Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE93765
2008-09-02 17:26:00
SECRET
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

CONTINUED COOPERATION BETWEEN SINGAPORE'S ACE

Tags:  PARM MTCRE PREL SN PK 
pdf how-to read a cable
P 021726Z SEP 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO PAGE 02 STATE 093765 021728Z
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY
S E C R E T STATE 093765 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2033
TAGS: PARM MTCRE PREL SN PK

SUBJECT: CONTINUED COOPERATION BETWEEN SINGAPORE'S ACE
PRESSUREWELD AND PAKISTAN (S)

REF: A. 07 STATE 016106

B. 07 SINGAPORE 000803

C. 07 STATE 132776

D. 07 SINGAPORE 001797

E. 07 STATE 159276

F. 07 SINGAPORE 002128

G. STATE 059289

H. SINGAPORE 000639

Classified By: EAP/MTS DIRECTOR KAMALA S. LAKHDHIR
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B),(C) AND (D).

S E C R E T STATE 093765

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2033
TAGS: PARM MTCRE PREL SN PK

SUBJECT: CONTINUED COOPERATION BETWEEN SINGAPORE'S ACE
PRESSUREWELD AND PAKISTAN (S)

REF: A. 07 STATE 016106

B. 07 SINGAPORE 000803

C. 07 STATE 132776

D. 07 SINGAPORE 001797

E. 07 STATE 159276

F. 07 SINGAPORE 002128

G. STATE 059289

H. SINGAPORE 000639

Classified By: EAP/MTS DIRECTOR KAMALA S. LAKHDHIR
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B),(C) AND (D).


1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Singapore, please
see paragraph 5.


2. (S) Background: On several occasions since September
2007, the United States has alerted the government of
Singapore to efforts by the Singaporean firm Ace Pressureweld
and the Pakistani trading company Sahara International to
supply a variety of controlled items to entities affiliated
with Pakistan's missile and nuclear programs (Reftels). In
response, Singapore indicated it was monitoring Ace
Pressureweld's activities and had initiated a direct dialogue
with the company regarding its export control obligations
under Singapore's law (Refs D and F).


3. (S) In June 2008, we alerted Singapore that Ace
Pressureweld and Sahara International were working to procure
a variety of computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine
tools, including a 5-axis machining center controlled by the
Wassenaar Arrangement and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
Sahara International was attempting to acquire this equipment
on behalf of Pakistan's Progressive Engineering, which has
been associated with an entity responsible for overseeing the
development of short range ballistic missiles (Ref G).
Singapore authorities responded to this information by noting
that they were auditing Ace Pressureweld, but had not
actually begun to formally investigate this company (Ref H).


4. (S) We would like to inform Singapore officials that it
appears Ace Pressureweld is continuing to broker
proliferation-related sales to Pakistan. For example, as
recently as July 2008, Ace Pressureweld and Sahara
International were working to procure a heavy duty turning
center on behalf of an entity associated with Pakistan's
missile program. We would like to emphasize that the United
States remains concerned about Ace Pressureweld's exports to
Pakistan and request that Singapore authorities provide us an

update of the actions they have taken in this case. We again
urge Singapore to use all available measures to prevent Ace
Pressureweld from acting as a source of supply to
proliferation programs in Pakistan. (Note for Post: If
Singapore officials ask whether this machine is controlled,
Post should note that this machine is not controlled under
any of the multilateral export control regimes. End note.)


5. (S) Action Request: Request Embassy Singapore approach
appropriate host government officials to deliver talking
points/non-paper in paragraph 6 below and report response.
Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper.


6. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:

(SECRET REL SINGAPORE)

-- On several occasions since September 2007, the United
States has alerted the government of Singapore to the efforts
of the Singaporean firm Ace Pressureweld and the Pakistani
trading company Sahara International to supply a variety of
controlled items to entities affiliated with Pakistan's
missile and nuclear programs.

-- In our discussions of this case, you indicated that
appropriate authorities were investigating the activities of
Ace Pressureweld and had initiated a direct dialogue with the
company regarding its export control obligations under
Singapore law.

-- In June 2008, we informed you that Ace Pressureweld and
Sahara International were working to procure a variety of
computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools,
including a 5-axis machining center controlled by the
Wassenaar Arrangement and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG),on
behalf of Pakistan's Progressive Engineering.

-- Progressive Engineering has been associated with the
Project Management Office, which is the entity responsible
for overseeing Pakistan's development of the
M-11/HATF-III/Ghaznavi short range ballistic missile.

-- We were informed that appropriate Singapore authorities
were in the process of auditing Ace Pressureweld, but had not
actually begun to formally investigate the company.

-- The United States remains concerned that Ace Pressureweld
is continuing to use its base of operations in Singapore to
broker proliferation-related sales to Pakistan.

-- For example, as recently as July 2008, Ace Pressureweld
and Sahara International were working to procure a heavy duty
turning center on behalf of Progressive Engineering.

-- Such procurement activity is consistent with the past
efforts of Ace Pressureweld to assist weapons-related
entities in Pakistan.

-- The United States would appreciate learning of the actions
the government of Singapore has taken in response to the
information we have provided you in this ongoing case.

-- We also urge you to use all available measures to prevent
this firm from acting as a source of supply to proliferation
programs in Pakistan.

-- We look forward to continuing cooperation with your
government on nonproliferation and export control issues.

End talking points/non-paper


7. (U) Washington POC are ISN/MTR James Mayes (Phone:
202-647-3185) and EAP/MTS Daniel Bishcof (Phone:
202-647-2931). Please slug any reporting on this issue for
ISN/MTR and EAP/MTS.


8. (U) A Word version file of this document will be posted
at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche.
RICE