GEORGIA -- GUIDANCE FOR POSSIBLE UNSC EMERGENCY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 092342

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL UNSC GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA -- GUIDANCE FOR POSSIBLE UNSC EMERGENCY
SESSION ON GEORGIA, AUGUST 28, 2008


1. The Department understands that Georgia may ask for an
emergency UNSC session as early as tomorrow in light of
the Russian Federation's recognition of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia on August 26. If the UNSC does meet to discuss
Georgia on August 28, the Department requests that USUN
draw on the following points in making its statement.


2. Begin Points:

Mr. President:

The Council is convening for the eighth time in emergency
session to consider the situation in Georgia since the
outbreak of hostilities on August 7. During this time,
members of this Council and other leading members of the
international community have worked in good faith to reach
agreement on a cease fire aimed at saving lives, to
prevent the unnecessary destruction of property, and to
avoid the creation of a new wave of internally displaced
persons and a resulting humanitarian catastrophe. At the
same time, members of this Council have in good faith
worked diligently to reach agreement on a Security Council
resolution that would provide a foundation for a lasting
solution to the underlying internal instability in
Georgia.

Over the course of our eight meetings, a significant
number of Council members, supported by leading members of
the international community, have voiced a consensus view
that we must work toward a solution that is consistent
with international law and the UN charter, and respects
Georgia's territorial integrity, the rights of internally
displaced persons, and other principles set out in
Security Council resolutions, and previous international
agreements on Georgia.

During this time the Russian Federation has stood apart
from this consensus and offered justifications for its
actions that are clearly at odds with the reality of the
situation. While claiming to have acted in a manner
consistent with their role as quote "peacekeepers" in
South Ossetia, since the very first hours of the crisis,
Russia's actions have betrayed its true motivations, which
go completely beyond any role Russia might have exercised
as an impartial peacekeeper in the region.

The Russian Federation's actions in fact served only to
widen the conflict well beyond its origins in Tshkinvali
and its environs. The Russian Federation deliberately
opened a second front in Abkhazia completely unconnected
to the original conflict, restricted free access to the
port of Poti, Georgia's economic lifeline, and carried out
wholly unjustified attacks and military operations in
Georgian territory well outside South Ossetia and Abkhazia
that constitute a gross violation of Georgia's sovereignty
and territorial integrity, and appeared designed solely to
cripple the Georgian state and imperil its democratically
elected government.

Moreover, after President Medvedev freely entered into an
agreement negotiated by the President of France, the
Russian Federation inexplicably chose not to live up to its
commitments spelled out in that agreement, exacerbating
the crisis, contravening the express wishes of the
majority of Council members, and all the while inflicting
further unjustifiable damage on the Georgian state and its
people.

The Russian Federation's actions have also had the effect
of creating a virtual embargo on reliable information from
South Ossetia and the rest of the conflict zone. Russian
officials were quick to claim that they were responding to
a "genocide" involving the deaths of thousands of
civilians and that Georgian forces had effectively wiped
Tshkinvali from the map. From the scant information the
international community has been able to gather from
impartial observers, principally from international human
rights organizations, we have good reason to question the
Russian account, and compelling reasons to examine what
human rights abuses have occurred in Georgian territory
under the control of Russian Federation forces. This
Council must also have an impartial and accurate account

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of the number of internally displaced persons created by
this conflict, not only in the conflict zone of South
Ossetia, but also in Abkhazia.

The Russian Federation's actions culminated on August 26
with its recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. With
its actions, the Russian Federation has raised very serious
questions about the purpose of its long-standing strategy in
dealing with Georgia and its aims since this crisis first
began on August 7.

Let me here reiterate President Bush's statement of August
26 in response to the Russian Federation's actions. We
condemn its decision to recognize South Ossetia and
Abkhazia as independent states. This decision is
inconsistent with numerous United Nations Security Council
resolutions that Russia has voted for in the past, and is
also inconsistent with the French-brokered cease-fire that
President Medvedev signed on August 16. The six-point
agreement offered a peaceful way forward to resolve the
conflict. We expect Russia to live up to its
international commitments, reconsider this irresponsible
decision, and follow the approach set out in the six-point
agreement.

Among the numerous other leaders that have joined with
President Bush, the members of the G-7 yesterday took the
unprecedented step of jointly condemning the Russian
Federation's recognitions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Colleagues:

The practical question now arises, more urgently than ever
before, of how this Council can meet its responsibilities
to contribute to a peaceful and lasting solution to this
crisis when one of its permanent members is a party to the
conflict.

Let me highlight the United States' desire to work with
all Council members, including Russia, to reach agreement
on a resolution that will serve the interests of peace and
uphold the principles of international law set out in this
Council's previous resolutions on Georgia. Consistent
with the French-brokered agreement, the United States is
fully prepared to consider the legitimate security and
stability concerns of all parties to the conflict,
including the Russian Federation. The United States
welcomes the commitment of the OSCE leadership and member
states to contribute additional personnel and resources to
its monitoring mission and believes the OSCE mission
should serve as the international mechanism called for in
the six-point agreement. We must, however, move forward
in a manner that fully upholds the principles set out in
previous resolutions on Georgia.

Let me be clear about the most important of these
principles. Georgia's sovereignty and territorial
integrity must be preserved. Its borders cannot be
changed by force: not by the Russian Federation or anyone
else. South Ossetia and Abkhazia remain a part of
Georgia. The rights of internally displaced persons from
the conflict zones must also be preserved. In particular,
the Russian Federation's recognition of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia must not in any way compromise the rights of
Georgian citizens who retain their rights as residents of
either South Ossetia or Abkhazia.

If this Council is unable to agree in the near term on a
solution that preserves these principles and contributes
to a lasting settlement, Council members, at the very least,
should reaffirm their own commitment to respect Georgia's
sovereignty and territorial integrity, one of the core
protections the UN charter grants to member states that
this Council is obligated to uphold. The United States is
convinced that these important reaffirmations will lay the
foundation for a lasting resolution of the current crisis over
the longer term.
RICE