State Party
which will be briefed by the other State Party,s liaison
team.


B. LIAISON TEAM PROCEDURES


1. The other Participant is to provide a liaison team no
later than at the time of arrival of the inspection team at
the point of entry. The Host State Participant is to
expedite the entry of the other Participant,s personnel and
their equipment and materiel (possibly including a mobile
laboratory),into its territory.


2. The liaison team is to travel with the Host State
Participant,s escort team and be available on short notice
to accompany the escort team.


3. The liaison team is to have the right at the point of
entry to participate in the examination of equipment and
supplies that the inspection team brings into the territory
of the Host State Participant pursuant to Part II, section C,
paragraph 29 of the VA when equipment and installations
belonging to the other Participant may be affected by the
inspection. The other Participant is to escort the
inspection team during inspection of equipment,
installations, or assets belonging to the other Participant
until the inspection team completes that part of the
inspection.


4. Unless otherwise stated in this Memorandum, the liaison
team is to play no role on the Host State Participant,s
escort team until equipment, installations, or assets
belonging to the other Participant are encountered during an
inspection. In cases where a facility belonging exclusively
to the Host State Participant (or a part of a facility
belonging exclusively to the Host State Participant) is to be
inspected, no representative of the other Participant,s
liaison team is to participate unless invited to do so by the
Host State Participant.


5. Equipment or installations belonging to the other
Participant are not to be inspected until a representative of
the other Participant is available to escort the inspection
team in accordance with paragraph B.1.of this Memorandum.


6. The ISP is to exercise the rights and obligations of the
ISP, such as provisions concerning the designation of
sensitive points, shrouding, and other access control, and is
to respect the other State Party's positions regarding
provisions specified in the VA, Part X, section C: Conduct
of Inspections, Managed Access, paragraphs 48 (a)-(g),with
respect to the other State Party,s equipment or
installations.


7. Both State Parties retain their full sovereign rights
with regard to their government sovereign vessels and
aircraft. When government sovereign vessels and aircraft are
the object of an inspection, the State Party owning or
operating such assets should be the ISP. If the State Party
not owning these assets is designated as the ISP, the
Governments should advise the OPCW that the government vessel
or aircraft is solely under the jurisdiction and control of
the other State Party and that, therefore, the other
Government should be the ISP regarding that vessel or
aircraft.


8. Any ambiguity concerning equipment or installations
belonging to the other State Party is to be addressed by the
other State Party,s liaison team. The senior member of the
other State Party is to consult with the ISP,s escort team
leader prior to communicating with the inspection team.


9. The other Participant,s liaison team is to be furnished
transportation, lodging, meals, work space, and, as
necessary, medical care or any other emergency assistance by
the Host State Participant. The other Participant is to bear
the expenses for all of the above services furnished by the
Host State Participant to the other Participant,s liaison
teams.


C. INSPECTION SITE PROCEDURES

The following procedures are to apply at inspection sites
where equipment, installations, or assets belonging to the
other State Party are present:


1. The leader of the escort team is to be a representative
of the ISP, except when equipment, installations, or assets
of the other State Party are inspected in which case the
other State Party will lead the escort team.


2. The pre-inspection briefing is the responsibility of the
ISP and is to be presented by a representative of the ISP.
If facilities belonging to both Participants are to be
inspected, the pre-inspection briefing is to consist of two
parts, with each participant briefing its own facilities.
Representatives of both Participants are to be present during
both parts of the presentation to answer any questions that
might arise concerning equipment and installations at the
inspection site. The ISP is to consult with the liaison
officers of the other State Party on the implications of any
proposals that might be made on an alternative perimeter, and
before any decision is made on the final perimeter. The
other State Party is to have, if deemed necessary, up to 108
hours from the inspection team's arrival at the point of
entry before it provides access to its assets inside the
perimeter.


3. When the inspection is being conducted at or in the
immediate vicinity of a military installation of the Host
State Participant, the Host State Participant is to hold the
pre-inspection briefing, with representatives of the other
Participant briefing any portions of the site in which the
other Participant,s assets may be affected by the challenge
inspection.


4. Upon receipt of the preliminary inspection report
("Preliminary Findings (PF)"),the ISP is to transmit,
without delay, a copy of relevant parts of the report to the
other State Party that may concern the other State Party,s
assets.


