Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE92325
2008-08-27 23:03:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

TFGG01 - GEORGIA - DEMARCHE REQUEST ON SOUTH

Tags:  UNSC PREL GG 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #2325 2402305
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 272303Z AUG 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI IMMEDIATE 0000
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE IMMEDIATE 0000
UNCLAS STATE 092325 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: UNSC PREL GG
SUBJECT: TFGG01 - GEORGIA - DEMARCHE REQUEST ON SOUTH
OSSETIA AND ABKHAZIA PARTICIPATION IN UNSC

REF: USUN 757

UNCLAS STATE 092325

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: UNSC PREL GG
SUBJECT: TFGG01 - GEORGIA - DEMARCHE REQUEST ON SOUTH
OSSETIA AND ABKHAZIA PARTICIPATION IN UNSC

REF: USUN 757


1. (SBU) This is an action request: The Department requests
that action addressees, with the exception of Moscow, Hanoi,
Tripoli and Pretoria, approach host governments at the highest
appropriate level to urge them to oppose the participation of
representatives from the de facto governments of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia in upcoming UN Security Council meetings on
Georgia.

Objectives
--------------


2. (SBU) To convince Security Council members that with
negotiations on a draft resolution on the Georgia crisis at a

critical stage, dealing with the issue of South Ossetia's and
Abkhazia's participation, especially in light of de facto
officials' moves to secure independence from Georgia and
Russia's recognition of the Georgian regions as independent
states, would complicate and delay efforts to successfully adopt
a resolution. In particular, to do so at this stage would be
seen as validation of Russia's unilateral act to recognize as
independent states these Georgian territories, an act which we
strongly condemn and is inconsistent with numerous security
council resolutions affirming Georgian territorial integrity.
It would also reward Abkhaz leaders for destroying the UN
Friends effort by launching a military attack against Georgia ir
conjunction with Russia.


3. (SBU) To secure a "no" vote against S. Ossetian/Abkhaz
participation in the event of a procedural vote on the matter i
the Security Council.


4. (SBU) To outline to UNSC members the additional reasons for
opposition to S. Ossetian/Abkhaz participation, including the
political signal that the Security Council would be sending
given the recent decision by Russia to recognize Abkhazia and
South Ossetia and public statements of prominent South Ossetian
leaders supporting the ethnic cleansing of Georgians from South
Ossetia.

Background
--------------


5. (SBU) Last week, the de facto leaders of the separatist
regions of South Ossetia (Georgia) and Abkhazia (Georgia),
informed the Belgian Presidency of the UN Security Council of
their desire to participate in any subsequent UNSC meetings on
Georgia as "parties to the conflict." Although the Security
Council has debated the situation in Georgia as it relates to
the conflict in Abkhazia numerous times since it first mandated
the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) in 1993,

representatives from the regions have never participated (or
been present) during any UN discussions. The question of Abhka
and/or South Ossetian participation in future UNSC discussions
would complicate efforts to reach agreement on a draft
resolution, divert Council Members' attention, and provide at
least de facto arguments for their status that would complement
the regrettable Russian recognition.


6. (U) The Security Council will soon take up the issue of
whether to invite Abkhaz and South Ossetian representatives to

participate in an upcoming meeting on Georgia. If a procedural
vote is held on the issue, supporters of the request would need
at least 9 affirmative votes for invitations to be issued
(opponents would need to marshall 7 negative votes). Should th
Council vote to extend invitations, the US would not have the
power to veto the outcome.


7. (SBU) The United States opposes a UN Security Council
invitation for Abkhaz or South Ossetian leaders to participate
in UN discussions. Such participation would compromise the
Security Council's position on Georgia's territorial integrity,
especially given Russia's unilateral recognition of the
independence of these Georgian territories. The issue still at
hand is implementation of the ceasefire agreement negotiated by
President Sarkozy between the presidents of Russia and Georgia,
and securing the withdrawal of Russian and Georgian forces to
their pre-August 6 position. Additionally, inclusion of the
Abkhaz and South Ossetian leaders in UN discussions will hinder
resolution as their recent statements and actions, as well as
that of Russia in recognizing the two Georgian territories,
indicate an unwillingness to consider anything but independence
from Georgia, which contradicts the Council's long-time
commitment to Georgia's territorial integrity.


8. (SBU) Moreover, de facto leaderships from both regions have
organized and participated in attacks on Georgian forces and
villages. South Ossetia's de facto leader has admitted that hi
subordinates are conducting ethnic cleansing against Georgians.
The Abkhaz attack, with Russian assistance, on Georgian
personnel in the Upper Kodori Valley, undermined the letter,
spirit, and viability of the UN Friends process. The U.S. is
not prepared to grant any legitimacy to separatist regimes that
have largely completed the ethnic cleansing of Georgians from
the territories they control, and have repeatedly stated
publicly that Georgian civilians will not be allowed to return
to their homes. Such an attitude is unacceptable.


9. (SBU) Abkhaz and South Ossetia leaders have not been present
during previous UN discussions involving Georgia. Most
recently, they did not participate in the April 2008 UN
discussion on the renewal of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia
(UNOMIG) nor in the June or July emergency special sessions. W
should also remind Council members that Russian attempts to
include Abkhaz leaders in the past have not been successful.
Now is not the time to be seen as rewarding Russia's military
actions in Georgia, failure to fully comply with the ceasefire
agreement, and recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Department Point of Contact
--------------





10. (U) Posts should provide responses to this demarche at the
earliest opportunity by cable. Department's point of contact is
IO/UNP K.G. Moore, 202 647-2392, moorekg@state.gov.
RICE