5. Upon receipt of the draft final inspection report (FIR),
the ISP is to exercise the rights of the ISP, pursuant to
Part X, D, paragraph 61 of the VA. The ISP will share those
parts of the report with the other State Party that are
findings related to the other State Party,s assets, and
submit any proposals made by the other State Party for
changes to the draft FIR to the OPCW Technical Secretariat as
soon as possible after receipt from the other State Party.


6. The Participants agree that, regardless of the location
of the inspection, the language used during the inspection is
to be English.


7. The ISP is to be responsible for providing or arranging
for all services described in the VA, Part II C, paragraph 26.

II. PROCEDURES CONCERNING INSPECTIONS SOLELY INVOLVING
VESSELS, AIRCRAFT, OR ASSETS (FACILITIES, EQUIPMENT, AREAS,
BUILDINGS, OR LOCATIONS) OPERATED AND/OR OWNED BY THE OTHER
STATE PARTY THAT ARE LOCATED IN HOST STATE PARTICIPANT
TERRITORY


A. In the case of a challenge inspection solely involving
vessels, aircraft, or assets operated and/or owned by the
other Participant but located in the Host State
Participant,s territory, the other Participant is to
exercise the rights and obligations of the ISP, such as
provisions concerning the designation of sensitive points,
shrouding, and other access control. The Host State
Participant is to facilitate the inspection of such vessels,
aircraft, or assets, and provide for the necessary support to
the inspection team and to the other Participant. The other
Participant is to inform the Host State Participant within
two hours of receipt of the CI notification.


B. Representatives from both Participants are to take part
in the perimeter negotiations. Both Participants are to
mutually consent to an alternate perimeter before this is
offered to the inspection team. The other Participant is to
advise the inspection team if the Host State Participant,s
assets may be within the inspectable area.


C. If the requested or the alternate perimeter includes Host
State Participant assets, the Host State Participant may
provide a liaison team to the other Participant,s escort
team no later than at the time of arrival of the inspection
team at the point of entry. The other Participant is to
expedite the access of the liaison officers and their
equipment and material into its assets.

III. PROTECTION OF INFORMATION


A. Each Participant is to take all lawful steps available to
prevent disclosure of all information exchanged in confidence
under this Memorandum and is to also take into account its
obligations under the CWC to treat information that it
receives from the OPCW in accordance with the level of
confidentiality established for that information (CWC Annex
on the Protection of Confidential Information, Chapter A,
paragraph 4). Any request for information from third
countries is to be referred to the originating Participant.


B. All information and material arising out of Section IV is
to continue to be protected in the event of withdrawal by
either participant or upon termination of this Memorandum.

IV. SECURITY


A. Classified information exchanged or generated in
connection with this Memorandum is to be marked in one of the
following security classification levels:

U.S. NORWAY
-------------- --------------
TOP SECRET STRENGT HEMMELIG
SECRET HEMMELIG
CONFIDENTIAL KONFIDENSIELT
(No equivalent) BEGRENSET


B. All classified information exchanged or generated in
connection with this Memorandum is to be used, transmitted,
stored, handled, and safeguarded in accordance with the
provisions of the Agreement on the Safeguarding of Classified
Information between the Government of the United States and
the Government of Norway, entered into by an exchange of
notes on February 26, 1970.


C. Norwegian information classified "BEGRENSET" is to be
safeguarded in the United States in accordance with the
principles laid down in the NATO - Document C-M(2002)49 and
supporting directives regarding information classified
NATO-RESTRICTED.


V. SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES:

Any dispute regarding the interpretation and application of
this Memorandum is to be resolved exclusively by means of
negotiations and consultations between the Participants.

VI. AMENDMENTS

Amendments to the above procedures may be made at any time by
mutual agreement of the Participants.

VII. DURATION AND ENTRY INTO EFFECT

This Memorandum is valid upon the date of the last signature
and is to remain valid until terminated either by the mutual
agreement of the Participants or by the withdrawal of one of
the Participants. A Participant is to give a one-year
written notice to the other Participant before such
withdrawal.

Signed this -------------- day of -------------- , in the
English and Norwegian languages.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA OF THE KINGDOM OF NORWAY

End draft text.
RICE